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Abstract 
Food-related practices are constantly in flux, characterised by variation over time, 
between places and across cultures. However, amidst this fluidity, the edibility of 
animals and the consumption of their flesh prevail as enduring components of these 
practices. Attending to this two-fold persistence—in meat consumption and the 
constitution of animals as ‘food’—this thesis extends current understandings of 
‘meaty practices’ by exploring how ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals are ‘made sense of’ 
specifically when their environmental and ethical legitimacy is challenged. The aim 
is to reveal additional, and arguably more fundamental, aspects of meat’s 
persistence that might indicate more effective ways to unsettle, and ideally 
dismantle, associated practices. Re-constituted, and re-affirmed, understandings of 
meat and ‘food’ animals were sought through semi-structured interviews with 41 
self-identified producers and consumers of ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ meat in the 
greater Melbourne region of Australia. Foucault’s regime of power/knowledge/ 
pleasure was used to analyse data from a critically posthuman perspective, and also 
informs the structural organisation of the thesis. Foregrounding normalized 
mechanisms by which animals’ bodies are meatified, mapped, and rendered edible, 
and by which certain animals and ‘meat’ are variably rendered more ‘ethically’ 
edible than others, this approach reveals deeply embodied dimensions of meaty 
practices.  
It is these embodied entanglements of knowledge, emotions and senses that 
contribute, I argue, to steadfast legitimations of ‘food’ animals and the edibility of 
their flesh, and hence to the persistence of practices that rely on, and reinforce, the 
associated domination of animals. Drawing on Mulvey’s exposition on the pleasure 
of looking, the final part of the thesis introduces the notion of the ‘entitled gaze’ 
which is seen as exemplifying humans’ effective, and affective, embodiment of 
animals’ domination. Under this gaze, the increasing visibility of ‘food’ animals, 
meat, and associated practices, seen especially in the ‘ethical foodscape, is ‘made 
sense of’ in ways that reinforce rather than challenge relations of domination. I 
reflect on these findings with suggestions for how to start unsettling meaty 
practices in ways that address a priori constitutions and understandings of ‘food’ 
animals and ‘meat’. The aim is to trouble habitual ways of thinking and acting, 
create caesuras or ruptures in the normalized order of things, and find 
opportunities for animals to ‘make sense’ in ways other than as food.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Royalty free image ID 7275892 ã Raja Rc at Deamstime.com 
 
On the wall a chart shows an outline of a bull, like a map covered with frontier 
lines that mark off the areas of consuming interest, involving the entire anatomy 
of the animal excepting only horns and hooves. The map of the human habitat is 
this, no less than the planisphere of the planet; both are protocols that should 
sanction the rights man has attributed to himself, of possession, division, and 
consumption without residue of the terrestrial continents and of the loins of the 
animal body. 
 
              Italo Calvino. Mr Palomar. (1986: 69) 
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Chapter 1 
I use this introduction to explain the question that underpins and guides this thesis, 
which asks why cows, pigs, chickens, sheep and goats1 are not regarded as 
anything other than ‘food’ animals? Why do cartographies of meat, such as 
illustrated above, dominate humans’ understandings of these animals’ lives and 
bodies, thereby normalizing and supporting the intensification of environmentally 
harmful practices that demand the termination of millions of lives every hour? My 
point of observation is an entirely different and hypothetical territory, one that is 
perhaps quixotic—and that is a vegan pantopia. This pantopia is conceived in 
contrast to utopia, described by Foucault (1967: 3) as “fundamentally unreal 
spaces”. Literally denoting “a place that does not exist…the ‘forever nowhere’” 
(Bauman 2002: 238), utopian imaginings conjure idealistic but also seemingly 
unattainable dreams (Bauman 2005). Pantopia is instead “the place of everywhere” 
(Jacobson 2013: 233), evocative of creative possibilities rather than impossibilities.  
 
Though still a largely imagined, hoped-for future, the seeds of a vegan pantopia are 
present in very real but diffuse sites of resistance, or “effectively enacted utopias” 
(Foucault 1967: 3), which Foucault terms ‘heterotopia’. Heterotopia are sites that 
‘disturb’ or ‘detonate’ the normalised social order, logic, and language (Foucault 
1989; Dehaene 2008). Vegan heterotopia are therefore construed as sites where 
normalised constitutions of meat consumption and ‘food’ animals are at once 
“represented, contested and inverted” (Foucault 1967: 3; see also Meininger 2013). 
Crucially for my purposes, both Foucault and Meininger highlight the inherent 
power of heterotopia, simply by occupying the anomalous zones that normality 
negates, and from which the “self-propelling power of the othering and excluding 
normality” can be critiqued, disturbed and challenged (Meininger 2013: 28). 
 
Being myself an occupant of vegan heterotopia, I can exercise the power this offers 
to observe how ‘normal’ space is constituted and maintained, and subsequently 
challenge the associated mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. As Hook (2007: 
184) states, heterotopia “represent a point of destabilization for current socio-
political or discursive orders of power”. In doing this, I intend to “trouble habitual 
ways of thinking and acting” (Castree and Nash 2004: 1342) in alignment with an 
                                                
1 As the animals that are overwhelmingly used for meat, above all others. 
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openly emancipatory agenda with regard to humans’ current use of ‘food’ animals. 
As part of this, I imagine what it would take for vegan heterotopia to become a 
unified vegan pantopia. Therefore, building on my first question, more specifically, 
the central question that guides this thesis is, what is it about meat consumption 
and the use of animals as ‘food’ that keeps these animals persistently edible? This is 
what I endeavored to understand in this research project. For answering this 
question has revealed mechanisms of inclusion that are simultaneously mechanisms 
of exclusion that prevent the expansion of heterotopic sites of veganism.  
 
The next section states the aim of my study and, given its focus on ‘ethical’ meat, I 
briefly clarify its theoretical positioning in relation to studies of ethical consumption 
more broadly. Following this, I outline the main theoretical landmarks that 
anchored and guided my research. I expand on the nature of my enquiry, as 
described above, and the additional questions it raises concerning the nature of 
relations between humans and ‘food’ animals. I then introduce Foucault’s accounts 
of power, knowledge and pleasure. These three major components of his work 
provided the framework for this thesis and helped me to delineate the current 
‘map’. The introduction concludes with an outline of the thesis over four parts.  
 
i. Research aim 
My research is concerned with the persistence of meat consumption and the use of 
animals as food in spite of significant challenges to their environmental and ethical 
legitimacy (Steinfeld et al. 2006; Adams 2010 [1990]; Nibert 2013; Eisnitz 2006). I 
identify what contributes to this persistent edibility of ‘food’ animals even, and 
indeed particularly, as this edibility is being increasingly critiqued. I therefore focus 
only on meat that is labelled, promoted and understood as being ethical and 
sustainable, and purposefully sought by consumers as a ‘better’ alternative to 
factory farmed meat, better even than organic and free range. In so doing, I make 
an a priori assumption that it is particularly where there is awareness and 
appreciation of the issues associated with meat consumption, and yet consumption 
persists, that there is the opportunity to access fundamental, legitimizing criteria 
supporting persistent animal use.  
 
My primary research question is:  How do ‘food’ animals remain persistently and 
ethically edible? 
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Focusing on an area of consumption where this edibility is most likely to be 
questioned, the aim of my research is, then: to explore how ‘food’ animals remain 
persistently edible specifically when the environmental and ethical legitimacy 
of their consumption is challenged. I approach this exploration via the analysis of 
empirical data generated through interviews with self-identified producers and 
consumers of ethical and sustainable meat located in the greater Melbourne region. 
Interviews focused on how ‘food’ animals and meat were constituted as part of 
participants’ everyday activities or ‘social practices’. A focus on social practices 
allows these constitutions to be seen as part of broader mechanisms and 
arrangements of social life, rather than solely the result of individual choice and 
behaviour. The project’s objectives, listed below and repeated in the methodology 
section of Chapter 3, reflect the iterative and reflexive process by which I set about 
exploring how ‘food’ animals’ persistent, ethical edibility is constituted by my 
participants, and how this exploration was in turn shaped and re-directed as my 
research proceeded.  
 
1. How does certain ‘knowledge’ of animals contribute to their edibility and 
non-edibility? 
2. How do sensory and emotional associations with animals and meat shape 
their edibility or non-edibility? 
3. Where and how is this embodied knowledge of ‘food’ animals challenged 
and how is their edibility maintained? 
4. What mechanisms of power can be discerned in relation to the persistence 
of meat consumption and the use of animals as food? 
5. What effect have the increased visibility of ‘food’ animals and increased 
transparency of meat production processes had on the edibility of animals, 
and what does this say about how animals are ‘made sense’ of?   
Or? How have the increased visibility of ‘food’ animals and increased 
transparency of meat production processes shaped understandings of the 
edibility of animals, and what does this say about how animals are ‘made 
sense’ of?   
6. How then do consumers of ethical and sustainable meat ‘make sense’ of 
animals and meat? 
7. Is it possible that ‘food’ animals could be ‘made sense of’ in other ways, or 
permitted to make no (human) sense? What sort of dis-ordering of 
Foucault’s nexus of power/knowledge/pleasure would this require? 
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There is now a large body of literature on ethical consumption, particularly in 
relation to food. Reflecting three broadly distinct approaches, this literature 
encompasses philosophical perspectives that draw on (utilitarian) ’theories of the 
good’, (deontological) ’theories of the right’, and ideas of altruism and morality 
(Wilk 2001; Barnett et al 2005a, Pellandini-Simanyi 2014); psychology-based 
attempts to characterise and motivate the ‘ethical consumer’ (Barnett et al. 2005c; 
Eckhardt et al 2010; Memery et al 2012); and sociological and cultural explorations 
of the everyday or ‘ordinary ethics’ of ethical, moral or ‘good’ consumption 
(encompassing politics, materialities and practices) (Lewis and Potter 2011; 
Guthman 2003; Clarke et al. 2008; Carrier 2008; Goodman et al. 2010; Hall 2011).  
 
Addressing each of these approaches in turn: I am not concerned with philosophic 
theorising about the type of ethics or morality that might be said to characterise 
understandings of animals and their flesh. While certainly not denigrating the value 
and importance of abstract theories, I am keen to remain focused on the living and 
experiencing being-ness of animals rather than ‘philosophising them away’, to 
paraphrase Cudworth (2003). I also do not hold that there is such a thing as a 
psychologically identifiable ‘ethical consumer’ but rather that variable ‘truths’ or 
‘knowledges’ of what is ethical (following Foucault’s use of these terms) become 
attached to certain material objects, human and nonhuman figures, and practices. 
As ‘truths’ change, attachments might weaken or break altogether and new ones 
form with other objects, figures and practices. However, the ‘truth’ of consuming 
meat and using animals for food, as it characterises traditionally meat-eating 
societies (which constitute the majority, see Chemnitz and Becheva 2014), is one 
whose attachments have not altered significantly for centuries. Hence it is these 
persistent ‘truths’ or ‘knowledges’ regarding animals and meat that sustain their 
associations through understandings of what is ethical and/or sustainable that I 
want to investigate. My study therefore follows the third method of enquiry by 
taking a broadly sociological/cultural approach to critically explore, with reference 
to empirical data, a specific rendering of ethical consumption in terms of what it 
reveals about humans’ enduring relation with edible animals. 
 
This research contributes to an embodied understanding of the persistence of meat 
consumption and the use of animals as food by focusing on how meat and animals 
are made sense of within ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ practices. This understanding 
can be used firstly to reflect on the minimal impact of past and current strategies 
intended to intervene in meat consumption and the use of animals as food, and 
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secondly to indicate what else needs to be acknowledged and accounted for to 
constitute a more effective and radical challenge to these practices. Addressing the 
wider importance of my research, I situate human’s use of ‘food’ animals within a 
broader field of study concerned with multiple forms of oppression and the 
connections between them, beginning with how animals, and their bodies, are 
mapped. 
 
ii. Theoretical landmarks: Animal mapping, practices and power  
In Science and Sanity, Alfred Korzybski made the statement “a map is not the 
territory” (1958[1933]: 58). He also said, “words are not the things we speak 
about” (222). Yet, for all the ways that animals used as food are spoken about, and 
their bodies literally mapped, their territory or undesignated ‘thingness’ remains 
enduringly unknown. In order to apprehend a life for them not predicated on the 
value of their bodies to humans—an unmapped territory of other possibilities—the 
current map would be discarded and the words used to speak about them would 
change.  
 
In his investigation of Australian explorers’ texts, Simon Ryan notes that space is 
socially produced and describes maps as an imperial technology used to establish 
colonial space (1996: 5). Mapping, then, is centrally about control and 
colonization—a distinctly non-neutral process which Ryan represents through his 
conception of the ‘cartographic eye’. Through the course of this thesis, this notion 
of the cartographic eye and its entitled, territorializing mission will resonate with 
references to the ‘arrogant eye’ in cinematic studies, and to theorisations of the 
gaze—patriarchal, colonial and, ultimately, human. Indeed, since Ryan’s 
articulation, the ‘cartographic gaze’2 has been defined by Pickles as “a controlling 
gaze rendering the broad swathes of worldly complexity and enormity in miniature 
form for a discrete purpose” (2004: 80). Pickles’ reference here to visual rendering 
and reduction to miniature form becomes doubly meaningful when applied to 
animals used as food. 
 
Drawing on Ryan’s terminology to consider cartographies of meat, the process of 
designating and charting the various locations, features, and landmarks in the life of 
                                                
2 The cartographic gaze is a recognised topic of scholarly attention (Ellis and Waterton 
2005; Jacob 2006; Wilson 2011). 
  8 
a cow, sheep, pig or chicken, or the journey of a steak, cutlet, loin or breast, is the 
outcome of a long history of interconnected systems of human value and use that 
are not easily disentangled or dismantled. Eating meat is universally embroiled in 
social, cultural, and religious practices and recruits sensory and biological processes 
to create even more complex entanglements. Equally, its production is part of a 
tightly meshed, globalised network of economic, political, and scientific 
arrangements. Together they comprise the animal-industrial complex3 (Noske 1989; 
Twine 2012). If this extensive complex is to be dismantled, there first needs to be 
some understanding of what, besides a certain path dependency, makes eating meat 
such an enduring, and persistently alluring part of social practices.  
 
Practice theories comprise a vast and heterogeneous body of literature (Warde 
2005) arguably characterised by four different ‘types’ (Schatzki 2001) and two 
generations of theorists (Postill 2010). In this thesis, I rely on the theoretical 
lineage traced by Warde (2005)—from Giddens and Bourdieu, through Schatzki, 
Reckwitz, and Shove—up to and including recent theorists who are applying social 
practice theories in diverse and distinctive ways to gain insight into the workings of 
the social world and how its less desirable trajectories might be altered (Hui et al. 
2016; Strengers and Maller 2014; Shove and Spurling 2013). As noted earlier, 
social practice theories are united by a shared understanding of practices as the unit 
of focus rather than individual behaviour. Across the body of work I am drawing 
on, practices are commonly understood as a diverse nexus of bodily activities or 
routinised “doings and sayings” (Schatzki 1996: 89) such as driving, keeping warm, 
cooking, or eating breakfast (Maller 2015). Individuals are conceived as being 
recruited into, reproducing, or defecting from practices (Shove et al. 2012). As this 
account suggests, social practices are conceived as both entities and performances. 
This enables the constituent elements necessary to the existence and performance 
of practices to be determined, while also providing the opportunity to address 
                                                
3 Noske (1997) describes rather than defines the animal-industrial complex. Based on 
Noske’s account, Twine (2012:23) offers the following definition: “a partly opaque and 
multiple set of networks and relationships between the corporate (agricultural) sector, 
governments, and public and private science. With economic, cultural, social and affective 
dimensions it encompasses an extensive range of practices, technologies, images, identities 
and markets”. Regarding the human-animal relationship, Noske describes it as “embedded 
in a web of exploitative practices, in which one type of exploitation is carried over onto 
another” (1997: 38).  
 
  9 
questions of change—e.g. exploring how or why certain practices persist, evolve or 
die out, and how to approach more purposive intervention.   
 
Practices as entities generally comprise material objects and infrastructures (living 
and non-living), common understandings and meanings, and competencies and 
skills (Shove et al. 2012; Reckwitz 2002). Rules and ‘teleoaffective’ structures, the 
latter understood as “orientations toward ends and how things matter” (Schatzki 
1997: 302) or “emotion and motivational knowledge” (Reckwitz 2002: 249) are also 
commonly included. Practices emerge and are recognised as entities through their 
repeated performance in generally cohesive ways, or, to invert Warde’s phrasing, ‘a 
practice presupposes a performance’ (2005: 134). Many practices may share one or 
more elements, or be temporally and/or spatially shaped to greater and lesser 
degrees by other practices. For example, roads are an element of driving, cycling, 
walking, and other forms of transport, with many shared meanings, competencies 
and teleoaffectivities. Roads are also part of planning practices, shaped by 
population changes, development, and increased car ownership. ‘Meat’ can be part 
of practices of shopping, cooking (e.g. BBQ), eating, celebrating (e.g. Christmas, 
Australia Day), commensality, and overseas travel, again with many overlapping 
meanings, competencies and teleoaffectivites. The availability of ‘meat’ relies on 
practices associated with animal agriculture, trading and markets. Such groups of 
practices are commonly referred to as a bundle or complex of practices with 
varying dimensions of co-dependency (Shove et al. 2012).  Practices, and their 
constituent elements, are therefore constantly being shaped by bodily performances 
across a wide array of practices.  
 
The understandings, meanings, competencies, rules and teleoaffective structures 
that variably characterise a practice are understood as belonging to, or associated 
with, that practice rather than being qualities of the individual that performs it 
(Reckwitz 2002: 250). This includes discourse, which is understood as an implicit 
part of social practices (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002; Halkier et al. 2011a). Indeed, 
Reckwitz explains that practice and discourse cannot be conceived separately, more 
especially “if we want to trace the ramifications of affects as formed in specific 
discourses at specific times” (2016: 121-122). However, as I emphasised in the 
previous paragraph, what I have described—the meanings, discourses, rules, 
affects etc.—are not fixed, pre-existing elements that are then enlisted in practices, 
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but are themselves constituted through the ongoing performance not only of said 
practice, but of all other practices that are in any way related.4 It can therefore be 
seen how the normalization and assumed stability of certain material objects as 
practice elements can be critiqued and challenged, especially when those same 
objects are constituted and understood differently across alternate, or counter-
practices, for instance in heterotopia. 
 
Although I use practices as my unit of focus, or foundation for understanding how 
the social world is (re)produced, my study is not an analysis of practices of the 
same order as previously cited works. Rather it is concerned with this question of 
how it is that certain objects, in this case living ‘food’ animals and their non-living 
bodies, are persistently (re)constituted (or made sense of) as material elements 
across a vast nexus of interconnected bundles of practices. The persistence and 
maintenance of these constitutions contribute to the stability of all associated 
practices, and vice versa. In other words, I consider these constitutions central to 
understanding how to destabilise practices involving ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals, and 
set them on an alternate (vegan-pantopian) trajectory. To my knowledge, the a 
priori constitution of material objects as practice elements has not been a focus of 
analysis in the practices literature to date. By highlighting opportunities to 
problematise the constitution of practice elements, especially normalised ‘objects’, 
my study therefore introduces a further way in which social practice theories can 
approach questions of change and intervention.  
 
Opening up the constitution of material ‘objects’ as part of social practices for 
scrutiny in this way potentially leads to an engagement with power, especially when 
those ‘objects’ are living organisms—human or nonhuman. Becoming part of 
practices involves the materialization of some aspect of the organism’s being, such 
as their physicality, ‘other-ness’, biology, body, or its disaggregated parts (Arcari 
forthcoming). From the perspective of the ‘practitioners’ around whom the practice 
is conceived, these (once) living objects, or parts thereof, are a resource that is 
more or less essential to the practice. They are effectively subaltern, understood as 
“a condition of subordination brought about by colonization or other forms of 
economic, social, racial, linguistic, and/or cultural dominance” (Beverley 1999: 
Frontmatter)—to which I would add species as another basis for subordination. 
                                                
4 Practices are not closed systems, and so all practices can be said to be related to greater 
and lesser degrees. 
  11 
Directing critical attention at constitutions of living or once living ‘objects’ of 
practices foregrounds these systemic forms of dominance, or mechanisms of power. 
In the absence of this attention, these constitutions—or how these objects make 
sense—continue to be unquestioningly reproduced and further normalised, and the 
power relations that shape them are effectively being maintained through their 
concealment in everyday ‘doings and sayings’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1. A meat map observed hanging on the wall of a restaurant. (Author’s own 
image) 
 
Supporting this conception, Foucault asserts that in order to be successful, 
mechanisms of power cannot be recognised as such, and that part of their 
concealment depends on foregrounding power’s positive aspects: “[Power] needs to 
be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, 
much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression” (1980: 119). 
In the same way, meat consumption and the use of animals as food need to be 
understood as part of a productive network of social practices that persistently 
maintains the edibility of animals. It is no good attempting to discredit the 
production and consumption of meat on economic, environmental, social or even 
ethical grounds if this productive basis of its endurance has not been recognised—
this is like targeting the Greek hydra’s nine heads while leaving the immortal head 
intact. Moreover, the use of animals for food cannot be conceived as a deliberate act 
of domination, whereby individuals recognise and wield their power over these 
animals’ lives solely for their own gain, whether economic, sensory or otherwise, 
and without any regard for the animals’ wellbeing. In other words, power does not 
result from “the choice or decision of an individual subject” (Foucault 1978: 95). It 
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is rather a dispersed, indeterminate phenomenon of social relations that is 
“employed and exercised through a net-like organisation” and “never localised here 
or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity of piece of 
wealth” (Foucault 1980: 98). In Foucault’s conception then, power comes from 
everywhere and individuals are conceived as “vehicles of power, not its points of 
application” (1980: 93, 98). 
 
However, Foucault does not discount that there are ‘points of application’, as 
exemplified, for example, by meat maps. He describes two primary forms of power, 
the first being a “mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on 
others. Instead, it acts upon their actions; an action upon an action, on existing 
action or on those which may arise in the present or the future” (1982: 789, 
emphasis added). This describes power in its more covert aspect, where it is 
variously persuasive, coercive, disciplinary and limiting. The other is “a relationship 
of violence [which] acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on 
the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities” (ibid, emphasis 
added). This describes a relation of overt power where the possibility of an 
individual’s resistance, which Foucault identifies as one of the necessary conditions 
for the exercise of power, has been removed. Foucault calls this a state of 
domination (1994: 283). Animals used for food, or ‘food’ animals, can be seen as 
being acted upon by both modes of power as they traverse the various landmarks 
on the map that chronicles their lives and deaths. Ultimately though, their state of 
domination always presides in their relations with humans.  
 
In relation to systemic power, Foucault (1982: 787) goes on to describe certain 
‘blocks’ in which relationships of power become so regulated and formulaic that 
they form a concerted system. From a practices perspective, these relationships 
could almost be considered another element, or a common effect of several 
elements, that is shared, or faithfully reproduced, across a bundle of practices.5 He 
identifies religious orders, prison systems, apprenticeship, medical care, and 
military service as illustrative of such blocks, emphasising that they are 
characterised by an invigilated process of rational and economic adjustment 
between “productive activities, resources of communication, and the play of power 
relations” (1982: 788). I suggest that the network of relations, institutions and 
                                                
5 Although it is of course how these relationships are constituted and maintained that is 
being systemically reproduced across practices. 
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practices that support animals’ state of domination, consolidated in the animal-
industrial complex, constitute another ‘block’ where the domination of ‘food’ 
animals has been similarly codified, ordered, professionalised, regulated, 
structurally realised, and systemically normalised so that associated relations of 
power are similarly “rooted in the system of social networks” (Foucault 1982: 791). 
However, like Foucault (1980: 92) and also Noske (1997: 39), it is not power as 
such that I want to study, as if it were a reified force, but rather its mechanisms, or 
the how of power: how it gains expression, how it comes to be exercised, how it is 
sustained, how it is legitimated, and thus how it endures.  
 
This point further emphasises the value of a practice theoretical perspective for my 
research. Furthermore, in taking this Foucauldian approach to the embodied, 
productive mechanisms of power, my research adds to existing theorisations of how 
power and affect can be understood as part of practices by focusing on how they 
shape the constitution of individual elements, particularly living, human and 
nonhuman, material ‘objects’.  
 
This thesis is therefore primarily concerned with understanding what nourishes the 
roots of our domination of ‘food’ animals6—a domination that is fully embodied and 
not simply an external phenomenon—making it thrive and survive, especially 
through current challenges to its legitimacy. More specifically, returning to 
Korzybski (1958 [1933]), what makes this the only useable map we have with 
which to view and navigate the wider territory from which ‘food’ animals are 
derived? Is it possible to eliminate the map altogether, rather than simply rearrange 
its contents (which I will demonstrate is the outcome of efforts to produce meat 
that is considered in some way ‘better’)? Is it possible that ‘food’ animals might be 
permitted to exist in this wider territory, shrugging off the shackles of their various 
designations to become more than the human words used to describe them? These 
are the more philosophical questions I hold in mind throughout my analysis, rather 
than ones I intend to answer directly. 
 
                                                
6 All animals, including microbes, in their ontological relation to humans, exist in a state of 
domination, in that their bodies are always justifiably available and their lives legitimately 
extinguishable. For this thesis, however, I am focusing only on animals commonly used for 
food, or ‘food’ animals for short. 
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iii. Thesis outline 
My thesis follows a quasi-traditional structure in that Part I includes a review of 
literature relevant to my theoretical orientation and methodological approach. 
However, throughout Parts II to IV, I continue to draw on and reference key 
theories, ideas and authors that contribute to a more critical understanding of my 
data within the scope of my research objectives. I present my research in four parts 
of two chapters each. Part I describes the contextual landscape, theories, research 
design and methodology that define my research while Parts II to IV comprise the 
main data analysis—each corresponding to one of three key aspects of Foucault’s 
work that I have chosen as a framework for my analysis. Hence, Part II focuses on 
power/knowledge; Part III addresses the pleasure of knowing; and Part IV 
explores the power of transparency. These three parts comprise the major work of 
this thesis, with the addition of this introduction (Chapter 1), Part I (Chapter 2 and 
3) and a conclusion (Chapter 10) that draws together my overall findings with 
reference to the aim and objectives.  
 
The two chapters comprising Part 1 lay out the theoretical architecture and 
analytical framework that underpin my research and provide the organizing 
schema for the parts and chapters that follow. Chapter 2 begins with an overview 
of the key issues and agendas that are increasingly shaping the production and 
consumption of meat, and at the same time foregrounding the persistence of 
associated practices. Briefly, these include environmental degradation, pollution, 
habitat loss, contribution to greenhouse gases and climate change, health issues 
relating to meat consumption, ethical and social justice issues relating to industry 
practices and the mistreatment and abuse of animals, and broader intersectional 
issues relating to the ongoing objectification and use of ‘others’. I discuss how these 
issues and agendas are variously defined and approached in the literature, with 
particular reference to conceptualisations of the ‘Anthropocene’ and certain 
extensions of non-dualistic and posthuman approaches.7 With respect to recent 
shifts in approaches to producing and consuming meat, I explain why it is 
                                                
7 Posthumanism is an increasingly diverse field of study, encompassing approaches based in 
techno-science, biology, philosophy, literature, art, the social sciences, the humanities, and 
many others. Within the social sciences, further distinctions are shaped by environmental, 
feminist, eco-feminist, cultural and other perspectives. The strand of posthumanism I am 
referring to here is characterised by a largely eco-feminist, but also techno-science and 
environmental approach to posthumanism. It is characterised by notions of ‘becoming 
with’, ‘vibrant matter, ‘hybridity’, and ‘mortal/vital/material entanglement’ (Haraway 2008; 
Bennett 2010; Whatmore 2002; Barad 2007; Braidotti 2013). 
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important that associated practices are challenged in ways that not only confront 
the consumption of ‘meat’ but also the use of animals as food.  
 
Together, these two sections emphasise the importance of this research and indicate 
its relevance and potential contribution to existing literature on food systems, 
climate and environmental change, sustainability, and critical animal studies. From 
here, I draw directly on Cudworth (2005; 2011) and Cudworth and Hobden’s 
(2014a; 2014b) accounts of anthroparchy and critical posthumanism, in 
combination with Foucault’s theorisations of power, knowledge and pleasure, to 
describe my theoretical architecture. Chapter 3 concludes the introduction to my 
thesis with a detailed account of my research design, methodology, exclusions and 
limitations, and a reflexive account of my own position as researcher. 
 
In Part II, I address the first of my objectives and explore how certain 
‘knowledge’ of animals contributes to their edibility and non-edibility. I 
approach this over two chapters. The first, Chapter 4, is concerned with animal 
categories and the maintenance of order. Here I explore designations of animal 
kinds, or “order and its modes of being” (Foucault 1989: xxiii), and specifically how 
different animals are more broadly constructed as edible or not. Extending this 
enquiry, I focus on the language and discourses my participants use in relation to 
animals, and the knowledge they enlist to support orders of edibility, which 
together contribute to how they make sense of ‘food’ animals and ‘meat’. From this 
taxonomical analysis of my participants’ sense-making, I identify what I term 
‘validating discourses’. These are common discourses used by producers and 
consumers that support and reinforce overarching orders of animal edibility. 
Validating discourses are understood as the first mechanism of power, and the 
three identified in this chapter—invoking nature, the benevolence of the natural 
contract, and the value of contingent life—are therefore considered key to ‘food’ 
animals’ persistent edibility. An awareness of these discourses is carried through to 
the next chapter, where their contribution to shaping further designations of 
(ethical) edibility becomes apparent.    
 
Chapter 5 further examines these orders, or rather degrees, of edibility—i.e. the 
orders within the a priori category of ‘edible’, to show how ‘food’ animals are 
additionally constituted by my participants as variously ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ethical or 
unethical to eat. The validating discourses discussed in the previous chapter suffuse 
these negotiations of edibility, contributing to understandings of what is ‘natural’, 
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‘proper’, ‘right’, ‘genuine’, ‘authentic’, and therefore by default also ethical and 
’good’. After identifying exactly what my participants understand to be ‘good’, ‘bad’ 
and ‘ethical’, I undertake an in-depth interrogation of notions around the ‘kill-
ability’ and ‘better’ killing of animals. A group of interview questions were 
specifically oriented to this topic with the intention of targeting what are perhaps 
the most unavoidably problematic practices associated with eating meat, and 
thereby getting to the heart of how ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals maintain their ethical 
edibility. This section demonstrates how effectively the validating discourses work 
to maintain the normative order, and also serves as a point of entry to my 
discussion, in Part III of emotional discomfort and particularly transgressions. 
 
Part III turns to the pleasure of knowing to explore my second objective, which is 
how sensory and emotional associations with animals and meat shape their 
edibility or non-edibility. I tackle this across two chapters, beginning, in Chapter 
6, by situating this part of my thesis in the broader literature on senses, emotions 
and affect. I then demonstrate how my participants’ senses inform their 
determinations of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ meat, conceiving the senses as the link between 
Foucault’s knowing and pleasure. This sets up the main focus of the first half of this 
chapter, which is emotion—specifically, how the emotions expressed and identified 
by my participants, in addition to their senses, contribute to an embodied mapping, 
or ‘making sense’ of ‘food’ animals and ‘meat’. In the second half, I explore how 
particular emotions, associated with comfort and discomfort, become associated 
with different animals and meat. Here, I start to more specifically address my third 
objective, to explore where and how an embodied knowledge of ‘food’ animals is 
challenged and how their edibility is maintained.  
 
Extending this line of enquiry, Chapter 7 explores circumstances in which more 
intense challenges lead to transgression. First, I examine when ‘good’ meat becomes 
emotionally inedible—when ‘meat’ or ‘food’ animals become something else—and 
also how such transgressions are corrected, policed, and can be seen as normalised 
and even necessary features of the existing map. As an outcome of this, I introduce 
the first of two emotions of ‘distinction’ that I identify in my data. As with the 
validating discourses, these emerge as common emotional associations with meat, 
‘food’ animals and/or associated practices, which support and reinforce meat 
consumption and the use of ‘food’ animals. Emotions of distinction, the first being 
requisite bravery, are therefore similarly recognised as mechanisms of power.  
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The second part of this chapter examines the reverse transgression—when ‘bad’ or 
unethical meat become edible—and particularly the circumstances, or broader 
practices, which these transgressions are part of. The further insight this provides 
on how my participants make sense of meat and animals leads to the identification 
of a second emotion of distinction, identified as cultural omnivorousness. The final 
part of this chapter identifies a third ‘type’ of mechanism of power. In addition to 
the validating discourses and emotions of distinction, there are also ethico-aesthetic 
mechanisms that support meat consumption and the use of animals as food. 
Defined as an embodied ethic that encompasses a consideration for the life and 
pleasure of the ‘other’, I identify two ethico-aesthetics in this thesis. The first, 
described as moral approval, is addressed in this chapter, while the second is 
covered in Part IV.  
 
In sum, Part III demonstrates how knowledge, senses and emotions operate 
rhizomatically to constitute and maintain a Foucauldian nexus of 
power/knowledge/pleasure that casts ‘food’ animals as persistently edible. So far, 
over Parts II and III, my analysis has revealed six mechanisms of power, across 
three ‘types’ of mechanism, that contribute to the persistence of meat consumption 
and the use animals as food, thereby cumulatively addressing my fourth objective: 
to explore what mechanisms of power can be discerned in relation to the 
persistence of meat consumption and the use animals as food? 
 
In Part IV, the final data analysis component of this thesis, I turn to Foucault’s 
insights regarding the power of transparency and Laura Mulvey’s seminal work on 
the pleasure of looking before bringing my analysis of the 
power/knowledge/pleasure of meat and ‘food’ animals to an integrated conclusion 
in the notion of the ‘entitled gaze’. This section is equally concerned with my fourth 
objective to identify mechanisms of power. Divided again into two chapters, 
Chapter 8 focuses on the deeply normalised sense of entitlement to animals, their 
lives, and their bodies that permeates producers’ and consumers’ constitutions of 
good/bad, ethical/unethical, right/wrong meat—as these are described in the 
preceding two sections. Entitlement, as it manifests in my participants’ accounts of 
their practices, is discussed with reference to the wider literature on privilege, 
oppression and intersectionality. This leads to a critique of ‘respect’ as a concept 
widely employed by producers and consumers in relation to the use of ‘natural 
resources’. Respect is identified as the second ethico-aesthetic, and subsequently 
discussed in more detail in relation to the constituted notion of a ‘natural’ contract.  
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Next, in Chapter 9, my focus is the increased material as well as discursive 
visibility of ‘food’ animals, especially in the ‘ethical’ foodscape. Here, I attend to my 
fifth objective by examining what effect increased visibility of ‘food’ animals and 
increased transparency of meat production processes have on the edibility of 
animals, and what this says about how animals are ‘made sense’ of. I 
demonstrate how visibility has become a marketable commodity that is promoted 
and used as brand leverage. Contrary to popularly held assumptions, I show how 
visibility does not challenge my participants’ constructions of animals as food. 
Power, knowledge and pleasure are brought to bear by producers and consumers 
alike on the animal subject of their gaze, and consequently, under the weight of 
what I describe as this ‘entitled gaze’, they remain firmly mapped as edible 
resources.  
 
To conclude my thesis, Chapter 10 brings together the discussion and arguments 
from its three main parts to show how orders of knowledge, socialised senses and 
emotions, and the entitled gaze work rhizomatically, in a nexus of 
power/knowledge/pleasure, to trap ‘food’ animals in their ‘rightful’ place—that 
being a state of domination. I provide a summary of the key findings with reference 
to my stated aim and objectives, the intention being to elucidate mechanisms of 
power and in so doing address my sixth objective which is to understand how 
consumers of ethical and sustainable meat ‘make sense’ of animals and meat. 
Together, my findings in response to these six objectives address the overall aim of 
my research, which is to explore how ‘food’ animals remain persistently edible 
despite significant challenges to their environment and ethical legitimacy. Following 
this, and attending to my final objective, I consider whether it is possible that 
‘food’ animals could be ‘made sense of’ in other ways, or permitted to make no 
(human) sense, and what sort of dis-ordering of power/knowledge/pleasure this 
would require. I end with a critical reflection on the overall contribution of this 
thesis and the sort of further research it might prompt into questions of animal use 
using a critical posthumanist lens. 
 
This thesis endeavours to not supply simply another account of how practices 
involving meat are constituted, but to delve deeper and uncover what makes them 
so persistent. I argue that in order to conceive of any change in current trends and 
trajectories involving ‘food’ animals and meat, the ties that anchor associated 
practices so firmly to ‘normality’, enabling them to withstand even the harshest 
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critique, need to be understood. Using Foucault’s work to frame a non-dual and 
critically posthuman analysis of how meat and ‘food’ animals are made sense of, I 
reveal the embodied and rhizomatic ways in which knowledge and pleasure work 
to maintain ‘food’ animals in a state of domination. I suggest that any effective 
challenge to the edibility of these animals needs to start with disordering how they 
are made sense of—so that, ultimately, they stop making sense as food. Otherwise, 
as Marion, the protagonist in Atwood’s novel The Edible Woman ponders, “they’ll 
eventually be able to breed them so that they’re born already ruled and measured” 
(1998: 185). 
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PART I 
Theory, Research Design  
and Methodology 
 
 
 
 
What is at stake is not simply a set of eating guidelines, but a total critique of 
society—of a way of life that has become inimical to life. 
 
John Sanbonmatsu (2014 Interview) 
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Chapter 2. Background, positioning and theoretical architecture 
 
Reflecting the politicization of consumption more broadly, as multiple agendas 
permeate what were formerly more discrete spaces of production and consumption, 
meat consumption has become an increasingly contested space in the politics of 
food. Concerns relating to the environment, health, food security, and animal rights 
variably swirl and roil in a constant churn of debate and discussion—about the 
amount of meat consumed (too much vs too little), the type of meat, how it is 
produced, the impacts of its production, how to produce more but ‘better’, how to 
reduce animal suffering and abuse, and, rather less so, whether humans need it at 
all. The first part of this chapter attends to these varying discussions and associated 
literature, providing some illustration of how they are shaping broader trends, 
including the trend towards ethical and sustainable meat. In light of this and other 
meat-related trends, I explain why it is important to challenge not only meat 
consumption, but also, and more importantly, the use of animals as food. An 
attentiveness to nonhuman life as well as the materiality of meat directs me 
theoretically towards a practices-focused critical posthumanism that is a deliberate 
response to certain strands of posthumanism perceived as human-centric. In the 
second part of the chapter, I explain this particular orientation of critical 
posthumanism in more detail and couple its emancipatory agenda with Foucault’s 
theorisations on power, knowledge and pleasure to generate the architectural 
framework for my thesis. 
 
i. Meat, Animals, Environment, and Ethics 
Agricultural production of our food is recognised as the source of a significant 
proportion of the total global greenhouse gases that are contributing to climate 
change—between 14% and 22% according to various sources (Barker et al. 2007; 
McMichael et al. 2007; Schwarzer et al. 2012; Smith et al. 2007).8 Disaggregating 
the impacts of the sector as whole, it is revealed that 80% of global agricultural 
emissions of greenhouse gases are attributable to livestock (Schwarzer et al. 
                                                
8 For their fifth assessment report (2014), the IPCC changed the scope of the agriculture 
sector to include forestry and other land use (AFOLU). The proportion of overall 
emissions from AFOLU is now estimated to be 24%, although the authors say that the 
main contributions are from “deforestation and agricultural emissions from livestock, soil 
and nutrient management” (25). 
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2012)—that is 11% to 18% of total emissions. Other studies have suggested that 
meat9 production on its own contributes 15% to 24% of total global emissions 
(Fiala 2008; Steinfeld et al. 2006), higher than many of the estimates for the total 
agricultural sector, and comparable to, or higher than, the percentage of estimated 
emissions from industry, forestry and transport (19%, 17% and 13% respectively, 
IPCC 2007). Goodland and Anhang (2009) claim that due to routine 
underestimation, omission and mis-assignment of various emissions sources, the 
figure is closer to 51%.10 
 
Although emissions estimates vary depending on the system boundaries used, it is 
widely agreed that 30% of the earth’s surface, or 70-75% of all agricultural land, is 
allocated to livestock either directly through grazing or for growing the 35-40% of 
the world’s total grain used as feed (Bailey et al. 2014; IAASTD 2009; Pimentel and 
Pimentel 2007; Ripple et al. 2014; Steinfeld et al. 2006; Worldwatch Institute 2013). 
To support these animals and produce their feedstock requires almost a third of the 
total water footprint attributed to agriculture globally (Mekonnen and Hoekstra 
2012). Considered another way, Mekonnen and Hoekstra estimate 12% of the 
global consumption of groundwater and surface water for irrigation is allocated to 
growing feed for livestock, as opposed to food, fibers or other crop products (408). 
In the prominent FAO publication Livestock’s Long Shadow, the authors declare that 
the contribution of livestock to environmental problems, including deforestation, 
desertification, water pollution, eutrophication of freshwater and marine 
ecosystems, oceanic dead zones, acidification, soil and nutrient loss, loss of habitats, 
species extinction11/endangerment and other land use changes, is “on a massive 
scale” (Seinfeld et al. 2006: xx; see also Koneswaran and Nierenberg 2008; UNEP 
2012; Ripple et al. 2014; Leip et al. 2015). This all serves as evidence that meat 
production is, directly and indirectly, the leading cause of environmental 
degradation associated with agriculture. Demanding the lion’s share of our 
available arable land and water, and producing the most greenhouse gases, it is the 
                                                
9 ‘Meat’ as referred to in these studies and reports, and in this thesis, refers to the flesh of 
animals most commonly used as food, which are cows, pigs, chickens, sheep and goats. It 
excludes fish.  
10 Goodland and Anhang (2009) identify several sources of emissions that they claim have 
been underestimated, overlooked or misallocated in past studies. While subsequent authors 
have accepted some of their claims, there remains controversy around others, especially 
livestock respiration, which comprises 13.7% of their total figure of 51%. 
11 Probyn (2017, conference abstract) highlights how the word extinction obscures the 
agency (human and nonhuman) behind it, arguing instead that a discourse and cultural 
politics of ‘eradication’ foregrounds how species are rendered eradicable. 
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most inefficient way of converting food into nutritional energy (Pimentel et al. 2003; 
Clune et al. 2017).  
 
In addition, the production of meat currently appropriates about 33% of the world’s 
fish catch for feedstock (Alder et al. 2008), while an estimated 50-80% of the 
antibiotics produced globally are allocated to the meat industry as growth 
promoters and to prevent and treat infection (EASAC 2007; Laxminarayan 2002; 
Worldwatch Institute 2015). This recognised overuse of antibiotics led to a call to 
action from the Infectious Diseases Society of America in 2008, concerned at the 
“epidemic of antimicrobial resistant infections” and citing misguided regulation of 
antibiotic use in food animals as one of the key causes (Spellberg et al. 2008). In 
2013, the Lancet launched a Commission and call to action, which included a 
recommendation for a worldwide ban on the use of antibiotics as livestock growth 
promoters (Laxminarayan et al. 2013: 1064). Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is 
now identified by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) as posing a “major global threat of increasing concern” with “implications 
for both food safety and food security” (webpage).12 With reference to the sheer 
(and increasing) numbers of animals bred for food, the FAO also notes that 
livestock now account for 20% of the world’s terrestrial animal biomass, and the 
land they occupy was once habitat for wildlife (FAO 2006). Agricultural 
production and expansion (and implicitly livestock production) has been described 
as the main driver of land extinctions threatening 26% of mammals (McKie 2014; 
Monastersky 2014) and causing leading scientists to predict the cow could become 
the earth’s largest mammal in just a few hundred years (Smith et al. 2018). 
 
Aside from environmental impacts, meat production and consumption has been 
associated with a range of implications for human health that over time are 
becoming less contested. Mounting evidence demonstrates direct links to cancer 
(Walker et al 2007; Joshi et al. 2009; zur Hausen 2012; Pan et al. 2012), coronary 
heart disease, and stroke (Walker et al. 2007; Pan et al. 2012; Feskens et al. 2013), 
and indirect links to both diabetes (Pan et al. 2012; Feskens et al 2013) and obesity 
(Wang and Beydoun 2009; Vergnaud et al. 2010). There are, in addition, health 
impacts to workers and wider communities from exposure to pesticides, fertilisers 
and waste from the animal industry (Walker et al. 2007), as well as the threat of 
                                                
12 www.fao.org/antimicrobial-resistance/background/what-is-it/en/ 
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‘super-bugs’ associated with the over-use of antibiotics (Silbergeld et al 2008). 
Most health and medical bodies now urge people to reduce the proportion of these 
foods in their diets while also providing assurances of the adequacy of a well-
balanced vegetarian or vegan diet for all life stages (Craig et al. 2009; NHMRC 
2013; www.nhs.uk). Less well known or acknowledged are the psychological 
effects of acts of normalised and other violence carried out by those involved in 
killing these ‘food’ animals. This violence has been linked to increased crime rates, 
interhuman violence, and a high propensity for aggression (Beirne 2004; Fitzgerald 
et al. 2009; Stull and Broadway 2012; Richards et al. 2013).  
 
From a certain perspective, the UNEP’s concern that meat (and dairy) production 
“undermines the ecological foundation of food security” (2012: 31) seems to be 
widely shared, and is based on increasingly unavoidable scientific evidence. A 
number of organisations and prominent researchers have expressed concern 
regarding the impacts associated with the production and consumption of meat, 
and its future sustainability, particularly in the context of steadily increasing rates 
of per capita consumption and the FAO’s predicted doubling of worldwide 
consumption by 2050 (FAO 2014). Encompassing affiliations with the UN, the 
FAO, Oxford University’s Food Climate Research Network, Chatham House, the 
World Resources Institute, the World Wildlife Fund, and the 2006 Stern Review, 
there is growing consensus that moving to a meat and dairy-free diet is necessary to 
avoid the worst impacts of climate change. On its current trajectory, the livestock 
industry represents “one of the greatest challenges to global food security and to 
the environment” (Giovannucci et al. 2012: 12), while studies demonstrate that 
vegetarian and vegan diets are associated with the lowest environmental impacts 
(Scarborough et al. 2014; Baroni et al. 2006; Clune et al. 2017). 
 
Environmental and social/health challenges are not the only ones confronting the 
global meat industry13 and an increasingly meat-consuming, and growing, world 
population. Meat production has increased almost five-fold since 1961 in order to 
keep pace with demand (Ritchie and Roser 2017), and the treatment of animals 
within these expanding systems of progressively more industrialised and 
mechanised use is also coming under increased scrutiny. This has dovetailed with 
technological advances in surveillance equipment, meaning that cameras can now 
be easily carried into most premises undetected. Consequently, visual footage of 
                                                
13 The global meat industry includes all types and scales of meat production. 
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‘food’ animals in industrialised systems of production and slaughter has become 
much more commonplace and also more widely disseminated through both 
mainstream and social media.  
 
Much of this footage has been obtained undercover and shows the crowded, 
concrete and steel, and primarily indoor conditions in which the majority of these 
animals are raised, without natural light or freedom to move; and conditions on 
denuded feedlots14 where mostly cattle but also sheep spend between two and four 
months being intensively ‘fattened’ in order to reach slaughter weight more 
efficiently than they would on pasture. The physical and mental conditions of the 
animals themselves are also a focus, with oversized chickens commonly seen 
struggling to stand and pigs exhibiting stress-related behaviours such as tail biting 
or bar chewing. What such footage may also reveal is the treatment of these 
animals at the hands of industry workers, especially at the slaughterhouse. An 
extended news report, broadcast in 2011 by the ABC—one of Australia’s leading 
national public television networks—on their investigative journalism/current 
affairs program, Four Corners, graphically documented the treatment of Australian 
cattle in Indonesian slaughterhouses and sparked a period of vigorous public 
debate about the ethics of live animal export that continues today (Ferguson 2011; 
Burke 2011; Vidot and Conifer 2016; Wahlquist 2017). Since then, similarly 
graphic footage of animal cruelty in Australian slaughterhouses has provoked 
action, with many businesses being investigated, some facing formal charges, and 
two closed as a direct result (Cannane 2012; March 2011; see also Noone 2014; 
Thomas 2016; Walls 2016; Carlyon 2016).   
 
Improved surveillance techniques have thus provided a window into the formerly 
hidden world of industrial meat production. New forms of social media have 
allowed this knowledge to disseminate more widely and rapidly than ever before so 
that increasing numbers of consumers are becoming aware of ethical (and not just 
environmental and health) issues associated with the production and consumption 
of meat, even if not the principle of using animals as food. Animal advocacy 
                                                
14 More often associated with US meat production processes, there are at least 450 feedlots 
in Australia, mostly in New South Wales and Queensland, supplying around 80% of the 
beef sold in Australian supermarkets (ALFA website - About the Australian Feedlot 
Industry. Accessed April 2018). 
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organizations (both welfare and rights oriented)15 make frequent use of visual 
images showing the rearing, transport, holding and slaughter of ‘food’ animals in 
their campaigns, including associated acts of negligence, abuse and violence that 
animals suffer at the hands of industry owners and workers.  
 
A growing concern with the environmental, health and ethical implications of ‘food 
choices’ is reflected in, and further fuelled by, popular media. Over just the last ten 
years, there has been a swathe of new literature and visual media focusing in some 
way on questions involving meat. Some of the more prominent of these are listed in 
Table 1. Over the same time, a slew of dietary prescriptions has emerged 
representing a variety of positions on the nexus of concerns between environment, 
health and ethics. What they all share is a focus on eating less and/or ‘better’ meat. 
These include: flexitarian, reducetarian, climatarian, ethitarian, palaeo, semi-
vegetarian, part-time carnivore, and part-time vegan. Kangatarians, vegeroos and 
cameltarians have even made a brief appearance. The question now is whether and 
how all of these evidence, discussions and dietary manoeuvrings have changed the 
situation for ‘food’ animals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 An animal welfare perspective focuses on the treatment of (food) animals within systems 
of rearing, transport, holding and slaughter, seeking to reduce suffering and eliminate 
‘abuse’. The use of animals for food is therefore not problematised—only their treatment. 
An animal rights perspective regards any use of animals as unethical, however well 
regulated and monitored. 
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Table 1. Prominent meat-related non-fiction literature and visual media from 2006 
to present. 
Title Year Author/Director/Producer 
Books   
The Omnivore’s Dilemma  
Slaughterhouse  
The Ethics of What we Eat  
Eating Animals  
The Compassionate Carnivore  
The Meat Crisis  
Meat: A Benign Extravagance  
Why We Love Dogs, eat Pigs and Wear Cows  
The Ethical Butcher  
Meatonomics  
Farmageddon  
Defending Beef  
The Meat Racket  
The Ethical Meat Handbook 
Meathooked  
The Ethical Carnivore: My Year Killing to Eat 
What’s the Matter with Meat 
Big Chicken 
2006 
2007 
2007 
2009 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2011 
2013 
2013 
2014 
2014 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2016 
2017 
2017 
Michael Pollan 
Gail Eisnitz 
Peter Singer & Jim Mason 
Jonathan Safran Foer 
Catherine Friend 
John Webster 
Simon Fairlie 
Melanie Joy 
Berlin Reed 
David Robinson Simon 
Phillip Lymbery & Isabel Oakeshott 
Nicolette Hahn Niman 
Christopher Leonard 
Meredith Leigh 
Marta Zaraska 
Louise Gray 
Katy Kieffer 
Maryn McKenna 
TV & Documentary   
Earthlings  
Meat the Truth  
Kill it, Cook it, Eat it  
Hugh’s Chicken Run 
Jamie’s Fowl Dinners 
Food Inc.  
Planeat  
LoveMEATender 
Farmageddon  
Forks over Knives  
Speciesism 
Cowspiracy  
For the Love of Meat 
Meat 
Meat the Future 
2005 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2010 
2010 
2011 
2011 
2011 
2013 
2014 
2016 
2017 
2019 
Shaun Monson 
Karen Soeters & Gertjan Zwanikken 
Firefly Productions; BBC (UK) 
KEO Films; Channel 4 
Firefly Productions; BBC (UK) 
Robert Kenner 
Shelley Lee Davies & Or Shlomi 
Manu Coeman 
Kristin Canty 
Lee Fulkerson 
Mark Devries 
Kip Andersen & Keegan Kuhn 
Matthew Evans; SBS (Australia) 
David White 
Liz Marshall 
 
The persistence of meat 
Given that the production and consumption of meat is under the spotlight more 
than ever before, both scientifically and publicly, it might reasonably be expected 
that its status on the perceived hierarchy of foods might be seriously questioned. 
However, these same ten years have seen global production and consumption of 
meat increase steadily, on both a net and per capita basis. This means that meat 
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consumption is continuing to increase faster than population growth.16 The 
conservative estimation of over 65 billion ‘food’ animals slaughtered every year for 
human consumption (almost 7.5 million per hour), more realistically estimated at 
100-150 billion by other sources,17 does not include ‘acceptable’ industry losses due 
to transport, contamination, disease and other factors (Chambers and Grandin 
2001; Greger 2007)—at least another 1.3 billion—nor the 33% of an estimated 90 
billion marine animals killed annually for food that are used as feedstock (Alder et 
al. 2008). The FAO’s (2014) predicted doubling translates to just under two billion 
more animals slaughtered per year, for every year until 2050. Other figures suggest 
an average 25 million more domestic ruminants have been added to the planet 
every year for the past 50 years (Ripple et al. 2014). Either way, considering the 
environmental resources that 65 billion ‘food’ animals currently require, and the 
environmental impacts of raising them for meat, not to mention the ethical 
concerns, more effective ways to challenge the enduring (and increasing) use of 
animals as food are urgently needed. 
 
Despite the growth in meat consumption, at the same time, recent media reports 
suggest that the numbers of vegans and vegetarians are increasing specifically in 
the UK, Australia, USA, and China (Watters 2014; Dean 2014; Quinn 2016; Anon 
2016). In the UK, almost half of the increase is being observed in the younger 
demographic, aged between 15 and 34. Similarly, it is mainly China’s teenagers and 
‘youth’ that are reportedly turning to a vegan diet, citing both health and ethical 
concerns (Anon 2014). It is impossible to predict what the future will look like for 
‘food’ animals—whether the number annually slaughtered for meat will continue to 
increase as statistically-based trends indicate, or whether the numbers of people 
reportedly turning vegetarian or vegan will continue to grow and start to have an 
impact on these numbers. More important then, is whether these self-reported 
vegetarians and vegans will actually remain so.  
 
Contrary evidence indicates that 84% of vegetarians and vegans return to eating 
animals (Herzog 2014). In addition, a number of books and plenty of media articles 
                                                
16 There are shifts in the global meat market with growth slowing slightly in some nations 
and increasing in others, and changes in the types of meat being consumed. See Christine 
Chemnitz and Stanka Becheva, Meat Atlas: Facts and figures about the animals we eat; also 
Rousseau 2016. 
17 See the Animal Kill Counter which is based on FAO statistics: 
http://www.adaptt.org/killcounter.html 
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document their author’s or other peoples’ rejection of vegetarianism or veganism, 
sometimes after several decades (Keith 2009; Reed 2013; Lennon 2007; Wheal 
2013; Roberts 2016; English 2014; Woginrich 2011). Admittedly, there are vegan 
structures and markets now in place, in 2018, that did not exist several years ago so 
it is perhaps unreasonable to extrapolate from this earlier evidence. Ongoing 
research in this rapidly changing space is much needed. Nevertheless, as well as 
health issues, the emergence and availability of ‘better’ meat that is produced 
‘locally’, ‘ethically’ and ‘sustainably’, and where animals are treated ‘humanely’ is 
cited as one of the main factors supporting a shift away from plant-based diets 
(Wheal 2013; Lennon 2007; Wongrich 2011). These authors indicate, sometimes 
explicitly, that their original rejection of meat was because they found the ways in 
which animals are used in industrial systems problematic, and not their use in itself.  
 
Indeed, the ‘ethicalisation’ of the broader, mainstream meat industry seems to have 
been the primary outcome of a growing concern for the environmental, health and 
ethical impacts of meat production and consumption, circumventing any question 
of eschewing animals as food altogether. In 2014, McDonalds announced their 
intention to source “a portion” of their beef from accredited sustainable sources by 
2016 (Katsnelson 2015),18 and Australia’s two leading supermarkets, Coles and 
Woolworths have responded to an identified trend towards “more humane and 
ethical shopping habits” (Coles 2011) by introducing ethical, sustainable and/or 
responsible sourcing policies. These supermarkets do not explicitly label their 
products as being ethical or sustainable; it is rather implied through association 
with animal welfare organisations, such as the RSPCA, and reference to 
responsible sourcing policies and farming practices.19 Fast food chains Subway, 
Burger King and KFC in Australia all variously state their commitment to 
sustainable and ethical sourcing, responsible farming, animal welfare, and the 
environment.  
 
                                                
18 As of February 2017, McDonalds has launched pilot programs in the US to measure 
supply chain sustainability and explore negative carbon grazing practices (Kowitt 2017). 
This follows the reporting of results, in June 2016, of a pilot project with Canadian beef 
producers designed to test the application of principles laid out by the Global Roundtable 
on Sustainable Beef, thereby bringing them closer to a sustainable “birth to burger” model 
(Stephenson 2016). 
19 However, in their account of supermarket wars and ethical consumption, Lewis and 
Huber note that in the case of Coles, it is the improved taste outcomes of these measures 
for consumers, rather than any alleged benefits for animals or the environment, that are 
emphasised (2015: 14). 
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These moves by leading fast food chains and supermarkets indicate that ‘ethics’ has 
been recognised as a commodifiable and economically valuable asset by big 
retailers keen to capitalise on this, as yet, additional market. By additional I mean 
that it has not so far been associated with a relative decline in the production and 
consumption of factory farmed meat. Any suspicion that maintaining profit margins 
is considered more important here than actual change could be well founded.  
 
Explicitly prioritising perceptions over actual practices, in their 2010-2015 Strategic 
Plan, Meat and Livestock Australia Limited (MLA), the leading industry service 
body that delivers marketing and research programs for 47,500 of Australia's cattle, 
sheep and goat producers, declared the development of a set of environment, 
welfare and ethical standards to be an “imperative” for the industry so that 
“consumer perceptions of animal welfare and environmental issues do not become a 
major barrier to red meat consumption” (MLA 2010, emphasis added). Similarly, 
the Cattle Council of Australia, which represents the interests of Australia’s beef 
cattle producers through their member organisations, states in its 2013 strategy 
framework document Beef: 2015 and Beyond that the “industry’s environmental and 
ethical credentials as perceived by government, the community and its customers are 
of immediate and future importance” (CCA 2013: 12 emphasis added). That the 
director of McDonalds worldwide supply chain sustainability similarly stated, “The 
long term goal is to drive continuous improvement that enhances and maintains the 
social license to operate and sell more beef” (Katsnelson 2015 emphasis added), 
suggests that this is a strategic approach to perception with broader corporate appeal. 
 
These various mainstream measures, effectively ‘ethical light’, are widely portrayed 
as offering a ‘balanced’ and positive way to address the environmental and ethical 
problems associated with large-scale meat production and consumption (Lennon 
2007; Meryment 2011; Woginrich 2011) - or at least a step in the right direction 
(Healy 2014; Matsumoto 2016). It is assumed that by raising consumer awareness 
about the environmental and ethical consequences of our food, people will make 
better choices and the broader market will respond accordingly. However, 
returning to the question of whether and how this changes anything for cows, pigs, 
chickens, sheep and goats, it seems that the cartography of their bodies—the ‘food’ 
animal map—remains the same; it has merely gained some new locations, features 
and landmarks, while some existing ones have been rearranged and rebranded. 
However, another response to concerns about the environmental and ethical 
impacts of industrial production processes, and also to concerns regarding the 
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health impacts of the associated meat, is the shift to a different model of production 
altogether. 
 
‘Genuinely’ ethical and sustainable meat 
Meat specifically labelled and promoted as being ethical and sustainable is a recent 
but, as yet, fairly unexamined emergence in the broader market for meat. Currently 
in Australia, it is primarily a niche product with small, local producers supplying 
directly to consumers through farmers markets, on-line purchasing and delivery, 
farm-gate, and specialist retailers. However, it is a growing trend evidenced by 
reports of increasing demand for mobile butchers and slaughtermen (Mackenzie 
2015).  
 
Australian producers of ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ meat claim that their products 
offer a more ethical and environmentally friendly alternative to mainstream, 
factory-farmed meat, and that consumer demand is growing (Akerman 2010). 
Consumers in the global north and Australasia appear enthusiastic about 
supporting this new trend, again reflecting and contributing to the dominant view 
evident in popular and academic discourse that it represents, at the very least, a 
‘step in the right direction’ (Cole 2011a; Freeman 2010b; LaVeck 2006). However, 
this particular step—ethical and sustainable meat—is just one of several, besides 
genetic and technological innovations, that have emerged in opposition primarily to 
factory-farming and not the production and consumption of meat per se. Essentially, 
challenges to the meat industry and to meat consumption based on environmental, 
health and ethical concerns are being countered with efforts to produce healthier 
meat from happy, well-treated animals, using sustainable and even 
environmentally-friendly farming practices. Meat promoted and labelled as ethical 
and sustainable promises the complete package, variously claiming that animals are 
reared in non-intensive, more humane conditions, that farmers practice 
‘regenerative’ farming with less or no use of growth hormones and non-therapeutic 
antibiotics, using improved farm and waste management techniques, and 
encouraging lower consumption of ‘better’ meat.  
 
However, the global demand for high quantities of cheaply produced meat persists 
while only a small proportion of discerning and privileged consumers participate in 
practices that prioritise alternative and ‘better’ meat products such as organic and 
free-range, and even fewer in practices that involve specifically ethical and 
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sustainable meat.20 This raises a number of questions that I cannot address in this 
thesis. For instance, in relation to the alleged mainstreaming of ‘better’ meat 
practices, how do such efforts interact with global market dynamics and the 
economic objectives of the animal industrial complex? What is it that actually ends 
up being mainstreamed? In what ways is this meat then environmentally, socially, 
nutritionally and/or ethically ‘better’? And in relation to niche practices involving 
alternative and ‘better’ meat, what do these practices reveal about broader food 
politics? Do their associated systems of production and provision merely reflect 
and reproduce structural inequalities along lines of class, gender and race (as well 
as species)? In what ways and for whom are they ‘better’? Such questions highlight 
the opportunities for further research to explore how different agendas are brought 
together and prioritised, and by what terms one ‘system’ is considered better than 
another. In other words, they emphasise the need to examine the politics involved in 
the politicisation of food.  
 
Respecting ‘our’ resources  
What the foregoing discussion indicates is that however much they are ‘respected’, 
animals remain persistently edible despite fairly damning and undeniable evidence 
of the environmental impacts of using them as food, and of the systems of 
domination that we use to control and ultimately kill them. It might be argued that 
this is largely on account of this evidence being filtered through various human-
centric discourses21 (scientific, economic, political, public), through the media, and 
then through everyday normalised practices, so that the majority of consumers 
remain unaware of the extent of these impacts, and the actual terms of our 
‘relationship’ with ‘food’ animals. The findings of a UK-based study (Bailey et al. 
2014) suggest this is likely to be the case. Based on at least 12,000 survey responses 
from 12 countries, the researchers found “a significant lack of understanding about 
                                                
20 It is unclear to what extent meat specifically labelled and promoted as being ethical 
and/or sustainable is as much a part of local/regional food practices in Asia, Europe, the 
US and elsewhere as it is in Australia. However, moves by expanding US food chains such 
as Chipotle to supply their customers with meat from ‘happy’ animals, and the development 
of new standards and labelling schemes which assure consumers that an animal led “a good 
life”, received “higher welfare” and was “humanely treated” (e.g. the Global Animal 
Partnership’s 5-step Animal Welfare Rating used by Whole Foods Market in the US, and 
the UK RSPCA’s Freedom Food label) suggest that the emergence and growth of similar 
practices based on definitions and understandings of meat production practices that go 
beyond organic and free-range meat is not restricted to Australia.  
21 See Arcari (2017a) 
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the links between livestock and climate change among publics—an awareness gap” 
(22).22 
 
According to this line of thought, if consumers were to become more aware, i.e. 
were provided with more information, then a transformation in practices would 
inevitably follow. However, a large, and arguably growing, proportion of 
consumers are gaining considerable knowledge and awareness—often first-hand—
of exactly how meat is produced and of the associated issues. This trend is being 
shaped by, and also further shaping, the emergence of ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ 
meat, of ethical or ‘conscious’ consumption in general, and the associated de- and 
re-fetishisation of production processes in favour of authenticity, tradition, 
transparency, and artisanal ‘skills’ (Pratt 2008; Parry 2010; Ocejo 2014; Matchar 
2015). And yet, this knowledge and awareness has failed to fundamentally alter 
practices. Animals have remained enduringly edible in the face of all of these 
challenges. This is why I have chosen to focus on this specific model of meat 
consumption, being one that implicitly and explicitly foregrounds the problems 
associated with the mainstream meat industry and offers a point at which these are 
somehow satisfactorily ‘resolved’. How meat and ‘food’ animals are reconstituted as 
part of this resolution will, I contend, reveal those persistently ‘productive’ aspects 
of humans’ relationship with ‘food’ animals that Foucault indicates are key to the 
successful exercise of power, and to its substantial concealment. 
 
Navigating towards my theoretical approach, which I describe in the next section, 
the continuing treatment of ‘food’ animals as a resource—just one of many ‘natural’ 
resources that the earth (or God) ‘provides’ for humans, can be viewed as part of a 
package of symptoms accredited to the ‘human age’ or the Anthropocene. This 
marks an age where humans stand apart from all other animals and planetary 
processes in the ways we are “remaking the planet” (Crutzen 2002; Monastersky, 
2015; Jamieson & Nadzam 2015: 10). Not yet formalised, the onset of the 
Anthropocene is generally placed around the time of the Industrial Revolution and 
is associated with a barrage of environmental changes attributed to human 
activities, including the hole in the ozone layer, a 30% increase in levels of Co2 (to 
                                                
22 The study was based on the results of an online survey conducted in “Brazil, China, 
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Poland, Russia, South Africa, the UK and the US, 
with a minimum of 1,000 participants in each country” (Bailey et al. 2014: 17).  
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levels not seen in 400,000 years), accelerating rates of erosion, and the progressive 
loss of Arctic Ice (Monastersky 2015: 145). Most, if not all, of these changes have 
been caused by humans’ increasing effectiveness at mining the planet’s perceived 
‘resources’. The cartographic eye used in this endeavour is decidedly 
anthropocentric. Water, forests, land, air space, plant-life and (nonhuman) 
animals—all are designated terra (and bestia) nullias until recognised under this 
eye whereupon the ‘resources’ emerge, such as gas, coal, oil, minerals, wood, and 
nonhuman animals. Human value makes ‘things’ infinitely accessible, ‘own-able’ 
and mappable.  
 
Rather than simply describing and demonstrating how meat consumption and the 
use of animals for food fit the criteria of the Anthropocene, I am interested in what 
underpins this age of unbridled extraction and exploitation. For the sensibility 
which maintains animals as persistently edible bears similarities to that which 
supports humans in their sovereign right over the entire planet. If the basis of this 
fundamental entitlement, which is manifest through mechanisms of power and 
domination, can be understood, then perhaps the ‘map’ and the ‘word’ can be seen 
for what they are, i.e. neither the territory nor the thing. Thus freed from the 
constraints of normalization and naturalization, the perception of the broader 
territories and ‘things’ might then be possible. In the next section, I suggest that a 
critical posthumanism offers a way to imagine, and enact, this vision. 
 
ii. Theoretical framework: Advancing and enacting a Critical 
Posthumanism  
Critical posthumanism, as described by Cudworth (2005; 2011) and by Cudworth 
and Hobden (2014b) addresses what these and other authors perceive as a 
prevailing human-centrism in certain accounts of posthumanism (Giraud 2013; 
Weisberg 2009). Critical posthumanism provides the overarching, and ongoing, 
theoretical impulse for my research, while the practical theoretical and analytical 
framework is inspired primarily by Foucault in combination with social practice 
theories. For the remainder of this chapter, I provide a broadly-contextualised 
explication of critical posthumanism before introducing Foucault’s work and 
clarifying how it aligns with this explicitly emancipatory approach. I then articulate 
what Foucault’s theorisations on power, knowledge, language, discipline, sexuality, 
and ethics contribute to a study of meat’s persistence in social practices, and how I 
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apply these to critically explore the persistent edibility of ‘food’ animals among self-
identified producers and consumers of ethical and sustainable meat. 
 
A more robust tool 
Persistent constitutions of ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals are firmly situated in networks 
of relations characterised by the systemic domination of nature by humans 
(Cudworth 2005: 45). The historical effects of this human-centric system of natured 
domination are of such magnitude that they have been accorded their own 
geological epoch, the Anthropocene, where “humans and our societies have become 
a global geophysical force” (Steffen et al. 2007: 614). However, while the 
Anthropocene is used to define our current geological location, the term “does not 
refer to a passage out of certain social conditions” (Alberts 2011: 5). In other words, 
the causes and effects of, and potential alternatives to, the Anthropocene still need 
to be clearly articulated.  
 
Using accounts of the Anthropocene as a theoretical fulcrum, I draw on 
Cudworth’s (2005; 2011) unique perspective on the term, which she uses to 
emphasise the contribution of ecofeminism to understanding “how societies are 
organized with respect to ‘nature’” (2005: 1). As indicated, the Anthropocene is a 
descriptive and fairly neutral term, and while its co-noun ‘anthropocentrism’ 
denotes the inherent prejudice (of human-centredness), it is “rather weak for the 
capture of more direct aspects of human domination” (Cudworth 2005: 64). Both 
terms are therefore similarly limited as robust conceptual tools to imagine and enact 
social change (ibid: 64-70). As Cudworth later explains:  
 
[…] ‘anthropocentrism’ has been used so broadly to describe human centred 
attitudes, beliefs and behaviours, that its link to a system of social 
organization has been lost. In addition, ‘centrism’ is inadequate to rise to the 
challenge of interrogating forms of exploitation, and in the case of some 
non-human animals, oppression. (2011: 68). 
 
In response to the political weakness of ‘centrism’ (Cudworth 2008: 34), Cudworth 
proposes ‘anthroparchy’ as a more meaningful and useful concept, as it explicitly 
foregrounds the bases of human’s dualistic orientation towards ‘nature’ (2005; 
2008; 2011). Anthroparchy directly implicates “different forms and practices of 
power: oppression, exploitation and marginalization” (Cudworth 2008: 34) with the 
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emphasis on ‘the environment’ as what is dominated in the anthroparchal society 
(ibid): 
 
Anthroparchy is a formation of social relationships in which non-human 
nature is cast as a series of resources for human ends, and in which human 
interests inform the systemic ordering of social control over the 
environment. (2011: 68). 
 
Anthroparchy therefore relies on a fundamental dualism between the human and 
the ‘environment’, and dualisms have long been identified as constituting the roots 
of domination and oppression, whether relating to gender, ‘race’, social class, 
religion, ability or any kind of distinction that delineates an ‘other’. Overcoming 
these and other dualisms is perceived as a way through and out of the 
environmental, social, political and ethical challenges the human race faces today, 
and scholars (for example Foucault 1989, Deleuze and Guattari 1987, Latour 1993, 
Merleau-Ponty 2002, Carson 1962, Plumwood 1994, and Braidotti 2013, to name 
just a few) have been applying themselves to this task ever since Nietzsche’s 
seminal Beyond Good and Evil, written in 1886. However, with regard to more recent 
scholarly activity in fields relevant to my research, there are certain anti-dualistic 
approaches and theories that stand out for addressing questions relating to 
nonhuman animals and/or meat. These can be found especially in the work of eco-
feminists such as Val Plumwood (1994; 2002; 2013), Carolyn Merchant (1990; 
2005) and Karen Warren (1997; 2000), and posthuman theorists such as Donna 
Haraway (1990; 2008), Sarah Whatmore (2002; 2013) and Cary Wolfe (2010). 
There are no dividing lines between my over-simplified divisions—eco-feminism 
can be posthumanist and vice versa, and the work of associated scholars similarly 
defies strict categorization. However, the range of perspectives I am most interested 
in is unified by the shared intent to “productively trouble habitual ways of thinking 
and acting on both academia and everyday life” (Castree and Nash 2004: 1342).  
 
This quote from Castree and Nash, which I also flagged in my introduction in 
relation to the role of heterotopia, serves well as the overriding intent of my 
thesis—to trouble habitual ways of thinking and acting that involve ‘food’ 
animals. But before I explain the relevance of these anti-dualistic and posthuman 
perspectives to my research design, I will first highlight their potential pitfalls. These 
are not conceived as faults of these perspectives per se, but are rather a question of 
how far they ‘trouble habitual thinking’—the answer being, I argue, not far enough. 
  37 
To that end, I will demonstrate how non-dualistic and non/posthuman perspectives 
often elide material conditions of inequality, thereby exposing “residual forms of 
essentialism lurking behind apparently nonessentialist forms of analysis” (Sedgwick 
2003: 8) 
 
An obstinate duality 
As mentioned, dualistic and hierarchical conceptions of human/nature (nonhuman), 
culture/nature, male/female etc. (see Plumwood 1994: 43; and Cudworth and 
Hobden 2014a: 757) have been soundly critiqued, and a range of anti- or non-
dualistic and posthuman perspectives seek to move beyond such ultimately false 
binaries, at least in theory (Plumwood 2004; Haraway 1990, 2008; Whatmore 2002; 
Barad 2007). However, lived reality for ‘food’ animals, and many ‘others’ who find 
themselves on the wrong (i.e. right hand) side of these binaries, reflects and 
reinforces profound dualisms that pervade associated practices and which need to 
be attended to empirically, before (or while also) thinking beyond them. 
Consequently, I agree with Weisberg (2009) and Cudworth (2014) in considering 
most anti- or non-dualistic and posthuman perspectives to be essentially idealist 
and therefore not sufficiently attentive to systemic dualisms to offer a useful 
framework for the exploration and analysis of unequal relations that are universally 
normalised, e.g. as in power ‘blocks’ or states of domination. It is the same sense in 
which Cudworth perceives studies of anthropocentrism to lack political teeth. 
 
Some anti-/non-dualistic and posthuman perspectives elide any question of animals 
altogether, subsuming them within the term nature (Warren 1997; Barad 2003). 
Similarly, Plumwood’s overall oeuvre offers an invaluable critique of normative 
dualisms that underpin the colonisation of nature, women, and people, and yet she 
actively refutes similarly critical engagements with questions of human/animal 
relations such as those undertaken by ecofeminist scholars, including Carol Adams, 
Lori Gruen, Greta Gaard and Marti Kheel (Plumwood 2004, 2013; see also Alloun 
2015). Still other posthuman and ‘hybrid’ 23 scholars, notably Whatmore (2002) 
                                                
23 Citing Rose, Kwan explains, “Hybrids ‘transgress and displace boundaries between 
binary divisions and in so doing produce something ontologically new,’…hybrid 
geographies are geographical practices (or ‘boundary projects’) that challenge the 
boundary and forge creative connections between social-cultural and spatial-analytical 
geographies” (2004: 758). Whatmore describes “hybrid mappings” that “emphasise the 
multiplicity of space-times generated in/by movements and rhythms of heterogeneous 
association” (2002: 6). 
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and Haraway (2008), recognise what is unique and interesting about human 
relations with animals as opposed to generalised ‘nature’. The human/animal 
dualism is the main target in this body of literature, which argues for continuity 
rather than discontinuity and an appreciation of the porosity of borders, much as 
continental philosophers concerned with the ‘question of the animal’ have argued 
(Calarco 2008). However, I argue below that the agenda being advanced in these 
anti-/non-dualistic and posthuman imaginings is one that is still decidedly human-
centric, or more accurately, anthroparchal.  
 
Making an admittedly simplified generalisation across these works, while these 
enquiries into the human/animal distinction are framed as attempts to dismantle the 
universal anthropocentrism seen as pervading our discourses and institutions 
(Calarco 2008: 9), the main concerns invariably emerge as being about conceptions 
and definitions of ‘animality’, ‘the Animal’, ‘humanness’, ‘the human subject’, ‘the 
self’. For example, the ‘becoming animal’ of the human being (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987); discovering the animal that ‘I’ am (Derrida 2008); the implications of the 
anthropological machine for human beings (Calarco, commenting on Agamben, 
2008:102; see also Chrulew 2012); or what humans have to gain from “becoming 
worldly” and embracing a “dance of encounters” (Haraway 2008: 296, 4). The 
(de/re)construction of what it means to be human seems to be the underlying focus 
of these projects with less, if any, attention paid to what this all might mean for the 
animals (as opposed to ‘the Animal’ as an aggregated and reified object) currently 
living a vividly and persistently anthropocentric, or anthroparchic, reality. 
Posthuman enquiries that focus on the notion of the animal, rather than animals 
themselves, thus take on a “radically passive dimension” (Chrulew, describing 
Agamben’s The Open, 2012: 58). In the case of Agamben, Calarco writes, 
“Agamben's writings…focus entirely and exclusively on the effects of the 
anthropological machine on human beings and never explore the impact the 
machines has on various forms of animal life” (2008: 102, emphasis in original). 
Sorenson also singles out the work of Derrida and Haraway for its questionable 
contribution and “bizarre” prominence within Animal Studies, arguing it offers 
little to animals, and that Haraway’s is actually opposed to animal advocacy (2014: 
xix). 
 
The anti-/non-dualistic and posthuman scholars I mention certainly vary in their 
level of critical engagement with different kinds of human/animal relations, Derrida 
(2004) being notable here for at least confronting the issue of animal rights and the 
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use of animals as food and entertainment. Yet there is a common reluctance to 
admit, let alone question, the fundamental circumstances and terms of human 
relations of animal use. As Giraud observes, “posthumanist relations towards 
animals end at the moment of consuming animal products” (2013: 50). Hence, 
although not all anti-/non-dualistic and posthuman perspectives are guilty of the 
“discursive wizardry” that Weisberg (2009: 37) and others24 have identified in 
Haraway’s oeuvre, I do agree with her assertion that “Haraway’s work has become 
paradigmatic of a depoliticised approach within Animal Studies”. To paraphrase 
Pederson (2011: 75), this approach serves to obscure, dilute or displace 
responsibility for animals’ situation, reinforcing rather than dismantling their 
exploitation.  
 
While anti-/non-dualistic and posthuman perspectives provide an interesting and 
productive line of theoretical enquiry, it is one that can, at least in the case of 
animals, appear premature and not sufficiently attentive to the multitude of 
dualisms that are still alive and well across social practices. However, unlike 
Weisberg, many CAS scholars, including Twine (2010b), Pederson (2011), 
Cudworth and Hobden (2014), Giraud (2013), Deckha (2012) and Alloun (2015) 
take a more positive orientation towards posthumanism, seeing the recent, popular 
strands of thought as just one interpretation of a fundamentally useful intent to 
develop a non-anthropocentric ethic. Marrying this intention with the social and 
political critique that defines Critical Theory, and also CAS, generates a critical 
posthumanism that seeks to resolve theoretical tensions and potentially offers ways 
to materially enact and realise the anti-anthropocentric (or anti-anthroparchic) 
project that remains largely idealistic in posthuman theory (Giraud 2013; 
Cudworth and Hobden 2014). 
 
Cudworth is, to my knowledge, the first scholar to introduce critical posthumanism 
as an approach to social research that is more politically engaged than the cultural 
renditions of posthumanism that currently dominate this space (2011: 12).25 In this 
                                                
24 For example, Cudworth (2011), Pick (2012), Gaard (2013), Giraud (2013), Wadiwel 
(2015) and Sorenson (2014). 
25 The only other accounts of critical posthumanism that I have found are similarly 
inattentive to anything other than the human. The prefix ‘critical’ is used rather to describe 
a critical approach to theories and concepts of posthumanism itself, rather than society, 
social structures and systems of power, as in Critical Theory and Critical Animal Studies 
(See for example, Herbrechter 2013a, 2013b; Banerji and Paranjape 2016; Forthcoming 
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respect, the intention behind Cudworth’s proposed critical extension or realignment 
is similar to that which provoked her development of anthroparchy as a more 
accurate and necessary account of the mechanisms shaping the Anthropocene. As I 
have demonstrated, Cudworth and others identify a specifically “uncritical 
posthumanism” (2010: 79) that: 
 
[…] lacks an understanding of species as an effect of social power in which 
non-human species and forms, and Other animals in particular, are 
marginalized, exploited and/or oppressed. 
 
In its stead, Cudworth offers the following account of critical posthumanism, which 
includes a reference to Haraway’s posthuman proposition that ‘we have never been 
human’ (2008): 
 
A sufficiently critical posthumanism must draw in the insights about human 
centrism, human power and social justice provided by elements within 
political ecologism and critical animal studies. We may never have been 
human, but our social relations have been human exclusive, and latterly, 
also humanist. We need to understand the contingency of the categories of 
human and ‘animal’ whilst also hanging on to these concepts in our critiques 
of species relations. (2011: 13). 
 
The mission to dissolve boundaries that are lived and experienced by sentient 
‘others’ is not advanced simply by dissolving them conceptually or theoretically. As 
Cudworth goes on to assert, “We will not see justice for animals by deconstructing 
species” (2011: 13). Species, and other differences (race, gender etc.) need to be 
retained as agendas for critical social science for as long as they remain grounds for 
social exclusion, oppression and domination. Therefore, while posthumanities have 
their theoretical value, it is “’the social’ in social sciences” that Cudworth believes is 
in need of more critical problematisation (2011: 13). 
 
Cudworth therefore outlines a posthumanism, and a science of the social, with an 
overtly emancipatory agenda, articulated more explicitly in a later work with 
Hobden (Cudworth and Hobden 2014). Here, the authors additionally emphasise 
                                                                                                                                       
BRILL series titled Critical Posthumanisms: www.brill.com/products/series/critical-
posthumanisms). 
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the embodied and “embedded character of human activity” (2014: 146, also 144), 
seeing the inherent complexity of this embodiment and embedded-ness as 
something to be embraced and learned from/with rather than avoided with a sense 
of hands-thrown-in-the air futility. Delving into and through complexity is, they 
suggest, the only responsible way to approach global issues in a spirit that 
envisages the possibility for positive, emancipatory change rather than a 
disempowering fatalism (Cudworth and Hobden 2014: 146).26 With this in mind, 
across the breadth of Foucault’s oeuvre exploring the interplay of power, 
knowledge, language and bodies in diverse social ‘locations’, I recognise the 
blueprint for a resolutely non-dualistic, posthuman but also importantly, a critical 
framework for embracing complexity that seems well-suited to my intent to ‘trouble 
habitual ways of thinking and acting’ with regard to ‘food’ animals.  
 
A Foucauldian lens 
My thesis framework is therefore based on my identification of a complementary 
conceptual link between the critical posthumanism of Cudworth and colleagues—
focused on foregrounding and articulating practices of power—and Foucault’s 
accounts of power, knowledge, language, discipline, sexuality, and ethics. 
Effectively, Foucault’s body of work on these topics provides me with the analytical 
tools with which to dissect and understand the practices of power that contribute to 
the ongoing ‘oppression, exploitation and marginalisation’ of nonhuman animals, 
and the associated persistence of ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals (Cudworth 2008: 34). 
Additionally, across his explorations of power, discipline, sexuality and ethics, 
Foucault demonstrates intimate connections between knowledge, emotions and the 
senses—all key players in the consumption of food—and how these operate co-
constitutively, both reflecting and contributing to the exercise of power. Therefore, 
in this regard, his work provides a useful analytical framework with which to 
critically explore the persistent edibility of ‘food’ animals, and thereby also trouble 
habitual ways of thinking about them.  
 
Across the aforementioned accounts, the human that Foucault describes is a 
thinking and feeling body that is fundamentally both a product and productive of a 
broader social body or order. In other words, it is through this ordered social body 
                                                
26 An emancipatory agenda is similarly absent in Haraway’s (2016) more recent focus on 
complexity and ‘staying with the trouble’ (Hornborg 2017) 
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that humans are at once shaped by their environment27 and also implicated in the 
creation and operation of mechanisms that shape the terms and conditions of that 
environment for other bodies. Foucault most closely articulates these unifying 
aspects of his work in the following excerpt from The Order of Things:  
 
But to man’s experience a body has been given, a body which is his body – a 
fragment of ambiguous space, whose peculiar and irreducible spatiality is 
nevertheless articulated upon the space of things; to this same experience, 
desire is given as a primordial appetite on the basis of which all things 
assume value, and relative value… (1989: 342. Emphasis added). 
 
Foucault’s neglect of the bodies of nonhuman others (and also gendered bodies) has 
been noted by several authors (Palmer 2001; Cole 2011; Taylor 2013; Chrulew and 
Wadiwel 2016), some being more critical than others (e.g. Cavalieri 2008). 
However, this is not generally conceived as deliberate avoidance; “amnesia”, as 
Cavilieri describes it (2008: 100), is not the same as purposive exclusion. Indeed, 
Foucault does not directly engage with other analytical approaches to overtly 
power-infused inter-human relations, such as feminism, postcolonialism, race 
studies, or disability studies (Chrulew and Wadiwel 2016: 4). And yet the value of 
his work in problematizing conceptions of ‘other-hood’ and critiquing the systemic 
and normalizing orders that bring about such ‘othering’ has made it a prominent 
feature across all these fields, including critical animal studies. As Chrulew and 
Wadiwel comment, “the anti-dogmatic and provisional character of Foucault’s 
infamous “toolbox” not only tolerates but encourages such reinscriptions and 
intersections” (Chrulew and Wadiwel 2016: 4).  
 
Indeed, there is a growing appreciation of the value of Foucault’s ideas to the 
critical study of animals. Many CAS studies draw substantially from his body of 
work, particularly his conceptions of power (including disciplinary power, pastoral 
power and sovereign power) (Palmer 2001; Twine 2010a; Cole 2011; Taylor 2013; 
Wadiwel 2002, 2015), and the associated power of knowledge (Johnson 2012; Cole 
and Stewart 2014), power of the gaze (Pachirat 2011; Freeman 2013; Acampora 
2016), power of language (Peggs 2012); and ethics of self care (Taylor 2010), to 
                                                
27 In every way imaginable, including (but not limited to) materially, biologically, 
physically, emotionally, and intellectually. 
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name just a few. An edited book dedicated to Foucault and Animals (Chrulew and 
Wadiwel 2016) confirms his contribution to this field.  
 
Another scholar notable for his expansion of Foucault’s conceptions of sovereignty 
and biopower to encompass not only human but all life, including ‘the animal’, is 
Agamben (1998; 2004). However, while Foucault might be charged with a certain 
‘amnesia’ when it comes to nonhuman animals, the work of Agamben explicitly 
includes animals but has been described as decidedly anthropocentric in its register 
(Chrulew 2012). Thus, Chrulew asserts, Agamben’s line of philosophical enquiry 
“does little to disrupt the thesis of the animal’s captivation” (2012: 58). 
 
To date, most of the aforementioned Foucauldian approaches to animals have dealt 
in a largely singular fashion with one or two of Foucault’s concepts. None, to my 
knowledge, have drawn a direct connection across several, as I propose here, and 
applied that to the analysis of one specific aspect of animal use—the persistent 
consumption of their flesh. By focusing on a circumstance in which, 1) a 
distinctively ‘valued’ living ‘other’ is not only used, but also, in the final instance, 
consumed, and thereby made entirely ‘other’ through being extinguished and then 
assimilated; and 2) embodied human immaterialities are engaged via the emotions 
and all of the senses, there is a unique opportunity to apprehend “the tangibility of 
power, its texture and flavor” (Probyn 2000: 7). For even though, as Bertrand 
Russell observes, “forms of power are most nakedly and simply displayed in our 
dealings with animals” (1986: 20), those animals that are killed and eaten would 
have to represent the apogee of that power, for there is nowhere left to go in the 
expression of power beyond material embodiment.  
 
Three schemas are variously emphasised across Foucault’s body of work and these 
provide the overall architecture for my research design and this thesis. First, in 
Power/Knowledge, Foucault emphasises the integral relationship between knowledge 
and power: “The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, 
knowledge constantly induces effects of power” (1980: 52). Cartographies of meat 
are permeated with knowledge, or “sets of knowledges” (82), and an examination 
of these knowledges, and their genealogy, will go some way to illuminating the 
domination of animals that is taken to be natural and unquestionable.  
 
Second, in The History of Sexuality (1978), Foucault examines the pleasures invested 
by effects of power and their associated discourses, and the knowledges that 
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emerge as a result of this interplay. This “regime of power-knowledge-pleasure”, he 
argues, is what “sustains the discourse on human sexuality” (1978: 11). Exchanging 
sexuality for food is not a long bow to draw,28 and leads me to enquire how 
emotions in general, not just limited to pleasure, might be invested by effects of 
power and associated discourses surrounding meat and ‘food’ animals, and what 
knowledges and “truths” (1978: 123) this interplay contributes to.  
 
Third, another of Foucault’s key theorisations explores Jeremy Bentham’s famous 
Panopticon29 as a “technology of power” (1980: 148). Foucault describes how 
increased surveillance enables the effects of power to extend, “gaining access to 
individuals themselves, to their bodies, their gestures, and all their daily actions” 
(1980: 151-152). He calls this “subjection by illumination” or “power through 
transparency” (1980: 154). As well as using this lens of power to explore the 
increased visibility of ‘happier’ animals and ‘better’ meat production processes 
associated with ethical meat,30 I link this visual/power association back to 
knowledge. For, as Foucault notes, those subjected to power through transparency 
exist “under the gaze of a permanent corpus of knowledge” (1977: 190) whereby 
the regarded ‘other’ is always “already encoded” (1989: xxii).  
 
Completing the loop back to regimes of power/knowledge/pleasure, I also link 
transparency and visibility to pleasure, or in my schema, all emotions. Foucault 
draws implicit rather than explicit links between his theorisations on the gaze, or 
transparency, and his regime of power-knowledge-pleasure. In Seeing and Knowing, 
where he explores the clinical gaze, he describes the visible as being divided “within 
an already given conceptual configuration” (1973: 113), while in Discipline and 
                                                
28 In Volume 2 of the History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure, Foucault notes “the long 
history of connection between alimentary ethics and sexual ethics” (1985: 51). These 
together relate to food, drink and sex—the “three basic appetites”, as Foucault (49) calls 
them, or according to Aristotle, the “three common pleasures” (51). Many scholars since 
have also explored this connection (for example, Probyn 2000; Cudworth 2011; Potts and 
Parry 2010), and it serves as a constant source of symbolic and narrative texture for works 
of art and literature across a variety of media (for example, Margaret Atwood’s The Edible 
Woman (1969); Jim Crace’s The Devil’s Larder (2002); Peter Greenaway’s 1989 film The 
Cook, the Thief, His Wife and Her Lover, and the more recent Raw (2017) by Julie Ducournau, 
among others). 
29 The panopticon is an architectural form that Bentham proposed for the design of prisons. 
It comprises a central tower from which the many can be observed by the one, thereby 
reversing the principle of the dungeon. Instead, visibility becomes a trap (Foucault 1977: 
200).  
30 Which is an aspect of ‘conscious’ consumerism more broadly—the increased 
transparency and de/re-fetishisation of production processes. 
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Punish he describes a mechanics of forces behind the disciplinary gaze that “makes 
the penalty be feared” over the “pleasures” of the crime (1977: 106). Taken together 
with his account of ‘knowledge-pleasure’ in The History of Sexuality Volume 1 (1978: 
55), which he defines as “a knowledge of pleasure, a pleasure that comes of 
knowing pleasure”, and where he also describes a “fundamental petition to know” 
linked to “a refusal to see” and “masking” of truth, the common threads between his 
philosophical enquiries in these areas are discernible, even if not explicit. This is 
especially so when this refusal to see, or masking of truth, is considered in light of 
his observation regarding the myth of the ‘pure gaze’ or what he calls the “speaking 
eye” (1973: 114). This ‘pure’ gaze, as a “servant of things and master of truth” 
(ibid), is one that Foucault believes does not exist.  
 
In The Use of Pleasure (1985), the second volume of the History of Sexuality, Foucault 
draws on classical Greek and Greco-Roman thought, Christian doctrine, and the 
pastoral ministry to conduct a genealogy of “the hermeneutics of desire” (5). He 
describes eating and drinking as ‘natural pleasures’ and notes “the moral 
problematisation of food, drink and sexual activity” (51) (the “three basic 
appetites”) that characterised Greek classical thought. It was Aristotle who 
identified the common principle that links all three, that being “the pleasures of 
contact and touch” (1985: 51). Throughout, Foucault also comments on the links 
between pleasure (and other emotions) and the senses, including sight, arguing 
“there are sights capable of affecting the soul like venom” (1985: 41). Equally, I 
would add that there are touches, sounds, smells and tastes, e.g. relating to food, 
that would similarly ‘affect the soul’. 
 
It is from recognizing, and explicitly connecting, these common threads in 
Foucault’s work that I have arrived at a framework suited to my enquiry. A truly 
whole-of-body understanding of the mechanisms of power that keep ‘food’ animals 
in a state of domination may therefore be undertaken by traversing rhizomatically 
through Foucault’s accounts of: 
 
1. Power/knowledge, 
2. The pleasure of knowing 
3. The power of transparency or the gaze, and  
4. The pleasure of looking 
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Integrating Laura Mulvey and others’ work that more specifically addresses the 
pleasure of looking allows me to enhance my analysis in this fourth area, and 
reinforces the connections between power, knowledge, pleasure and looking. 
 
This Foucauldian framework also provides a way to empirically demonstrate why 
‘the critical’ is needed in a posthuman approach, and determine what sort of 
embodied and embedded considerations need to be accounted for before a wholly 
posthuman territory can even be imagined or glimpsed. As Cudworth (2011) 
suggests, a constant and vigilant awareness of the prevalence of the anthroparchic 
gaze, even in the ‘social’ sciences, is imperative. 
 
Relatedly, Foucault’s observations regarding the potential for mechanisms of power 
to establish a formulaic and systemic ‘block’ are especially relevant for my enquiry 
not only into mechanisms of power relating to ‘food’ animals, but their persistence. 
There can be an overemphasis in some areas of the social sciences, including 
posthumanism, on a constant evolution, changeability and transformation that is 
perceived to characterise the social world, which is in keeping with the rhizomatic 
assemblage of life described by Deleuze and Guattari whereby “everything 
changes” (1987: 21). Indeed, change is often conceived as a fundamental feature of 
all phenomena—the “uneven front of change” (Schatzki 2016: 18). However, 
Schatzki, and other scholars of social practice theory (for example Shove 2012; 
Walker 2013; Halkier et al. 2011b; Watson 2016) also recognise that social order, 
continuity, stability, habit, routine, and persistence are produced by everyday 
practices that are reproduced through performance. As Schatzki explains: 
 
Activities happen. Happening, however, is not equivalent to change…The 
performance of an action does not necessitate any more change than that the 
stock of events in the world has increased by one. In particular, a 
performance need not implicate further changes in social facts, phenomena, 
or events. In other words, an activity can just as easily maintain the world as 
alter it. In fact, this is the usual case. (2013: 82).  
 
Hence, while certain features of Foucault’s ‘blocks’ or Schatzki’s bundles of 
practices may change, these changes are limited and “occur amid general continuity 
in activities, arrangements, interwoven time-spaces, practice organizations, 
entwined practices, and links between practices and arrangements” (Schatzki 2013: 
97). In this way, bundles can survive both small, isolated changes and larger, more 
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extensive changes (ibid). I suggest that radical social transformations require a 
better understanding of these nexuses of profound persistence and resistance to 
change.  
 
Amidst the myriad changes, over time and across cultures, relating to food,31 the 
consumption of animal flesh has remained a significant constant. This signals an 
opportunity to examine just such a persistent nexus of social practices in which 
taken-for-granted relations, between humans and ‘food’ animals, are reflected and 
reinforced such that they represent a block or “context” of social life (Schatzki 
2005: 467). A characteristic feature of these ‘contexts’, among which Schatzki 
includes agriculture, is a “persistence of structure from the past into the present” 
(Schatzki 2006: 1868). For those cows, pigs, chickens, sheep, goats and other 
animals cast at the base of this structure, as Horkheimer depicts in his 
‘Skyscraper’,32 this can have profound implications for their possibilities in life. But 
these implications also extend vertically, up the skyscraper. For as Horkeimer and 
others of the Frankfurt School note, presaging an intersectional and critically 
posthuman attention to the Anthropocene, “the domination of nature is intimately 
tied up in the domination of the self and other human beings” (Gunderson 2014: 
288). As indicated in the introduction, the aspect of this ‘persistent structure’ of 
domination I have chosen to examine, which I contend is key to more effectively 
understanding, and ideally changing, taken-for-granted human/animal relations, is 
how ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals continue to be made sense of, or (re)constituted, as 
material objects of everyday practices. It is through unpacking these sense-making 
constitutions that relations and effects of power are revealed, or unmasked. 
  
Emphasising that power is to be “comprehended as effect rather than object” (2016: 
174), Watson identifies an affinity with Foucault in his practice-based approach to 
power as a social effect—one that can “direct or purposively influence the action of 
others” (170), rather than a force deliberately wielded by individuals. Recognising 
                                                
31 In terms of what is regarded as edible, how it is obtained, what purpose different foods 
are understood to serve both physically and symbolically, and the methods and tools used 
to prepare food for consumption. 
32 In ‘The Skyscraper’, Horkheimer (1978: 66-67) paints a critical and vivid picture of the 
social order, at the base of which, “we encounter the actual foundation of misery on which 
this structure rises…Below the spaces where the coolies of the earth perish by the millions, 
the indescribable, unimaginable suffering of the animals, the animal hell in human society, 
would have to be depicted, the sweat, blood, despair of the animals…The basement of that 
house is a slaughterhouse, its roof a cathedral, but from the windows of the upper floors, it 
affords a really beautiful view of the starry heavens”. 
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a similar affinity, Schatzki (2005) describes power as when, “actions structure 
others’ possibilities” (479 emphasis added). He continues:  
 
…the notion of power thus captures the responsibility that actions bear for 
the differential access that other people [and animals] have to the 
possibilities carried in practice-arrangement bundles (479).  
 
Though neither authors explicitly include animals in their designation of ‘others’, 
both acknowledge that nonhumans are part of practices (Watston 2016: 171; 
Schatzki 2005: 478). Whether conceived as blocks, bundles or contexts, it is clear 
that unequal relations founded on dualistic representations of an ‘other’ are 
reflected and reproduced through social practices, whereby they are experienced as 
systemically normalised, and normalizing, aspects of everyday life. Drawing on 
Foucault (1973; 1977; 1978; 1980), I understand these unequal relations, 
specifically between humans and ‘food’ animals, as expressions of invisible 
mechanisms of power supported by legitimated rights of entitlement and privilege. 
These unequal relations are in turn more tangibly expressed in persistent 
constitutions of ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals, and it is therefore through these 
constitutions that the nature of these mechanisms of power can be apprehended. 
 
Conclusion 
My research is theoretically defined by Cudworth and Hobden’s (2014) petition for 
a critical posthumanism that “abandon[s] its history of humancentrism and [is] 
highly attuned to the domination of the animal that is not human, in addition to the 
animal which is” (2014: 144). With my introduction and this first chapter of Part I, 
I have described and justified my conceptual starting point(s), stated the aim and 
objectives of my research, and demonstrated why it is important and what it will 
contribute. I have also presented an account of the key theories and concepts that 
have led me to adopt a critical posthumanist approach to understanding the 
persistent edibility of ‘food’ animals—an edibility which, like Foucault’s power, I 
conceive as being constituted, reproduced and reinforced in social practices. As 
such, my approach is one that is alert to and intent on “eliminating multiple forms 
of oppression” (Cudworth and Hobden 2014: 145). In this endeavour, I draw 
heavily on Foucault’s accounts of power, knowledge, pleasure, and transparency, 
which provide the analytical tools I need to unmask the mechanisms of power, as 
exercised through social practices, that contribute to the persistence of meat and 
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the use of ‘food’ animals. In the next chapter, I provide a detailed account of my 
research design and methodology, including the processes followed for the 
recruitment, sampling, and interviewing of participants. This is the final chapter of 
the introductory part of my thesis, and it is bookended with reflexive observations 
regarding my role as a researcher.  
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Chapter 3: Research design and methodology 
Acknowledging that my theoretical and methodological choices are themselves 
“rhetoric”— “encoding certain assumptions and values about the social world” 
(Agger 1991: 114), I begin Chapter 3 by openly owning the assumptions and values 
I bring to this research and declaring it to be an attempt at a “moral science, a 
critical enquiry into the everyday conditions of domination for the purposes of 
altering them” (Seidman 1998: 329). Accounting for myself in this way, making 
explicit my a priori knowledge, beliefs and biases, is an attempt at reflexive research 
as described by Cutcliffe (2003). The intention is to guard against the potential 
that, in my interpretations, I have ‘colonised the discourse of the ‘other’’ (Berger 
2014: 221)—and also allow the reader to make their own determination. This 
reflexivity is not a post-analysis addition to the thesis, but was part of the entire 
research process, as will become apparent. Hence, while included here as a point of 
reference for the reader, a constant awareness of my own personal and contextual 
orientation has informed every phase of this research, hopefully enhancing its 
quality by allowing me to “ponder the ways in which who [I am] may both assist 
and hinder the process of co-constructing meanings” (Berger 2014: 221). I also 
discuss how an awareness of my agentic role as a researcher, responsible for 
creating as much as collecting my data, came about and how this caused a shift in 
the way I applied my theoretical approach. These brief sections serve to ‘top and 
tail’ the main body of this chapter, which comprises a detailed account of my 
methodology. The final section covers the exclusions and limitations of this 
research. 
 
i. Researcher as subject(ive) 
Meat does not occupy a prominent position in my personal foodscape. I am vegan 
for all the reasons associated with veganism as an intersectional and therefore 
necessarily political movement and not simply a diet. These reasons include the 
materialisation of animal bodies, the aggregation and de-personalisation of living 
beings, the ‘othering’ and oppression of animals based on species, their use as a 
human resource, the intersection of issues of race and gender in our (mis-)use of 
animals, and many others (Adams 2010 [1990]; Cudworth 2011; Fiddes 1992; 
Harper 2011; Nibert 2013). I do not consider meat to be an essential or even 
necessary part of the human diet. Whole cultures, especially in India and Japan, 
have existed for generations without it. However, many, and indeed the majority of 
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people do consider it both essential and necessary. Putting aside arguments relating 
to the (un)availability of alternatives, which pertain to broader mechanisms of 
distribution and access rather than necessity, my personal view is that a plant-based 
diet is a viable proposition for the global population. Given the breadth of scholarly 
work covering animal rights, critical animal studies, veganism, and notions of the 
next (nonhuman) social contract (Gabardi 2017), literary explorations that 
challenge the edibility of nonhuman animals (for example Vint 2010; Atwood 1998; 
2004), and filmic endeavours that draw attention to our current treatment of 
animals (for example Noah 2014; Okja 2017; Carnage 2017), I am certainly not 
isolated in this view.  
 
In declaring the values that imbue my research, not only to the reader but to my 
participants (as described later), I am drawing not only on one of the tenets of 
critical theories but also aligning myself with the movement within sociology over 
the past one to two decades towards research that is overtly ethically, morally 
and/or politically engaged (Fassin 2011; Seidman 1998). This movement has 
emerged at a time when human (and nonhuman) inequalities are increasing along 
with awareness of the consequences of such inequalities, in concert with, and 
fuelled by, the rise of a highly globalised and socialised media and advanced modes 
of networked communication. Most importantly for my research, it recognises that 
“all research is inherently political –and perhaps especially that scholarship 
presented under the guise of ‘objectivity’, which is really no more than a veiled 
defence of the status quo” (Sanford 2006: 14). Meat is “imbued with social rules 
and meaning” (Fiddes 1992: 5) and is therefore just as ideological and overtly 
political as vegetarianism. Consequently, I do not consider my research to be taking 
any more (or less) of a value or moral stance than would be reflected by an 
uncritical, ‘objective’ view on meat consumption and the use of animals. As Agger 
(1991: 114) says, “value-freedom being a value stance, after all”, such value 
freedom would implicitly support and reinforce the dominant, normalised paradigm 
that endorses the use of animals as food. This is a view taken up also by critical 
animal studies (Taylor and Twine 2014). 
 
ii. Research design 
Reflecting the theoretical approach of critical posthumanism described in the 
previous chapter, my methodology facilitates a critical, embodied and emotionally 
engaged approach to understanding the persistence of meat consumption and the 
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use of animals as food. Attention to language and discourse is considered a 
fundamental aspect of this. As Sedgwick comments, with reference to Foucault’s 
account of the ‘productive force of taxonomies’, “[t]hat language itself can be 
productive of reality is a primary ground of antiessentialist inquiry” (2003: 5). 
Following Machin and Mayr (2012), visual communication is considered part of 
discourse - “…visual communication plays its part in shaping and maintaining a 
society’s ideologies, and can also serve to create, maintain and legitimise certain 
kinds of social practices” (19). This becomes particularly significant when looking 
at the ways in which producers and suppliers promote their ethical and sustainable 
meat and how they represent animals.  
 
My overarching research question is:  How do ‘food’ animals remain persistently 
and ethically edible? 
 
The aim of my research is: to explore how ‘food’ animals remain persistently 
edible specifically when the environmental and ethical legitimacy of their 
consumption is challenged. 
 
My methodology is thus constructed around the collection, interpretation and 
analysis of primarily discursive but also visual data relating to meat consumption 
and the use of animals as food. I am specifically interested in how ‘food’ animals 
remain edible when their environmental and ethical legitimacy is challenged. 
Consequently, I focus on consumers and producer/consumers of so-called ‘ethical’ 
and ‘sustainable’ meat, and explore, through semi-structured interviews and an 
analysis of promotional materials, how my research participants make sense of, or 
(re)constitute, ‘food’ animals and meat through their everyday ‘meaty’ practices.33 
In this way, by understanding how these sense-making constitutions are themselves 
constituted, I aim to identify what makes practices involving meat consumption and 
the use of animals as food so resilient to change, or what it is about this particular 
“edge of change” (Schatzki 2013) that does not change.  
 
                                                
33 Meaty practices are conceived broadly as all practices that are in any way connected to 
the production and consumption of meat and the use of ‘food’ animals where their 
constitution as food in implicitly accepted. These include, for instance, any practices that 
involve the sourcing, buying and eating of meat, practices relating to the breeding, 
purchase, feeding, rearing, trading, marketing and general ‘production’ of meat, and other 
practices where ‘food’ animals might feature, for instance as entertainment (e.g. petting 
zoos, rodeos), or objects of welfare efforts. 
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My participant data are considered the product of a collaborative process. Made by 
recording and subsequently transcribing semi-structured interviews (conducted on-
farm with producers, and at home, in a café or university office with consumers), 
these communications, or conversations, reflect dynamic, animated, embodied, and 
always newly articulated engagements as participants “make sense of the moment-
by-moment unfolding of interaction” (Wooffitt 2005: 79). This type of 
communication is naturally more spontaneous, ‘alive’ and less scripted than the 
textual and visual promotional material of producers, which is, by comparison, 
static and one-directional (though still co-constituted). An analysis of the latter 
involves a focus on discourse or ‘accounts’ defined as “specific discursive acts which 
excuse or justify some course of action or…a passage of text or talk which 
expresses opinions, formulates versions of events and so on”, and is concerned with 
their “wider interpersonal or social functions” (Wooffitt 2005: 79-80). Especially 
with regard to the promotional material associated with ethical and sustainable 
meat, text and image are purposefully deployed to attract consumers, whereas 
conversations are more immediate, less (consciously) censored and provide access 
to ‘moment-by-moment’ understandings, emotions and senses. 
 
Based on this, the data component of my research entails two main activities:  
 
1. Analysing the promotional material (textual and visual) of producers 
and retailers of ethical and sustainable meat in Victoria to examine 
another facet of how animals and meat are made to ‘make sense’. 
2. Analysing the data made via participants’ conversations with me to 
explore how animals and meat are ‘made sense of’. 
 
During the interviews, producers and consumers were asked about their everyday 
practices relating to meat and ‘food’ animals. This line of questioning helped 
determine when and how the ways in which meat and animals ‘make sense’ change, 
why they change and how these changes affect the edibility of ‘food’ animals. 
Exploring the interplay of knowledge, emotions, and the senses in different 
circumstances (of ‘doings and sayings’) in this way also foregrounded how the 
persistent edibility of these animals is constituted—i.e. what tacit rules, knowledge, 
competencies and skills remain consistent across the ways they and their flesh 
‘make sense’. This approach reflects Reckwitz’s conception of social practices as 
constituted by “forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and 
their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states 
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of emotion and motivational knowledge” (2002 :249). My analysis of promotional 
texts and images focused on the notions of ‘address’ and ‘reception’ as used in 
discourse analysis and cultural studies, denoting, respectively, the intended and the 
actual response of the reader or viewer (Sturken and Cartwright 2009: 72; also 
Machin and Mayr 2012). By undertaking a critical and embodied analysis of social 
practices involving ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ meat, my methodology is designed to 
highlight the Foucauldian mechanisms of power by which ‘food’ animals are kept in 
a persistent state of domination. My aim and objectives reflect this critical 
posthumanist approach and provide the practical framework by which I can 
explore the persistent edibility of ‘food’ animals. 
 
As a point of note, I am not attempting to assess the accuracy or validity of any of 
my participants’ knowledge and understanding regarding what is ethical or 
sustainable. Rather, my goal is to illustrate how fluid constructions of the ethical 
and the ‘good’ can be, and how these variously implicate one animal over another, 
one method of production over another, one way of acquiring it over another—all 
with tangible consequences on the lives of current and future ‘food’ animals. It is 
the power of this albeit fluid knowledge that contributes to masking a state of 
domination, as my analysis will demonstrate. 
 
My entire study can be conceived in five phases consisting of a literature review, 
content and discourse analysis (promotional material), empirical data collection 
(interviews), data analysis, and writing (Figure 2). However, as I illustrate with 
this diagram, my progress was not linear. The phases necessarily overlapped and 
entangled with each other and, in this way, my research process reflected my 
theoretical approach as I advanced forward in a rhizomatic interplay of my own, 
and also my participants’, thinking, emotion, sensing, and practice, trying to make 
sense of it all. 
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Figure 2. Five-phased research design to explore the persistent edibility of ‘food’ 
animals through cartographies of meat. 
 
Every phase contributes to my overall aim and broader research question by 
addressing, to greater and lesser degrees, the research objectives.  
 
1. How does ‘knowledge’ of animals contribute to their edibility and non-
edibility? 
2. How do sensory and emotional associations with animals and meat shape 
their edibility or non-edibility? 
3. Where and how is this embodied knowledge of ‘food’ animals challenged 
and how is their edibility maintained? 
4. What mechanisms of power can be discerned in relation to the persistence 
of meat consumption and the use of animals as food? 
5. What effect have the increased visibility of ‘food’ animals and increased 
transparency of meat production processes had on the edibility of animals, 
and what does this say about how animals are ‘made sense’ of?   
6.  How then do consumers of ethical and sustainable meat ‘make sense’ of 
animals and meat? 
7. Is it possible that ‘food’ animals could be ‘made sense of’ in other ways, or 
permitted to make no (human) sense? What sort of dis-ordering of 
Foucault’s nexus of power/knowledge/pleasure would this require? 
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iii. Methodology  
Each of the five phases of my research design is described in detail in Appendix 1. 
Phase three, comprising my interview research, is broken down and described over 
four steps: recruitment, sampling, questions and data collections, and a summary of 
my final participants. A table containing basic demographic and dietary 
information for each participant is included here as a point of reference for the data 
analysis chapters to follows. 
The participants 
Of the 26 consumers interviewed, 19 were female and the majority aged between 
26 and 44 (Table 2). They lived mainly within the urban boundary of Melbourne, 
although five lived in regional areas one to three hours outside of Melbourne and 
one was from interstate, interviewed via Skype. The 15 producer/consumers that I 
interviewed were split more evenly between male/female, although often the person 
I interviewed was one member of a partnership. As Table 2 illustrates, I ensured 
that I gathered data from producers of different types of meat, although beef and 
pork were the most common. 
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Table 2. Summary of participants including prior vegetarian or vegan practices, 
and current frequency of meat consumption. Animals used by producers are 
indicated as follows: C (cow), P (pig), Ch (chicken) and S (sheep). 
CONSUMERS	
Pseudonym	 ‘Gender’	 Age	 Past	vegan	(V)	
or	Veg’n	
Period	Vegan	(V)	
or	Veg’n	
Frequency	of	meat	
consumption	
Geoffrey	 M	 <25	 -	 -	 1-2	times	per	day	
Diane	 F	 26-34	 Veg’n	 5	years	 Once	per	day	
Beverley	 F	 26-34	 Veg’n	 12-18	months	 Once	per	month	
Julie	 F	 26-34	 Veg’n	 6	months	 1-2	times	per	week	
Ellis	 F	 26-34	 -	 -	 Once	per	day	
Dan	 M	 26-34	 Veg’n	&	V	 9	years	 Once	per	day	
Heather	 F	 26-34	 Veg’n	 2-3	years	 2-3	times	per	week	
Charlotte	 F	 26-34	 Veg’n	&	V	 2-3	years	 1-2	times	per	week	
Anthony	 M	 26-34	 Veg’n	 5	weeks	 Once	per	day	
Lisa	 F	 26-34	 Veg’n	 6	months	 Once	per	day	
Sophie	 F	 26-34	 Veg’n	 Current	(1	year)	 -	
Damien	 M	 26-34	 -	 -	 5-6	times	per	week	
Fiona	 F	 35-44	 -	 -	 3-4	times	per	week	
Joyce	 F	 35-44	 Veg’n	&	V	 3	years	 4-5	times	per	week	
David	 M	 35-44	 -	 -	 1-2	times	per	day	
Maria	 F	 35-44	 Veg’n	 3	months	 3-5	times	per	week	
Anne	 F	 35-44	 Veg’n	 6	months	 5	times	per	week	
Natalie	 F	 35-44	 Veg’n	 12	years	 Once	per	day	
Helen	 F	 35-44	 Veg’n	 3-4	years	 5-6	times	per	week		
Michael	 M	 35-44	 Veg’n	 1	year	 3-4	times	per	week	
Henry	 M	 45-54	 Veg’n	 5	years	 4-5	times	per	week	
Sally	 F	 45-54	 -	 -	 1-2	times	per	day	
Tracey	 F	 45-54	 Veg’n	(+fish)	 Current	(23	years)	 Once	per	day	(for	
family)	
Gillian	 F	 45-54	 Veg’n	&	V	 16	years	 1-3	times	per	day	
Lucy	 F	 45-54	 -	 -	 2-3	times	per	day	
Grace	 F	 55-64	 -	 -	 5-6	times	per	week	
PRODUCERS/CONSUMERS	
Ian		 C	 M	 26-34	 -	 -	 1-2	times	per	day	
Jennifer		 P	 F	 26-34	 -	 -	 3	times	per	week	
Blake		 C,	P,	Ch,	S	 M	 26-34	 -	 -	 6	times	per	week	
Brigid		 S	 F	 35-44	 -	 -	 6-7	times	per	week	
Florence			 C	 F	 35-44	 Veg’n	 Current	(30	years)	 Veg’n	
Shane		 P	 M	 35-44	 -	 -	 5-6	times	per	week	
Finn			 All	-Retailer	 M	 35-44	 Veg’n	 1	year	 1-3	times	per	day	
Graham		 Ch	 M	 45-54	 -	 -	 1-2	times	per	day	
Will		 Ch	 M	 45-54	 -	 -	 5-6	times	per	week	
Trevor			 C,	P,	Ch,	S	 M	 45-54	 -	 -	 5	times	per	week	
Bella		 C,	P	 F	 45-54	 Veg’n	 7	years	 6-7	times	per	week	
Oliver		 C,	S	 M	 45-54	 -	 -	 3	times	per	week	
Alison		 C	 F	 45-54	 Veg’n	 5-6	years	 1-2	times	per	day	
Melanie		 P	 F	 55-64	 -	 -	 1-2	times	per	day	
James					 C	 M	 55-64	 -	 -	 5-6	times	per	week	
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iv. Researcher as agent 
In this section, I return to my role as a researcher and describe how in the course of 
my data collection, I became aware not only of the values I brought to my research 
as a vegan ’subject’, but also of the intersubjective effect of being a ‘researcher’ 
engaging with my ‘participant’, and the assumptions that created on both sides of 
the relationship. 
 
While conducting my first five consumer interviews it unexpectedly became clear 
that some of my participants assumed I was conducting my research in order to 
learn how ethical and sustainable meat could gain a better and more widespread 
foothold in the general market. I had initially decided to keep my position on meat 
consumption and the use of animals out of the data collection phase, although if I 
was asked directly I intended to be honest and have whatever discussion ensued. 
My aim was to appear neither for nor against ethical and sustainable meat in order 
to minimise my influence on participants and elicit their own associated meanings 
and understandings. The Participant Information Sheet (PIS Version 1, see 
Appendix 2) informed participants that the aim of my research was “to identify and 
explore in detail meanings and practices associated with ethical and sustainable 
meat in Australia”. However, I realised that value-freedom was not possible as an 
actual or perceived stance. Even though I was not indicating either way, the nature 
of my research, my physical presence (appearance, gestures, body language), the 
way I conducted the interview, and perhaps also incomplete understandings of the 
academic conventions of ‘research’, somehow led to the assumption that I was a 
‘supporter’.  
 
My participants were making their own assumptions about my position and their 
responses would be based on that to greater or lesser degrees. I was uncomfortable 
with this not only because I felt I was deceiving my participants but also because I 
realised this was creating my data in a certain way, just as much as if my 
participants knew from the outset that I was vegan. For the rest of the interview 
process—a further 36 interviews, I modified the Participant Information Sheet 
(Appendix 3), adding that this was “a critical study looking at the potential impacts 
and benefits of this meat, as well as implications of its broader uptake for meat 
consumption and the treatment of animals”.  I also decided to introduce myself as a 
vegan at the end of the interview, regardless of whether I was asked or not, 
although it sometimes came up during the interview and we would have the 
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discussion then. This involved me answering questions about my vegan practices in 
the same way I was asking them about their meaty practices—a reflexive moment 
of role reversal. This decision alleviated the anxiety I was feeling around my 
potential deception but it also, more significantly, changed how I approached the 
research and my participants.  
 
Specifically, I became a more active and respectful listener (Slim et al. 1993), more 
open to learning how my participants had come to their current knowledge of meat 
and animals, and what their practices meant to them, why they were important. In 
line with my focus on social practices rather than individualised choices and 
behaviours, my own focus and inter-personal approach switched from the 
individual to the everyday practices they performed, and how and why they had 
become part of their lives. This process of quite suddenly embodying my own 
theoretical approach removed my fear of appearing adversarial or threatening by 
being vegan, and also mitigated any tendency of my own to be judgmental. I 
became more conscious of the fact that I was not standing apart from my 
participants, investigating or even interrogating them about their practices. Instead, 
I had an active, constituent role in eliciting their language and articulations of 
meanings, emotions and practices associated with ethical and sustainable meat, 
using these as gateways to a better understanding of how they made sense of meat 
and animals in general. As I would tell my participants, rather than how an 
individual behaves or ‘chooses’ to act, I am interested in how practices come about, 
are socially maintained and reinforced, and how they evolve, and particularly the 
role of discourses, knowledge and emotions in their constitution. This constituted a 
qualitative shift in my position as a researcher from the personal to the systemic, in 
the same way that my ‘choice’ to be vegan is not (only) personal but is linked to 
broader, socially constituted meanings and practices that are similarly social, 
economic, political, ethical, and ideological.  
 
In arriving at this orientation to the empirical process and my participants, I was 
able to enter each interview situation with a sense of excitement and curiosity in 
anticipation of a lively, mutually interesting discussion. I was able to not just listen 
but (I hope) also hear what they were saying—to understand and empathise with 
where they were coming from. As a result, there is not one interview that I did not 
wholeheartedly enjoy, given that we were all equally passionate about the topics up 
for discussion, if for slightly different reasons. This in itself led to vigorous but 
always respectful and frequently fun exchanges. Lasting up to three hours, and in 
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some cases longer, I was invited to share sizeable parts of many participants’ days, 
especially the producers, and their homes too. This often included being provided 
lunch or snacks and generally being made to feel very welcome on their properties. 
I am very fortunate to have recruited such a spirited and generous group of people 
and will be forever grateful for the time and energy they freely allocated to me and 
my research venture. 
 
v. Exclusions and limitations 
This research contains a number of exclusions and limitations. Perhaps the most 
obvious exclusion is my focus on terrestrial animals and the production and 
consumption of their ‘meat’ to the exclusion of marine animals, their ‘meat’, and 
other terrestrial animal products such as eggs and dairy. Although the production 
and consumption of ‘seafood’, eggs, and dairy products raise significant issues 
worthy of investigation, it is not possible within the scope of this study to give 
sufficient consideration to all kinds of animal products. My decision to focus on 
terrestrial ‘meat’ is supported by a number of observations about ‘food’ animals, 
their products and the broader utility of this research. 
 
Terrestrial ‘meat’, eggs and dairy products, more than seafood, are implicated in 
long, interconnected genealogies of domestication (of animals and nature), 
colonialism and environmental change. Practices associated with the production 
and consumption of these ‘foodstuffs’ are equally ‘sticky’ in terms of their 
persistence, geographical spread, and per capita increase (OECD-FAO 2017; 
Conway 2015). Indeed, the production and consumption of eggs and dairy 
products cannot be isolated from the production and consumption of meat. 
Associated practices are intertwined and often inextricably interlocked, with ‘spent’ 
animals, and their wastage (e.g. male chicks and calves) constituting a significant 
proportion of the trade in slaughtered animal products, including meat. Exploring 
how ‘egg’ and ‘dairy’ animals and their products continue to be ‘made sense of’ in 
the midst of concerns about increasing demand, the environmental impacts of 
production, associated health issues, and ethical issues surrounding the treatment of 
animals, would therefore provide a rich topic for analysis.  
 
However, terrestrial ‘meat’ has been on the receiving end of more direct and 
sustained challenges on all these fronts for several decades such that it leads eggs 
and dairy in the variety and extent of responses. Rejecting ‘mainstream’ options, 
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consumers now have access to ethical, sustainable, environmentally-friendly, 
organic, grass-fed, biodynamic, humane, free-range, happy, and many other 
iterations of ‘better’ meat. Egg producers have adopted some of these production 
and branding practices, but not nearly to the same extent, while dairy products, 
besides organic, A2-protein and lactose-free products, remain comparatively 
untouched by the broader environmental, health and ethical concerns associated 
with terrestrial ‘meat’.34 Therefore, compared with both eggs and dairy, so-called 
ethical and/or sustainable meat, in all its various guises, is a widespread and 
recognisably distinct trend that is shaping significant changes in mainstream as well 
as alternative markets.  
 
For these reasons, and for the fact that I am interested in exploring how 
understandings of ‘food’ animals and their edibility respond to direct and sustained 
challenges (relating to the environment, health, and ethics), this study focuses 
solely on terrestrial ‘meat’. However, the same approach may be extended to all 
animals used to produce food for humans, including chickens, ‘dairy’, and marine 
animals, to similarly explore their ongoing (re)constitution as edible. Indeed, 
concerns about the environmental and ethical implications of increasing production 
and consumption of ‘seafood’ (Walsh 2011; Silver and Hawkins 2014; Larsen and 
Roney 2013) have tended to overshadow those associated with the treatment of 
animals in the egg and dairy industries. Yet at the same time, seafood is often 
promoted as the healthy and more sustainable alternative to ‘meat’. Combined with 
the lower regard afforded to marine life, and ongoing questions concerning their 
sentience (Brown 2015; Bergqvist and Gunnarsson 2013), the increasing 
production and per capita consumption of seafood (FAO 2016) and also fish oil 
supplements present a particularly interesting case for exploring the persistent 
edibility of nonhuman animals.  
 
A further two exclusions relating to the scope of my research (commonly 
understood as the system boundary (Braschel and Posch 2013) are that I do not 
explore how ‘food’ animals and ‘meat’ are ‘made sense of’ across practices that are 
not associated with ethical, sustainable or otherwise ‘better’ meat, nor how the 
broader nexus of social practices that constitute the animal industrial complex 
                                                
34 Notwithstanding the rise of plant-based ‘milks’ that are gaining increasing traction. It is 
not clear whether this is being shaped primarily by environmental, health, ethical, and/or 
other concerns.  
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shape this sense-making. A comparison of the discourses and practices associated 
with ‘mainstream’ meat, plant-based diets, and ethical/sustainable meat would allow 
for a more comprehensive analysis, and understanding, of how the edibility of 
‘meat’ and animals is differently constituted between practices, and perhaps 
reconstituted over time as practices change. Likewise, locating these discourses and 
practices, and those explored in this thesis, in the broader nexus of economic, 
political, religious, social and cultural practices that support the meat apparatus is 
an essential component of a more thorough analysis and understanding. Once 
again, within the parameters of this research, a study of this scale is not possible. 
 
Further limitations of this study relate to the type of data collected and the 
orientation of my analysis rather than its scope. In order to allocate sufficient 
resources to exploring understandings of ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals, I was limited in 
the extent to which I could explore how constitutions of gender, and other social 
‘locations’ such as socio-economic status and ‘race’, might also shape these 
understandings.  
 
Within the broad field of research that addresses consumption, which stretches 
across the social, cultural and political sciences, a burgeoning body of literature 
explores lifestyle politics and patterns of consumption relating to race, class and 
gender (Lewis 2011; Barnett et al. 2005b; Wilk 2001; Thompson 2011). Relatedly, 
the agency of consumption as a positive expression and active means of social 
change through, for example, conscientious or political consumption, green 
consumption, and ethical consumption, is another rich area of research (Micheletti 
et al. 2012; Lewis 2008; Littler 2008; Humphery 2011; Spaargaren & Mol 2008). 
Studies of ‘Alternative Food Networks’ (AFNs) such as Slow Food, local, organic, 
fair trade, vegetarianism and others, feature strongly among this research (Gray 
2013; Micheletti & Stolle 2010; Clarke et al. 2008; Goodman 2004), and many of 
these studies highlight the different ways in which these forms of consumption 
intersect with holistic conceptions of race, class and gender. Of particular relevance 
for my research are notions of ethical consumption as appealing to, and creating, 
privileged niche groups of predominantly white, middle class consumers (Lury 
2011; Guthman 2008; Slocum 2007). This raises questions regarding how these, 
and perhaps other, social locations might shape practices associated with ethical 
and sustainable meat.   
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This body of work only indirectly informs my analysis, and, as with the exclusions 
above, the parameters of the research process and the priorities of my research 
precluded me from including aspects of social location in my data collection 
activities. Nevertheless, while acknowledging there may be a range of factors 
relating to my recruitment process that contributed to my sample, the fact that only 
two of the total 41 participants could be described as non-white (both at least 
second-generation) suggests there is more to explore and understand about the way 
these practices are constituted, and also even conceived.  
 
Similarly, it is interesting to note that 19 of the 26 consumers I interviewed were 
female. In fact, of the 65 consumers who originally expressed interest in being part 
of the study, 54 were female, and only 11 were male. The producer sample tells a 
slightly different story, though perhaps more similar than expected based on the 
long-standing tradition of the male-dominated ‘livestock’ industry. Of the 15 
producers interviewed, six were female, of which three appeared as more equal 
partners in the business, while the remaining three were the sole or primary 
operators.  
 
Though I cannot make any robust comment in this regard, Parry (2010 - thesis) 
highlights the role of gender norms in shaping and even perhaps enforcing the rules 
around a new type of ethical meat eating. For instance, contrary to the association 
of meat-eating and butchery with masculinity, across the ‘New Carnivore’ 
literature, which bears many of the characteristics associated with ethical and 
sustainable meat, he observes “a bold revision of traditional feminine gender norms, 
as well as performance of female empowerment” (74). Simultaneously, across the 
body of literature dealing with the ethics of care (human and nonhuman), care is 
theorised as an alternately feminine and feminised trait (Gilligan 1982; Noddings 
1984; Donovan and Adams 2007). Shifts in understandings of ‘meat’, ‘food’ animals 
and their edibility therefore warrant further investigation from the perspective of 
binary gender norms, particularly in light of Comninou’s somewhat prophetic 
enquiry over 20 years ago as to whether “animal exploitation [will] become the 
ultimate symbol of equality with the white male?” (1995:14). 
 
Conclusion 
Over the preceding two chapters, I have provided an account of the theoretical 
roots of this research, which draw on social practice theories, posthumanism and 
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Foucauldian accounts of power, knowledge and pleasure, and also my own 
positioning with respect to this literature, which I align with an openly 
emancipatory, critically posthuman agenda. Having also mapped out the overall 
architecture of my research, which references Foucault’s conceptions of 
power/knowledge, knowledge and pleasure, and the power of transparency, the 
following three parts of my thesis take up the analysis and discussion of my data. 
This is integrated with relevant literature and organised according to my 
Foucauldian framework.  
 
Hence, I begin, in Part II, with the power/knowledge that designates animal ‘kinds’ 
and shapes distinctions between edible and non-edible, ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and ethical 
and unethical animals and meat. This component of my analysis is concerned with 
the “experience of order and its modes of being” (Foucault 1989: xxiii), or with the 
way in which: 
 
[…] as one traces…language as it has been spoken, natural creatures as 
they have been perceived and grouped together, and exchanges as they have 
been practised; …our culture has made manifest the existence of order, and 
how, to the modalities of that order, the exchanges owed their laws, the 
living beings their constants, the words their sequence and their 
representative value… (Foucault 1989: xxiii). 
 
More specifically, it attends to the first of my research objectives by exploring, over 
two chapters, how ‘knowledge’ of animals contributes to their edibility and non-
edibility.  
  65 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
Categories and Boundaries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human language developed around human bodies, it never quite fits other ways of 
being 
 
Emma Geen. The Many Selves of Katherine North (2016: 66) 
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Introduction to Part II 
Categories and boundaries are the starting point for my thesis as they reveal the 
arbitrary and conventionalised nature of the ways in which animals and meat are 
classified. They also appear as more or less culturally and historically (and often 
legally) stable, serving as ready-made rubrics that can be both efficient and 
desensitizing, as Douglas (2002: 37) explains: 
 
As learning proceeds objects are named. Their names then affect the way 
they are perceived next time: once labelled they are more speedily slotted 
into the pigeon-holes in future. 
 
A well-known and oft-cited passage from the Book of Deuteronomy (14: 3-20) 
begins “3. You shall not eat any abominable things. 4. These are the animals you 
may eat: …”, and goes onto describe which animals are sanctioned for eating in 
terms of their being ‘clean’ or ‘unclean’ (Christian Old Testament 1250-1200BC). 
This is one of the earliest examples of a dietary edict. Many such edicts, oral and 
written, have issued from religious, philosophical, scientific, medical and various 
other ‘authorities’, from different cultures, since historical records began. For 
example, Hindu Dharma texts forbid the consumption of “five-nailed animals, 
except for the hedgehog, hare, porcupine, monitor, lizard, rhinoceros, and tortoise” 
(Gautama Dharma-Sutra 17.27, in Jamison 1998). 
 
What these texts highlight is that the orders and ‘pigeon holes’  that mankind uses 
to make sense of experience do not exist “except in the grid created by a glance, an 
examination, a language” (Foucault 1989: xxi). Indeed, Bujok asserts that “the 
animal” as a term used to denote all species except humans, “does not, in fact, 
exist”, being rather a political device to “mask diversity and to place all other 
animals at a distance” (2013: 37). Thus, though we know nature only through such 
denominations or ‘masks’, Foucault describes how it: 
 
[…] glimmers far off beyond them, continuously present on the far side of 
this grid, which nevertheless presents it to our knowledge and renders it 
visible only when wholly spanned by language (1989: 175).  
 
It is this language that then “furnishes us with the rooms we dwell in” 
(Sanbonmatsu 2014: interview). What sort of possibilities would open up if we 
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were able to see past this grid or “tabula” that we impose on the world, look into 
the gaps created by momentary breaks? Would we see absurdities in our current 
orders and classifications? Would we recognise other ontological pathways for 
animals, and all of nature, once the opacity of the grid imposed by our current 
values starts to dissolve? These questions relate to my location in vegan heterotopia 
and I use them to frame the discussion in this second part of my thesis where I 
draw on my discussions with producers and consumers about their meat-related 
practices to address my first objective: How does certain ‘knowledge’ of animals 
contribute to their edibility and non-edibility? My intention is to draw the 
reader’s attention to grids, breaks, gaps, absurdities, and the alternative pathways 
that might glimmer beyond the system of categories and boundaries that delineate 
various permutations of food animals and their flesh. 
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Chapter 4. Animal categories and the maintenance of order  
With this first chapter of Part II, I examine the anthroparchal categories, and 
constitutive knowledges, that construct animals in binary terms as edible or non-
edible, food animal or pet, in ways that impact materially on their lives and deaths. 
At the same time, I highlight where a non-/anti-dualistic or posthuman perspective 
can elide material conditions of inequality. Starting with a review of the ways in 
which categories and boundaries relating to animals have been theorised to date, I 
then bring together these accounts with my participants’ data to examine the range 
of ways in which animal categories are employed as technologies of power and 
normativity. This involves exploring the language and discourses that my 
participants adopt, develop and put to work in speaking about their meat-related 
practices. However, what this also reveals is the complexity, and occasional 
ambiguity, of various and varying categorisations of edible animals, which exists 
alongside the maintenance of order. An exploration of this simultaneous order and 
fluidity helps me to identify three ‘validating discourses’ that fundamentally support 
and reinforce the use and consumption of ‘food’ animals. These discourses 
represent the first of three major contributions of this thesis towards revealing the 
mechanisms of power behind the persistence of ‘meat’.  
 
i. Taking note of categories 
As I will demonstrate throughout the parts of this thesis, the ways my participants 
‘make sense’ of ‘food’ and other animals reflect historical practices of anthroparchal 
animal use that have become deeply normalised. Early critical theoretical accounts 
of these uses identified categories that have endured, and remain just as relevant 
today. One of the first documented formal classifications of animal use I am aware 
of is by Henry Salt who, in his 1894 volume on Animals’ Rights, includes chapters 
on domestic animals, wild animals, animals slaughtered for food, sport, fashion, and 
finally experimental torture. More recently, this conception of use can be traced 
through the writings of animal rights scholars including Singer (1975), Regan 
(2004 [1983]), Benton (1993), Adams (1994), Dunayer (2001), and Cudworth 
(2003), among others. In ‘Natural Relations’, Benton (1993: 62-67) itemises nine 
admittedly overlapping categories of what he calls human/animal relations, or what 
I prefer to call human relations of animal use: 
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1. To augment human labour 
2. To meet bodily needs  
3. As entertainment 
4. For education 
5. Commercial exploitation (where profit-making is a fundamental element 
of their use as labour, food, entertainment and education). 
6. For physical protection 
7. As domestic pets 
8. As symbolic resources 
9. Wild animals (Benton acknowledges that ‘wildness’ is a social relation) 
 
That at least some of these categories were more tacitly recognised as part of 
everyday life well before these formal accounts is clear from Erica Fudge’s archival 
studies of 16th and 17th century documents relating to livestock (for example 2002, 
2013a, 2013b). And before Benton, in 1965, author and social critic Brigid Brophy 
wrote regarding animals that: 
 
We employ their work; we eat and wear them. We exploit them to serve our 
superstitions...we sacrifice them to science...we could quite well enjoy 
marksmanship or cross-country galloping without requiring a real dead 
animal to show for it at the end. (3)  
 
Later, she refers to them being put on public exhibition in circuses and bull-fighting 
rings (3, 7) and, along with Benton (1993) (and prefiguring the rapid increase in 
human’s physical and virtual colonisation of the planet that has occurred over the 
intervening 50 years), astutely observes that “it is rare for us to leave wild animals 
alive; when we do, we often do not leave them wild” (3). Several scholars have 
expanded on Benton’s (1993) classification to consider species hierarchy within 
these systems of use (Cudworth 2003), how this hierarchy extends into legal 
protection instruments for nonhuman animals (O’Sullivan 2011), and how cultural 
representations of animals vary according to species and use (Morgan and Cole 
2011).  
 
By recognising the widely different animal attributes, constitutions and ecologies 
that contribute to our equally varied relations with them, such categories provide 
some degree of grounding to explorations of human/animal relations in 
acknowledging that there is a diverse reality that “exists independently of our 
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perceptions, theories, and constructions” (Maxwell, 2012: 5). It is only our 
perception of this surface reality—of the varying attributes, constitutions and 
ecologies of animals—that informs our classifications of value and use. This 
mitigates against an overly social constructionist, abstract depiction of all “natural 
kinds” (Hacking 1991) and our relations with them, as being only what we imagine 
them to be, in which animals as sentient beings can tend to be “sociologize[d] 
away” (Cudworth, 2003: 164). These categories, being “nominalist in inclination 
but agreeing that kinds arise in nature” (Hacking 1991: 110), thus highlight that 
our constructed ontological determinations for the lives of animals have a biological 
and ecological basis, as well as very tangible implications for the animals. However, 
Hacking is also quick to point out at that what biologists might consider “natural 
kinds” does not cover all the species that humankind has domesticated, cultivated, 
modified and bred (114), and most significantly, we assign animals to one or more 
categories of use or ’kinds’ based primarily on social interests. It is at that point of 
assignation, where differences are carved up and ordered, where one differently-
identified body is given more or less worth than another, that a reality of difference 
gets mistaken for a reality of value. Speaking of racial difference Claire Jean Kim 
(2015: 15) explains: 
 
Nature, of course, has always offered up a great deal of visible human 
variation by way of skin color, hair texture, facial features, and so forth, but 
"race" is a historically and culturally mediated way of reading, classifying, 
and ranking bodies, of assigning some more worth than others on the basis 
of physical variation. It is a means of producing and disciplining different 
and inferior bodies. 
 
Attending to social practices that at once shape, reflect and support categories of 
human/animal relations, and more specifically how these practices are constituted, 
will help explain how they are maintained, what makes them so resilient and also 
how they might be disrupted in ways that fundamentally change animals’ lived 
reality. The aim is to expose the grid of surface differences, so that it might then be 
possible to glimpse beyond it, to where categories and boundaries become 
meaningless, recognising that “[a]nimal species differ at their peripheries, and 
resemble each other at their centres; they are connected by the inaccessible, and 
separated by the apparent” (Foucault 1989: 291). Hence, I now draw on my data to 
explore the ways in which consumers and producers of ethical and sustainable meat 
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separate ‘food’ animals and their body parts, and also how explicit and tacit rules, 
knowledge, and skills shape the boundaries between them. 
 
Animal categories in practice 
The usual suspects of designated ‘food’ animals appear throughout my participants 
accounts of their meaty practices and there is unanimous agreement that sheep, 
pigs, chickens and cows are regarded first and foremost as “our food animals” 
(Natalie C). Therefore, for all of but one of my participants—producer Florence 
(explained below), ‘food’ animals are clearly edible. However, for a considerable 
number, this was not always the case. Regarding their current and previous dietary 
practices, and providing some justification for my questioning, in Chapter 2, of the 
longevity of vegetarian and vegan practices, 14 of the total 41 participants (eleven 
consumers and three producers) had been vegetarian for between six months and 
twelve years when they were younger (Table 2). A further four consumers had also 
been vegan for between two and twelve years. An additional two consumers (self-
described pescetarians Tracey and Sophie) do not currently eat ‘meat’ (from 
terrestrial animals) but are happy to buy and cook it for their families or partner 
and do not consider using animals for food as inherently problematic. Florence, the 
vegetarian producer, does not believe animals should be eaten but still participates 
in producing and supplying it to others. In sum, 21 of the 41 participants involved 
in the production and consumption of ethical and sustainable meat also have at 
least six months experience being vegetarian or vegan. How is it, then, that these 
‘food’ animals have remained fundamentally and persistently edible? 
 
Reflecting the same understanding about ‘food’ animals as former vegetarian 
Natalie (C) (above), Blake (P) emphasises that these animals are “existing for 
that”. This determination is suffused with a sense of ‘how could it ever not be thus’, 
recalling what Foucault (1989) described as the impossibility of thinking otherwise, 
for as Natalie (C) says, “this is our culture”, or as Lisa (C) reasons, it is 
“…inevitable, that’s why it’s [“things that have been farmed”] here I guess…that’s 
sort of why it exists is to be killed”. These and other participants portray any 
alternate existence for sheep, pigs, chickens and cows as unimaginable, because the 
implications would evidently be ridiculous, as former long-term vegan Gillian (C) 
implies: “they should just all live, that's a great idea, well where the hell are they 
going to go…really?”. 
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That categorisations of certain animals are understood as empirical truth rather 
than a “historically and culturally mediated way of reading, classifying, and ranking 
bodies” (Kim 2015: 15) is reflected in the seeming imperviousness of their 
boundaries—the edges hardened and stabilised over time (although individual 
animals are sometimes permitted to transgress, as I will demonstrate). To think of 
‘food’ animals otherwise is therefore deemed almost illogical because “chickens are 
chickens” as Charlotte (C) says, and “a pig is a pig is a pig, it should be valued for 
what it is [i.e. pork]” (Gillian C). As pescetarian Tracey (C) reminds us, “in the end 
they are animals, so I'm not confused about the difference between people and 
animals”. To be so confused would, by inference, mean that you were wrong-
headed, muddled, and not ‘seeing’ clearly. Joyce (C) explains you must instead be 
“clear-eyed about that”, or open your eyes (Anne C) and “broaden [your] mind” 
(Gillian C). However, this is not the kind of clarity implied by Foucault’s (1989) 
critique of order, based as it is on a fabricated and learned construction, or grid, of 
‘the Animal’. As Butler asks in Gender Trouble, “[w]ho devises the protocols of 
“clarity” and whose interests do they serve?” (1990: xx). 
 
In Butler’s seminal volume, she describes the conception of (human) gender 
categories as the result of repeated and sustained social performances (191-192). 
Later, in Bodies that Matter she extends this theory of performativity to describe how 
even before birth a girl is ‘girled’ or a boy is ‘boyed’, representing “at once the 
setting of a boundary, and also the repeated inculcation of a norm” (Butler 1993: 8). 
Butler’s theory has been critiqued for failing to account for how ‘human-ness’ is 
similarly performed resulting in an inherent speciesism (Iveson 2014). The 
significance of this critique lies in how oppressions based on gender, gender 
identity, sexual orientation, ‘race’, religion, ability, economic status and many 
subaltern ‘others’ draw repeatedly on tropes of ‘more’ and ‘less’ human, and ‘more’ 
and ‘less’ animal (Iveson 2014: 28; see also Kim 2015). However, while 
wholeheartedly accepting Iveson’s objections, I see value in thinking how, like 
gender, animals can be similarly ‘done’ (Gherardi 1994; Martin 2003) by the 
performance and reproduction in social practices of pre-determined categories 
which are in turn re-inscribed on their bodies.  
 
That all animals are similarly ‘done’, as in performed, from birth, being first, and 
most inescapably ‘nonhuman animal’ and subsequently ‘dogged’, ‘horsed’, ‘pigged’, 
‘cowed’, ‘chickened’ etc., is illustrated by my participants. Diane (C), a former 
vegetarian, has observed that some people are surprised when a duck or chicken 
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walks up to them for a pat, but, she says, “it’s because they don’t remember that 
those animals are exactly the same as their dog and cat”. Referring more explicitly 
to normalised categories of use, Michael (C) comments that his pets are 
companions, “they are never entertainment”, and perceives animals variously “as 
part of food, visual enjoyment, as part of nature, companion animal, there’s many 
ways of looking at it”. This is the first process in animals’ objectification, where 
their individuality is reduced to their species and use. As I will show, further 
processes are deployed to reduce animals’ bodies to smaller parts and 
characteristics of their flesh. These “processes of objectification”, Foucault 
observes, “originate in the very tactics of power and of the arrangement of its 
exercise”, and are one of its most obvious effects (1977: 102).  
 
Hence, the edibility of ‘food’ animals is broadly conceived, and maintained, as an 
indisputable and God-given truth, as Trevor (P) queries rhetorically, “if we weren’t 
supposed to eat any meat at all, why would we, the Creator or whoever, why would 
we have had meat here in the first place?” Following Butler, the ‘speech act’ does 
indeed appear to exert a degree of agency through both its performative and 
linguistic dimensions, and play a role in the ongoing materialisation of these ‘social 
kinds’—their constitution first as animals, then as meat, beef, etc. (1990: xxvii; 
1993: 13). However, despite this categorizing of edible kinds and the distancing 
from human kinds that it accomplishes, my data show that in most cases people 
readily acknowledge themselves as being animals at some level.  
 
Reflecting on her animal-eating practices, Joyce (C), a former vegetarian and 
vegan, reasons that “a lot of animals kill animals to eat, and humans are animals”. 
Anne (C), a previously short-term vegetarian, contends that we face “life and death 
like every other animal”. “We’re animal like everything else” asserts James (P), 
echoing Diane (C) who says “I am an animal, and I’m an omnivore” and “I’m 
comfortable eating animals”, by which I must assume she means nonhuman 
animals. No-one claimed to have eaten human animal flesh, and so the ‘(nonhuman) 
animal’ category remains intact for all practical intents and purposes, though 
frequently obfuscated and often requiring further clarification, as Stibbe (2001: 
152) also found in his study of language and the social construction of animals. In 
the next section, I explore this human/nonhuman animal boundary in more detail. 
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The human/animal (dis)continuity 
While connotations involving nonhuman animals in our language in general are 
overwhelmingly negative and reflective of the human/animal binary (Adams 2010 
[1990]; Dunayer 1995; Yates 2010; Kim 2015), there are times when humans make 
positive associations with certain animal attributes—‘strong as an ox’; ‘brave as a 
lion’, ‘wise as an owl’ (Dunayer 2001:165). These associations suggest a desire to 
identify more closely with particular animals (in certain circumstances), to enhance 
human qualities they are also perceived to possess, but in greater measure. The 
mythic personification of the noble savage, living ‘in a pure state of nature’ is 
another aspect of these positive associations with animal nature, absent the 
corrupting forces of civilisation (Ellingson 2001). Having animal instincts is also 
viewed positively in situations construed (and constructed) as predatory, such as in 
business, sport, dating, and sex. Most sports teams and many car brands proudly 
adopt an animal as their emblem and mascot (Dunayer 2001: 165).  
 
However, these symbolic gestures to a certain qualitative continuity are not 
reflected in social practices. Hence, “in everyday parlance, animals means not, and 
less than, human” (Dess and Chapman 1998: 156, original emphasis). References to 
animals are widely used as derogatory epithets to ‘explain’ particularly distasteful 
human practices (Sergie 2018; Murdoch 2016). When discussing food, the use of 
the word animal becomes something of a misnomer for it is in fact species 
difference that defines the primary category being ‘done’ to ‘food’ animals and 
which makes all ‘other-than-human’ animal species edible. Species difference is, as 
Iveson (2014: 25) says, the fundamental “unmarked-but-marking” filter through 
which all social ‘norms’ pass—the ultimate ‘group’ that is maintained through 
repeated and routine, everyday enactments of us-and-them boundaries (Bauman 
and May 2001).  
 
Ahmed describes borders as being constructed by fear (2004a: 128). While her 
focus is on borders between social groups, and particularly ‘race’ and nation, her 
depiction of fear as defining borders from which one reified group stands apart, so 
that the ‘other’ becomes the ‘not’ (128) is interesting for the questions it raises in 
terms of what might be feared about the ‘Animal’. For it is not the object per se that 
is feared, but rather what ‘it’, as the reified construction of the Animal (or the 
Terrorist or the Immigrant), represents that needs to be somehow held back, and 
more specifically, what a transgression of the border or boundary might mean for 
the dominant group (132)—is it simply a loss of primacy? I will be exploring the 
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role of emotions further in Part III, but for now continue with theorisations of the 
human/animal boundary. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, some posthuman and ecofeminist scholars such as 
Haraway (1990), Whatmore (2002), Plumwood (2001) and Warren (1997) argue 
that the perception of boundaries, and the binaries or dualisms that they define—
between culture/nature, human/animal, male/female and many more, needs to be 
“jettisoned” (Whatmore 2002:159). Against all perceived manifestations of 
anthropocentrism, they advocate for the “deconstruction of symbolic, discursive, 
institutional and material arrangements that produce the category ‘human’ as 
something unique, distinct, and at the centre of the world” (Pederson 2011: 67). 
Minimizing boundaries is often undertaken as a rejection of human exceptionalism, 
defined as “the idea that humankind is radically different and apart from the rest of 
nature and from other animals”, in preference for a “human/animal continuity” 
(Plumwood 2007: 1) of “mutually affective” relations (Latimer and Miele 2013: 5) 
that emphasise “alongsideness” (Latimer 2013).   
 
The understanding of a human/animal continuity. i.e. the absence of a boundary, is 
used in relation to ethical and sustainable meat to support continued (and in some 
cases renewed) practices involving ‘food’ animals and their flesh.  For example, 
Maria (C), who had a brief encounter with vegetarianism as a teenager, asserts 
kinship with all animals and characterises humans as “in the food chain”. Consumer 
Anne, who had a similarly brief stint eschewing meat, remarks on the “ethical 
dangers for humans in setting themselves above nature…divorcing ourselves from 
the food chain”, or as Joyce (C) puts it, being “in denial about humans being 
animals”. These narratives directly reference the human exceptionalism argument 
notable in the work of Plumwood (2004) and Haraway (2010) (who are cited 
specifically by two of my participants), and also Bennett (2010), who theorise 
human/nonhuman relations as a mutual “becoming with” in an undifferentiated 
assemblage of all “vibrant matter” (Haraway 2008; Bennett 2010). As Maria (C) 
comments: 
 
In some ways the same human exceptionalism that allows us to treat animals 
the way we do in the industrial system, saying, well I’m human, I don’t need 
to eat meat, therefore I won’t, is also a form of human exceptionalism 
because it says well, we are different in the food chain because we have 
morality and ethics. … We are also animals and so whilst we don’t have to 
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eat meat we are also food, you know, and we are being fed on all the time by 
all sorts of organisms that we would not like to think about. 
 
This system of knowledge also informs Alison’s (P) assertion that, “I don’t have a 
problem with eating something that would probably want to eat me”. Alison is one 
of four producers who have previously been or are currently (Florence) vegetarian, 
in her case for five to six years. With her family, she now eats meats one or two 
times a day. However, as explained above, there is an element of evasiveness in this 
understanding of human/animal continuity, especially in putting humans on par 
with other animals as prey—that “we are all here together, …we share what we do” 
(Gillian C). James (P) astutely points to the truth of the matter when he ponders 
“what it’d be like if someone ate us, …if we actually…were farmed or had a 
predator”. As he intimates, while we may have once been more embedded in the 
food chain, where the possibility of encounters with ‘something that would 
probably want to eat you’ (including other humans) would have been very real and 
more common, that has not been the case for centuries and we have never been 
farmed for our meat. 
 
Arguments for theoretically ‘jettisoning’ the human/animal binary are problematic 
for the “detachment from the actual life conditions of animals” (Pederson 2011: 67) 
that it can foster, and its tendency to minimise the very real differences between 
humans and other animals in their capacities to affect the lives of others. This is a 
view supported by Pederson and other CAS scholars (e.g. Weisberg 2009; Twine 
2010b; Cudworth 2011; Deckha 2012; Giraud 2013). For animals that are 
genetically designed, bred, raised and used for food, notions of a mutually affective 
continuity seem particularly untenable. Until such time as practice falls in line with 
theoretical ideals, there is an ongoing need to acknowledge dualisms, understand 
the mechanisms behind their construction and maintenance, and determine how 
they can be transcended practically and not just theoretically. My participants’ 
accounts of their (ethical) relation to ‘food’ animals and nature, which evince an 
implicit speciesism, and also anthroparchy, illustrate this need.   
 
In sum, the continuity perspective that views humans as part of the planet’s ecology 
along with all other animals in a kind of natural symbiosis, while being 
theoretically, biologically accurate, fails to acknowledge the disproportionate 
impact that humans have on earth. Testifying to this is the proposed recognition of 
the Anthropocene as an official geological epoch, as mentioned in the introduction 
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to this thesis. Therefore, contrary to its anti-dualistic intent, the notion of an 
idealised human-animal continuity, as advanced by Plumwood (2002), Haraway 
(2008), and others, and reflected in discourses of ethical and sustainable meat (Bost 
2012; King 2017; Mark 2017), conceals, justifies, and reinforces persistently 
dualistic practices of animal use. A prevalent and enduring discontinuity between 
the categories ‘human’ and ‘animal’ supports the persistent use of animals as food. 
It is, therefore, the architecture of this discontinuity that I seek to understand.  
 
ii. Stable and unstable ‘food’ animals 
Despite anti-exceptionalist intents and justifications, we live in a fundamentally 
speciesist society where all nonhuman animal ‘others’ are potential food for humans 
but humans should never (normally) be food for other animals. Given the open 
pantry that speciesism then permits, what is regarded as acceptable to eat depends 
on a swathe of interconnected meanings, knowledges, skills and materials. These 
constructions can themselves be potent enough to dissolve the species barrier and 
the taboo of human flesh when human ‘others’ are so othered as to become 
animalised and thereby edible.35 Notions of edibility are therefore theoretically 
unstable. Besides notions of ‘naturalness’, they are tied to broader meanings and 
locations of ‘otherness’ and the entitlements assumed under these conceptions. This 
highlights the falsity of viewing practices or ‘behaviours’ involving meat and 
animals as isolated entities or individual performances, and also of attempting to 
untangle the dizzying array of elements that shape the practices associated with 
ethical and sustainable meat that I am concerned with here. Next, I provide a more 
detailed analysis of how the edibility of animals is constituted as part of practices 
involving ethical and sustainable meat, and from this, discern what appear to be the 
most resilient connections. In doing so, I am necessarily selective in the practices I 
examine; although I acknowledge that other practices support the edibility of 
animals, detailed investigation is the work of further, multiple studies. 
 
Most of my participants are very assured in identifying what animals they will and 
will not eat. There are certain animals they would never consider eating. For 
instance, Henry (C) initially had trouble describing an animal that he would not 
eat, but was then quick to qualify: “within reason—I’m not going to eat a whale or 
                                                
35 These cannibalistic outcomes are rare and extreme cases; however, the animalisation of 
many human ‘others’, as individuals or groups, is widely recognised and acknowledged as 
contributing to practices of exclusion, oppression and violence. 
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a turtle”, as if that would be ‘of course’ unthinkable. For Henry, who spent five 
years as a vegetarian, the understanding of an animal as endangered renders it non-
edible, despite his gastronomic adventurousness. James (P) similarly says he would 
“certainly not [eat] anything that’s endangered”. The speculative implication here is 
that it is the endangered status of some animals that guards against their edibility 
(notwithstanding that the appellation ‘endangered’ is also largely socially 
constructed albeit in relation to concrete conditions in ‘nature’, see Sutton 2004: 
65). Anne (C) alludes to “freaky” animals as being the only ones she would not eat, 
“like, I wouldn’t go to Africa and eat a monkey or China and eat a dog or 
something like that [laughs]”. And yet, these ‘freaky’ animals that are ‘outside’ 
reason might hold a different meaning for another person. For example, Oliver (P) 
describes himself as “pretty versatile, I’ve eaten monkeys, I’ve eaten lots of you 
know, different [animals/species]…”.  
 
The meanings humans associate with these variably ‘off-limit’ animals can therefore 
change depending on the practice. Given that meanings are malleable, then within 
the universally normalised understanding of nonhuman animals as a natural 
resource (to be eaten, or otherwise used, as per Brophy 1965, Benton 1993, 
Cudworth 2003 and others) these endangered, ‘freaky’, weird, or companion 
animals could theoretically become edible, or, in the language of Deuteronomy, 
shift from being unclean to clean.  
 
Mary Douglas’ notions of dirt and purity come to mind here. For some, to think of 
a certain animal as food transgresses a boundary of edible purity. Given such a 
situation, the animal, or their flesh, would become “matter out of place” (Douglas 
2002: 36). Hence the sense of revulsion and danger that is evoked by the thought of 
eating something that is considered ‘dirty’, i.e. contaminated by virtue of being out 
of order. As Douglas elaborates, “[d]irt is the by-product of a systematic ordering 
and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate 
elements” (2002: 36). However, as indicated above, the constitution of certain 
animals as unclean or ‘dirty’ in terms of edibility does not negate the possibility of 
them becoming edible. Rather, the socially determined appropriateness of this 
edibility construes it merely as dangerous depending to what extent it is “likely to 
confuse or contradict cherished classifications” (Douglas 2002: 37). In the ongoing 
process of (re)defining such ‘dirty’ and out of place matter, these ‘pure’ 
classifications of edibility, e.g. the ‘clean’ cow, pig, sheep, chicken, are strengthened, 
the stability of their position emphasised in the process of identifying and naming 
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what absolutely does not belong, e.g. the freaky, the endangered, the companion. 
These determinations, constitutions, and (re)definitions of edibility are the product 
of practices undertaken within different time-spaces, which shape the level of 
danger perceived in the transgression of boundaries between pure and dirty. 
However, they also underscore the implicit edibility of all animals and the 
arbitrariness of related classifications where the degree rather than the fact of their 
edibility is what is open to change.  
 
To illustrate, animals generally regarded as pets, such as dogs, present greater 
resistance to being thought of as food. A lot of my participants housed a canine 
companion or two and they often volunteered that there was no question of their 
being eaten—“it’s just not a meat that you’d eat” as Florence (P) explains, and as 
Anne (C) also indicated above. As we sit in her living room with her two dogs, one 
sitting on the sofa beside me, Grace (C) exclaims, “I wouldn’t eat the dogs”, and 
Florence (P) speaks for her uncle when she says, “he wouldn’t eat his pet dog”. 
However, as with ‘endangered’, ‘freaky’, and weird, there is the implication and 
potential that dogs can be ‘un-petted’ to become edible. Dan (C), who also has 
dogs, and was both vegetarian and vegan for nine years, is a little ambiguous when 
he speculates that he would “really struggle eating a dog if I was in you know south 
east Asia where it was on the menu”. It is not clear from Dan’s statement what the 
outcome of that struggle would be. Maria (C), who also has a canine companion, 
“would probably be willing to try dog meat”, while Helen (C) observes that “in 
Tonga, it’s quite common and quite acceptable to eat dog”.  
 
Eating horses is met with slightly less resistance, perhaps owing to their greater 
mobility and acceptance across multiple categories and practices—sport, 
entertainment, pets, labour, fashion (horse hair), food and wild animals—as 
compared with dogs who are more generally regarded as pets (though dogs can 
also be wild, labour, entertainment, food and, more deceptively, fashion). The 
danger their edible flesh presents to ‘cherished classifications’ is therefore lessened. 
Melanie (P) keeps and breeds ponies and says with astonishment “I don’t eat them 
[laughs]”. But Alison (P), who also keeps horses, is less adamant—“I probably 
wouldn’t eat horse”. Then there is Blake (P) who admits “there’s probably nothing 
wrong with horse meat” and Geoffrey (C) a committed carnivore who has also 
“eaten horse before in Europe”. These examples highlight the permeability of edible 
boundaries depending on negotiations between variable meanings associated with 
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practices that involve ‘food’ across time and space (negotiations I will explore 
further in Part III). 
 
The transgression from dirty to pure, or unclean (inedible) to clean (edible) can 
also work the other way, from edible to inedible, and is equally dangerous to the 
normal ordering of animals. Stepping away from my participants for a moment, a 
prominent, and revealingly problematic, instance of this is illustrated by the 
following story of Baa the sheep. I include it here as I will make reference to Baa’s 
situation at several points in my thesis, including the conclusion. 
 
In 2000, a Melbourne man purchased a three-year old ewe from a nearby farm. 
After nearly 11 years, during which time Baa had become this man’s beloved pet, 
he was forced to engage in a lengthy and expensive court battle to fight a council 
ruling that prohibited keeping ‘livestock’ on a suburban block. He fought the ruling 
for the next two years, costing him hundreds of thousands of dollars, but ultimately 
lost. By this time, at the age of 16, Baa had developed cancer. Her health steadily 
declined over the following year and she died at the age of 17 at home with her 
owner. He described his relationship with her as “true love” and that he had not 
expected to have such joy with her. On her last day, she was “still wagging her 
head” (Townsend 2014).  
 
This story demonstrates the effect that the (taxonomical) naming, classifying and 
‘ordering’ of animals has on the stability of associated practices, and the ways both 
discourse and practices work to reproduce and reinforce these orders and limit 
opportunities for transgression. By contesting the incongruity and, more 
proscriptively, the illegality of treating a sheep—i.e. livestock, natural resource, 
food—like a pet in Australia, Baa becomes a heterotopic site where normalised 
orders are disturbed and subverted.36 However, for most of my participants, 
transgressions from edible to inedible are less radical. 
 
Effecting a more ambiguous form of boundary blurring, the popularity of keeping 
pigs as pets has spread in recent years (Blakemore 2011; Major 2017), and the 
focus of breeding practices has expanded from improving their economic and 
                                                
36 Due in part to their constitution as livestock according to the National Livestock 
Identification System (NLIS). As such, in Australia, as in most Western nations, they are 
subject to a different set of welfare guidelines and codes of practice than ‘companion 
animals’. 
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gustatory value to humans, to include aesthetic values such as size, colouring, other 
physical traits, and temperament, in a similar way to dogs.37 Whether this has led to 
the increased recognition of their intelligence, or vice versa, is unclear, and probably 
a little of both. However, this intelligence, especially when likened to dogs, causes 
pigs to be the typically farmed edible animal whose boundaries have become less 
solid and more easily transgressed than those for cows, sheep, and chickens.  
 
On the one hand, pigs are generally celebrated for the variety of ways their flesh 
can be treated and the different types of meat that can be produced (Villas 2011; 
Pearsall 2015)—sentiments also shared by my participants, as Gillian (C), a former 
vegetarian and vegan of 16 years, illustrates:  
 
I like pork, pork is really flexible in what you can do with it, preserved meat 
as well as lunch meats and cooking. …I don't do a lot of pork cutlets or pork 
roasts but I do have bacon and I have lardons and lard [laughs], …and if I 
make soup it’s got the bacon rinds in it, …so you can use everything of the 
animal, that's what I love about it. 
 
Andrew (P) agrees, “pigs are just amazing animals, in that you can use so much of 
[them]”. Bacon, pork belly, salamis and even blood pudding feature prominently 
throughout my participants’ accounts and pigs are commonly agreed to make a 
significant and prized ‘contribution’ to the available range of edible meat products, 
as Maria (C) explains, “pork can go into so many things, …pork belly, bacon, 
pancetta, …the flavour is in the fat”. The pig is often the animal that provokes a 
(humorous) sense of the inevitability of its flesh being eating, and its power to 
‘break’ vegetarians and vegans, as Gillian (C) recalls, “bacon was a problem, oh 
boy, [groans, laughs], and that was what broke me”. Their ‘efficiency’ and 
usefulness is also admired. Considered the “tractors” of the farm, their talent for 
“digging up the earth” (Alison P) means they “go through [the land], turn it all 
over, get rid of all the weeds” (Gillian C). They are also “very efficient…because 
you can feed them anything” (Geoffrey C).  
 
                                                
37 For example, see: http://americanminipigassociation.com/owners/ready-mini-pig-
owner/mini-pig-facts-myths/ , www.orangegrovefarmstinypigs.com/specific-breedsize-
standards- and also Cyranoski (2015). 
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On the other hand, there are participants for whom a recognition of the intelligence 
and ‘pet potential’ of pigs unsettles normalised understandings of their edibility. 
Speaking of her sons’ ambivalence about eating pork products, pescetarian Tracey 
(C) explains, “it’s the pet thing…they’ve seen pigs as pets”. Diane (C) simply says 
“pigs are smarter”, and similarly for David (C), “pigs are much more highly 
intelligent”. The straying of pigs from the traditional and comfortable conception of 
farm animals as just passive, “large bovine, ruminants” (Tracey C) presents a 
discernible challenge to ‘normal’ classifications and thus to practices. As Natalie 
(C) expresses, talking about how factory farming affects animals, “…particularly 
pigs because they are so intelligent and so beautiful, and there’s a part of me that 
thinks I really shouldn’t eat them”. For Finn, a producer who spent one year being 
vegetarian and now eats meat at  least once a day, “pork breaks my heart cos they’re 
just so smart, like they’re really smart animals” (emphasis added).  
 
But it is comparisons of this intelligence with dogs that reveal just how slippery and 
awkward the categories can become. Elaborating on her sons’ practices with regard 
to pork products, Tracey (C) continues: “it’s well known how smart pigs are. [My 
son’s] got dogs and they can correlate the fact that the pigs are smarter than their 
dogs”. Dan (C) notes “they’re pretty intelligent sentient animals”, then goes on to 
add, “especially now since having dogs I’m kind of like, feel a little bit awkward 
eating a pig”. Grace (C), slightly rueful of her own taste for bacon in light of 
developing a fondness for a particular pig at a local animal sanctuary describes how 
“he’s so friendly and he does tricks just like my dogs”.  
 
The edible ‘purity’ of pigs is being challenged for many participants to a greater 
extent than it is for cows, sheep and chickens. In effect, the normal system of 
knowledge relating to pigs is being altered in response to new knowledge. With 
additional meanings now being associated with ‘pig’ (intelligent and friendly) along 
with the traditional ones (efficient food, tractor), they are transgressing normalised 
boundaries, falling in and out of edibility depending on the practice. Nevertheless, 
in all cited cases, products made from pigs are still being eaten by these participants 
despite the chink in the food/pet boundary. This chink, or glimpse through at least 
one denominational grid (‘food’ animals), has only slightly increased the perceived 
level of danger in eating pigs. Except, that is, for current pescetarian Sophie (C), 
for whom pigs have so completely crossed over that she “couldn’t imagine eating a 
pig. Pigs are so intelligent, it’s like dogs”. The resilience of pigs’ general 
understanding as food is summed up by Graham (P), who keeps pigs, some of 
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whom are named. He emphasises their difference from “a complete pet”, saying 
“…ones that are named, pigs, you know they’re alright, their taste outweighs the…” 
—while trailing off here, it is clear that Graham means that their taste outweighs 
any level of attachment that comes from naming them.  
 
As observed previously in relation to horses, animals that are more equally and 
acceptably understood across multiple categories may cause problems around 
order. Dan (C) “really struggled” with eating rabbit “because I had pet rabbits as a 
kid and it just, the body parts were just way too familiar”, and Helen (C) does not 
eat them because “I had rabbits when I was a child”. More commonly however, for 
my participants, the understanding of rabbits as also wild and vermin, on top of 
being potential food, makes them fair game. Particular animals may also be 
removed from the food category by virtue of their ‘cuteness’. Natalie (C) has a “soft 
spot for ducks”, and Sophie (C) says simply “I like cows, I don’t want to eat them”. 
Such categorising can also exempt individual animals while keeping them 
collectively edible as a species. Describing all “viable backyard” animals as edible, 
including “poultry, guinea pigs, rabbits, even goats”, Julie (C), who eats meat once 
or twice a week, makes it clear that “we don’t eat our poultry, they’re too cute”. Yet 
cuteness is not an issue for Dan (C) with respect to “little baby lambs” because “I’m 
sorry, you taste too delicious”.   
 
While my data exhibit significant variation in whether certain species are perceived 
by producers and consumers solely as food or not, such determinations are clearly 
not purely reducible to simple personal attitudes and opinions about what is and is 
not edible. Rather they are an amalgam and manifestation of my participants’ much 
broader understandings—about life, consciousness, nature and human/animal 
relations—that are constantly evolving and being shaped through myriad 
connected discourses and practices. As Dan (C) indicates, his ‘decisions’ 
surrounding what he regards as edible stems from something much more complex:   
 
If an animal has a conscious awareness of self then I wouldn’t eat it because 
I wouldn’t eat another person, because they have a conscious sense of self, a 
storied sense of self that goes over time, a narrated sense of beginning, 
middle, end of who they are. I think possibly chimps have that and other 
higher kind[s] of primates so I wouldn’t choose to eat a chimp. 
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Similarly, for Sophie (C), the possibility of some kind of mutual connection with an 
animal is enough to disturb common boundaries around what is and is not edible: 
“If I could have a relationship with that animal potentially, I don’t really want to eat 
it”. Incidentally, seven months after conducting the interview with Sophie, she 
informed me that she had become vegan.  
 
Yet another way that the order of edible animals can be disturbed is their age. Ellis 
(C), a once-a-day meat eater, finds chicken “really problematic” because “most 
chicken you eat, even the [named product] ones would only be about eight weeks 
old”. As Will (P) says, “we call it chickens, we’re eating chicks”. Diane (C) feels the 
same about veal, which she “wouldn’t eat”, and, ever since breastfeeding her son, 
Natalie (C) avoids eating suckling animals because she “just related to it too much”. 
Tracey’s (C) husband also “has a big issue around things being too young” 
(emphasis added); however, as with animal classifications, determinations 
regarding what/who is ‘too young’ to eat are equally arbitrary.  
 
Unlike the aforementioned characteristics that my participants attribute to animals 
(e.g. intelligence, relatability), age does not seem to have the potential to exclude an 
entire species from being considered edible, but instead modifies under what 
circumstances it becomes edible. There is a small pocket of people in Melbourne 
whose distaste for the way approximately 800,000 ‘bobby’ calves are routinely 
slaughtered each year at a few days old (the legal minimum being five days) has 
prompted them to create ‘ethical’ veal that has had “some time” (usually around a 
couple of months) to run around “really enjoying their life” (Alison P). As Finn (P) 
explains on his website, “we sell grass fed veal…from fully weaned cattle, aged 
between four to six months. This may sound young, but in agricultural terms it is not. 
At least the animals have the opportunity to experience life” (emphasis added). The 
already arbitrary evaluation of an animal being ‘too young’ to eat can therefore be 
ameliorated by adopting an agricultural perspective, and drawing on similarly 
arbitrary evaluations of the alternatives, such as being ‘wasted’ as a by-product of 
the dairy industry, or “enjoying” a few weeks of life before being eaten—a notion I 
will shortly return to. ‘Waste’ here is defined in a way that prioritises a certain 
construction of value, for whether at five days or a few weeks old, the calf is still 
slaughtered and its carcass profitably used in cheesemaking and canned export 
products, as well as “pet food, leather goods, the pharmaceutical industry or to be 
processed into pink veal for human consumption” (Voiceless 2015).  
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Thus far, I have shown that the edibility of animals is shaped by a range of 
constructions and understandings that variously reinforce or unsettle the 
boundaries of the denominational grid that identifies them as food, pet, vermin, or 
labour (and also endangered or intelligent). In addition to illustrating the influence 
of naming, order and classification, these observations relating to animals’ edibility, 
including the story of Baa, are suffused with emotions. They trace, through 
discourse and related practices, attempts to navigate and negotiate between 
pleasant and less pleasant feelings. This process is a key element in my analysis of 
the persistence of meat and will be the focus of Part III. In the final part of this first 
chapter of Part II, I turn to the ways in which edible orders are maintained so that 
glimpses beyond Foucault’s grid do not constitute a significant threat to normalised 
classifications. 
 
iii. How discourse can inform practice  
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the categories and boundaries of 
order, although flexible and continually evolving, require work to maintain them. 
Through everyday practices, they are iteratively enforced and reinforced, and also 
occasionally challenged. One way in which challenges are negotiated—and 
thereafter deflected or incorporated in some way—is with recourse to dominant, 
normalised discourses. Such discourses serve to defend normalised categories and 
associated practices. But they can also be a test of the extent to which different 
understandings, and new constitutions of practices, and of animals, are ‘ready’ to 
emerge; i.e. whether they are considered sufficiently acceptable such that the 
dominant discourse starts to change. So far, new understandings and ways of 
thinking about ‘food’ animals (whether intelligent, potential pets, young) have not 
constituted a sufficient challenge for them to be considered wholly inedible, but 
have instead been incorporated to define a more sophisticated discourse that 
effectively doubles down on their edibility.  
 
Hence, in relation to ethical and sustainable meat, my research has identified a 
number of validating discourses that are drawn on to mount a more forceful and 
decisive defence of meat consumption and the use of animals as food – to maintain 
proper order when “aberration”, “defilement”, and “abomination” threaten “the 
margins of the lines” (Douglas 2002: 123 and various). I describe the first of these 
discourses next. The second and third are discussed in the following section. 
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Validating discourse No 1: The value of contingent life 
The ‘right to life’ argument, in relation to contingent beings, plays a fundamental 
role in shaping the common or ‘normal’ regard towards ‘food’ animals as a category, 
in policing its boundary, and therefore in reinforcing the persistence and resilience 
of associated practices. This discourse, which prioritises contingent life, holds that 
‘we’ have an obligation to grant life, any life, because life in and of itself is worth 
more than the quality of that life. Moves in support of ’ethical’ veal, as mentioned 
previously, are especially illustrative of this discourse but it appears more broadly 
across my data, underscoring my participants’ regard for animals and meat.  
 
Contingent beings are defined as those who do not (yet) exist and whose existence 
depends on particular practices, such as the killing and/or eating of existing 
animals. Their lives are thus understood as ‘contingent’ rather than ‘inevitable’ 
existence (Kagan 2015: 141). Valuing the lives of contingent beings above those of 
already existing beings is what Henry Salt describes as “the Logic of the Larder”. 
Under this logic, a ‘food’ animal’s few hours of suffering are perceived to outweigh 
the “enormous benefit of life” (1914: 1). Alison (P) illustrates this thinking, 
believing “there is something to do with the actual animals being born just as they 
would’ve been in nature, masses of animals being born and having a life”. From 
this, it follows that killing animals for food becomes “morally permissible and even 
obligatory” (Visak 2013: 130) as long as the animals lead pleasant lives and would 
not have otherwise existed.  
 
This is a logic that has proven resilient and recurs as a consistent theme in my data. 
As Gillian (C) explains, “if we didn’t eat them, they wouldn’t exist”. It is only by 
virtue of being eaten that they are ‘granted’ a life at all, for as Blake (P) exclaims, 
“if we all stopped eating meat, all the animals would die out, for sure”. Producers 
James and Andrew respectively echo this understanding: “If we weren’t eating him 
then he wouldn’t have lived”; and “if we weren’t here farming and eating the 
animals…they wouldn’t actually exist”. There is remarkable similarity in the ways 
this understanding about using animals as food is expressed, suggesting that it is a 
perspective that over time has taken on the unreflexive quality of accepted common 
lore. Some even construe this as a ‘deal’ that animals themselves have signed-up for, 
as producer Alison explains, they “understand they’re here for that, they’re actually 
here for us to use…animals accept that”. Grace (C) agrees “that’s the bargain in a 
way, animals have made”. (The attribution of subjectivity, thoughts and feelings to 
animals that is evident here will be explored in Part III). 
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However, the fallacy of this position is revealed by the “nonsense” of 
“predicating…happiness or unhappiness, of that of which we can predicate 
nothing” (Salt 1914). Put more simply, “non-existent animals cannot benefit from 
being caused to exist” (Visak 2013: 136). Hence, bargaining on the value of such 
contingent lives, and constructing the ’kindness’ of bringing them into being to 
justify the killing of existing animals for food, even very happy animals, does not 
endure scrutiny. For “killing an animal which otherwise could have continued a 
happy life counts as a welfare loss” (ibid: 135). 
 
A pivotal tenet in the discourse of contingent life is the naturalness of this 
arrangement, as Alison (P) and Grace (C) illustrate above. Indeed, earlier in this 
chapter, in the section titled ‘Human/Animal Discontinuity’, I described how 
participants draw on the notion of humans being part of nature to legitimise their 
eating of animals as participation in the ‘natural’ food chain. While naturalising the 
edibility of nonhuman animals in general, these discourses also foreground the 
social construction of nature and the targeted application of naturalisation this then 
allows for, which provides the basis of my second and third validating discourses.  
 
iv. ‘Natural’ food animals and meat 
Thinking on nature  
In tackling conceptions of what is ‘natural’ in my data, I am not only engaging with 
theorisations of ‘nature’, variably understood as the physical, material and natural 
world (Castree and Braun 2005). What is regarded as ‘natural’ does of course play 
off, and leverage, the idea of ‘nature’ as a real entity or force that exists outside the 
reach and influence of humankind. However, mirroring my participants’ observed 
orientations, I conceive it also as a quality that suggests something or somebody 
exhibits characteristics of belonging more in ‘nature’, or more in their/its ‘true 
nature’, with both positive and negative interpretations of that depending on the 
intention behind the association. 
 
Therefore, drawing on Williams, who described nature as “perhaps the most 
complex word in the [English] language” (1985: 219), and later Demeritt (2002), 
my conception of ‘naturalness’ as it relates to ‘food’ animals and meat includes the 
following three ‘types’ and understandings of nature: 
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1. The essential quality or character of something. 
2. An inherent force that directs the world or humankind or both. 
3. The external material world itself 
 
Rather than which of Demeritt’s ‘natures’ are invoked by my participants when 
they talk about what is ‘natural’, I am instead interested in how something (meat) or 
someone (‘food’ animals) is understood as ‘natural’—how they/it are ‘naturalised’.  
 
The process of naturalization  
In the context of consumption, Richard Wilk defines naturalisation as when wants 
are defined as needs, taken out of contention and embodied as (natural) taste, urge 
and impulse (2002: 10). They become so naturalised they are not given any 
conscious thought (Wilk 2009: 150). Wilk distinguishes two types of naturalisation: 
submersive, where wants and needs unaligned with the status quo are not able to 
be expressed and remain buried as the existing order of ‘natural’ needs is 
conformed to; and repressive (though perhaps oppressive is a better word), where 
wants and desires are elevated “to the status of [natural] needs by legitimising 
them, linking them to existing needs, or stigmatising alternatives” (2002:11; also 
2009). I will provide evidence of both types of naturalisation in my data; however, 
it is the latter that is particularly salient for considering how certain ‘knowledges’ 
and ‘truths’ regarding ‘food’ animals and meat are constituted and how they 
construe the associated domination of animals as an unproblematic, and even 
ethical, facet of normal human/animal relations. This technique of naturalisation is 
typically, though not always, successful; as Wilk comments, “I have seen struggles 
with parents over the question of whether eating meat is ‘natural,’ and sometimes 
children win and develop a new definition of a normal diet” (2002: 11).  
 
The goal of naturalisation (as a process), Wilk says, is “to make some practices 
unthinkable while making others seem ‘normal’” (2002:11)—a further iteration of 
boundaries and categories. Implicit in the process of naturalisation then, is the 
normalisation of whatever conception, relation or practice is being naturalised, 
simply because it is construed as abiding by natural law. In other words, natural = 
normal, by decree of a higher-than-human authority. It enters into a realm of myth, 
which Barthes describes as a “system of communication” that confronts and 
“purifies” what might be considered socially problematic by making it seem 
“innocent…natural and eternal” (1972: 93, 132). The perceived clarity and ‘truth’ 
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of such myths does not come by way of explanation but the statement of fact that is 
beyond critique (Barthes 1972: 143). As I will shortly discuss, a link is evident here 
with my participants’ ‘knowledge’ of ‘proper’ and ‘right’ ways to kill animals, 
especially in the expressed preference for hunting wild ‘meat’, commonly described 
as more ‘natural’. 
 
Naturalisation has been widely used to account for relations of social inequality 
(Barthes 1972; Goodman and Redclift 1991; Guthman 2008; Nayak 2006). For 
instance, the still persistent myth that women are ‘naturally’ less or more [insert 
subordinating adjective here] than men (Adams 1991; Alloun 2015), and of course 
the many means by which perceived ‘race’ distinctions are naturalised. It is also 
used to explain how human-made entities and objects become part of everyday 
practices (Spaargaren 2011; Couldry 2001). These constructions feed off 
connotations of nature so that they become imbued with a sense of inviolable truth 
and inevitability, as Barthes (1972) observes. In this way, “‘naturalness [becomes] 
constituted through discursively constrained performative acts” (Butler 1990: 
xxxi). A further example is the term ‘natural resource’, a myth that delivers up the 
use of a designated resource as natural, right and inevitable (Tovey 2003). The 
advantage of drawing on common understandings of what is ‘natural’ is that it 
allows associated discourses and practices to leverage the fallacy of an appeal to 
nature. This fallacy holds that what is ‘natural’ is inherently right or good and what 
is ‘unnatural’ is inherently wrong or bad. It then follows that discourses or practices 
that run counter to what is normatively constituted as right and good are going 
against nature.  
 
Naturalization of certain ‘food’ animals, ‘meats’, and practices of production and 
consumption contributes in the same way to upholding species inequality (Joy 
2009; Twine 2012; Iveson 2013) and is prevalent in my data. Having established 
animals’ general edibility in the previous section, my focus for the rest of this 
section is therefore where and how the process of naturalisation is applied to 
further distinguish more natural, i.e. ‘good’ and ‘ethical’, animals and meat. In 
relation to their meaty practices, participants use a range of words to denote 
something less artificial and therefore ‘good’ or ‘better’—closer to some (mythical) 
understanding of nature. Besides nature/natural, these include ‘genuine’, 
’authentic’, ‘normal’, ’pure’, ‘real’, ‘proper’. I therefore consider below how the 
‘natural’ is constituted in relation to ethical and sustainable meat through the use of 
all these words. My analysis of naturalization is presented in two parts, which I 
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have identified as constituting two further validating discourses (in addition to that 
concerning the value of contingent life discussed in the previous section). The first 
discourse is characterised by uncritical invocations of the ‘rightness’ of ‘nature’ and 
associated determinations of what is ‘natural’, which contribute to the 
naturalisation of certain animals, meats and practices. The second construes all that 
is ‘natural’ as inherently benevolent, which adds an enhanced and more ‘productive’ 
(after Foucault) sense of ‘goodness’ to what is already considered ethical.  
 
Validating discourse No 2: Invoking ‘nature’. 
Above all other ‘meats’, the flesh of wild animals is regarded by many of my 
participants as the most ethical because, as Beverley (C) says, “[the animal] can 
live a natural life rather than a kind of weird farmed environment that’s not natural 
for it”. Beverley spent just over a year being vegetarian and now eats meat once a 
month on average. Pescetarian Sophie (C) is of the same mind. She not only 
regards these animals as “natural wildlife”, but the act of killing them as “sort of 
how it would happen naturally”— “natural hunting” as Beverley (C) describes it. 
This imbues practices that involve hunting and eating ‘wild’ animals with a sort of 
purity, less blemished by human intervention—matter more in place. However, 
unlike Beverley (C), most of my participants do not think a farmed environment is 
‘weird’ and perceive “traditional” farming as natural. Practices and elements of 
‘traditional’ farming, such as pastures, grazing, and rotation, then become ‘natural’ 
by association and furthermore part of a complete system that constitutes farming 
as a way of caring for, regenerating, and supporting key elements of ‘nature’ such as 
ecosystems, soils, and biodiversity. 
 
Speaking of his farm as a whole, Andrew (P) describes his efforts to “get a more 
natural system in place”, a system that ‘necessarily’ includes animals in a biological 
(i.e. natural) interaction between soil and plants. Graham (P) also appeals to the 
natural sciences to naturalise farming, explaining how “the whole soil life, the 
biology and everything, it’s all tied in together, it’s tied in with different animals”. 
“If you take animals out of that system” Andrew (P) explains, “you get woodlands 
or more complicated kinds of forests, so…”—the implication being that woodlands 
and complicated systems are undesirable in some way and grasslands are natural. 
In response to being asked to consider food systems without animals, Simon (P) 
asks, “what’s going to happen to our grasslands?” This is redolent of the common 
discourse surrounding what are judged to be ‘wastelands’ with no intrinsic value 
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and therefore best put to (typically economic) use (Baka 2013). As committed 
meat-eater David (C) says, referring to large tracts of Australia, it is “space that 
really is only suited to pasture”. Hence the land is perceived and defined in terms of 
its ‘natural’ potential as a place to raise ‘food’ animals. Trevor (P) describes his area 
of farmland as having a “relatively high stocking rate”, while James (P) endeavours 
to maintain a “very low stocking rate” because “it’s more natural”, the implicit 
assumption being that there is a baseline stocking rate as defined by nature.  
 
‘Nature’ becomes almost reified as a living and even thinking entity, with Florence 
(P) describing sustainable farming as “the way it should be and that nature would 
like it to be”. A distinct system of thought or knowledge becomes evident wherein 
‘the soil’ and ‘ecosystems’ are understood as needing to be cared for by humans, 
and where ethical/sustainable farming systems are seen as the way to achieve this 
because they are “so beneficial to the soil…that’s the way it should be” (Will P). 
Gillian (C) believes “healthy soil needs animals as part of it”, and Bella (P), another 
formerly vegetarian producer (of seven years), similarly stresses the importance of 
“doing the right thing by the soil” by having animals as part of “a really nice 
system”. Animals “keep the ecosystem going”, says Geoffrey (C), by eating grass 
and fertilising the land. As Florence (P) explains, the way “to return [the land] to 
its natural state” is by farming in the right way, an ethical way, where everything is 
“treated humanely”, including the animals and the environment.  
 
The naturalness of ethical and sustainable farming systems as described by my 
participants is constructed in opposition to ‘unnatural’ practices. For example, 
Florence (P) describes farming “more intensely”, and creating “dusty, dirty 
paddocks”, remarking “how awful that would be, and how unnatural”. While the 
“high tech and unnecessary” process of producing in vitro meat prompts former 
vegetarian Heather (C) to declare her “preference for low tech natural processes”, 
i.e. farming animals. For ethical farming practices are ‘known’ to be not only ‘good’ 
and ‘natural’ for the soil, ecosystems and the land, but also for the animals involved. 
 
An alternate system of knowledge, one that suspends the normalised boundaries 
and categories that divide up the ‘natural’ world according to anthroparchal 
constitutions of purpose and value, might offer a different view of this farming 
‘nature’. Several authors have remarked that the agricultural landscape so widely 
regarded as ‘natural’ is the result of centuries of environmental and habitat 
destruction (Redman 1999; Nibert 2013) – a destruction that has steadily 
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intensified to the present day (Grigg and Halford 2013; Tanentzap et al. 2015). 
Some have even questioned the benefits of the Agricultural Revolution (Larsen 
2006; Harari 2011), with Jared Diamond (1987) going so far as to describe it as 
the worst mistake in human history.  
 
The history of agriculture and human’s domestication of animals challenges the 
conception of any farming landscape as natural. However, the normalised discourse 
that invokes nature helps to maintain the practices and material constitutions 
(landscapes, animals, meat etc.) of ‘food’ animal farming as seemingly inviolable. As 
Wilk (2002) explained, the appeal to nature reframes a want as a natural need. In 
so doing it effaces the acts and conditions of domination that are involved in 
turning animals into meat. Relatedly, but also distinctively, the discourse of 
naturalness also fosters a sense of the benevolence of associated systems and 
practices—the goodness that they bestow on animals, communities and individuals. 
This sense of benevolence constitutes the third validating discourse. 
 
Validating discourse No 3: The benevolence of the ‘natural’ contract 
The producers and consumers I interviewed commonly refer to the ‘natural’ 
environments in which ‘food’ animals live, where they are able to exhibit their 
‘natural’ behaviours. As Nicki (C) says, ethical farming practices enable farmers to 
“look after their [animals] naturally”—to give them “the right sort of life” (David 
C). The ‘knowledge’ that this life constitutes these animals’ ‘natural’ environment is 
widely shared among my participants. Trevor (P) says it is where “they naturally 
should be”—living their life, according to Will (P), “the way nature intended”. 
Simon (P) maintains it is where they are able to exhibit “their natural behaviour”, 
“do things that come more naturally to them” (Ellis C) and “have a quality of life” 
(Alison P).  
 
There are a lot of hidden and commonly unacknowledged assumptions underlying 
the notions that, first, there is a ‘natural’ environment that can be associated with 
farmed ‘food’ animals, and second that there are ‘natural’ behaviours that will be 
facilitated by such environments. However, an examination of these assumptions 
might prove problematic as they raise questions that are not easily answered 
regarding, for example, how natural such long-domesticated and genetically altered 
animals can be said to be in the first place; how the ‘naturalness’ of their behaviours 
can be determined given this domestication and genetic modification; and the 
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extent to which their farmed environments can be described as natural. 
Understandings of ‘food’ animals being in “their natural environment” (Melanie P 
and James P), and “doing what the animal naturally is going to do” (Damien C) 
are nevertheless drawing on the normative discourse of nature. As discussed 
previously, this discourse does the work of naturalizing ‘food’ animals and 
associated practices, and is also reinforced by being set against what are 
simultaneously constituted as ‘unnaturally’ harmful practices (e.g. factory farming, 
cages, feedlots) that effectively go against this nature. 
 
After conducting some informal research into raising backyard rabbits as food, 
Heather (C) decided, “it’s not very natural actually” (implying an understanding 
that other ways of raising ‘food’ animals are). Blake (P) similarly invokes the 
“terrible conditions” of a commercial piggery, and Will (P) the shock of “seeing 
what happens in a feedlot or a confined animal factory operation”. Highlighting 
how “unnatural” they are (Blake P), ethical/sustainable farming practices are 
depicted as “more natural” in comparison (Will P). My participants consistently 
draw on and articulate a common ‘knowledge’ that it is through ethical farming 
practices that, as Graham (P) says, “animals are grown properly” in ways that take 
their individual well-being into consideration. The farmers applying these ethical 
principles are in turn described in benevolent terms. Because they “pretty much go 
all out…to make it natural, healthy, happy for the animal” (Heather C), the farmers 
are seen as “doing the right thing…it’s all very real and genuine” (Florence P). 
Jennifer (P) describes the lives of such farmers as “based around being 
authentic…with absolutely everything they do”.  
 
Linked to my participants concerns, authenticity is a common trope in studies of 
consumption (Beverland et al. 2008; Leigh 2006; Banet-Weiser 2012), and 
especially consumption of food (Beverland et al. 2010; Weiss 2012; Simunaniemi et 
al. 2013; Pratt 2008). Jeffrey Pratt conceives one of the two main forms of 
‘reconnection’ advocated in the alternative food space is with “the genuine or 
authentic” in contrast to “the artificial or adulerated” (56). The other reconnection 
is with a “personalised set of economic relations” as opposed to “the impersonality 
of the market”. I have already shown how a ‘knowledge’ of local food and its 
relation to the personal and community sphere is placed in opposition to the 
impersonal industrialised system in order to add another distinguishing dimension 
to constructions of meat that is ethical, ‘good’ and ‘natural’. Indeed, my participants 
describe such local systems as being also more genuine and authentic. The 
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interchangeable use of particular words—local, ethical, good, natural, genuine, 
authentic—with the collective intent to define something ‘better’ does not mean that 
there is agreement on what that ‘better’ is, as I have also illustrated. However, there 
is a common sensibility in my participants’ range of ‘knowledges’ surrounding 
ethical and sustainable meat by which particular notions are placed together, or in 
close proximity, where they can “become synonymous, or at least immediately 
evoke each other”. For example, when free range becomes authentic and also 
natural. Pratt (2008) describes this as a “pre-set discursive field—that of the 
natural, the organic, the local, the rooted, the distinctive, the authentic”, and he 
connects this field “precisely” with the romantic tradition.  
 
It is this discursive field of romantic “folksy charm” that Anne-Marie Todd (2009) 
identifies in her analysis of the construction of “Happy Cows and Passionate 
Beefscapes” in food advertising. ‘Natural’ landscapes and ‘food’ animals are 
foregrounded amid allusions to what has been ‘lost’—“solitude, wilderness, lush 
landscapes, free-flowing water, and clean air” (172, citing Corbett 2006). But the 
consumer can regain some part of this loss through the consumption and literal 
embodiment of these natural, happy animals. She similarly observes that nature is 
frequently personified and also the animals anthropomorphised (a feature of my 
data that I will discuss in Part IV), to portray a pastoral idyll that is “steeped in 
community values…simple pleasures and down-home values” (Todd 2009: 174). 
Table 3 illustrates how the producers that I interviewed endeavour to tap into this 
discursive field to create similar associations with their animals, farming practices 
and meat in their promotional materials. 
 
With these promotional materials, under so-called “old-fashioned”, “natural” and 
“traditional farming methods”, the paddocks and pastures required for raising 
‘food’ animals, and the practices of grazing and rotation, become ‘natural’ by 
association. They come to be understood as part of an ethical, holistic and above all 
natural system. ‘Farming’ animals, or raising them for meat, is thereby conflated 
with “respecting”, “regenerating”, “nurturing”, “enhancing”, caring for, and 
generally supporting key elements of this ‘nature’ including its ecosystems, soils, 
and biodiversity. 
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Table 3. Authentic, natural and sustainable idylls within producers’ promotional 
materials. 
Farm Animals 
- The farm is fully sustainable, a running creek 
and dams on the property 
- environmental farming principles 
- care of the natural biology and enhancing 
our biodiversity - ecologically sustainable 
farming practices 
- sustainable philosophy 
- regenerating land – a holistic farming 
system. Natural and ethical farming. Our 
philosophy of farming naturally  
- support local farmers - local, ethically grown 
chickens - operates within the ecological 
boundaries of our property, regenerating the 
land & soil. 
- a truly sustainable way to farm. 
- clean natural farming practices. 
- respecting the land that we farm 
- environmentally sustainable and ethical 
- Environmentally sustainable. ...sustainable 
farming practices 
- sustainable, organic/biodynamic, non-
chemical/no-hormone practices - health of the 
land and water for future generations, build 
connections with local families 
- Our animals are happy and stress free… 
grow in a natural and healthy environment 
- Free Range Pigs are happy pigs. 
- Our pigs live as pigs are meant to 
- Our cattle lead a contented low-stress life 
live a happy life out in the open 
- ‘Beyond’ Free range, pasture-raised, 
ethically grown…allowing the behavioural 
instincts be real. 
- raised the old fashioned way 
- true free range, outside, cage free and 
happy animals 
- Our animals roam free across our 
paddocks, eating beautiful green pasture 
- Organic – Grass-fed – Ethical 
- Our lovely animals graze on native 
pastures and live and grow the way Nature 
intended. 
- Natural Beef. 
- clean, wholesome, natural beef and 
lamb… genuine seasonal lamb. 
...traditionally aged 
 
Whether or not these producers’ practices can indeed be judged ‘better’ than others 
is not in question. The point is that the discursive field they are tapping into evokes 
certain images and emotions and fosters an association with the meat that comes 
from animals raised on such farms as equally ‘real’, ‘clean’, ‘genuine’, ‘pure’ and 
‘natural’. In other words, it shapes how they are made sense of. Anderson and 
Barrett (2016: 11) demonstrate that, based on three different descriptions of how 
animals were raised (either humanely, on a factory farm, and a control description), 
participants in their study “were willing to pay the most for meat paired with the 
humane description”. Geoffrey (C) explains that as long as an animal has been 
raised “correctly”, meaning, “in the sun, on the pastures, eating grass, kind of just 
hanging around and being happy”, then he regards that as “optimal” and therefore 
the more ethical meat to eat. The promoted authenticity and benevolence of 
producers’ clean, real, and natural farming practices contribute to constitutions of 
‘good’ meat (as I will discuss in the next chapter). Hence, it is not only good or 
‘better’ meat as a consequence of being not factory farmed, or not from a 
supermarket. The broader goodness and benevolence associated with being also 
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natural enhances the ‘productive’ aspects of using animals ethically, in the same 
way, as I will show in the next chapter, it enhances the productive aspects of eating 
cows and sheep over pigs and chickens, of ‘wild’ hunted meat, and of backyard as 
opposed to slaughterhouse killing. These are all constituted as (more) ‘natural’ and 
therefore not just good but true and ‘right’. As producer Simon exclaims, “nature 
does it [i.e produces meat] naturally”. 
 
The intrinsic benevolence of what is constituted as ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ processes, 
which include ‘meat’, and notions around the ‘proper’ and ‘correct’ way to treat 
edible animals in return, frequently segue into references to a natural contract 
between humans and these animals. This contract is understood as one that is 
willingly entered into by ‘food’ animals, or is at least in their best interests. Joyce 
(C) describes some of the terms of this contract: 
 
The idea of a social contract between the animal and the human…like the 
trade-off that an animal makes for a life of never having to forage, never 
having to…be exposed to danger is the fact that it dies before its time. But 
maybe it dies before its time [in the wild] or maybe it would have died a 
horrible death you know as a piglet, aged 13 days or something, who 
knows”. 
 
Grace (C) similarly explains how the contract benefits ‘food’ animals: 
 
Animals are sort of in the evolutionary decision making thing, got 
domesticated…not to be treated the way we treat them, you know like on 
factory farms and stuff like that. I don’t think that’s what they agreed to, but 
if you look say a subsistence villages, you see pigs and chooks and guinea 
pigs or whatever running around without fences. They’re going to be eaten, 
but they’ve moved in with the people because it’s a guarantee…that their 
genes will be passed on. So I think there’s an element of, that’s the bargain 
in a way, animals have made. 
 
In support of the terms of this contract, there is a common narrative, illustrated in 
Joyce’s (C) comment above, whereby the lives of animals in the wild are construed 
as dangerous and harsh, and more especially their deaths as brutal and much worse 
than the ‘instant death’ of the slaughterhouse. Daily meat-eater Geoffrey (C) places 
a lot of weight on this argument and explains at length: 
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If we don't eat the meat, how else will it end its life? Do we let them rot and 
die of old age? Do we allow foxes and other predators to tear them apart as 
they are living?…It's like instant death so it doesn't really affect them, 
they’re never under stress or anything like that. The other option is if they 
just stayed on the farm and slowly withered away and died... I reckon it's 
actually a lot nicer for them just to have an instant death than if they were 
just roaming around on their own and died from breaking a leg or being 
attacked by another animal which would happen if they were just in the 
wild and us humans didn't eat them…Right now the meat I buy lives better 
than some humans. 
 
Former long-term vegan and vegetarian Dan (C) expresses a similar point of view: 
 
No-one dies peacefully, really, especially not in the wild. So, an animal living 
on a free range, healthy farm where they’re provided with good food is 
probably living a better life than they would have lived necessarily out in the 
wild sometimes. Getting eaten alive by a lion is not as nice as getting shot 
with a bolt through the head in a slaughterhouse. 
 
Mary Douglas describes a “ritually contracted death” as one that separates the 
personal life of the sacrificial subject from their public life – or constituted role in 
that public life (2002: 69). The purpose of the ritual narrative is to “control 
situations” and thereby modify or mediate the experience (68, 70). Drawing on 
Douglas’ account, one could conceive of my participants’ contractual narratives as 
supporting a kind of secular ritual of meat consumption. This ritual can even take 
on an animated life of its’ own.  
 
As Geoffrey (C) illustrates above, many of my participants conjure the thoughts 
and feelings of ‘food’ animals at the point of slaughter to support these animals’ 
‘preference’ for the ‘instant death’ that humans provide in contrast to the 
constructed ravages of nature. So as well as being ‘not really affected’ and ‘never 
under stress’, Julie (C) maintains they are “not in a state of panic and fear”, 
because as Henry (C) says, they “don’t see it coming, no idea, nothing”; they have 
“a few minutes of fear, potential fear, but minutes, not days”, Nicki (C) explains, 
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and even, as Sophie (C) describes, just “fall asleep with their friends”.38 What is 
additionally fortuitous is that these animals “have no concept of the future…it’s had 
its life and it’s not wanting more” (James P). As Grace (C) says reassuringly, “I 
don’t think animals necessary think about the future or what’s going to happen”. 
Sometimes, both consumers and producers will ventriloquise ‘food’ animals, play-
acting little scenes as they describe them being led into a new paddock, loaded into 
transport for the slaughterhouse ‘with their friends’, or making amorous advances 
to their field-fellows. However, these animated and subjectified animals always at 
the same time remain resolutely objectified as meat. The seemingly contradictory 
positions of animal-as-subject and animal-as object can easily co-exist, as Morgan 
and Cole also observed in their analysis of the discursive representation of ‘happy 
pigs’ (2011: 125).  
 
These animals’ objectified flesh is also woven into the contractual narrative, being 
the ‘gift’ that is ‘given’ in return for the benefits of domestication or a quick(er) 
death. Alison, one of the formerly vegetarian producers, explains: 
 
For me the ethical side is that…we’ve got these cows that would normally 
be slaughtered…it’s our way of thanking them for what they’ve given us in 
their milk…then you’re given these calves…animals understand they’re here 
for us, they’re actually here for us to use. (emphasis added) 
 
In a similar vein, Jennifer (P) describes her relationship with the pigs that she 
raises for meat as one where “your energy that’s gone into producing it is then 
providing you again with more energy back”, while Oliver (P) emphasises the 
importance of consumers “givi[ing] dignity to the animal that provided them with 
meat”.  The suggestion of meat as a natural bounty that animals willingly ‘give’, 
‘provide’ and bestow on humans suffuses my data. Nicki (C) comments, “a happy 
animal…gives you happier, healthier meat”, and Sally (C) describes “the amount of 
food that [a cow] gives us back”. The state of domination in which ‘food’ animals 
exist, evidenced by the fact that they are always destined, and liable at any time 
(for example due to inappropriate behaviour or insufficient worth), to ‘fall off’ the 
end of the power spectrum, is concealed by a narrative of reciprocity. As Nicki (C) 
says of the sheep that she keeps, whose lambs are killed for home consumption, 
                                                
38 This is in reference to the Co2 gas chambers now in use for the slaughter of pigs—a 
method of killing that is far removed from simply falling asleep (Akbar 2015). 
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“they’ve given me joy looking after them, they’re keeping down the grass, it’s like 
an almost synergistic relationship”. This implied ‘self-mortification’ is one of the 
features of pastoral power as described by Foucault (1979: 239), and one that Cole 
also observes in discourses of ‘animal-centred’ welfare in which ‘food’ animals are 
seen as ‘choosing’ to self-mortify and submit their bodies in a “devotion of their 
lives to serving human appetites” (2011: 92).  
  
The prioritisation of contingent lives, combined with the naturalization of meaty 
practices and the constituted benevolence of the natural contract, are therefore key 
discursive mechanisms by which the domination of ’food’ animals is substantially 
concealed. Drawing on Todd and Pratt, what is ultimately at work in how ethical 
‘meat’, ‘food’ animals, and practices are ‘made sense of’ is therefore a fusion of 
idealised notions of nature, pastoral life, local, organic, free range, the ‘genuine’, 
‘real’, ‘authentic’ and ‘natural’—a collective ‘knowledge’ that constitutes a “passion 
for [ethical] meat…as a passion for nature” (Todd 2009: 175). However, this 
human/animal symbiosis and benevolence is constituted around a human-centric 
and naturalised want that requires the persistent regulation and control of these 
animals’ lives until their unavoidable deaths. As Derrida remarks, “The 
appropriation, breaking-in, and domestication of tamed livestock are human 
socialization” (2008: 96, emphasis added). 
 
Conclusion 
In Chapter 4, I have drawn on theoretical commentary and my interviews with 
producers and consumers to explore the various categories of animal use that 
circulate, slice and carve through discourses and practices involving ethical and 
sustainable meat. In so doing, I have also drawn attention to the knowledge and 
discourses that not only shape these categories but reveal how they are constituted 
and, most importantly, how they are maintained. As an outcome of this analysis, I 
have identified three validating discourses, which contribute to the constitution of 
‘food’ animals as persistent and normalised elements of social practices on the basis 
of these (and those yet to exist) animals’ right to life and humans’ naturalised 
entitlement, and ethical responsibility, to eat them.  
 
Together, these discourses act as boundary-forming devices, maintaining the 
overarching edibility of ‘food’ animals. Given, then, that practices involving the use 
and consumption of ‘food’ animals are constituted as natural, benevolent and 
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essential to their being alive, how are some animals and ‘meat’ constituted as ‘better’ 
to eat than others? What other meanings are attached to ‘food’ animals and their 
meat’ to make some more ethically edible than others? These are questions I attend 
to in the next chapter where I demonstrate how these validating discourses can be 
seen to shape, alter and modulate understandings of a range of meat-related 
practices, interacting with these further systems of distinction to perform even 
more variable and shifting dissections of the good, the bad, and the ethical.  
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Chapter 5. Negotiating edibility  
In 1964, Spanish poet and novelist Jorge Luis Borges cited an excerpt from a 
Chinese encyclopedia, of “unknown (or apocryphal) authorship, by which animals 
are divided into:  
 
(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking [sic] 
pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present 
classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine 
camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) 
that from a long way off look like flies. 
(103-104). 
 
Borges is specifically poking find at the ambiguities, redundancies and deficiencies 
surrounding humans’ arbitrary fragmentations of the universe. This ‘classification’ 
has in turn been widely cited, most notably by Foucault, to highlight how it is 
“system[s] of thought” that shape conceptions of ‘Same’ and ‘Other’ (1989: xvi) – 
and therefore of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘clean’ and ‘unclean’, ‘edible’ 
and ‘inedible’, and so on.  
  
In this chapter, I explore how further refinements of ‘thought’ that make edible 
animals and ‘meat’ more and less edible are constituted by producers and 
consumers, using this to further examine the relevance of Foucault’s theorisations 
of knowledge and power to an understanding of the persistently normalised sense-
making of ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals. Drawing on his discussion of “biological-type 
caesura” 39 (Foucault 1997: 255), the further slicing and dicing of ‘food’ animals 
that takes place as part of negotiating their edibility emphasises the reduction of 
these animals to their biology. The biologisation of life erases the individual and 
reduces them to certain differently valued components of their physical bodies and 
parts thereof. In this way, power is able to be exercised over a species (or race, 
gender etc.) and from there, “to subdivide the species it controls into the 
subspecies” (ibid). 
 
                                                
39 A caesura is variously a division, gap, cessation or rupture. Here I employ its meaning as 
a division or fracture. 
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Although Foucault is here attending to racism, the same functional intent—to 
fragment and create caesuras in the biological continuum, can be identified in 
speciesism. Hence, in addition to the taxonomical knowledges of edible vs non-
edible discussed in Chapter 4, and the validating discourses that support these 
orders, Chapter 5 delves deeper into my participants accounts to identify a variety 
of non-hierarchical distinctions that further carve animals and their flesh into 
diverse, overlapping and fluid constructions of the ethical, less-ethical and un-
ethical. These distinctions include: 1) The species of animal; 2) The age and breed 
of the animal; 3) The type of ‘production’ system (organic, free range, wild or 
farmed); 4) The type of operation (industrialised or not); 5) The size of operation; 
6) The local-ness of production; 7) The type of outlet (supermarket, butcher 
farmers market, farm-gate) and, 8) The method of slaughter.  
 
There are endless ways in which these eight categories (and possibly more) and the 
knowledges that constitute them can be put to work on an animal and its flesh. This 
fluidity creates a sense of the ‘ethical’ as a mobile and stretchy denomination that is 
pulled in one or other direction, resisting and contracting away from some 
categories while expanding to accommodate others, possibly yet unidentified, but 
always potentially ethically edible. From this vantage point, the reader can perhaps 
begin to appreciate how well regulated the ‘system of thought’ that upholds 
nonhuman animal edibility is, and the extent to which it limits opportunities to 
glimpse any territory that might lie beyond, on ‘the far side of this grid’ (Foucault 
1989: 175). 
 
i. Separating the ‘bad’ from the ‘good’  
In this first section, I focus on the categorisation that takes place in association with 
attempts to determine the ‘bad’ which thereby delineate the ‘good’. For as 
Goodman et al. observe, food is not only good to eat, but “good food is even better to 
both think and feel with (and sometimes eat)” (2010: 1782, emphasis added). How, 
then, do producers and consumers make sense of the different kinds of ‘meat’ and 
’food’ animals that become part of their meaty practices? 
 
Before answering this question, I provide some insight into my participants meaty 
practices. In terms of their dietary and functional conceptions of meat, the majority 
of producers and consumers consider a ‘main’ meal without it ‘not a big deal’. In 
fact, keenly aware and often troubled by some of the environmental, health and 
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welfare issues associated with practices of meat production and consumption, many 
were making an effort to eat less meat (apart from former vegetarians and vegans). 
Only five producers and five consumers reported that they resolutely ate meat at 
least once and sometimes two or three times a day (or cooked it for their family) 
and for these participants, meat was perceived to be a non-negotiable and necessary 
feature of their food-related practices (Table 4). A further seven consumers 
regularly ate it once a day. However, some of these consumers, and all of the 
remaining 23 producers and consumers, were variably ambivalent around the 
notion that a meal had to include meat. Yet despite this ambivalence, they still ate 
some meat, even if only once a month. So how does the meat they eat keep making 
sense to my participants? What are the associations with different kinds of meat 
and ‘food’ animals that keep at least some of them a stable and normalised part of 
broader food practices? 
 
Table 4. Participants reported frequency of meat consumption (n= 40)* 
	 Consumers	 Producers*	
1	to	3	times	a	day	 5	 5	
Once	a	day	only	 7	 	
3	to	7	times	a	week	 10	 9	
1	or	2	times	a	week	 3	 	
Once	a	month	(approx.)	 1	 	
*One of the 15 producers I interviewed is vegetarian. They were a member of a family of 
producers and fully involved in the business. 
 
Instrumental ‘meat’ categories 
‘Meat’ can be categorised as more or less ‘good’ in different ways. It may be 
reduced to its chemical composition where it becomes nutritionally tagged as “a 
good source of protein” as Henry (C) calls it, or, according to Bella (P) a “high-
nutrient food stuff”, except when it is processed at which point, according to 
nutritional guidelines, it becomes ‘bad’. The flesh of ‘food’ animals is also 
categorised according to the age, (genetically engineered) ‘purpose’, and breed of 
the animals, and by the different parts of their bodies that it comes from. These 
biologised subdivisions are co-constituted along with knowledge, skills and tacit 
rules that describe the ‘appropriate’ or best use for each type of flesh—what it is 
understood to be for, how it ought to be prepared and cooked, and how it ‘eats’ 
(sensorially). In contrast to the ecological niches associated with nature, ‘food’ 
animals have thus been adapted, both physically and taxonomically, to fit what 
Fiddes describes as various economic niches based on entirely human-centric 
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understandings of, and appetites for, their flesh (1992: 81). Thus, he continues, 
“[w]e arrogate to ourselves divine power not only of life and death but of evolution 
and destiny itself” (ibid).  
 
According to this socially and economically constituted system of knowledge, or 
ontological grid, ‘food’ animals are instrumentally divided into categories of age and 
breed,40 such as lamb, hogget or mutton as opposed to simply sheep; suckling or 
spit pigs, pink pigs and heritage breeds such as Berkshires; cows as vealers, 
weaners, beefers, and milkers, also Black Angus, Friesian and other breeds; 
chickens as meat birds or broilers as opposed to layers, then industrial or heritage 
birds. Then there is the long list of body parts for each animal that are commonly 
and less commonly used as food: fillet steak, eye fillet, sirloin, oyster blade, rib eye, 
porterhouse, rump, skirt, shank, loin, leg, cutlets, belly, ribs, brisket, silverside, 
chops, breast, leg, neck, oxtail, brains or fry, tripe, head cheese, offal, kidneys, 
livers, and many more. A wealth of knowledge, skills and tacit rules accompany 
each of these body parts that advise when to eat them (what season or occasion), 
where to buy them, how to prepare and cook them, the associated skills and 
material infrastructure required for this preparation and cooking, and the sort of 
sensory experience to expect from each. The economic, and social, as opposed to 
ecological niches that define these animals’ lives is clear, particularly as this 
knowledge is accompanied by an understanding of the differential monetary value 
associated with every possible division of animal and flesh.  
 
However, rather than determinations of what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ about the health, 
safety, tastiness, cut or quality of the animal and/or their flesh, which have been the 
traditional measures of ‘goodness’, it is more recent determinations that I am 
interested in here. For these have arisen out of a need to identify what are ethically 
and environmentally ‘good’ animals and ‘meats’ to eat in response to growing 
challenges to fundamental practices of ‘growing’ animals to eat. These are 
challenges that many consumers, including my participants, have faced and which 
have made them reassess how they approach eating meat. How animals and their 
flesh are understood in response to this critical reassessment provides an indication 
                                                
40 Cole has noted the fetishization of breed and specifically ‘rare breeds’ in discourses of 
ethical and ‘happy’ meat where the latter are credited with “morally superior 
characteristics” (2011: 95).  
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of some of the means by which their status as food is upheld, and even reinforced, 
as against the prospect of eschewing meat altogether, and of the ‘knowledges’, 
discourses and associated practices that have evolved and emerged as part of this 
“ethical foodscape” (Goodman et al 2010: 1783).  
 
Therefore, for the rest of this chapter, I use my data to demonstrate how certain 
animals and ‘meats’ are constituted as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ethical or unethical, 
sustainable or unsustainable. First, I look at two determinations of particularly 
‘bad’ or unethical meat that involve factory farming and supermarkets, for as 
Douglas observes, the process of rejecting or excluding as an “abomination” 
strengthens the delineation of what is ‘good’ (2002: 40). In this way, appropriate 
order is emphasised and maintained. 
 
Bad meat: Factory farmed animals and their flesh 
Factory farmed, industrial and mass-produced animals and meat collectively 
comprise one of the most prominent and consistent ‘bads’ for my participants. Lisa 
(C), who eat meat daily, says plainly, “factory farmed things are both unethical and 
unsustainable” (emphasis added). Nicki (C) “can’t handle…the thought of a factory 
produced piece of meat”. Similarly, Sophie (C) “can’t stand” it, and Damian (C) 
calls it “horrendous”. Factory farming is commonly associated with 
industrialisation, as David (C) says, “it’s the industrial side of the equation which is 
problematic”. He goes onto say “particularly with chickens… [the industrial 
system] is particularly unethical and unsustainable in terms of that breeding”. 
Referring to a particular pork product, Bella (P) likewise explains “it’s mostly not 
very good cos it’s industrial pigs”.   
 
Chickens and pigs are the ‘food’ animals most associated with industrial or factory 
farming—“chickens and pork are more your intensive things” (Melanie P, emphasis 
added), they are “the extremes because growing indoors and never seeing the light 
of day, never seeing a blade of grass” (Will P). Natalie (C) believes, “chicken and 
pork is really priority…they’ve got it worst here”, and they have indeed become the 
main focus of animal advocacy campaigns aiming to draw attention to and improve 
the conditions in which the industry raises, or ‘grows’ these animals. Increasing 
awareness of these conditions—sow stalls, cement floors, cages, crowding and lack 
of daylight/fresh air, no doubt contributes to the perception among my participants 
that eating these animals is especially ‘bad’ and unethical, as Charlotte (C) explains, 
  106 
“I would never knowingly or willingly eat chicken or pork that I know is not 
organic or sustainable labelled or free range”. Abhorrence of factory farming of 
chickens is especially strong. David (C) considers chickens (and dairy) “very much 
the most animal exploitative industries that there are”, while Henry (C), who was 
previously vegetarian for five years, refers to it poignantly as “Armageddon for 
chickens”. Beverley (C) finds it “just disgusting” and Lisa (C) describes commercial 
chicken production as “so disgusting” and “so gross” that she “pretty much never 
gets chicken out”. Simon (P) tells me that his family has “stopped eating 
supermarket chickens”. Slightly enigmatically, Andrew (P) says “I do like to know 
where my meat comes from. I don’t eat chicken, let’s just put it that way”. As Simon 
indicates, the ‘badness’ of this meat is generally compounded by its typical retail 
setting—a supermarket. 
 
Animal flesh from the supermarket 
Theorisations of political consumption, sustainable citizenship and the consumer 
citizen see “ordinary people invest[ed] in ethical, social and civic concerns”—such 
as corporate dominance, slave labour, and habitat loss—through their everyday 
consumption practices (Lewis 2016: 201, also Micheletti et al 2012). Engaging with 
these notions the pinnacle of ‘bad’ meat would seem to be “chicken from the 
supermarket in a bag” (Brigid P). As Brigid goes on to exclaim, “Oh my god, it just 
freaks me out, where that chicken’s been or how it’s been raised, even though it is 
just a chicken” (emphasis added). David (C) would “never go and buy a chook off 
the shelf at the supermarket, ever, just full stop”. Describing a “supermarket bird” 
as a “dirty bird”, and that she would rather not have meat at all than eat it, Maria 
(C), and many others, combine a rejection of all supermarket ‘meat’ with a rejection 
of what it is understood to represent. This variously includes industrialised, 
homogenised, and/or environmentally harmful production practices, the mis-
treatment and abuse of animals, and anti-competitive corporate practices. In these, 
and many other ways, supermarkets represent a defilement of the “symbolic 
systems of purity” associated with ethical and sustainable consumption (Douglas 
2002: 36).  
 
Literally referred to as dirt, the supermarket chicken becomes emblematic of much 
larger processes of pollution—of different kinds of ‘matter out of place’. In 
response, my participants explicitly situate themselves in direct opposition to the 
globalised, corporatised, impersonal model of mass production and market 
homogenization, preferring “to support small independent producers” Anne (C). 
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Large-scale industrial systems are therefore associated with ‘bad’, unethical and 
unsustainable meat from factory farmed animals and, prefiguring my exploration of 
the role the senses and the emotions, there are in some cases very strong feelings 
attached to it. Grace (C) describes walking into the supermarket and being 
“assaulted with all that meat in plastic and it’s all sort of red and it’s just depressing” 
(emphasis added). There is “something kind of gross about it” for Anthony (C), 
and Maria (C) finds it simply “distasteful”. 
 
Unmasking distaste  
Looking more closely at what exactly is depressing, distasteful, gross, horrendous 
and problematic about factory-farmed and supermarket meat for my participants, I 
suggest it is not simply that it is abhorrent and incompatible with a new system of 
knowledge relating to ethical and sustainable consumption. It is also that the 
mechanisms of power by which ‘food’ animals are dominated in these systems have 
been made more obvious and therefore partly unmasked. Hence, it is the close 
confinement in harsh concrete and metal environments, and the force and harm 
applied to animals’ bodies, that are identified as the ‘problems’ visibility has 
unmasked rather than the actual use of these animals’ use as food. Although 
visibility is contributing to why such meat is increasingly considered out of place, it 
does not generally unmask the state of domination in which these animals exist. 
This also speaks to the ‘power of transparency’, which I will explore in depth in 
Part IV. Humans’ domination of animals is thereby revealed as a ‘right’ so 
normalised that it remains invisible. 
 
This observation supports one of Foucault’s central points regarding power—that it 
is “tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is 
proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms” (1978: 86). In The Subject and 
Power, Foucault further explains how power is only possible under conditions of 
freedom—the freedom to resist, against which unequal relations come to light and 
power is seen, and felt, to be exercised. As Foucault explains, “without the 
possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determination” 
(1982: 790). The point at which disciplinary actions and techniques—the hidden 
mechanisms of power designed to counter resistance and maintain matter in its 
proper place—are no longer hidden and tip over into physical determination, or 
domination, seems to be when a theory of rights holds sway. The essential role of 
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this theory, according to Foucault, is to fix the legitimacy, and, I would add, the 
truth of power (1980: 95). To this end, its essential function is then: 
 
[…] to efface the domination intrinsic to power in order to present the latter 
at the level of appearance…as the legitimate rights of sovereignty, and…as 
the legal obligation to obey it. The system of right is…designed to eliminate 
the fact of domination and its consequences. (1980: 95) 
 
To illustrate his point, Foucault describes the situation of a married woman in the 
18th and 19th centuries who may have had certain capacities for resistance within 
the institution of marriage but who was ultimately under a state of male domination 
in which all such acts of resistance were “ultimately only stratagems that never 
succeeded in reversing the situation” (1994: 292). A theory of male sovereignty and 
rights thereof, articulated in law, essentially masked mechanisms of domination 
(and in many ways still does today) (Foucault 1980: 106). 
 
Clare Palmer notes the relevance of Foucault’s conception of power (regarded as a 
“grid of analysis” rather than a theory) to the situation of animals, particularly his 
distinction between a ‘power relationship’, where resistance is always present, and 
‘domination’, where the capacity for resistance has been eliminated (2001: 342). 
She distinguishes between “internalized practices” that act on the subjectivity of 
animals, such as training, taming, breaking and teaching, and “external practices” 
that act on the physical bodies of animals, such as confinement, bodily mutilations, 
physical abuse, breeding, and genetic modifications (355). Although these external 
practices also affect the animal’s subjectivity, Palmer’s point is to highlight the 
difference between them in the possibilities for resistance. Referencing a range of 
wild, agricultural, urban and domestic human/animal relations to explore the extent 
to which animals are either “free to opt for other possibilities” or involved in 
relationships that are “persistent and nonreversible”, Palmer’s conclusion is that 
most of these are relations that no amount of “tricks” or “stratagems” can reverse: 
 
It is hard to think of many human/animal power relationships which contain 
within them the possibility of power reversal perhaps because of the ways in 
which humans affect the constitution of many animals and/or because of the 
probability that sufficient resistance on the part of an animal to human 
power will result in humans moving along the power spectrum to 
domination—and ultimately to physical violence or death which “drops off” 
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the edge of the power spectrum (the trapped wild animal may be shot; the 
bucking horse can be sent to the knackers. (2001, 351, emphasis in original) 
 
While highlighting that animals generally become “things which cannot resist”, 
Palmer (2001) emphasises that she is not making any universal claims regarding 
human/animal relations and that the “specificity of particular contexts and 
environments in which they may be located” must be understood (358). In the 
specific case of ‘food’ animals, I suggest this relationship is one that always ‘drops 
off’ the spectrum and is therefore always one of domination, even though this fact is 
effaced in the discourse and practice of (human) rights relating to food—whether 
juridical, religious, secular, or ‘natural’.  
 
Therefore, the real ‘problem’ with factory farmed animals and supermarket meat is 
that the appearance of a human/animal relationship sanctioned by these rights of 
juridical, religious, secular, and ‘natural’ law, can no longer be easily upheld 
because the mechanisms of power are no longer hidden. The state of domination 
that these rights actually support is now visible in the obvious repression of the 
lives and bodies of these animals so that the perception of a ‘relationship’ (in the 
sense of mutuality and two-way connection that this word implies) becomes 
untenable. But only because factory farming and supermarkets exemplify the “ever 
more general mechanisms and…forms of global domination” by which more 
regional and local forms of power become “invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, 
transformed, displaced, extended etc.” (Foucault 1980: 99). 
 
Meat that is the product of such undeniable mechanisms of power is therefore 
condemned by my participants. It has invaded the artifice of ‘possible resistances’ 
that allows human relations with ‘food’ animals to be benevolently characterised as 
‘husbandry’ or as following the model of ‘pastoral care’ (Foucault 1979; Cole 2011). 
Under such characterisations, disciplinary measures are undertaken only in so far 
as they mutually benefit both humans and animals; ‘for their own good’ as it were, 
as Nibert explains: 
 
The term widely used to refer to this practice, ‘domestication’, has come to 
reflect what is largely regarded as the ‘providential inevitability’, the much-
touted human-animal ‘partnership…A benign partnership. 
  (2013: 11-12) 
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Jeffory Clymer (2012: 84) identifies a similar “rhetoric of tender fondness” in his 
exploration of family, property and race in the 19th Century whereby 
institutionalised violence is cloaked in the “warm embrace” of interracial “affection” 
and “companionate marriage” (84). Still relevant today, a study of modern-day 
compassionate or benevolent sexism reveals that it both “masks” and reinforces 
gender inequality and thus undermines efforts towards equality (Hideg and Ferris 
2016).  
 
The artifice of a cloak or mask is essential to the normalization and ongoing success 
of relationships of power. For once the mechanisms of domination are evident, 
resistance intensifies (in the form of suffrage and anti-slavery movements), ‘proper’ 
order is destabilised, and matter (slaves and abused women) becomes increasingly 
out of place until a new order is established, however long that takes. I argue that 
this is what is happening with my participants’ demonization of factory farmed and 
supermarket meat (and movements for ‘better’ meat more generally). In fact, Grace 
(C) makes an explicit comparison when she exclaims, “you know it’s like having 
workers and things like that, I mean you don’t abuse them”. The formerly effaced 
mechanisms of domination are being exposed and becoming part of common 
knowledge—a new ‘truth’ that identifies this meat as inappropriate and ‘dirty’.  
 
However, it is not edible animals per se that are ‘out of place’, but rather it is the 
signs of domination that certain practices inscribe on their bodies and their flesh 
that make them distasteful and abhorrent. Ethical and sustainable animals and meat 
are inscribed with different signs that restore a pastoral rhetoric of ‘tender 
fondness’ for the care and welfare of individual animals. There are no obvious 
mechanisms of power here. In this way, the creative, productive and positive 
aspects of a sovereign power, as described by Foucault (1980: 105), that bestows 
and protects the rights of its animal subjects, come to the fore and the negative 
aspects of a state of domination are minimised. As Foucault explains: 
 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact 
that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses 
and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces 
discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs 
through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance 
whose function is repression. (Foucault 1980: 119) 
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Essentially, returning to Foucault’s (1978) assertion that a substantial masking of 
power is necessary to its success, the fact and consequences of the state of 
domination in which humans by rights hold animals have been partly unmasked only 
to be effaced anew by power’s positive and ‘productive network’. I will turn 
properly to the notion of rights or entitlement in Part IV, highlighting and 
integrating its appearance through much of the preceding analysis. In the next 
section, I explore the positive aspects of power that traverse my participants 
accounts of their meaty practices, helping power ‘hold good’ by shaping a new, 
more substantial mask, which supports the continued use of edible animals in 
ethical and sustainable ways that are not ‘distasteful’.  
 
ii. Constructing a ‘better’ mask  
So, if, as producer Bella says, “you shouldn’t eat factory farmed meat”, or “random 
generic supermarket meat” according to Natalie (C), what meat ‘should’ you eat? 
Answers to this question reveal some broadly shared, but by no means unanimous, 
understandings of what is ‘better’ and ‘best’. These understandings, and their 
associated discourses, contribute to what might be imagined as different (but co-
constituted) layers of permeable and shifting boundaries which variously intersect, 
align, complement or conflict. The most prominent of these boundary-delineating 
discourses are discussed in the following sections.  
 
Cows and sheep vs pigs and chickens 
In terms of preferred or ‘better’ animals, former 12-year vegetarian Natalie (C) 
believes that in general “[beef and lamb] seem to have better welfare outcomes than 
chicken and pork”. The perception that these animals spend most of their lives 
outside in open paddocks is a common element in many of my participants’ 
reasoning. “Cows, are more likely to have a kind of genuinely free-range system or a 
grass-fed system” says Maria (C) (emphasis added), and Anthony (C) reasons that 
“cows and sheep I suppose, I feel like generally [they] have a better life because 
they're outside, they're eating grass…I think in general they probably live a happier 
life [than pigs]”. Natalie (C) similarly explains, “we have a lot of land for cows to 
graze on, there isn’t as much pressure to have feedlot sheep…”. 
 
For Finn (P), and also Diane (C), “the amount of water that goes into creating a 
kilo of beef compared to the water, the grass, the methane emissions, all that CO2 
stuff that’s coming out of the cows” (Finn) constitutes cows and their ‘meat’ as less 
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ethical than chicken. For while some consider chickens the apex of ‘bad’ meat, as 
illustrated above, their “fast turnaround compared to pigs, cattle or sheep” (Will P) 
leads Diane (C) to view them as “more sustainable than beef” and Finn (P) to 
conclude that “in terms of pumping out lots of protein for minimum resources, 
chicken’s the meat of the future…the way forward” (emphasis added). Chickens 
may also be more easily construed as ethical because theirs tends to be the meat 
more commonly labelled as such—free range, organic, biodynamic, welfare 
approved—distinguishing them and their flesh more clearly and authoritatively 
from their factory-farmed, industrial cousins. As Charlotte (C) says, “it’s easier to 
get. It’s probably the most common cheapest kind of meat that is more ethical or 
more free range or whatever”. Similarly, “it’s a lot easier to access the information 
on the chicken than it is on the beef”, explains Geoffrey (C). All of which 
emphasises the wealth of knowledge on meat production processes and animal 
‘welfare’ that these participants tap into to construct their determinations, or make 
sense, of what is ethical and sustainable. 
 
The availability of clearly labelled meat that has already had much of the work 
done for the consumer in terms of its construction as ethical highlights the 
hierarchies of meat that can emerge, converge and conflict. Even though they 
endeavour to avoid supermarkets in principle, free range and organic labels can 
overcome that resistance for some participants like Julie (C) who says, “at a real 
push, I would buy the chicken that’s free range”, and Lucy (C), who is “happy to 
go supermarket free range or whatever, those sorts of things, that’s fine”. Maria (C) 
notes that her supermarket stocks a particular brand of free-range chicken and 
although she “would consider them industrial” she will sometimes buy it “as a poor 
option”. Such labelling embodies a broad set of knowledge apparatuses, including 
measurable criteria, system compliance, legislative support and government 
oversight, that appears to engender at least a basic level of trust among my 
participants, even as a least worst option. A “tier of best options” is how Helen (C) 
depicts the mediation of her practices. Charlotte (C) succinctly captures the flow 
and negotiation between her different understandings of what is ethical and ‘good’:  
 
It is much better to buy organic, free range chicken than not buy organic 
free range chicken. If I had a choice I'd buy it from a massive industrial 
company but it wouldn't be my first choice to buy from them, I'd rather buy 
it from a small non-organic, non-certified free-range chicken farm that I 
would visit, that is local to Victoria.  
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After being classified as an edible animal, Charlotte’s chicken undergoes a further 
four potential levels of classification depending on the interplay between her 
prioritised sub-categories of how it was raised, the size of the operation, the type of 
operation, and its location. This further illustrates both the flexibility and mobility 
of boundaries between categories of ‘good’, ‘bad’ and also ethical. 
 
‘Local’  
As Charlotte (C) indicates, where the animal comes from creates another 
opportunity for distinction, though of course location, type of operation, size of 
operation, and how it was raised are all inextricably related.  Supermarkets are 
almost universally placed at the bottom of this hierarchy and their “bad”, “crappy”, 
“dirty” meat is mostly to be avoided. This leaves local butchers, farmers markets, 
farm-gates and personal connections as the preferred avenues for obtaining “good 
meat” (Maria C) that is known to come “from a good source” (Geoffrey C). 
However, it is not necessarily these outlets themselves that possess the ethical 
credentials, but again, as with supermarkets, it is what they are understood to 
represent and the qualities, and knowledge, with which they then imbue the 
animals and the meat they provide. It is this embodied knowledge that is being 
offered and in turn valued by my participants. 
 
Animals and meat from these ‘good sources’ become imbricated in what local food 
is understood to mean more broadly, which prominently includes supporting a 
community, and nourishing a sense of personal connection as opposed to the 
disconnection attributed to the industrial system. As Jennifer (P) illustrates, “to me 
they’re linked, the eating the meat and having a flourishing community”. Ellis (C) 
thinks there are “so many benefits” of eating ethical and local meat, “it’s better for 
the planet, it’s better for the community, you know community building, people 
being connected with their producers.” For Heather (C), the “connection between 
a producer and a consumer is really valuable”. Hence, it is a quality of being local, 
and the meaning that accompanies it, that my participants seem to particularly 
want to associate with their ethical meat practices. “We usually try and source 
[meat] from farmers markets or a local meat supplier”, says Henry (C), while 
Damian (C) proclaims that “the meat we eat should be from farmers markets and it 
should be sourced locally” (emphasis added).  
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Even within the range of meat sold by a butcher, which is already considered better 
by dint of not being from a supermarket, Charlotte’s (C) previous quote also 
indicates how further distinctions are made based on the size of farm that the 
butcher is understood to support. Thus, Geoffrey (C) avoids “some of the other 
butchers which might get it from a bigger farm” and prefers a specific butcher 
“because he supports a lot of local small farmers”. It is therefore not a given that 
butchers, farmers markets, farm gates or personal connections will impart the 
‘right’ or sufficient quality of ‘localness’ to make the meat that they offer ethically 
‘edible’. For the definition of local is slippery and stretchy, and its ethical credibility 
can be revised depending on the circumstances and other ways in which ‘ethical’ is 
being understood.  
 
Sometimes animals and meat that are from Australia in general could be construed 
as local and therefore ‘better’ regardless of how it was raised and produced. As 
Melanie (P) reasons, “it might be ethically grown overseas to what the overseas 
people class as ethical, but it won’t be Australian probably”, while Anthony (C) 
further condemns “the crap that is in the supermarkets” for not being “Australian 
made and owned”. Different Australian states can also be associated with different 
kinds of production system, adding another potential distinction to understandings 
of what is local, ethical and ‘better’. Observing that “meat that was produced in 
Victoria is a lot less likely to have feedlots associated with it”, Charlotte (C) 
concludes that buying ‘meat’ from Victoria is therefore “quite different from getting 
it from Western Australia”.  
 
Local can therefore mean many things, including local to your neighbourhood, your 
region, your state or your nation, and the degree to which animals and meat from 
any of these locales is considered ’better’ will depend on how their construction as 
‘ethical’ is shaped by other considerations such as the way it was produced. For 
instance, Anne (C) would “rather have the production standards than the low food 
miles”, whereas Lisa (C) “would much rather have something that was local but 
maybe not organic”. Similarly, unlike many of my participants, Heather (C) does 
not consider eating kangaroo in Victoria an ethical practice because “any of the roo 
meat that we eat here has probably come from south Australia, maybe from NSW.” 
 
Stănescu (2010) and Hinrichs et al. (2008) have critiqued this kind of discourse 
surrounding local food, highlighting its inherent vagaries and inconsistencies. On 
the one hand, claims that local food is more environmentally sustainable, in terms of 
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its ecological or carbon footprint, cannot be upheld when different foods, 
production systems, and associated energy usages are taken into account, which too 
often result in local options performing least well (Stănescu 2010: 12-13). On the 
other hand, there is the tendency for local food movements to draw on idealised 
depictions of a pastoral idyll that is “at times, distressingly sexist and xenophobic” 
(Stănescu 2010: 10). By “gloss[ing] over the issues of sexism, racism, speciesism, 
homophobia and anti-immigration sentiments” (Stănescu 2010: 8), a focus on the 
local as opposed to the global encourages what Hinrich’s et al. define as “selective 
patronage” that favours the social justice needs of designated groups while 
excluding other disadvantaged groups (2008: 331). These authors argue that ‘local’ 
needs to be ‘retired’ as a designation of more ethical and sustainable foods to 
encompass a wider range of social justice issues and avoid the potential for 
“nationalistic regionalism” that it contains. Nevertheless, the (unsubstantiated) 
‘knowledge’ that local is better has been popularised to the point of an 
unquestionable truth, fuelled by the bucolic imagery of a certain kind of farming, 
one that is generally, but not always, small-scale and that is assumed to benefit the 
wider community or the nation as a whole.  
 
Wild ‘meat’ 
Moving away from the idea of any kind of formalised farming system involving 
traditional ‘food’ animals, but maintaining the focus on local, some of my 
participants consider it ethically preferable if the animal is instead “in the wild” at 
the time of death. As once-a-month meat eater Beverley (C) explains, “the animal’s 
had a happy life, and as painless as possible death”. Pescetarian Sophie (C) reasons 
that “they’re just running around in the wild and it’s sort of how it would happen 
naturally”, which mirrors Beverley’s depiction of “natural hunting, hunting natural 
wild animals”, whose flesh she is “perfectly happy to eat”. Heather (C) is similarly 
“much more comfortable eating wild meat” (emphasis added), and Gillian (C) 
“loves” wild chuck rabbits but “won’t touch” farmed rabbits.  
 
Wild animals mostly eaten in Australia—kangaroos, rabbits and deer—are also 
regarded as ‘pests’, and this additionally informs their construction as ethically 
edible. Gillian (C) will eat “wild shot venison, because that's a pest”, and for 
Beverley (C), it is “especially overpopulated ones” that she is “happy” to eat, “ones 
that are causing damage to the environment or native animals”. How what is 
classified as a native animal is negotiated against what is also regarded as a pest is 
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not clear from my data, but this introduces another area of ambiguous and shifting 
boundaries around what is ethically edible.41 Kangaroo to some extent exemplifies 
that conflict.  
 
For Beverley (C), “if they say it’s wild kangaroo, then I’m ok with buying that”, 
and Lisa (C) and Sophie (C) are equally unequivocal: “Kangaroo meat is like all 
wild caught I think, which really sits well with me”, says Lisa, while Sophie “will 
eat kangaroo because it’s a natural wildlife and it’s just been hunted and killed. It’s 
natural, it’s fine”. Presumably, however, not all wild animals would be considered 
natural and fine to eat, therefore the ‘knowledge’ of kangaroo, and to some extent 
also wallaby and possums, as pests makes their flesh edible while those of other 
native animals remains non-edible. Drawing an additional distinction between 
sustainable and ethical, Diane (C) surmises, “a sustainable meat would be you 
know, kangaroo or whatever, but kangaroo’s not ethical”. For Diane, and also Finn 
(P), who agrees that “roo…is not ethical”, wild is not a sufficient criterion for being 
ethical, as hunting methods must also be considered. As Finn explains, “there’s a lot 
of foul shots…you know, shot in the neck, shot in the shoulder…joeys they just, 
you know, chicken them [sic] or smash them on the ground. It’s…not a very well 
regulated, professional, streamlined industry”.  
 
Wild ‘meat’, as another category of ‘ethical meat’ is therefore further distinguished 
according to how the animal is hunted and, more especially, killed. As Bella (P) 
says, “a hunted one I probably would prefer, if it was a good hunter”. She is 
therefore more ambivalent about wild, hunted ‘meat’ being considered more ethical 
than farmed—“I think there are problems with both”, she says. However, popular 
distinctions between wild and farmed meat are not only muddied by ethical 
considerations. Contradicting prevalent notions of wild ‘meat’ as more natural, and 
highlighting the construction of the ‘natural’ I discussed in the previous chapter, 
Trevor (P) maintains that because “wild meat runs from my farm to the next door 
neighbours” (emphasis added), it is very unlikely to be what he regards as organic, 
which is for him the priority. 
 
                                                
41 If the negotiation simply involves a perceived tipping point in populations whereupon an 
animal becomes designated as a ‘pest’, it is theoretically possible that koalas, wombats and 
other native herbivores would similarly become edible if their habitats were to recover 
sufficiently to allow their populations to grow.  
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If the purposeful hand of humankind can be completely removed from the equation 
then that is even ‘better’ than eating ethically farmed or wild animals for Beverley 
(C) who describes herself as “very pro-roadkill’. But even here, what she considers 
a more ethical practice is shaped by her knowledge and skills. She admits that 
although she would be “perfectly happy eating at one of those [roadkill 
restaurants], she has “never eaten road kill”. She explains, “if I knew how to skin 
and chop up an animal that I found on the side of the road and know whether it 
was still safe to eat then I would, but I don’t”.  
 
Knowing 
In an effort to negotiate these multi-faceted and shifting criteria of ethical-ness, 
participants often rely on a more general sense of knowing (as opposed to ‘fact’-
based knowledge) to inform their meaty practices. Also highlighting the role of the 
imagination in the constitution of practices and their elements (see Chapter 6), this 
‘knowing’ and the associations it evokes—especially sensory and emotional 
(explored in Part III)—shape the perceived edibility of ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals 
and therefore contribute to their persistence as constituent elements of ethical 
practices.  
 
For example, Maria (C) recalls having bought meat from a different producer than 
she would normally buy from; however, “I know the region their meat comes from, 
I don’t know them personally. I know that it’s free range, it’s rare breed. I have less 
of an attachment to the producer but I feel comfortable with the choice”. Will (P) 
also suggests that knowing is directly related to an animals’ edibility: “you feel 
better about it if you know how it was grown and what sort of methods are 
used…and even how it was killed”. Such ‘knowing’ is now de rigeur as part of a new 
food ethics, as Diane (C) illustrates: 
 
Everyone’s obsessed with you know, ‘what’s the story’, ‘where did it come 
from’? Nobody wants anything unless they know [where it comes from]. In 
a Virgin magazine, there was this big article on it, the new luxury is 
knowing where something came from.  
 
Knowing (as opposed to seeing) can thus be enough in and of itself to lend certain 
objects some of the ‘goodness’ that comes from being authentic. As Ellis (C) 
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explains, “if I know how the animals were raised and kind of where, that makes me 
comfortable enough to eat them”. And as Anne (C) further illustrates: 
 
I need to know the story in quite specific detail. So land management 
practices that are kind to the landscape and animal treatment methods that 
are about where and how an animal is processed and finished off basically, 
so minimum stress possible production. I don’t need a certification of those 
things, but I do need to know, I do need to know the story of the animal 
basically. 
 
This extends to ‘knowing’ about how these ‘food’ animals are killed. Joyce (C) 
describes asking a producer to ‘walk her through the process’ in detail: 
 
I said to her, ‘tell me about how you kill your pigs?’, and so she told me and 
that was the first time that I’d asked a farmer to walk me through the 
process. I didn’t anticipate that I would find it upsetting and I didn’t find it 
upsetting. I’m very matter of fact about it. It was good to know I suppose 
that there were farmers out there who had thought about it. 
 
Making a more explicitly emotional association, Michael (C) says he “wouldn't be 
enjoying it if I didn't know where it came from”. And speaking of knowing all the 
producers of “my beef and pork” (emphasis added) personally, Anne (C) says, 
“that’s what I’m most comfortable with, so I know the producer”. Some participants 
prefer to also see—a certain mediated visibility playing a significant role in the 
(re)constitution of ethical consumption more broadly, as I will show in Part IV. 
However, this is not always necessary. If it is simply somebody that you know, 
Graham (P) explains, “you can just tell, if people are right or not”, and similarly 
Florence (P), “They’ve got the right thinking going on…they look and feel right”.  
 
Thus far, all of the considerations, negotiations and orders of edibility that my 
participants express quite clearly and assertively describe various systems of 
knowledge that both shape their practices with regard to ethical and sustainable 
meat and simultaneously reinforce the domination of animals as a normalised part 
of those practices. As the mechanisms of power associated with factory farming and 
supermarkets are exposed, these new ‘knowledges’ contribute to making a more 
substantial mask for the domination of animals, providing somewhere for ‘food’ 
animals and meat to be considered once again ‘in order’ and not out of place. 
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However, the greatest challenge to that mask is the point at which the power 
relationship drops off Palmer’s (2001) spectrum, i.e. the point of the animal’s death. 
How ethical and sustainable meat withstands this ultimate challenge—how killing 
is constituted as ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘ethical’, thereby adding another layer to the 
shaping of boundaries—is the focus of the next section. 
 
iii. ‘Kill-ability’ and ‘better’ killing 
Animals generally have to be deliberately killed in order for people to have access 
to all the types of meat that they consider edible. Hence, the capacity to kill animals 
and the way they are killed provide further opportunities (or necessities) for 
distinguishing between what is considered ethically ‘good’ and ‘bad’ while 
maintaining Foucault’s ‘productive’ aspects of the obvious exercise of power this 
requires. This leads to the notion of ethical killing.  
 
As a side note, knowledge and skills around killing divide animals more readily into 
edible/non-edible than those around the preparing and cooking of their body parts. 
Therefore, while there is certainly a vast catalogue of knowledges and skills (and 
materials) relating to preparing and cooking the flesh of different animals, I 
consider these of lesser import in shaping how animals are variously constituted as 
edible, having more significance, I argue, for how different parts of their bodies are 
so construed. I acknowledge that the normalised, routine and everyday nature of 
practices for preparing and cooking animal flesh contribute to the resilience of 
associated practices and are a worthy subject for more detailed analysis. However, 
it is how animals and meat, as a whole, are made sense of as part of these practices 
that I am concerned with. 
 
As Beverley (C) indicated with regard to roadkill, the capacity and skills to take an 
animal’s life shape understandings of their edibility. Discussing which animals she 
might realistically raise for meat, Joyce (C) reasons that “feathers is one thing, I’m 
not sure I could thread a little bunny through…and yank and kill it with my bare 
hands”. In the context of her conviction that “if you eat meat you should be able to 
kill it yourself”, Lisa (C), who eats meat every day, goes on to attest that she “could 
definitely kill a chicken”; however, she envisages having “a pretty hard time 
killing…a pig or something really big like a cow”.  
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In addition to species, age, the way it was raised, where it came from, and its 
perceived kill-ability, how an animal is killed is at least as, and sometimes more, 
important in constructions of the ethical-ness and edibility of its flesh, as Finn (P), 
Diane (C) and Bella (P) indicated in the previous section with respect to hunting. 
In confronting the how of killing, my participants clearly reveal their efforts to 
resolve the consequences of the unmasking of factory-farming and industrialised 
processes of animal use. Gillian (C) describes ‘how an animal dies’ as a “central 
tenet to ethical and sustainable production” and asserts ending the “mechanisation 
and the industrialisation particularly of the slaughtering process” is key to 
improving the meat that is available. Similarly, for Nicki (C), “ethical is more to do 
with the actual killing and processing of them”. Heather’s (C) focus is equally on 
“how they’re slaughtered” as on “the physical environment and animal health and 
welfare”, and Diane (C) defines ethical meat as “meat that is ethically raised, 
ethically killed”.  
 
Echoing Gillian’s (C) understanding of industrialised slaughter processes, anything 
that avoids the use of abattoirs is generally regarded as more ethical. “Abattoirs are 
pretty horrific places”, says Charlotte (C), and “any way to take out that process is 
good”. Anne (C) does not believe “that there is humane processing of animals going 
on in any abattoir anywhere”, and David (C), who eats meat once or twice a day, 
sums up his own confusion in trying to attach further distinctions to the meat that 
he eats based on how it is killed:  
 
Should we use captive bolt stunning, should we use CO2, should we do this, 
should we do that? Halal [is bad] because they have to be conscious when 
their throats are slit and this sort of stuff.  
 
Given Anne’s (C) derogation of all abattoirs, for her, “the only ethical slaughter is 
backyard stuff”. Others concur, and “get[ting] to a point where we buy meat that is 
killed on the farm” is one of Diane’s (C) main criteria in her vision for ethical meat, 
and also Alison’s (P), who describes the “ultimate of having the non-aware 
slaughter on the property in their own paddock”.  
 
Understandings of on-farm-killed meat certainly add another dimension to the 
ethical-ness of meat for some of my participants, drawing once again on a collective 
‘knowledge’ and discourse associated with local, small-scale, family-run farms. 
Speaking of her local farmers, Charlotte (C) relates that she would “have a lot less 
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issues with eating the meat that they killed and produced on their farm than eating 
a chicken from a factory somewhere”. Referring to an occasion where she was 
eating the flesh of an animal killed on-farm by friends, Diane (C) says “they had 
given it a happy life and slaughtered it themselves so I was happy to eat that”. 
David (C) alludes to what he considers more ‘natural’ when he compares the 
abattoir, where “you’re putting them under that stress of the transport and 
whatever and taking them out and killing them” with the ‘better’ alternative “where 
they’re just in their normal environment” (emphasis added). 
 
As David (C) demonstrates, direct comparisons with industrial slaughter processes 
cast on-farm or home slaughter in an even more positive light. Similarly, Brigid (P) 
describes the process “when they get on a big truck and go to a big abattoir and 
they get manhandled by people other than me”, where instead she prefers “to do 
right by my [animals]” (emphasis added). Graham (P) illustrates the same 
comparative formulation: “to take them into a processing facility where there’s pigs 
roaring and screaming, they can’t not be stressed. If you just walk them up 
somewhere and gave them a bucket of feed and then shot them, humanely…”. 
Graham increases the stakes of his comparison by making denigrating assumptions 
about industrial facilities, the people who work there and where he imagines they 
come from. In a triple ‘othering’ of slaughterhouse workers, ex-prisoners, and 
animals, he states: “it’s far better than being loaded into a vehicle and transported 
halfway across the state and then in the charge of somebody who probably just got 
out of prison, you know, certainly not compassionate”.42  
 
Drawing more explicitly on the notion of having a duty of pastoral care and the 
responsibility for individual life that accompanies it, and also supported implicitly 
by the universal understanding of humans’ sovereign right over animals, killing the 
animal themselves is for some of my participants even better ethically. Therefore, 
while the readiness and capacity to kill certain animals can render the species as a 
whole more and less edible, it is through killing an animal first-hand that that 
individual’s flesh in particular becomes more ethically edible. Although Tracey (C) 
is pescetarian, she does not “mind the idea of eating an animal if I’ve killed it”. 
Similarly, producer Finn, who was vegetarian for a year, would “feel a lot better 
                                                
42 Graham may be referring to prisoners being employed at abattoirs in the Northern 
Territory since 2014 as part of the state government’s ‘Sentenced to a Job’ Program. 
However, questions of cause in the mis-treatment of animals in slaughterhouses are a more 
complex social issue, as Richards et al. (2013), and Fitzgerald et al. (2009) have highlighted.  
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about it if we…actually did it ourselves”. There is a tacit understanding, almost a 
rule, among these producers and consumers whereby the meat of animals that have 
been killed first hand is bestowed with an extra quality, beyond ethical ‘goodness’. 
That quality is a sense of that meat having been earned through the act of killing. It 
becomes a reward, something deserved in return for the physical and emotional 
labour of taking the life of the animal that it once was. This is a theme I will explore 
further in Part III. For now, I bring the focus back to negotiations around ethical 
killing, moving on from where the killing is performed, and by whom, to explore 
how ‘food’ animals are (ethically) killed.  
 
Killing animals is acknowledged as requiring a certain set of skills and material 
infrastructure. Joyce (C) has signed up for a “workshop on how to kill a chicken 
for backyard poultry”; while Nicki (C) has already attended such workshops and 
developed a skill set that enables her to regularly kill her own backyard chickens. 
She explains that of all the different methods, the “best” involves “a broomstick on 
the back of the neck and you just pull and it just snaps the vertebrae”. There is 
further knowledge and skill required after this step to do it ‘properly’, as she 
explains, “the chicken needs to flap around to actually expel the blood, so if you 
keep them in the cone, the blood just sits there…so you just let them roll around”. 
Graham (P) concurs: “You’ve got to do it right…do it properly. There’s spots that 
you’ve got to hit them, and then they don’t notice”.  
 
In light of this, much as a large number of my participants support an increase in 
backyard rearing and killing of ‘food’ animals, and changes in regulations to permit 
the distribution of this meat, others are more circumspect. A friend once asked 
Natalie (C) “why don’t you just kill it yourself?” She responded with, “I have no 
skill and I would cause harm”. Concerned that animals might be killed by people 
who “don’t necessarily have training or the background”, Natalie prefers the 
process to be handled by “skilled slaughterhouse staff…skilled butchers”. Melanie 
(P) is of the same mind and thinks “all animals should be slaughtered properly by a 
professional slaughterman”; while Will (P) emphasises that “it does require skills 
and also the right sort of equipment and restraining devices”.  
 
There is a sense in which recourse to a set of knowledges that describe, document 
and thereby reify ‘proper’ and ‘good’ killing, much of which is highly formalised 
through manuals, training and certification, legitimates the act of killing while 
creating distance from the living subject. Although the physical distance between 
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human and killable animal may be reduced, a focus on the act and art of killing puts 
their individuality and life to one side. The animal’s death becomes a technical 
exercise, which can be done the right or wrong way. At this point, the 
“thingification” (Palmer 2001: 358) of the animal is almost complete as the (short-
lived) living component is, expertly and less expertly, excised to leave the edible 
flesh that was always the end game. Pachirat notes a similar strategy at work in the 
industrial slaughterhouse where: 
 
[…] a focus on food safety deflects the attention away from the work of 
killing onto the technical realm of hygiene. The possibility of perceiving and 
experiencing what happens in industrialized killing is diverted into elaborate 
performances and deceptions generated by the focus on food safety (2011: 
206).  
 
Technical expertise and know-how aside, after careful negotiation and ordering of 
their ‘better’ meat based on species, breed, age, location, production processes and 
other criteria, it is still at the point of death that my participants perceive a 
potentially troubling (or disordering) loss of control in what is finally inscribed on 
their meat through the manner of slaughter. Backyard and on-farm slaughtered 
meat comprises only a tiny proportion of total meat consumed by the general 
population. For the majority, including consumers of all commercially produced 
ethical and sustainable meat, abattoirs and slaughtermen are the final arbiters of a 
more ethical outcome and so the focus turns to identifying more and less ethical 
methods of industrial slaughter. Abattoirs rarely permit visitors43 let alone allow the 
entire slaughter process to be witnessed. Therefore, for most of my participants, 
with few other means available, it is primarily hope and imagination that ensures 
meat does not become matter out of place due to unethical slaughter, as I will now 
demonstrate.  
 
For Finn (P), “it all comes back to whether it’s done properly…they’re not stressed 
out and they’re killed properly and they’re stunned, they’re not killed consciously”. 
Natalie (C) “hopes [the animals] don’t have to travel too far, and that they can go to 
a fairly small abattoir where they can get processed quickly and quietly…that they 
                                                
43 There is a shift in this space as many abattoirs now permit visitors by arrangement, while 
some in Europe and the US are open to the public and conduct daily tours. This 
development will be discussed in more detail in Part IV. 
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can’t see what’s going on and that it’s just quick” (emphasis added). Referring to 
the more recent use of Co2 gas chambers for rendering pigs unconscious prior to 
slaughter, Melanie (P) says they are slaughtered very early in the morning after 
being dropped off so they are not confined for long in pens. To her knowledge, they 
then “all go into a little room as mates, and they’re gone to sleep, so to me that’s not 
bad”. Sophie (C) has a similar conception of the process: “they walk into this 
chamber with their friends and then they just gas them, and they just fall asleep and 
I thought that sounded about the most ideal way you could do it”. The notion that 
being with their ‘mates’ or ‘friends’ makes slaughter more benign is a common one. 
 
To emphasise, it is not individual attitudes or judgments regarding the ‘best’ or most 
ethical way to kill animals that I wish to highlight or critique here, but rather the 
persistence of socially, geographically and historically normalised practices 
involving the acceptable, or at least justifiable, killing of ‘food’ animals. In other 
words, how questions regarding the most ethical way to kill animals come to be 
constituted as legitimate and unproblematic questions in the first place.  
 
Reflecting more generalised understandings among my participants of how 
‘properly’ (i.e. ethically) slaughtered animals are imaginatively distinguished from 
the non- or less-ethically slaughtered ones, Joyce (C) remarks, “the magic phrase I 
want to hear is, they’re killed first thing in the morning before the other animals, 
like for me that says those animals are being handled differently to how the rest of 
the animals are being processed”. These hopeful and idealised constructions of 
ethical abattoir practices rely to a large extent on constructions of the animals’ 
experiences and also feelings—a topic I will address in Part IV. As long as 
commercially sold meat has to be killed at a certified slaughterhouse, and as along 
as these businesses are not open to the public, how and whether the ‘most ethical 
way’ imagined by these participants is ever, or can be, achieved, can only be left to 
their imagination. 
 
That there is clearly broad agreement on there being a ‘proper’ or ‘right’ way to kill 
animals—notwithstanding these understandings of ‘proper’ can vary widely—
implies that there is also a wrong way to kill animals. Besides common assertions 
that it should ideally be quick and stress-free, there is generally no further 
meaningful explanation provided, and indeed these words—proper and right—do 
not demand it. Whenever they are used, they elicit a sense that you tacitly agree 
about what they mean even if it has not been made explicit. This vagueness 
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attaches significant power to these words in being able to evoke a moral high 
ground without having to be specific—they easily eschew closer examination of 
what they actually mean. In not having to qualify by what measure something is 
deemed ‘proper’ and ‘right’ or by whom, there is also the sense of appeal to a higher 
authority that has decreed such a thing to be truth—proper and right according to 
some natural law. Yet, in and of themselves, these ethical distinctions that my 
participants describe are only meaningful with the a priori acceptance of humans’ 
right to exercise power over ‘food’ animals. 
 
Interestingly, much of the concern expressed by my participants around how 
animals are raised and killed focuses on the effect this can have on the sensory 
qualities of the resulting ‘meat’, both actual and imagined—a finding I explore in 
Chapter 6. This is conceived as an added bonus, or another good reason for killing 
‘humanely’. ‘Ethical’ producers reflect and reinforce this expanded consumer 
knowledge in order to promote their meat. The website of one producer emphasises 
that for “eating quality…the life of an animal prior to its slaughter is the main 
factor” (Trevor). He continues, “ethical considerations are foremost in our minds – 
not only is this kind to the animals but it results in tender meat”. Indeed, consumers 
and producers frequently associate the quality and sensory attributes of ethical 
‘meat’ with quite specific or variably vague notions of an ethical life and death—
highlighting how certain practices are understood to enhance the gustatory 
experience (see Chapter 6). As Nicki (C) suggests, “to know the process and to be 
familiar with something dying makes a big difference to how you appreciate meat”.  
 
No amount of strategies, tricks or masks can alter the lived reality for ‘food’ 
animals—a reality that reflects their state of domination and can only end one way. 
Understandings relating to the various benefits that are transmuted to humans 
when the flesh of certain animals who have been treated in certain ways is 
consumed, can be considered part of Foucault’s ‘productive network’ that makes 
this normalised power “hold good” (1980: 119). As Marilyn Frye aptly comments 
with regard to enslavement: 
 
Although the slave is not engaged in ‘surpassing herself,’ she is engaged in 
surpassing: she is engaged in the master’s ‘surpassing’ himself. Her 
substance is organized toward his ‘transcendence’. (1983: 66, emphasis in 
original). 
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However constituted, the categories and knowledges discussed thus far that 
support determinations of the ‘ethical’ help to maintain meat, as the central matter, 
in place. They contribute to keeping ‘food’ animals’ state of domination more 
substantially hidden now that the mask has slid from factory farming and its 
industrialised associations.  
 
Conclusion 
In this and the preceding chapter, I have combined normative cultural accounts of 
animals as food with my participants’ accounts of their meaty practices. Using a 
critical theoretical approach, drawing primarily from Foucault and CAS scholars, I 
have exposed the discursive mechanisms by which my participants make sense of 
ethical ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals, and illustrated the difficulty these animals have in 
being understood as wholly un-edible as opposed to merely inedible. Specifically, I 
have shown how animals and their flesh are ordered according to their species, 
type, breed, age, use, intelligence,’killability’, source, body part, and degree of 
‘natural-ness’. I have also demonstrated the range of knowledges and truths that 
support this order and legitimise its inherent speciesism to the extent that it is, as 
Bujok said, “unalterable and unquestionable” (2013: 34).  
 
To imagine a different order where, for instance, cows, sheep, pigs, and chickens 
are relieved of the productive obligation that we assign as their birthright so they 
are no longer considered ‘meat’; and to also imagine a range of alternate 
knowledges and ‘truths’ that support these orders that are as ‘unalterable and 
unquestionable’ as our current ones, seems almost as fantastical as the Chinese 
encyclopaedic classification of animal types, cited at the beginning of this chapter, 
that so amused Borges (1964). Regarding this classification of uncertain 
authorship, Foucault remarked that it shattered “all the familiar landmarks of my 
thought…the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography – 
breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are 
accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things” (1989: xvi) 
 
The current normalised order is not more true or closer to ‘nature’ than any other 
order humans might construct. Looking back, Berger (1992: 4) notes that, before 
domestication, “[a]nimals first entered the imagination as messengers and 
promises”, and looking forward, at least one of my participants entertains the 
possibility of a world where: 
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cows and whatever are seen, not as pets, but as something that should be 
viewed, in nature…or something to paint, maybe to pat, maybe to ride on… 
Hopefully it will reach a point where it goes, the norm is not to kill.  
Michael (C) 
 
Our present order simply reflects human’s want to consume animals, reformulated 
and naturalised (and also materially, politically and economically systematised) as a 
need. To conceal the fact of this naturalised want, and maintain the artifice that it is 
an unalterable and unquestionable truth that legitimates relations of inequality—in 
other words, to maintain ‘food’ animals’ state of domination—a way of interpreting 
the practices of control that this involves is required. This interpretation is what 
constitutes Foucault’s mask. The various knowledges and ‘truths’ that legitimised 
meat consumption and the use of animals for food up to now, are part of this mask. 
However, these have been challenged of late, especially through visual disclosure of 
the undeniable mechanisms of power involved in factory farming and its associated 
industrial-scale practices of production and provision. As a result, the mask is 
slipping and these knowledges and ‘truths’ have to be reconfigured to deal with this 
matter (i.e. meat) that is now becoming ethically out of place.  
 
I have also introduced the notion of validating discourses that maintain animals as 
enduringly edible and reject or stigmatise alternative conceptions that might offer 
glimpses of the animal that is beyond such designations. Further evidencing the 
‘productive force of taxonomies’ (Sedgwick 2003: 5), these discourses help to hold 
power and ‘proper’ order in place. They are, therefore, mechanisms of power by 
which animals’ edibility is legitimised and made sense of at a fundamental level, 
with the effect that environmental and ethical challenges merely alter the conditions 
of this edibility. The three validating discourses I have identified are as follows:  
 
1) The value of contingent life (the ‘Logic of the Larder’): the idea that 
humans have an obligation to grant life that trumps any obligation to 
existing life. The ongoing breeding and eating of animals is therefore 
construed as an ethical responsibility. To in any way refuse or reject the 
primacy of life is deemed unethical and immoral. 
2) Invoking nature: where the consumption of meat and the use of ‘food’ 
animals is construed as natural and belonging to a given realm of (divine 
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or secular) external laws that humans are simply complying with. To do 
otherwise is to go against nature (or God). 
3) Benevolent natural contract: what is natural is necessarily good and can 
therefore only have positive outcomes for all involved—individuals, 
farmers, communities, regions, the nation, ecosystems, the environment 
and of course animals. To reject what is ‘natural’ is to also reject these 
broader reciprocal ‘goods’. 
 
Together, the knowledge, ‘truths’ and validating discourses surrounding meat and 
‘food’ animals support humans’ ‘natural’ right and capacity to exercise power over 
these animals in and through social practices. The exercise of this power, however 
‘ethical’ in human terms, restricts animals from “freely proceeding in their bodies or 
to use them as a means of acting…a total temporal and spatial control of their 
behaviour up to oppression and death” (Bujok 2013: 43-44). Their lives and bodies 
are directed entirely towards human goals—a ‘relationship’ of use that, as Foucault 
(1980) and Palmer (2001) assert, no amount of ‘stratagems or tricks’, on the part of 
those who are being used, can alter.  
 
The use of ‘food’ animals is constituted by their nonhumanness. It therefore follows 
that all ‘knowledge’ concerning meat and ‘food’ animals is inherently speciesist and 
permeated with naturalised rights that efface the state of domination that this 
speciesism facilitates. Any semblance of ‘welfare’ or care for the wellbeing of ‘food’ 
animals, however well-intentioned, must be viewed from within the normalised 
“logic of productivity” (Cole 2011: 87)—a capitalist logic that Nibert (2013: 1) 
argues has insinuated the oppression of animals into the fabric of our lives. As 
Foucault explains, “it is no longer their identity that beings manifest in 
representation, but the external relation they establish with the human being” 
(1989: 341). This relationship is encoded in knowledge, truths and validating 
discourses; in the systems, infrastructures and practices they support; and is 
permanently inscribed on physical bodies, both human and nonhuman.  
 
It is to these bodies that I now turn in Part III of this thesis. Following Foucault, I 
am interested in “how deployments of power are directly connected to the body – to 
bodies, functions, physiological processes, sensations, and pleasures” (Foucault 
1978: 151-152). Therefore, it is the immaterial dimensions of our human bodies that 
I am primarily concerned with: the links between desire and power (Foucault 1981: 
52-53), and between knowledge and pleasure through the pleasure of knowing— “a 
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knowledge-pleasure” that Foucault articulated in relation to discourse and sexuality 
(1978: 77). In other words, how knowledge and power are also emotionally and 
sensorially embodied. For as Grace (C) illustrated earlier, in her description of 
supermarket meat as a sensory ‘assault’, the knowledges, truths and discourses that 
order the human world not only shape our relations with objects and other beings, 
but also how they are sensed and felt emotionally, and vice versa.  
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PART III 
 
The (Dis)Pleasure of Knowing  
(about Animals & Meat) 
 
 
 
 
I joined him in cutting. Gorgeous, juicy slabs of pork seemed to melt off the 
carcass…I stopped to admire the marbling of the belly, which is of special 
interest to me for bacon curing, and pointed out the heavenly striations of fat and 
meat in mouthwateringly perfect proportion to one another. 
 
Berlin Reed, The Ethical Butcher (2014: 95) 
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Introduction to Part III 
What is evident throughout producers’ and consumers’ accounts of their meaty 
practices that I have drawn on thus far, especially when they deal with which 
animals are considered acceptable to eat (e.g. locally farmed, free range ‘food’ 
animals but not ‘baby’ animals or ‘pets’), which animals can be more problematic 
(e.g. pigs), and the enactment of distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ meat, is that 
a gamut of emotions contributes these constructions.  
 
In this section, I foreground Foucault’s regime of power/knowledge/pleasure for its 
emphasis on the positive and productive aspects of power, in contrast to the 
negative mechanisms of exclusion, repression, and domination. It is these positive 
mechanisms (being those that associate ethical meat with various benefits, ‘nature’, 
and a broader benevolence), but more specifically “the conditions of their 
emergence and operation”, that Foucault argues ought to direct analyses of power, 
“insofar as they produce knowledge, multiply discourse, induce pleasure, and 
generate power” (1978: 73). I suggest that these positive and productive aspects of 
power are missing from David Nibert’s conception of “the three factors in the 
theory of oppression—economic exploitation or competition, unequal power, and 
ideological legitimation” (2013: 275). Negative mechanisms of oppression are not 
sufficient to explain its persistence, and by focusing only on these, frameworks such 
as Nibert’s and other negative views of power as noted by Westwood (2002), tend 
to ignore the emergent and dispersed nature of power, with all its positive and 
productive aspects linked to bodily pleasures. In order to tackle oppression 
effectively, these productive mechanisms, which are ‘productive’ because of the 
emotions associated with them, need to be understood and acknowledged. As 
Anderson observes, “attending to spaces of affect orientates inquiry to the real 
conditions under which new encounters, relations and events emerge [or don’t]” 
(2014: 14).  
 
Of course, these ‘real conditions’ are shaped as much by association with 
displeasure, as with pleasure. In other words, productive mechanisms, and the 
positive emotions associated with them, are given form and definition by what 
evokes negative emotions, and vice versa. In what follows, my participants’ accounts 
of displeasure are therefore given equal weight in the constitution of productive 
mechanisms of power as their accounts of pleasure. Indeed, it is my contention that 
it is through the identification of how displeasure (e.g. with factory farming)  is 
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negotiated and reconciled to maintain the edibility of (ethical) animals that the most 
effective and persistent positive mechanisms are foregrounded. 
 
In light of this, the primary focus of Part III is demonstrating how emotions as a 
whole (associated with both pleasure and displeasure) shape the constitution of 
meat and ‘food’ animals, becoming an integral part of associated knowledges and 
truths that contribute to the normalisation of animals as food, and thereby helping 
to maintain mechanisms of domination. Thus, over two chapters, I address my 
second and third objectives by exploring:  
 
•  How sensory and emotional associations with animals and meat shape their 
edibility or non-edibility, and 
•  Where and how an embodied knowledge of ‘food’ animals is challenged and 
how their edibility is maintained 
 
I begin with an account of the senses and their role in Foucault’s nexus of 
power/knowledge/pleasure—the ‘regime’ that he identifies as being what “sustains 
the discourse on human sexuality” (1978: 11) and which I am arguing similarly 
sustains the discourse on human’s use and consumption of ‘food’ animals. This is 
especially important considering that food is the one area of consumption that 
involves bodily ingestion and assimilation, and which, in so doing, engages all five 
senses, and perhaps other unnamed embodied sensations, to an arguably greater 
degree than any other human activity. It would therefore be negligent in a study 
concerned with the ways in which animals and meat are ‘made sense of’ to ignore 
the senses. However, being conventionally thought of as belonging to individuals, 
they are also a tricky area to tackle from the perspective of socially constituted 
orders and practices, which is the overall orientation of this thesis. I confront this 
problem with specific reference to the knowledge-pleasure aspect of Foucault’s 
nexus which he describes as “the pleasure of knowing” (1978: 71), identifying the 
senses as providing a connection between pleasure/displeasure (or emotions) and 
knowing (or knowledges and truths).  
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Chapter 6. Sensory connections and emotional knowledge 
I begin this chapter by illustrating the role of the senses in constituting knowledges 
and ‘truths’ about ‘food’ animals and their flesh (as discussed in Part II), and in 
shaping determinations of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ meat. Taking up the pleasure, or for my 
purposes, emotional dimension of Foucault’s regime or nexus, I then outline 
particular theorisations and conceptualisations of emotions that inform my 
approach, and from these articulate my conception of emotions as part of social 
(and cultural) practices, and constituted by them, rather than belonging to 
individuals. As such, the notion that there are appropriate and inappropriate 
emotions, and even emotions of distinction, is introduced. From this, I assert that 
‘meat’, ‘food’ animals and meaty practices shape, and are shaped by, the 
constitution of certain distinctive, or more appropriate, emotions. Addressing this 
assertion, in the second half of the chapter I explore how challenges to the edibility 
of ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals are negotiated and ultimately defended. 
 
In relation to my third objective, I conceive emotional discomfort to be indicative of 
challenges to an embodied knowledge of animals’ normalised edibility. My further 
explorations of emotional associations are thus framed in terms of comfort, which 
maintains, and discomfort, which challenges this edibility. As well as avoiding the 
binary perspective of positive and negative emotions, these terms reflect the 
terminology used most frequently by my participants. I conceive them as my 
empirically supported variation on Foucault’s conception of ‘pleasure’. Thus, and 
continuing my analysis of (dis)pleasure and knowing, the second part of this 
chapter begins by examining my participants’ discomforting associations with 
practices of meat production, including killing, and how these are negotiated within 
the context of their meaty practices as a whole such that the edibility of animals is 
maintained. Drawing on literature around ‘feeling rules’ and ‘emotional rules’, this 
brings me to identify the first of two emotions of ‘distinction’, which I call requisite 
bravery, that appears to curry particular social favour and thereby potentially 
shapes how knowledges and ‘truths’ regarding meat and ‘food’ animals are 
constituted across multiple practices. 
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i.  Brought to your senses.  
Sensible theory 
It is through the senses that living bodies perceive, and make sense of, the world 
around them. They are the permeable interface by which places, people, ‘things’ 
(living and non-living) and situations are seen, heard, touched, smelled and tasted. 
However, I stress permeable to emphasise that this is not a dualistic framing that 
posits a purely biological bridge between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds; between mind 
and body. Recognizing that this has been the prevailing model of (anthropological, 
sociological and cultural) sensory scholarship over at least the past 30 to 40 years, 
scholars such as Chau (2008), Hsu (2008), Hayes-Conroy and Hayes-Conroy 
(2008) and Vannini et al (2013), counter with the inseparability of sensation and 
perception; body and mind. Further, and by way of explanation, they variously 
describe sensing operating “in a lived context of social representation” (Hayes-
Conroy and Hayes-Conroy 2008: 467), as a social practice (Vannini et al. 2013: 19), 
and explain how “sensory experience is socially made and mediated” (Hsu 2008: 
433). Indeed, Hsu (2008: 437) claims that “one cannot overemphasize the social 
and contextual nature of sensory experience”.  
 
Adam Chau goes even further and posits that “the sensory event is located not in 
the individual body but rather in the social collectivity itself” (2008: 288). He calls 
this the ‘sensory-production model’ to highlight the role of this social collectivity, 
through the ‘sensory orders’ they constitute, in shaping “ways of perceiving, 
knowing, and being in the world” (490). For Chau, every culture has its own 
‘sensory order’ and this notion of order is common across the scholarship that 
promotes a sociology of the senses. For example, Vannini et al. (2013) draw on the 
work of sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel to describe how sensory experience is 
understood via “mental clusters” or distinctions produced by “lumping” and 
“splitting”— analogous to the delineation of boundaries, categories and ‘orders’ 
discussed in Part II. The authors explain that these distinctions are not the outcome 
of individual thought processes, but rather constituted through “social and cultural 
sensory communities”: groups of people who share common ways of using their senses 
and making sense of sensations” (2013: 7, emphasis in original). Again, as with the 
categories and boundaries discussed previously, though these sensory distinctions 
might seem natural, in fact “we have been socialized to ‘see’ them” (Zerubavel 
1996, cited in Vannini et al. 2013: 7). Evans and Miele similarly explain that 
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“sensing is always already a ‘making sense’ because it always involves an act of 
creation/ordering” (2012: 301, emphasis added).  
 
What this preamble on the sociology of the senses illustrates is that boundaries and 
categories, and ‘orders of things’, shaped by systems of knowledge, ‘truth’ and 
understanding that ‘lump’ and ‘split’, constitute not only our understandings of 
‘things’ like meat and ‘food’ animals, but also our sensory perceptions, or 
experience,44 of them. Foucault makes similar reference to “the already ‘encoded’ 
eye” (1989: xxii), and Douglas to our impressions being:  
 
[…] schematically determined from the start…we select from the all the 
stimuli falling on our senses only those which interest us, and our interests 
are governed by a pattern-making tendency, sometime called schema  
  (2002: 37). 
 
Encompassing these notions of sense and perception, order and distinction, in 
relation to the performative encounter with food that takes place at a London food 
market, Coles and Crang observe, “the mediation between people and things…is 
crucial to the experienced 'alternative' qualities of market consumption” (2011: 94, 
emphasis added). The senses here assist in shaping understandings of and 
distinctions between ‘alternative qualities’ of food—for instance between meanings 
of ‘good’ and ‘bad’. In a similar way, Hayes-Conroy and Hayes-Conroy argue that 
“food beliefs are actually already material, experienced as part of the visceral body” 
(2008: 462).  
 
The act of eating and embodying food involves the senses to a greater degree than 
any other form of material consumption, enlisting sight, smell, touch, taste and even 
sound to help determine whether something is edible, and also whether it is ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ to eat. These senses become “part of old memories, new intensities, triggers, 
aches, tempers, commotions, tranquilities…The visceral body feels them as 
intensities that have an impact on tasting”, or more accurately how tasting (or 
smelling, touching, hearing, seeing) is interpreted (Hayes-Conroy and Hayes-
Conroy 2008: 467). Distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ meat are therefore also 
                                                
44 Elisabeth Hsu (2008: 436-7) notes that ‘sensory experience’ is often used rather than 
‘sensory perception’ to avoid the traditional conception of the mind/matter dualism that 
originated in the natural scientific framework. 
  136 
sensorially and viscerally constituted, in association with the knowledges, ‘truths’, 
and emotions that surround different ‘food’ animals, ‘meats’, and practices.  
 
Appadurai (1996) and Illouz (2009) also highlight the capacity of the senses to be 
evoked in real time through imagination, memory and nostalgia. Indeed, Eva Illouz 
describes the imagination as relying on sensations. She refers to this as “perceptual 
mimesis” (404, after Scarry 1999). These enduring perceptual bonds can create 
sensory expectations about certain foods, which Leigh-Gibson (2006) links to 
actual physiological changes in the body, and also to accompanying emotional 
responses. However, in the same way as the social mediation of the senses is 
understood to shape sensory experience or perception, I would interpret what 
Leigh-Gibson describes as individualised emotional ‘responses’ as being largely 
socially constituted such that physiological changes can also be attributed in some 
part to the everyday flow and performance of social practices.  
 
As Korzybski anecdotally demonstrated in a classroom experiment, a shared 
knowledge of dog biscuits as inedible and ‘bad’ to eat dramatically altered students’ 
emotional and sensorial experience of the anticipated and actual taste of a biscuit 
after Korzybski revealed the packaging. This is what Levi-Strauss meant in his 
analysis of classifications relating to totemic animal species when he said, “natural 
species are chosen not because they are ‘good to eat’ but because they are ‘good to 
think’” (1991: 89). However, my data indicate that the shift towards ‘better’ meat 
demands going further, for it is commonly understood that such meat must not only 
be ‘good to think’, but ‘also good to know’.  
 
Knowing taste 
As discussed in Part II, whether via direct experience, imagination or memory, 
knowing the story of a piece of meat—the breed of the animal that it came from, 
how the animal was raised, where the farm was, what type of farm, where and how 
the animal was killed, what age the animal was when it was killed, where the meat 
was sourced, and many more distinguishing features—contributes to the degree to 
which it is understood as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. But what I highlight here is that it also 
contributes to how ‘good’ or ‘bad’ it is perceived to taste (acknowledging that in 
practice, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are not so binary but rather slippery and ambiguous 
terms).  
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Rather than more knowledge detracting from sensory pleasure, as many assume it 
will, including animal advocacy organisations (as I discuss in Part IV), this 
knowing actually enhances it. Producers are aware of this as an added marketing 
opportunity. One advertises a special spit service on their website where “the meat” 
can take “centre stage”. The blurb continues:  
 
The background story behind the animal’s origin and how the animals are 
grown adds to the drama and appreciation of enjoying a whole beast from 
nose to tail. At the same time you can feel good about directly supporting 
farmers and their small businesses”.  
 
The “pleasure of knowing”, which Foucault originally articulated in reference to the 
scientification of sex and sexuality in the 19th century (1978: 70-71), is especially 
relevant today considering the “current hazing” of the twin carnal pleasures of food 
and sex (Probyn 2000: 9). Hayes-Conroy and Hayes-Conroy use the phrase to 
describe the visceral politics of the Slow Food movement where “knowing where 
and how food was produced” contributes to the pleasures of eating (2010: 467). 
Highlighting that the reverse is also true—that there is also knowing in pleasure, 
Beekman argues for using emotional perception as a source of knowledge about 
food by “listen[ing] to the aesthetic or cultural knowledge embedded in people’s 
emotional responses” (2006: 309).  
 
This type of knowing, and the emotions associated with it, arguably makes a 
significant difference to the anticipated and actual taste of food (Evans and Miele 
2012; Anderson and Barrett 2016). In their empirical exploration of ‘foodsensing’ 
Evans and Miele conclude that “product labels do not only have an impact on 
cerebral responses to commodities, but they can also affect sensual, emotional, and 
experiential responses” (2012: 310). It is very difficult to divorce the taste of 
something from knowledge about it and what it means, as blind taste tests can 
reveal. Food companies invest millions to take optimal advantage of this 
phenomenon, well aware of the multisensory and “embodied pleasures of food 
advertising” (Jameson 2015: 1068). This has seen the emergence of ‘sensory 
marketing’, a new field of marketing expertise which aims to engage consumers’ 
senses to positively influence their emotional orientation towards, and actual 
sensory experience of, a product (Hulten et al. 2009; Krishna 2012). Other 
empirical studies support these connections in addition to Evans and Miele (2012). 
For example, Anderson and Barrett report that when they paired identical meat 
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samples with descriptions of either factory farming or ‘humane’ production 
processes, their participants found that factory farmed meat “looked, smelled, and 
tasted less pleasant…tasted more salty, more greasy, and less fresh” (2016: 11-12). 
A broader review of similar studies of food and sensory experience concluded that 
sensory expectations, generated through verbal and pictorial descriptions, exert a 
“profound influence” on actual experience (Piqueras-Fiszman and Spence 2015: 
177). 
 
Just as Carolyn Korsmeyer illustrated in her comprehensive volume Making Sense of 
Taste, where she explores the meaning of taste, and the notions of ‘tasting symbols’ 
and ‘expressive foods’, “the aesthetic is cognitive; the sensuous and emotional layers 
of response have meaning” (2002: 117). The use of specific, evocative words and 
language that tap into collective knowledges are a demonstrated part of this 
sensuous engagement process, highlighting the role of the senses (real or imagined) 
as the dynamic, live (and permeable) interface with the physical world, and the link 
between knowing and the emotions. This interplay of knowing/senses/emotions 
connections is evident in my discussions with participants in relation to meat, ‘food’ 
animals and their related practices, characterised by a rhizomatic and almost 
synesthetic circulation of associations between all three.  
 
For instance, and adding to the above evidence of the relation between meaning, 
taste and emotion, Finn (P) recalls the appearance of an ‘unknown’ steak served to 
him at a restaurant, saying, “I knew it was an unhappy animal…it just wasn’t 
appealing to me, so I left it”. Similarly, Jennifer (C) explains that the animals “take 
on the flavour and the taste and the condition of the environment that they’re raised 
in”, and therefore, as Julie (C) says, “you can taste a well-bred animal”. These 
participants’ sensory and emotional expectations, experiences and final assessments 
of meat are being shaped by their prior knowledge and understandings of how and 
where the animals were raised. As Part II demonstrated, these understandings—of 
what is a ‘better’ and more ethical way to raise animals, as against what is not (i.e. 
factory farming), are socially (and also culturally) constituted. Hence, their 
emotional and sensory associations are socially mediated. 
 
As well as how an animal was raised, my participants demonstrate that his/her 
breed and age can similarly evoke quite specific sensory associations based on 
collective, socially mediated understandings of flesh. Trevor (P) comments that 
Brahman cows “aren’t really the most tenderest animals to consume”, while Bella 
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(P) remarks “rare breed pork is amazing…it’s just a totally different colour because 
they’re working their muscles all the time so they develop all this strength and 
colour”. Julie (C) remarks that “if an animal is older when it’s slaughtered…you 
can definitely taste the difference”. This leads to the final factor that appears to 
shape my participants’ sensory experience of ‘meat’. 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, the edibility of certain ‘meat’ and animals is constituted in 
part by knowledge about the way they were killed and this also translates to its 
perceived sensory qualities. Contrasting “farmed venison” with its wild 
counterpart, Gillian (C) explains, “it doesn’t have the same beautiful texture that I 
suppose in my mind a humanely slaughtered animal has”. Geoffrey (C) is of the 
understanding that the quality of the meat he eats is directly related to the way the 
animal was killed in terms of the stress it experienced: “If they send one cow off on 
its own, it stresses the animal which in turn destroys the meat, and the meat’s not as 
tender”. Having “read a little bit about the different ways of killing the animal”, 
Heather (C) now feels she has an appreciation of the impact of “first the speed, the 
time in which it takes the animal to die…on the quality of the meat that you harvest 
from the animal” (emphasis added). For Joyce (C), it simply “makes sense that 
animals that are slaughtered humanely are…it’s going to be a better quality meat 
than animals that are slaughtered under stress”.  
 
What becomes evident is that knowledges and accepted ‘truths’ regarding species, 
breed, age, and method of slaughter are engaged in constituting particular sensory 
associations with specific edible animals as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. By these accounts, a 
happy, rare breed, older and ‘humanely’ killed animal actually tastes better. 
 
Some participants indicate awareness of how verbal and pictorial descriptions can 
shape their food experiences, predicting that in a blind taste test, they would be 
unable to tell the difference between meat that came from a factory farmed versus 
ethically raised animal. This suggests that when the more symbolic (Korsmeyer 
2002) components of meaning are removed, the constitution of expectations and 
experiences is somewhat simplified, encompassing aesthetic meanings and 
distinctions of what Korsmeyer (2002: 129) terms “taste qualities”. These include 
flavour, texture, smell, and colour, and are equally socially and culturally mediated, 
as Korsmeyer and others have demonstrated (Sutton 2010; Hayes-Conroy and 
Hayes-Conroy 2010). Indeed, once an animal is made meat, my participants 
demonstrate their familiarity with these ‘taste qualities’, and the collective 
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knowledge and expertise that shapes associated distinctions—an “ethical-aesthetic 
expertise and experience” that was also apparent across Evans and Miele’s 48 focus 
groups (2012: 308).  
 
As Anthony (C) explains, “chefs have taught me to pick good steaks…I’ll be 
looking for marbling through the steak and you just don’t see that in the cows in the 
meat or deli section of the supermarkets” (emphasis added). James (P) maintains it 
is the “grain” of the animal’s flesh that enables him to distinguish between breeds, 
and Gillian (C) and Simon (P) both make clear distinctions based on smell and 
taste between male, female and heritage pigs. As Simon (P) comments, “if you cut 
[a] boar open, when he’s working, you can smell him…but female pork, it is a slight 
difference, you can taste it…I can taste it slightly when it’s a male”.  
 
The way this specialist knowledge is expressed implies that it derives from a body 
of reliable, objective facts about meat. There is no appeal to a particular source or 
authority but rather the knowledge is conveyed as common truth regarding ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ meat. However, it is also understood to be quite specialist knowledge not 
shared by all. As Gillian (C) illustrates, “you can’t sell it as normal steak because it’s 
doesn’t look like a normal steak. [It’s] beautiful, yellowed fat, rich red meat…so it 
has to go to a specialty retailer”, presumably where those who share this knowledge 
will better understand the meat to be ‘good’. As I illustrated previously, many of my 
participants relate their knowledge around the tenderness (mouth feel) and taste of 
meat to the way in which the animal was killed, making a single sensory connection 
from a practice, through to the animal and the final meat. Effectively, for the 
‘knowing consumer’, the meat embodies all that happened to ‘it’ prior to that point, 
becoming sensorially and emotionally inscribed with its own history.  
 
By introducing further categories of distinction that are, as discussed, also 
emotional and sensory, the emergence and increasing mainstreaming of ethical and 
sustainable meat has enhanced this specialist sensory knowledge and disseminated 
it more widely. This has created the opportunity for visceral connections with 
different orders of edibility. The level of engagement and intensity with which my 
participants describe these connections, often tinged with excitement, pleasure, or 
disgust, also highlights that this nexus of knowing/senses/emotions constitutes a 
noteworthy dimension of meaty practices that likely contributes significantly to the 
persistence of meat and the use of animals for food more generally. It is a dimension 
that is perhaps moving these practices in a more sensorially aware and reflective 
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direction—reinvigorating and refetishizing the consumption of meat and use of 
‘food’ animals which is under fire on several fronts.  
 
Sensing pleasure (and pain) 
Competency in sensing ‘good’ and ‘bad’ meat can sometimes outweigh what is 
consciously known about, and the associated knowledge surrounding, the way the 
animal was raised. Despite being labelled free range, Maria (C) is suspicious of a 
particular producer’s packaged chicken because “the fat is still quite white…I know 
that a grain-fed or corn-fed bird will be quite yellow”. More typically, however, 
sensory associations tend to align with knowledge of the animal and the way it was 
raised. Grace (C) notices the chicken she buys has “that firmer, denser meat than 
the ones that are in the supermarket that are sort of blown up, and grown too 
quickly”. Chicken wrapped in plastic makes Natalie (C) “feel quite squeamish” 
whereas the ones that she understands to have “built up their muscles being 
outside” are considered edible. Once again, meat from a supermarket is widely 
understood, sensorially as well as intellectually, to be ‘bad’. Supermarket meat is 
“tougher” (Melanie P), “pumped with water” (Florence P), red dyes (Lisa C), 
“flabby [and] tender, it has no texture” (Gillian C) and “is just kind of dulled and 
less flavourful, less pungent, not as rich I guess” (Lisa C). Natalie (C) finds it “can 
just be a bit slimy and sweaty and just looks pallid and less appealing”. 
 
Fat and flesh emerge as common indicators of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ meat. The fat and 
flesh of cows is distinguished particularly in terms of texture and assimilation 
qualities. Alison (P) explains, “in the beef animal, it’s [the flesh is] quite a coarse 
grain, but dairy beef is quite a fine grain…easy to digest” (emphasis added). 
Florence (P) describes the ‘beef’ they produce as “very relaxed, it’s like jelly on a 
plate, it’s really flavoursome”. With the flesh of pigs, a range of sensory qualities 
can determine its edibility including colour, texture, smell, and the presence of 
hairs. ‘Good’ ‘pork’, says Simon (P), is “quite a lot darker”, while “supermarket 
pork, it’s very pale”. Finn (P) explains this is because supermarket ‘pork’ derives 
from “big white pigs” rather than “black pigs [which] have more fat and they’ve 
definitely got more flavour”. 
 
These participants’ depictions of their sensory associations with meat, animals, and 
associated practices emphasise how important the senses are to the constitution and 
ordering of ‘food’ animals and meat discussed in Part II—helping to delineate what 
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is ‘known’ to be edible/inedible and good/bad to eat. As previous studies have also 
demonstrated (Anderson and Barrett 2016; Evans and Miele 2012; Piqueras-
Fiszman and Spence 2015) associations with meat that is ‘known’ as ‘good’ are 
resoundingly positive, emphasising that all these sensory associations derive as 
much from a pleasure of knowing as a pleasure of thinking. As Tracey (C) explains, 
“the meat tastes better because it’s happier”.  
 
From this, it becomes apparent how much meaty practices are sensorially and 
viscerally constituted so that particular smells, tastes, textures, sights and even 
sounds (e.g. of cooking) become associated with particular practices, animals, types 
of meat, and different kinds of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ meat. Evans and Miele made the 
same observation in their study, noting perceived connections between animal 
welfare and the taste, texture, visual appearance, and cooking performance of meat 
(2012: 307). Ordering the edibility of different animals and meats is therefore as 
much about the senses as about knowledge, skills and associated practices. 
Furthermore, as Illouz (2009) and Appadurai (1996) indicate with reference to 
memory, imagination and the ignition of “triggers, aches and tempers”, sensory and 
visceral associations with objects are particularly enduring over time. This suggests 
that the rhizomatic connections they form between knowledge and emotions (or 
Foucault’s pleasures), here specifically in relation to meat and ‘food’ animals, play a 
major role in the persistence of associated practices. Stepping back from this focus 
on the senses, but remaining aware of how their constant presence informs how 
meat and edible animals make sense in associated practices, I now turn to the 
emotions. I propose that they occupy a central but under recognised role in 
constituting ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals, and hence in the performance, defection 
from, and persistence of meaty practices.  
 
A note here on my use of the term ‘object’ or ‘material object’. While reflecting the 
use of these terms in practice theories to describe the material components and 
infrastructures of a practice, I am also emphasizing the objectification and 
‘thingification’ of living beings who are used in practices. Nonhuman animals, 
‘other’ humans, and other living entities are therefore included under these terms. 
However, I will occasionally refer explicitly to nonhuman animals when I wish to 
emphasise the distinction. 
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ii. Locating emotions in practices 
How something smells, tastes, sounds, looks or feels tactilely in the present can act 
as a powerful emotional as well as perceptual trigger—or emotional mimesis, to use 
Illouz’s (2009) terminology—causing past emotional associations to surface in the 
present. Like sensory associations, emotional associations can be persistent across 
space and time, held together by the intensity of the emotion and further ‘charged’, 
or made more vivid and visceral, by the senses. These associations have a specific 
‘object’—either the practice(s) that delivered the experience, such as a social event 
or meeting, or certain elements of it, for instance a particular ‘food’ animal or meat. 
It is through these associations that an emotion may carry over to the same ‘object’ 
encountered in the present, in effect ’pre-loading’ them with a legacy of emotional 
value that shapes how ‘good’ or ’bad’ they are understood and sensed to be. 
However, these emotional associations are not static. They are at the same time 
open to being re-constituted at every newly unfolding moment of a practice. 
Conceiving social practices in this way, as emotionally and sensorially enlivened, 
and enlivening, goes some way to putting the visceral back in touch with the social, 
as Wetherell enjoins (2012, p10).   
 
Emotions are not conceived as “interior properties” belonging to or expressed by 
individuals but rather “properties of the specific affective ‘attunement’ or mood of 
the respective practice” (Reckwitz 2016: 119). Similarly, Ahmed (2004a) describes 
how emotions can ‘stick’ to objects and move sideways, creating sticky associations 
with other objects and also backwards so that “‘what sticks’ is also bound up with 
the ‘absent presence’ of historicity”, i.e. what has over time become normalised 
(2004: 120). However, it is less the object that an emotion attaches to than 
knowledge about that object—how it is being understood, for as Martha Nussbaum 
(2003 [1997]) explains, “emotions are about something…they have an object” but 
“emotions embody not simply ways of seeing an object but beliefs…about the 
object” (in Beekman 2006: 307). For example, different ‘knowledges’ about a 
certain animal’s flesh, or a certain meat-related practice, which variously define it as 
being more or less ’natural’ may invoke very different emotions (as Korzybski’s 
experiment demonstrated). They are not being attached to the object as such but 
associated with, and constituted by, the particular knowledge. Hence, Ahmed 
describes “the work of emotions” as involving “the ‘sticking’ of signs to bodies” 
(2004b: 13). Respectively, Foucault (1989: 44) observes that, “to know an animal 
or a plant, or any terrestrial thing whatever, is to gather together the whole dense 
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layer of signs with which it or they may have been covered”. In this way, the 
evocation of an emotion does not depend on the physical presence of the object 
with which it is associated. It may also be an imagined object, knowledge of which, 
in the imagining of its ‘signs’, evokes the real emotion in the present and reinforces 
the association—the aforementioned emotional mimesis.  
 
Emotions are thus perceived to circulate within and between practices of everyday 
life, along with knowledge and the senses, in a co-constitutive relation. Together 
these ‘create’ objects (human and nonhuman), and these objects continue 
“accumulating…affective value as social goods” as they move around between the 
practices they are part of (Ahmed 2010c: 21). However, practices are dynamic and 
constantly evolving and so an object’s emotional value may also change. In this, I 
draw also on Ahmed’s conceptualisation of ‘affective economies’ in which emotions 
can become attached to, and contained by (but do not reside in) objects, and also 
slide between them. Thus, her focus is not on emotions per se, but the work that 
they do (2004b: 14-15; 2004a). According to this, emotions (in terms of Foucault’s 
knowledge/pleasure) can be conceived as shaping objects in certain ways. Hence, 
Ahmed posits, “we could…ask how the circulation of signs of affect [understood 
here as knowledge and emotion] shapes the materialisation of collective bodies” 
(2004a: 121). This is an especially pertinent way of considering how emotions 
contribute to the collective materialisation of animals’ bodies and their flesh in 
everyday practices, and the persistent ways in which these meaty materialisations 
‘make sense’. 
 
In Part II, I demonstrated how persistent notions of what is natural, good, and bad 
can be associated with different practices, animals and types of meat. It is then 
conceivable that ‘good’ emotions could become associated with a practice, and ‘bad’ 
or less ‘good’ emotions with the animal or meat that is a material component of that 
practice. In this way, the emotional value that a practice or material component 
accumulates exerts its own agency within and between practices in a push/pull 
negotiation in terms of being attracted to what ‘feels’ good and repelled by what 
‘feels’ bad. As Anthony (C) says, he wants to eat “meat that makes me feel happy to 
be eating it”. Here, Anthony’s happiness is clearly associated with a specific meat 
that, in being associated with his knowledge of what is ‘good’, is conceived as 
having the capacity to make him happy. He implies that happiness is a quality of 
the meat—the cumulative product of a bundle of ‘good’ practices—that he 
assimilates when he eats it. It becomes, as Matthew Cole explains in his analysis of 
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‘Happy Meat’, “something to be consumed along with the muscle fibres, fat and 
blood”, producing a “morally satiated” consumer (Cole 2011: 94).  
 
I have so far described the ways in which, following Reckwitz (2002, 2016), I 
conceive emotions as being part of and constituted through social practices—
attached to the material objects of practices (living and non-living) and to practices 
as a whole—rather than emotions as individualised states. Indeed, the sociology of 
emotions has been a focus of scholarship and debate for an almost equal period of 
time as the sociology of the senses (Turner and Stets 2005). Therefore, drawing on 
and paraphrasing Vannini et al.’s (2013) conception of sensory communities, and 
supported by a significant body of literature on cultural differences in emotions,45 I 
suggest emotions can be similarly framed in terms of “social and cultural [emotional] 
communities”, defined as groups of people who share common ways of expressing 
their emotions and making sense of emotions (2013: 7, emphasis in original). Some 
scholars frame discussions of culture and emotions in terms of emotional practices 
(De Leersnyder et al. 2015; Mesquita and Walker 2003). However, they also 
describe cultural emotions as “a function of the interactions and relationships in 
which they take place” (De Leersnyder et al. 2015: 10), and as aligning with and 
reinforcing “the distinct cultural models (i.e. goals and practices) of self and 
relationship” (Mesquita and Walker 2005: 777). Thus, while there are clearly 
instances where the expression of an emotion could be perceived as a practice in 
itself—and I will allude to at least one of these instances later—these collectively 
expressed and understood emotions are seen as being constituted primarily by and 
through social practices.  
 
Indeed, my participants illustrate just how central their emotions are to how ‘meat’ 
and ‘food’ animals make sense in their meaty practices. I recall here Florence’s (P) 
assessment of herself, the only vegetarian in a family of meat producers, as being “a 
bit soft, or what I call soft I suppose, for animals”. She appears to feel that she 
ought not to be soft, that it is an inappropriate feeling to have towards animals 
constituted and understood as food. She has a regulatory feeling about her feeling—
that it is, in the context of meat-related practices, the wrong one. On the one hand, 
Florence’s (P) comment highlights the enduring historicity of the valuing of reason 
                                                
45 For example, Lim (2016); Mesquita and Frijda (1992) and De Leersnyder et al. (2015) to 
name a few. 
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over passion, or indeed any ‘irrational’ emotion, the latter being seen as biological, 
feminine, primitive and therefore lesser, while the former is cultivated, masculine, 
rational and therefore superior (Wetherell 2012: 95). On the other hand, it also 
indicates how emotions could be viewed as practices in and of themselves, as in 
being soft or sentimental. However, in the context of different practices, for 
example of caring, being soft or sentimental would be appropriate. It is, therefore, 
the meanings constituted in relation to practices and their elements that determine 
the (in)appropriateness of an emotion, not that the emotion is of itself right or 
wrong. 
 
However, as noted previously, cultural differences in the expression and 
understanding of emotions have been recognised wherein high arousal emotions 
(such as joy or anger) are more generally disparaged in Eastern (collectivist) 
cultures compared with low arousal emotions (being solemn or reserved), while the 
reverse holds true in Western (individualist) cultures (Lim 2016). In the same way, 
‘softness’ or ‘sentimentality’ is popularly understood in Westernised and some other 
cultures to be undesirable (Narula 2014; Knight 1999). Not only is it considered an 
inappropriate emotion to associate with certain practices or objects (such as 
slaughter or animals), but it is typically identified with women and femininity, and 
so tends to be construed also as weakness, eliciting associations with a range of 
similarly ‘soft’, sentimental and feminised practices such as caring for others, or not 
eating animals. An extreme example is the Rudalis of Rajasthan, a group of low 
caste women who hire themselves out as professional wailers for funeral 
processions (Singh et al. 2014; Devi 1997). Singh et al. explain that a “triple 
oppression of class, caste and gender” is in operation here because, for the 
Brahmins—the high caste group, to sing or wail at a funeral is considered low class, 
or at least questionable, and not reflective of their high status (Hurlstone 2011).  
 
Identifying appropriate ‘affective’ or emotional practices that “confer ‘distinction’” 
while stigmatising others, Wetherell draws on Ahmed to describe how emotions 
intertwine with cultural circuits of meaning and value (and their objects) so that 
“some get marked out as disgusting and others as exemplifying moral virtue” 
(Wetherell 2012: 16). However, as Wetherell hints at here, what are perceived as 
emotional practices (such as the Rudali’s performance of grief) are still being 
constituted within a broader nexus of social and cultural practices out of which 
they derive their distinct forms of expression and meaning. Emotions are therefore 
still being constituted through social practices. 
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Yet viewing emotions as also culturally constituted provides another way of 
thinking about how they shape practices involving ‘food’ animals and meat. It 
highlights that not only are certain emotions associated with these practices and 
their elements, but in certain circumstances there can also be a ‘preferred’ cultural 
emotion. This is one that is widely considered more appropriate or ‘better’ than 
others, and which can consistently subdue conflicting or contradictory intra-
practice emotions (when different emotions are attached to different material 
objects of a practice). The socially and culturally constituted knowledge and ’truth’ 
of that preferred emotion can in turn shape how practices and their various 
elements are constituted and known.  
 
It is therefore my contention that longstanding meaty practices in Westernised 
cultures shape, and are shaped by, the constitution of certain preferred emotions. 
These emotions are now so tightly associated with meat and ‘food’ animals that they 
tend to dominate any practice of which these material(ised) objects are part. At the 
same time, associations with these dominant, or distinctive emotions, which remain 
largely stable and persistent across bundles of practices, denigrate and stigmatise 
any contradictory emotions that may arise (such as ‘softness’ or sentimentality), 
along with their associated practices. In support of this contention, scholars have 
repeatedly highlighted “gendered norms of emotional expression” (Menely 2007), 
including the feminization (and by association denigration) of sentimentality 
(Solomon 2004; Campbell 1994), particularly in relation to animals (Menely 2007). 
According to Menely (2007: 249): 
 
Sentimentality’s devaluation has accomplished the crucial cultural work of 
guarding the border of human community, a border disrupted by the cross-
species sympathies widely promoted within sentimental culture.  
 
The next section explores the kinds of emotions that my participants’ associate with 
‘meat’, ‘food’ animals, and meaty practices, and how these can be indicative of 
potential disturbances, or challenges, in their normalised sense-making. 
 
iii. Negotiating challenges: emotional (dis)comfort with meaty practices 
Supporting my proposition of different and sometimes conflicting emotional 
associations within and between meaty practices, my participants variously 
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indicated feeling happy about eating some animals and ‘meats’, more ambivalent 
about others, and overtly uncomfortable or disgusted about others. The most 
prevalent emotions associated either with particular ‘food’ animals and meat, or 
with the practices these are part of—or more accurately, with knowledge about 
them—are a sense of comfort and discomfort. Some participants use the terms 
comfortable or uncomfortable (or variations thereof) in relation to having 
confidence or being confident in something or someone, and there is of course the 
physical understanding of these terms. And while emotions could arguably be said 
to contribute to these meanings, and there is some overlap between them, here I 
focus on emotional comfort/discomfort as describing the extent to which something 
is sensed or understood as being as it ‘should’ or is preferred to be.  
 
Theorising comfort 
This formulation of emotional (dis)comfort draws together two strands of 
literature. Firstly health care, where the concept of emotional comfort has been 
used to more accurately articulate the goals of patient care (Gropper 1992; Kolcaba 
2003). Williams and Irurita (2006: 408) describe emotional comfort as “pleasant 
positive feelings, a state of relaxation”, and its negative dimension, emotional 
discomfort, as “unpleasant negative feelings, a state of tension”. Second is food 
literature, where “relationships between emotions, memory, and food preferences” 
are examined through the notion of “comfort foods” (Locher et al 2005: 274, see 
also Wansink et al 2003). In theories of practice, comfort has been used with 
respect to thermal comfort, e.g. the comfort zone (Shove 2003). Quoting Crowley 
(2001), Shove acknowledges its broader usage to denote a “self conscious 
satisfaction with the relationship between one’s body and its immediate physical 
environment” (2003: 398, emphasis added). However, I would add that this 
environment may also be internal—emotional comfort or discomfort, as articulated 
by Williams and Irurita (2006), can arise from the thought of an object or practice, 
via the shared meanings and common understandings associated with its 
constitutive elements.  
 
I emphasise here that the constitution of emotions is not the focus of my analysis, 
but rather their associations and what insight these can provide to the constitution 
of meat and ‘food’ animals. Specifically, it is the emotions associated with a visceral 
sense of having satisfactorily balanced (or not) multiple understandings of an 
object, multiple objects, a practice as a whole, and even a bundle of practices, that I 
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am interested in as they relate to meaty practices, and within that, in particular, 
how these constitute meat and ‘food’ animals. Based on my data and other relevant 
literature, I have chosen to define these emotional associations as comfort and 
discomfort. 
 
Following Williams and Irurita (2006), comfort signifies a pleasant or relaxed 
balance of some kind, as Dan (C) says with regard to his meaty practices, “it’s 
about you making sense of life and meaning and right and wrong and where you fit 
into that and what you’re comfortable with”. It can be associated with a particular 
‘object’ (e.g. meat) that “sits well with me” (Lisa C), or with a person, entity, or 
practice, for instance, “a source that I kind of feel comfortable buying from” 
(Andrew P). If a balance between what is perceived as ‘right and wrong’ cannot be 
reached or is upset, discomfort may result, so that there may be practices and 
people that no longer feel comfortable, or foods that “I don’t quite feel right about 
eating” (Sophie C). Relating this to my previous conceptualisation of conflicting or 
contradictory emotions potentially being associated with different practice elements 
and with different practices across a bundle of practices, one can envisage that 
when these emotions are more aligned, there is a degree of emotional harmony. 
However, if they are more in conflict or contradict each other, then depending on 
their intensity, there will be emotional ‘unrest’ as multiple objects, meanings and 
emotions are negotiated in an effort to make sense of the ‘right-‘ or ‘wrong-ness’ of 
the practice as a whole—to find balance.  
 
Finding comfort through discomfort 
Accepting animals as food, there are certain practices surrounding the way these 
animals are treated that are more commonly ‘known’ to be problematic and cause 
discomfort to those seeking what they understand to be ethical and ‘good’ meat. 
Factory farming is generally regarded negatively, as I have illustrated. However, it 
is in the imagining of the devalued lives of the animals that are part of such systems, 
coupled with a knowledge and understanding of this as unethical, that an emotional 
association emerges that appears to reinforce this orientation. This could be 
thought of as a nexus of power/knowledge/displeasure, or in my framing, 
discomfort. 
 
As Ellis (C) illustrates, “factory farming is pretty horrendous, that thought of 
feedlots and animals living their lives in kind of confined spaces is pretty, I dunno, I 
  150 
just think that’s abhorrent” (emphasis added). Exhibiting both emotional and 
perceptual mimesis, David (C) recalls a visit to an industrial pig operation where 
there was, “crate after crate after crate after crate and they smelt disgusting”. Anne 
(C) relates an even more embodied association, asserting, “[factory farming] is just 
about trauma to animals and producers. And I don’t want to eat that, I don’t want 
to eat that violence”—alluding again to the treatment of animals being materially 
inscribed on the meat and, on ingestion, becoming part of her own body at a 
cellular level, just as Anthony (C), earlier in this section, was able to eat the 
happiness of a well-treated animal. Violence is reified and considered inedible, 
whereas ‘good’ treatment of animals is much more digestible, “[the meat] just sits 
better in you, knowing that the animal has lived well, and hopefully has died well”, 
affirms Nicki (C). Damien (C) captures this sense of the embodiment of the 
treatment of animals more eloquently when, speaking of the meat he prefers to buy, 
he says, “I feel like there’s an energy to it, it’s had this love and it’s been treated in a 
beautiful way and I just feel so much more nourished eating it rather than this 
factory farming”. As Gillian (C) claims, factory farmed meat “doesn’t feed your 
soul”. 
 
It is in my participants’ responses to a final supplementary interview question, 
where they express discomfort in association with in vitro meat,46 that an enhanced 
‘sense’ of nourishment emerges as a particular association with the practice of 
consuming, or more accurately, embodying the flesh, energy, or soul of a living, 
happy animal. For not only is in vitro meat considered “repellent” (Maria C) 
because it is a product of industrial process and therefore ‘unnatural’ and not ‘real’, 
concepts addressed in Part II, but also because it does not derive directly and 
wholly from a once living animal. As Joyce (C) explains, “there’s something 
extremely gut level and visceral and that’s why that animalness, I think there’s 
something in that”. And Maria (C) similarly asserts, “the difference in the meat is 
about the life of the animal and if there’s been no life, no animal, then it can’t taste 
the same, I just know that it can’t”. Hence an even more basic and visceral 
                                                
46 Also known as cultured meat, Miller defines in vitro meat as “meat that is grown by 
proliferating cells in a nutrient-rich medium without the necessity of an animal’s slaughter” 
(2012: 42). Some production methods rely on ‘donor’ animals and animal products, notably 
calf serum, although animal-free media are starting to be used. Much debate and 
contention surrounds this developing technological field (Pluhar 2009; Stephens 2010; 
Chiles 2013), and for many, the perpetuation of a ‘carniculture’, where ‘meat’, even animal-
free meat, is prioritised “remains in need of careful thought” (Miller 2012: 43). 
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emotional distinction emerges where meat (and presumably any meat, ethical or 
not) from living animals is digestible, and to a degree comforting, simply because it 
was once life, while meat from a laboratory is indigestible, because “there’s no life 
force in that meat” (Gillian C). After all, if not violence or happiness or life itself, 
what is inscribed on in vitro meat? What is ingested when one eats it? The 
emotional sterility of a laboratory is perhaps not so appetising.  
 
The visceral is “the realm of internally-felt sensations, moods and states of being, 
which are born from the sensory engagement with the material world” (Hayes-
Conroy and Hayes Conroy 2008: 462). In a 2011 article for the LA Times, the 
Pulitzer Prize-winning food critic Jonathan Gold refers to the exquisite rite of 
eating a particular food that was “heightened by danger, flavoured with death”. 
This sentiment echoes my participants’ accounts of emotionally inscribed meat and 
animals, and also presages associations of meaty practices with novelty and cultural 
omnivorousness (being the pursuit of anything defined as novel and exciting), 
which I discuss in more detail in the second chapter of Part III. Put simply, to 
ingest something is to also ingest everything socially constituted about it. Capturing 
the sentiments of many of my participants, Anne (C) says, “personally, I like my 
food to have had its feet on the ground” (emphasis added). In other words, life is 
appetising and affirming, while lifelessness is not. 
 
However, while participants associate a degree of relative comfort with eating an 
animal who has lived and died (as compared to in vitro meat), there is still evident 
discomfort associated with certain ‘meat’, animals and meaty practices, most 
especially in relation to practices of killing. For even ‘meat’ that has had its feet on 
the ground is necessarily inscribed with some degree of violence and there is 
widespread agreement that the “violence” of the slaughterhouse is the one 
discomforting process of producing meat that even producers of ethical and 
sustainable meat “haven’t got any control over” (Graham P) (unless they practice 
on-farm killing in which case the resulting meat cannot legally be sold to the 
public). 
 
Describing a vivid childhood memory of visiting an abattoir with her father, Julie 
(C) recalls that she “found it revolting and I remember leaving and saying thank 
you for killing our own meat, to my father, because it was so revolting, so revolting, 
I was disgusted”. This memory strengthens her commitment to buying “as ethical as 
I can”, being the response to her discomfort that is more relatable in the context of 
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normalised meaty practices than not eating meat. A more recent familiarity with 
abattoirs both in Australia and overseas has imprinted itself on Henry’s (C) 
memory, as he recounts:  
 
[…] it’s certainly distressing, it’s very confronting as well, to watch, to 
watch the whole live animals getting the chop, you know…less developed 
setting, where it’s much more confronting, cos it’s manual, and manual tends 
to be more grisly, that’s quite confronting, yeah. Some of the conditions that 
they’re killed in…there’s lots of crap, lots of shit, they’re all pissing, they’re 
all upset.  
 
Others who have visited abattoirs feel discomfort from imagining the emotions they 
ascribe to the animals in these situations. Finn (P) imagines (and perhaps 
somewhat feels) “just the stress of the process and pain, like stress and pain and 
confinement”, and Alison thinks of the “cows jammed in there…this real feeling of 
sadness” (Alison, P). These aspects of meaty practices “really bother” Finn (P), and 
Florence (P) explains that her brother finds it “horrendous. It hurts him”. Heather 
(C) finds “the thought of cutting the throat of an animal just awful” and the stun 
gun “really brutal, so I’m really uncomfortable with that”.  
 
These accounts further illustrate my point regarding competing emotions, and an 
implicit hierarchy, for while participants described to me (and often physically 
expressed) their discomfort with the ways in which some animals are killed, this 
discomfort does not outweigh the prevailing association of comfort with consuming 
meat as part of their everyday (or every week/month) practices. While arguably the 
most problematic, killing is just one among many practices that are part of 
consuming animals. Quite understandably, no other practice, except for perhaps 
hunting, is likely to be associated with such negative emotions. In contrast, many of 
those associated with cooking and eating are especially positive, both sensorially 
and emotionally, added to which are the range of knowledges and ‘truths’ (and 
validating discourses) associated with edible animals and meat that increase the 
probability that any discomfort associated with killing will be overcome.  
 
This appears to hold true as far as my data are concerned. My participants 
evidently grapple with discomforting emotional associations with ‘food’ animals, 
meat, and meaty practices, including the most discomforting practices involving 
killing, and these are negotiated against other, more ‘productive’, associations 
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within their meaty practices. The outcome of these negotiations, for all but one of 
my participants,47 and including the 17 participants who had previously been 
vegetarian or vegan, is their continued participation in meaty practices.48   
 
Discomforting emotions associated with how the animal is imagined to feel at the 
point of slaughter, made viscerally present through perceptual and emotional 
mimeses, are largely confined to this one aspect of eating animals amidst the many 
others that are overwhelmingly associated with comfort49 (or even more intense 
positive emotions). Participants recall vivid scenes of “big trucks going past with all 
the pink pigs in, screaming before they go off to the slaughterhouse” (Sally C), and 
of hearing the “horrific” sound of “the pig squealing” (Helen C). They express 
sorrow for the animals, imagining what it would be like for them because “death 
has a smell, blood you know…it’s death and blood. It does play on my mind” 
(Michael C); and also cling to the hope that an animal “would not be watching all 
of those animals die before them and knowing that they’re coming next, that’s 
horrible, that’s just horrible” (Julie C). Yet this discomfort is weighed in balance 
with their meaty practices as a whole where there are normalised and appropriate 
ways to compensate for this discomfort—more normalised than foregoing meat. 
Hence, although “what they have to go through to get them through an abattoir” 
does not “sit very well” with Nicki (C) who describes them “being around other 
animals that have to die, that sense of fear”, she and her partner instead kill their 
animals on farm (for their own consumption) so that the “animal has had the best 
life it could have had”.  
 
When it comes to killing animals first-hand, there is a rather more resigned 
perspective on the associated discomfort, which suggests that it is viewed less 
                                                
47 One participant informed me six months after her interview that she no longer ate meat. 
Having not followed up with the rest of my participants, I cannot say with any authority 
that they all continue to eat meat, or even that this one participant continues to not eat 
meat. 
48 I acknowledge here that the production and/or consumption of ethical and sustainable 
meat was my main recruitment criteria and therefore this is not surprising. 
49 I conceive this comfort as associated not only with other meaty practices, or elements 
thereof, but also with, and constituted by, the worldwide nexus of practices—
environmental, social, economic, medical, educational etc.—by which meat consumption 
and the use of ‘food’ animals have been universally, and systemically normalised. This 
aggregate comfort is set against, and enhanced by, the discomfort – the “unpleasant 
negative feelings, a state of tension” (Williams and Irurita 2006: 408)—associated with 
plant-based dietary practices situated within or alongside practices where meat has been 
normalised.  
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problematically, and as a general requirement of normalised meat consumption – a 
necessary practice. Melanie (P) “can’t watch that…can’t do any of that stuff” and 
lets her husband handle that aspect of their operation. Sally (C) has found ways to 
mitigate the sensory discomfort of it, first by never having music on, because “I 
don’t ever want any records to be associated with killing something”, and then 
having her husband hold the bird during and after, “because they flap…I can feel 
the heartbeat until it stops, and I can’t do that”. David (C) says, “I don’t find it an 
easy thing to do, slaughter an animal for meat consumption”. However, there is an 
indication here of a tacit knowledge and indeed universal ‘truth’, constituted via the 
historical and rhizomatic (knowledge/senses/emotions) normalisation of eating 
animals, that it has to be done regardless. As Henry (C) indicates, “killing 
something’s never much fun anyway…I always find it confronting…obviously it’s 
got to be quick”.  
 
Amidst these often intense and visceral associations with the ways in which ‘food’ 
animals are treated and especially killed, there are a few participants for whom the 
discomfort lingers—they do not feel quite right and evidently have more difficulty 
resolving the negotiation between multiple knowledges and emotions around their 
meat eating. Julie (C) reveals “those ethical issues around meat consumption have 
been really getting to me”, while for Joyce (C), “they’re the things I still feel pretty 
shit about and I’m still working through in my own head and may be the reasons 
why I may yet end up being a vegan”.50 This suggests that, theoretically at least, my 
participants meaty practices can change, and they may even defect from them 
altogether. However, almost half have already defected from plant-based diets to 
meaty practices. Additionally shaping these negotiations is the stigmatisation of 
emotions commonly associated with practices that do not involve eating animals. 
The emotional risks posed by taking up such (heterotopic) counter-practices act as 
an added deterrent to defecting from those involving meat. Such stigmatisation is 
not only associated with non-meaty practices and the threat of social exclusion they 
carry (Twine 2014), but with the opposite of every positive meaning that meaty 
practices are also conflated with. Thus, a person risks taking up ‘deviant’ practices 
uncomfortably construed and understood as un-Australian, anti-farmer, impolite, 
and unhealthy, among others (as I illustrate later in this chapter). The transference 
                                                
50 As a teenager, Joyce spent two years following a vegetarian diet and 6-12 months 
following a vegan diet. With respect to her current practices, she explains, “my body seems 
to be a body that needs to eat meat”. 
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of Australian nationalistic sentiment onto ‘meat’ or ‘food’ animals is noted also by 
Singer (2016: 191) and Dalziell and Wadiwell (2016). Singer additionally 
highlights the work of Wright (2015: 31) who observes that in the US after 9/11 
“the choice to be a vegan meant to step outside of the confines of what constituted 
an agreed-upon ‘American’ identity’”.  
 
It is understandable, in the context of the purposive sampling of my research 
design, that my data suggest defection from the normalised, animal-based diet is not 
common.51 Indeed conversely, as discussed in Chapter 2, some reports highlight the 
“mainstreaming” of veganism (Crawford 2015), especially part-time veganism 
(Barford 2014) and its rise as a “lifestyle movement” (de Boo 2016). However, 
these are based on self-reporting rather than actual dietary observations (ACE 
2017). Others, based on more detailed surveys and analyses of food intake, have 
found that a large proportion of former vegetarians and vegans return to meat 
(Asher et al. 2014; ACE 2017). In sum, it is not possible to foresee how persistent 
these apparent dietary changes will turn out to be, especially considering that more 
than half of my participants (two thirds of consumers and a quarter of producers) 
are former (or current) vegetarians or vegans and that a similar volume of media 
content can be found documenting vegans’ and vegetarians’ ‘return’ to meat, as 
highlighted in Chapter 2. On balance, my participants indicate that practices 
involving ethical meat are associated with greater emotional comfort than 
discomfort, as compared with those involving factory-farmed, supermarket or meat 
that is otherwise regarded as ‘bad’, and also with not eating meat. Discomforting 
associations are managed by identifying ‘better’ practices of animal use, such as an 
abattoir that “I’m quite happy with…it has a good feel” (Graham, P), or 
“supporting farmers who care about the animals” (Natalie C). 
 
Through exploring the discomfort associated with certain practices of using animals 
for food, especially practices of killing, and the common (perhaps cultural) 
understanding that emerges about how this discomfort ought to be approached, I 
identify the first of three emotions of distinction that I will highlight in this thesis. 
As well as directly referencing Wetherell’s (2012) meaning of distinction, I also 
intend ‘emotions of distinction’ as a play on the many ways in which my 
participants ‘create’ distinction in relation to ‘bad’, ‘good’ or ‘better’ meat. In this 
                                                
51 I do not count reducing meat consumption as defection because it still involves the 
persistence of practices relating to eating animals and their constitution as food. 
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way, the emotions I identify are doubly distinctive in that they accrue social 
distinction as well as ‘marking’ certain meat, animals or practices with certain 
distinctive qualities. The first of these ‘emotions’ brings together common emotional 
associations that participants make in response to certain, and especially intense, 
discomforts. Collectively, it summons what I term requisite bravery.  
 
Requisite bravery – an emotion of distinction 
I refer to these previously outlined emotional associations collectively as requisite 
bravery because, variously expressed, they resemble a social edict or precept of 
ethical meat eating that, I have observed, exists ‘out there’, like a law of nature that 
must be followed simply because “that’s the reality of it” (Henry C). Requisite 
bravery is an association with practices involving ethical meat that, as it is 
characterised in quite definitive terms by my participants, ‘has to’ be experienced 
and almost performed not only to be considered ethical, but to earn the right to eat 
meat at all. This requirement is proclaimed quite forcefully and is enacted by 
confronting the ‘reality’ of killing an animal whose flesh you will eat because, “it’s 
part of eating meat, and if you can’t do it, you should really be questioning how you 
could be eating meat” (Ellis C).  
 
Just as Foucault (1982) argues that power cannot exist without the possibility for 
resistance, in the psychology literature it is said that bravery or courage cannot 
exist without fear, or what I have conceived as discomfort—it is a prerequisite, i.e. 
they are mutually co-constitutive (Goud 2005; Seltzer 2015). As indicated, 
discomforting emotional associations with certain aspects of eating ‘food’ animals, 
particularly killing, can be implicated here, and bravery is (perhaps culturally) 
constituted as an appropriate way in which to confront and defeat this discomfort. 
Ellis’s (C) tone above is scolding, implying that there is something shameful about 
not being able to face this discomfort and kill an animal but still eating meat, an 
observation supported by Turner and Stets who describe the “embarrassment and 
shame” that comes from not following the “rules of feeling and display” (2006: 26).  
 
Exploring my data in more detail, the precept around bravery is sometimes applied 
to participants’ own practices, such as Dan (C), who began to eat meat again after 
many years of being both vegetarian and vegan yet still feels uncomfortable with 
the associated killing—“death…is a horrible thing”. The way Dan (C) mitigates the 
discomfort he feels around this element of his renewed flesh eating is to engage 
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with it in a way that certain knowledge now deems ethical. Accordingly, he “had to 
be comfortable with [killing] to be comfortable then eating an animal…if that was 
something I was going to do then I had to be able to do it myself”. David (C) 
acknowledges that killing an animal is “an intensely emotional sort of experience”, 
and one that, “I need to emotionally prepare myself to do beforehand”, evoking a 
sense of steeling himself to undertake something that he does not find pleasant but 
is nevertheless ‘known’ to be necessary. Berating herself for not being “braver” 
about “the life and the death of things”, Anne (C) decides “if I’m going to eat this 
stuff I need to step into that space and take control of it…I feel like I need to do 
that”, as it seems David (C) has also managed to do. In Tracey’s (C) firmly 
expressed opinion, “if I can’t kill it, I don’t deserve to eat it”.  
 
What these participants reveal is an implicit understanding that bravery, 
constituted in relation to ethical meat, earns them a greater right to eat meat than 
others. This contributes to the persistence of using animals for food more generally 
as a number of misgivings and challenges levelled at it can be aggregated and 
addressed through this ethical re-constitution, which at the same time promises a 
certain social distinction to its participants. This is why I identify this emotion of 
distinction, and one other identified in the next chapter, as mechanisms of power. 
These are in addition to, and work in association with, the validating discourses. 
 
This sense of social distinction emerges also when the bravery precept is applied 
more broadly, decreeing how others ought to approach their meaty practices. As 
Lisa (C) very plainly states, “if you eat meat you should be able to kill it yourself, 
you should be able to watch it die and butcher it”. If you cannot, she continues, 
“then you shouldn’t be eating meat”. At the very least, as Natalie (C) says, you 
“should be prepared to”. There are many ways in which this requirement is 
expressed, but the meaning is very clear—“if you can’t do it then perhaps you 
shouldn’t be eating it” (Sally C); “you have to be able to deal with this…you should at 
least be able to bear witness” (Natalie C). Producers are equally unequivocal: 
“people say, I don’t want to see the face of whatever I’m eating…you’ve got to” 
(Blake, P), and Finn declares even more prescriptively, “no you can’t watch it, you 
have to do it yourself” (Finn, P). In a similar vein, Natalie (C) questions whether 
those who cannot watch the process “should be allowed to get away with that”. She 
does not elaborate on what an appropriate penalty might be for not engaging with 
the bravery associated with practices of killing—perhaps exclusion from the 
community of even ethical practice. Nevertheless, there is certainly the implication 
  158 
in my data that some kind of exclusion would, or should, follow from a lack bravery 
in relation to these practices.  
 
Presumably there is in contrast an associated feeling of pride, or at least comfort, if 
you can follow the socially constituted emotional rules, or ‘rules of feeling and 
display’, in response to discomfort. The association with bravery appears repeatedly 
in my data, as I have illustrated. However, emphasizing how its constitution is 
practice(s)-dependent, there is an additional and related discomfort, associated 
with how practices of not eating meat are broadly constituted and understood (as 
illustrated in Part II), which locates the discomfort associated with certain aspects 
of eating ‘food’ animals as the lesser of the two to confront. Effectively, there is less 
social approval to be gained from exhibiting bravery in the face of this discomfort 
(associated with non-meat practices), and more likely the opposite—the discomfort 
associated with occupying heterotopic sites of vegetarian or vegan practices.  
 
Practices associated with the consumption of ‘food’ animals are so systemically and 
socially normalised that the regard one might lose by not facing ‘the reality’ of 
slaughter is far less than that which would be lost by defecting from these practices 
altogether. In other circumstances, defecting from these practices might be 
constituted as brave. To clarify, by itself, bravery is “morally ambiguous…neither 
virtuous nor vicious” (Seltzer 2014 online). The constitution of bravery as a ‘good’ 
emotion depends on whether it is considered appropriate to a practice, and also 
how the material objects of that practice (such as ‘food’ animals and meat) are 
constituted. It also depends on how fear or discomfort is constituted in relation to 
other practices, which represents the “fear of what people might say about you if 
you don’t act courageously” (Seltzer 2015, online). Emotional associations are 
constituted within and also across social practices, but these practices are also 
cultural.  
 
The constitution of bravery 
At least in Western cultures, bravery is commonly constituted as an emotion of 
distinction, and almost, at times, an emotional practice in and of itself. The capacity 
to ‘steel’ yourself, stand strong in the face of fear and have ‘the courage of your 
convictions’ (rather than change them) is universally elevated and there is a tacit 
understanding of what bravery or courage looks like. Practices involving health 
care, emergency services and the armed forces come to mind. But there are others 
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where discomfort appears to be more purposefully sought in order to create the 
opportunity for bravery. The rise of extreme sports (Brymer and Schweitzer 2013) 
and adventure tourism (Carnicelli-Filho et al 2010) can be seen as part of this 
quest, where “the search for new emotions and sensations different to those in daily 
routine has become a decisive factor” (Carnicelli-Filho et al 2010: 953)—
particularly, as these authors note, the emotion of fear and, it follows, what it takes 
to overcome it. There is also the rise of dark tourism, or thanatourism, where what 
has traditionally been regarded as a chance to fill vacation time with positive and 
pleasurable experiences becomes an opportunity to seek out what were once sites 
of others’ suffering and death (Stone and Sharpley 2008). Here, “a strange 
combination of empathy and excitement” turns these sites of tragedy into tourist 
attractions (Tarlow 2007: 51). As Beedie and Hudson (2003) note, these new 
tourist practices have successfully commodifed adventure, or rather the emotions 
associated with it, much like, as I will be discussing in Part IV, visibility of meat 
production is being commodified, perhaps in part provoking (and selling) a similar 
excitation of associated emotions. 
 
What these practices share is an element of fear or discomfort in “confronting death 
and dying” (Stone and Sharpley 2008: 576) in some form, with a concomitant 
element of social distinction that ensues from participating in them because 
“achieving an adventurous objective requires some kind of social validation to be 
meaningful” (Beedie and Hudson 2003: 637). With the term requisite bravery, I 
argue that it is the fortitude associated with facing and overcoming discomfort that 
invites social validation—the discomfort is expected (solicited even), but bravery is 
required to ‘complete’ the practice. The “capital potential of participation” (Beedie 
and Hudson 2003: 637) in practices associated with heightened emotions, especially 
fear, emphasises that these emotions are very much socially constituted and 
associated with practices in different ways. As Kemper observes, “a large class of 
emotions results from real, imagined or anticipated outcomes in social relationships" 
(1978: 43). These observations support Ahmed’s (2004a) notion of an affective 
economy and are also reflected in dramaturgical theories of emotion where one 
emotion (e.g. bravery) is offered in exchange for another of higher emotional value 
(e.g. respect) (Turner and Stets 2006: 26). 
 
In terms of food-related practices, bravery has already been associated with food 
tourism, also known as culinary tourism or food adventures (Molz 2007; Mykletun 
and Gyimothy 2010). Jennie Molz notes the double meaning of the ‘Intrepid’ 
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traveller in denoting the traveller’s character as well as the nature of their practices. 
She comments that at the same time as demonstrating their fearlessness in 
encountering the food of Others, the traveller’s consumption of what may otherwise 
be considered inedible also “becomes a way of performing the self as adventurous, 
curious and open” (2007: 86). However, bravery is not only required to overcome a 
fear of the Other’s food, but, as Mykletun and Gyimothy note, to confront a most 
vivid reminder “about death and dying” and the fact that animals are killed for our 
food (2010: 435). This echoes my participants’ preferences for assimilating the life 
of a living animal, with its feet on the ground, rather than the non-life of in vitro 
meat—confrontation with the life and death of meat is affirming in a way not 
otherwise possible. 
 
An encounter with freaky, scary, or frightening food experiences does not have to 
involve travel. Cultural omnivorousness (discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter) elevates the freaky and the low-brow in the context of “quality, rarity, 
locality, organic, hand-made, creativity, and simplicity” (Johnston and Baumann, in 
Kirkwood 2016). Lupton observes “a machismo of eating, an almost inverse food 
snobbery, in which the more repulsive the food, the more points are won for 
appearing gastronomically brave and adventurous’ (1996: 128). This bravery, or 
‘machismo’, Hollows adds, “can extend to other acts of cultural omnivorousness 
that transgress boundaries within, as well as between, national cultures” (2003: 
242). 
 
Bravery, is perhaps, then, the price of inclusion. Maria (C) implies that being brave 
is the ethical price that you must pay in order to be more connected with your food: 
“you have to learn how to do these things, so there’s an ethical cost in trying to 
develop a less substantiated relationship with the animal…to develop a real 
intimacy”. This of course presupposes the constitution and ‘truth’ of animals as 
food, and implies that a less substantiated relationship with non-animal foods does 
not incur the same ethical cost, presumably because the emotions surrounding plant 
production, especially of fear or discomfort, are far less heightened, present less of a 
challenge and therefore require less bravery—with less reward. The ethical cost is 
therefore outweighed by the social gains that come from performing a more 
‘appropriate’ connection with meat and animals, especially those of the ethical 
order.  
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A note on masculinity is called for here. There is a substantial body of literature on 
gendered norms of emotional expression, or more accurately, the gendering of 
emotions (Menely 2007; Citrin et al. 2004; Lewis and Simpson 2007), with bravery 
typically associated with masculinity, and with notions of power and dominance 
(Kinsella et al. 2017; Burnett 2001). Some authors have framed the surge in uptake 
of a more confrontational approach to the realities of killing and butchering ‘food’ 
animals, particularly from women, as illustrative of a feminist approach to 
empowerment through the co-option of practices understood to be in the ‘male’ 
sphere. In reference to a text that exemplifies this trend, which the media have 
dubbed the New Carnivore movement, Parry (2010: 383) observes that “violence 
towards animal bodies [is presented] as a bold revision of traditional feminine 
gender norms, as well as performance of female empowerment”. I have not set out 
to explore how gender shapes the (re)constitution of ethical meat and ‘food’ 
animals, primarily because this would have required a different approach to my 
interview questions, one that included ‘feminised’ foods, and also this question 
would deserve an entire thesis dedicated to its proper treatment. I do, however, flag 
it as an important topic for further research in my conclusion. 
 
Hard-won gains 
My participants’ understandings of the ethical distinction associated with 
participating more directly with practices of killing appears as tacit knowledge, and 
even an accepted ‘truth’, but one that has no recourse to a specific origin or 
authority. Witnessing and/or participating in killing ‘food’ animals is an aspect of 
normalised meat eating practices with a long history that has recently evolved a 
specifically ethical dimension, and an associated body of ethical knowledge, located 
within a broader bundle of ‘ethical’ consumption practices. As part of this 
evolution, participation in killing animals has expanded, being co-opted by 
everyday consumers, while new ways of accessing the practice are emerging, as I 
will elaborate in Part IV.  
 
However, the precept surrounding killing animals for ethical meat also comes with 
the added understanding that it should not be easy. In Berlin Reed’s The Ethical 
Butcher, the story of the author’s personal journey from vegetarianism to high 
profile butcher, Reed observes, “[Meat] is meant to be a hard won prize” (2013: 
52). Graham (P) conveys a similar sense of trial when, referring to the killing that 
‘meat’ requires, he says, “you wouldn’t want to enjoy that, that’d be a terrible 
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situation…people in their right mind don’t enjoy that sort of thing”. Gillian (C) 
anticipated being traumatised by killing her first chicken but proceeded through 
this fear and found it interesting that the experience did not actually bother her, 
noting instead that it “made beautiful soup”. Some of my participants express 
excitement at the prospect of killing animals themselves, especially in less 
conventional ways such as pig shooting or “boar hunting with bows and arrows” in 
France, which never actually happened for Sally (C), but nevertheless “sounded 
quite exciting”. Archery was also mentioned by Michael (C) as a skill he would like 
to learn. He has already identified a couple of archery schools and explains that it is 
the increased connection with the act of killing that he finds appealing: 
 
Maybe it’s a romantic notion, or the idea that you’re not disconnected from 
miles away. From hundreds of metres away, it’s fairly intimate. 
 
Michael echoes Maria’s (C) earlier notion of there being an ethical cost in being 
more ‘intimately’ connected with how animals become meat, a point Tracey (C) 
further emphasises by expressing her disappointment at her son’s decision to shoot 
a kangaroo: 
 
We just said, ‘how could you do that, how could you shoot it?’, like that's 
just the worst form of…abrogation of responsibility. You're not even killing 
it directly, you're killing it through a gun which is just pathetic. 
 
Tracey (C) implies that a more connected, intimate form of killing, such as perhaps 
bow and arrow, would have been more ‘responsible’ and therefore more ethical—a 
better way to show “a bit of humility and respect towards the animal” (Natalie C). 
 
As discussed, it is the trial involved in the confrontation, and the bravery associated 
with pushing through the resistance of discomfort, which generates the rewards 
and their deservedness. Sally (C) describes the process as “very exhausting 
emotionally”, while Gillian (C), acknowledging that she is not going to enjoy it, 
adds “but I’m not supposed to enjoy it”. For Anne (C), “it’s a humbling experience”, 
but one that “people should have”. Once again, there is the suggestion of a degree 
of sombre helplessness in the face of an inevitable and foregone conclusion, as 
Natalie (C) asserts, “I have come to terms with it”. Animals on Graham’s (P) farm 
receive an apology before being ‘sent off’—“you can’t do much more”, he opines. 
Andrew (P) describes ‘sending off’ cows that have been with him for 12 years to be 
  163 
slaughtered, saying, “that is a bit harder I would say, it gets you in here [pointing to 
his heart], of course it does”. What psychology and behaviour-based studies would 
construe as emotional dissonance or a “meat paradox” (Bastian et al. 2016: 278, also 
2012; Loughnan et al. 2014), I therefore conceive as being very much part of the 
constitution, maintenance and performance of the practice. 
 
For some participants, the intensity of emotional discomfort associated with killing 
animals has abated somewhat over time. As Henry (C) says, “I’m quite immune, 
I’m quite impervious, developed a sense of detachment from that process”. While 
for Will (P), “the more rabbits I’ve shot here…it desensitises you in a way that’s I 
suppose good ‘cos I can deal with it now”. For others however, and consistent with 
the knowledge that it is the emotional labour involved in killing that ‘earns’ the 
meat, such detachment is not to be prized. Referring to the emotional difficulty that 
he endures, David (C) says “I really want to keep that”. He goes on to explain: 
  
I don’t want it to be a point where it’s a production line…that just got to be 
the routine. I’d find it difficult to see how that could not take away from that 
connection that I would have and that way that I want to approach it 
emotionally.  
 
Discomforting associations, which I explore I more depth, in the next section, can 
thus present an opportunity to acquire an extra cache of emotional distinction. 
Rather than encouraging defection from meaty practices, discomfort conversely 
becomes part of the productive network available to those engaged in practices 
involving ethical meat and animals, because bravery, the emotion required to 
overcome it, is so universally feted. In the pursuit of eating animals ethically, the 
association with bravery becomes a mechanism of power that can be accessed 
especially via an engagement with killing. For my participants, this becomes 
evidence that one deserves to eat animals, elevating their edibility and the practices 
they are part of to a higher ethical level. In this way, emotional comfort and 
discomfort can work together to not only maintain but double down on ‘better’ 
meaty practices and the edibility of ‘food’ animals. Hence, Foucault’s nexus of 
power/knowledge/pleasure can be more broadly construed as a nexus of 
power/knowledge/(dis)pleasure.  
 
In this section, I have shown how productive aspects of power can be constituted, 
and are also foregrounded, through discomforting associations with practices of 
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meat production (especially killing), as well as with other distinctions of edibility as 
discussed in Part II. Meaty practices are therefore permeated with emotional 
associations. However, as my participants indicate, and as Korzybski (anecdotally) 
demonstrated with his students, it is the socially mediated knowledge and ‘truth’ 
associated with those practices, and with the material objects that are part of those 
practices, that most shapes the type and intensity of emotions. A change in 
knowledge, or the elevation of one ‘knowledge’ over another, can suddenly create a 
very different and even opposite emotional association, as I will demonstrate in the 
next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
In Part II, I demonstrated how systems of knowledge and discourse locate ‘food’ 
animals and their flesh in shifting categories of edibility within a universal category 
that constitutes the general edibility of nonhuman animals. So far in Part III, I have 
explored how the senses and emotions, mediated through this knowledge and 
through broader social and cultural practices, are associated with ‘food’ animals, 
meat and related practices. I then turned my attention to the different kinds of 
emotions that characterise these associations and shape the (in)edibility of animals 
and meat. I explored how feelings of discomfort, being indicative of some kind of 
challenge to normalised emotional associations, are negotiated with respect to 
specific ‘meats’, animals and practices. This led me to identify requisite bravery as 
an emotion of distinction and mechanism of power that helps mitigate or 
reconfigure discomfort in ‘appropriate’ ways.  
 
In Chapter 7, it is more substantial challenges to the edibility of ‘meat’ and ‘food’ 
animals that are my focus. Hence, I look at various degrees of transgression, when 
‘meat’ or ‘food’ animals cross over and become emotionally inedible, and when ‘bad’ 
or otherwise unethical meat or animals become edible. How these two-way 
transgressions are corrected, policed or ameliorated reveal further mechanisms by 
which these animals are unable to make sense as anything but food.  
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Chapter 7. Feelings of meat 
This chapter attends more specifically to my third objective in terms of how an 
embodied knowledge of ‘food’ animals is challenged and how their edibility is 
maintained. In contrast to the relatively easily resolved discomforting associations 
I examined in the previous chapter, here I home in on instances where these 
associations are intense enough to disrupt my participants’ meaty practices to 
greater and lesser degrees. I therefore explore, in the first half of the chapter, when 
‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals transgress, or cross over, emotional boundaries to become 
inedible, how ‘proper’ emotions are then re-associated, and also how potentially 
transgressive emotional trajectories are continually policed.  
 
The second part of the chapter focuses on the opposite transgression—
circumstances where ‘bad’ or unethical ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals become edible. 
This occurs when typical sources of discomfort, as discussed in Part II and thus far 
in Part III, give way to more comforting associations within the context of the 
practice as a whole. In both transgressive cases, from edible to non-edible and vice 
versa, the power exercised through the normalised, multi-sensory and embodied 
nexus of edible orders is foregrounded, whereby animals are persistently 
constrained within anthroparchal cartographies of meat. Encompassing aspects of 
this nexus that are hitherto not accounted for, either by validating discourses or 
emotions of distinction, I identify a third ‘type’ of mechanism that maintains ‘food’ 
animals’ domination. The type of mechanism is an ethico-aesthetic, and the first (of 
two) that I identify here is ‘moral approval’—essentially an invocation to do what is 
constituted as ‘right’ and morally ‘good’. The second appears in Part IV. 
 
i. Crossing over: From discomfort to emotional inedibility 
As is evident from my discussions with producers and consumers, occasionally, 
discomforting emotions associated with one type of knowledge or ‘truth’ (about 
‘meat’, animals or meaty practices) can be intense enough to momentarily arrest, 
and sometimes completely shatter, normalised emotional routines, or “practice-
specific emotionality” (Reckwitz 2002: 254). A ‘normal’ and ‘practice-specific 
emotionality’ is comfortable with the use of cows, pigs, chickens and sheep as food, 
and so the process of killing them “didn’t bother” Grace (C) when she was growing 
up on her family’s farm. Except, that is, “when Dad killed my only pet chicken”. 
Suddenly, her formerly comfortable associations were unsettled.  
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Highlighting the emotional associations entangled with orders of knowledge that 
designate animals more or less as pets, as discussed in Part II, Helen (C), who was 
vegetarian for three to four years, describes living with various ‘pets’ and how “all 
the animals interacting, made me feel more uncomfortable about eating meat”. 
Elucidating this further, Alison (P) observes, “You just don’t eat an animal that 
trusts you and follows you around”—i.e. they become emotionally inedible. This 
association of trust with certain animals, and the subsequent discomfort associated 
with betraying that trust, is a distinct thread in my data and is especially evident in 
the relationship between producers and ‘their’ ‘food’ animals. The emotional 
discomfort associated with this notion of betrayal can be intense enough to 
challenge and even dismantle normalised practices, but only to a degree still limited 
by cartographies of meat. 
 
Recalling his childhood on a farm, Simon (P) remembers that “any old lamb from 
the mob” would be killed on-farm for its flesh; however, “if it was a pet, it’d always 
go off to market”, thus creating distance from what he suggests might have been an 
uncomfortable on-farm process for him and/or his family. Melanie (P) is similarly 
bothered by eating their own animals, who she has watched running around in the 
paddock. She says, “I’m ok with it going to the market, knowing that it’s going to 
the abattoir from the market”, but she “wouldn’t have been happy” to know that the 
same animal “came back into my freezer”. Melanie (P) needs the distance and 
anonymity that comes from selling their animals to a sale yard and then buying 
meat from the butcher—to “not know where it’s come from”, because “knowing 
that it was one of mine, I couldn’t have done that”. Emphasising the sense of 
connection explicitly, Florence (P) describes how her father loves a “good steak”, 
but for him, “don’t overly connect it, which is probably why he won’t eat his own”. 
In fact, for her whole family, there is a heightened connection with ‘their’ animals 
so that “if they have to stop and think about that, they sort of go…something about 
knowing the animal”. If these producers did think about it, perhaps the associated 
emotional discomfort would unsettle their practices, as it did for Alison (P). After 
acquiring a few pigs to raise for their ‘meat’, Alison (P) explains, “we’ve raised 
them and then gone, Oh, we can’t even, we can’t eat them…cos they’ve got a 
personality, probably they’ve become pets”.  
 
Alison’s (P) comment highlights that for these producers, a different kind of 
connection with their animals allows a blurring and occasional transgression of 
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normalised boundaries between orders of edibility and non-edibility, and sometimes 
requires active policing of those boundaries. The status of their animals as food has 
become less unequivocal. Naming can play a big part in shaping transgressions. 
Nicki (C), who runs a hobby farm, tells me they “don’t name our boys [who go to 
slaughter], we only name the girls”. Similarly, Brigid (P) refers to her named pet 
sheep: 
 
He’s a boy and he was made an orphan…two years ago. He’s got such a 
personality, so yeah, there’s always exceptions I suppose.  
 
Naming implies subjectification, as against the normalised, wholesale objectification 
of these animals and their flesh. It risks an emotional connection that is not 
appropriate and often incompatible with the knowledge of these animals as edible. 
It is at this point, where experience is not conforming to the order of things, or “not 
pass[ing] the filter”, that Douglas sees the opportunity “to force attention into less 
habitual tracks” and “examine the filtering mechanism itself” (2002: 38).  
 
Every year, there are media reports of pigs, cows, chickens and sheep who have 
avoided becoming meat through dramatic acts of escape, often at the point of 
slaughter (Conaty 1998; Pleasance 2014; Bluestone 2014; Chasan 2015; Schelling 
2015; Krause 2015; Steinbuch 2016; Embury-Dennis 2018). Most of these stories 
are not reported in mainstream media. When they are, they depict the animals as 
“wily” and “devious” outlaws “on the run”, “evading capture” through their 
“fugitive antics”, and being chased by keystone cops as they “make monkeys of the 
police”. These descriptions are often accompanied by humorous epithets such as 
“houdini”, “save their bacon” or “walking steak frites” (the UK’s Butch Cassidy and 
the Sundance Pig being the most famous case to date). Invariably, the “daring”, 
“courage” and “spirit” shown by these “intrepid” individuals sets them apart from 
the billions of others killed each year for food. There is often a “huge public outcry” 
around their capture and the negotiation of their fate (if they have not been killed 
in the process), usually leading to a “quashing” or “reprieve” of their death 
sentence, which would now be “unsporting”. Even if they are killed in the process, 
they die “a hero’s death” (Bluestone 2014).52 The lucky ones are taken in by animal 
sanctuaries where they can instead lead “cushy” lives (Steinbuch 2016). Of course 
                                                
52 Implicit in these discourses is the idea that the ‘normal’ manner of their death in 
slaughterhouses is otherwise sporting and what the majority of non-heroes deserve. 
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in reality, these individuals are not any different from the billions who pass 
unnoticed through Noske’s (1989) animal industrial complex. However, their 
momentary humanisation, which occurs as a process of their individualisation from 
the herd, often (not always) allows them to cross boundaries of use, evading their 
former designation as food, to assume a new role no longer predicated on the 
edibility of their flesh.  
 
My participants reveal further instances of ‘crossing-over’. For instance, I 
previously illustrated that the cuteness of Julie’s backyard poultry rendered them 
inedible, and Diane (C) similarly relates the following story: 
 
I had two chickens, and we called them rhubarb and polenta to remind 
ourselves that they were to be eaten. But we just never got around to killing 
them and when they got sick we actually got them very expensive vet 
treatment and then when they died we had funerals, so we got very 
attached. 
 
Alison (P) makes a more direct connection, explaining that “sometimes animals just 
become humanised” – these individuals, “that were our pets, we didn’t eat”. 
However, this ability of certain individuals to ‘cross over’ serves to emphasise the 
status of others as food, as Michael (C) illustrates: 
 
We had cows - there was Dinner and Rosie, which was my dad’s first cow 
and he had to put it down. He found that quite distressing…we definitely 
knew both Mary [the pig] and Rosie [the cow] to be more household 
pets…but yeah, Dinner was just dinner. 
 
Crossing over appears to happen when a discomforting emotional association that 
would normally be inappropriate within meaty practices is provided an acceptable 
outlet when it is limited to just one animal. Such animals are constituted as being 
unique in some way from all the others on account of their more ‘human’ qualities 
and capacities, or their outstanding courage and will to live, which make them more 
relatable and bring them closer to those animals we would commonly regard as 
pets. These examples would seem to illustrate May’s (2014) theorisation of moral 
individualism (where the characteristics or capacities of the animal determine its 
moral status) and moral relationism (where this status is determined by the animal’s 
relations with humans). As Coghlan points out, “capacity-possession appears to be 
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necessary for RBRs [relation-based reasons] to arise” (2016: 1243). They also 
highlight the fickle or shaky ground on which these moral understandings rest, 
given that capacity-possession is selectively perceived and inconsistently applied.  
 
What appears ultimately more decisive in the fate of these animals is the socially 
constituted narrative that accompanies, and constitutes, their individual 
transgressions, which Coghlan (2016) attends to in his “narrative-style philosophy”. 
However, taking this further, I would conceive the selective moral elevation of 
certain animals rather as their location within a broader array of practices where 
occasional transgressions are actually allowed, and perhaps even necessary to 
maintain Foucault’s mask of power. Individual animals are therefore being 
differently constituted while leaving unchallenged the dominant, normalised 
constitution of their species as edible. Additionally, moments of transgression 
become focal points for any accumulated discomfort, or discomfort associated with 
a momentary visibility of mechanisms of domination. Much like requisite bravery, 
they serve to productively channel and transmute discomfort in ways that reaffirm 
the normalization and hence the persistence of meaty practices. Through their 
public enactment, these emotional flashpoints exercise the power to absolve, and 
thereby mask, the domination that characterises the normal order. As Douglas 
aptly explains: 
 
Then suddenly we find that one of the most abominable or impossible is 
singled out and put into a very special kind of ritual frame that marks it off 
from other experience. The frame ensures that the categories which the 
normal avoidances sustain are not threatened or affected in any way. Within 
the ritual frame the abomination is then handled as a source of tremendous 
power (2002: 166). 
 
Indeed, Douglas identifies the capacity to accommodate transgressions as essential 
to systems of power (2002: 40). 
 
Central to these alternate, ‘abnormal’ constitutions of certain animals is the 
existence of temporal spaces where the normal order can be suspended—where 
what would be inappropriate emotions to associate with ‘food’ animals 
(compassion, kindness, responsibility) become appropriate. An altered knowledge 
of these animals then becomes permissible, as well as a different emotional 
association, as long as that association “do[es] not deviate too far from the 
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emotional script provided by culture” (Turner and Stets 2006: 26). For these 
transgressions play out with their own inherent order, and in ways that reinforce 
what is ‘normal’.  
 
Transgressions are therefore by definition, and also necessity, the exception. They 
are singular instances where dominant emotional associations with ‘food’ animals 
are permitted to escape the normative script, allowing individual animals to cross 
boundaries, but only one or two animals, and crossing over only to ‘othered’ spaces 
that are legitimised within the overall system (e.g. farm sanctuaries). For all of my 
participants, the animals in question remain highly individualised and in some way 
unique, while the species as a whole remains persistently edible. To humans, a 
certain pig is still Pig, the edible animal that ‘produces’ pork, and the same with an 
individual cow, lamb or chicken – the individual does not escape their species 
representation. As Berger says of animals in myth and history: 
 
[…] each lion was Lion, each ox was Ox. This—maybe the first existential 
dualism—was reflected in the treatment of animals. They were subjected 
and worshipped, bred and sacrificed. (Berger 1992: 7) 
 
In terms of competing emotions, I would argue that the edibility of these animals 
persists because these often intense emotional flashpoints of individualisation do 
not present a sufficient challenge to the overwhelmingly comfortable associations 
with meat and practices involving meat, and the discomforting associations with 
not-eating meat. Furthermore, these transgressions are located in spaces 
constituted as being outside normalised practices where ‘non-normal’ emotions are 
uniquely construed as appropriate and are thereby unproblematically isolated from 
everyday practices of using animals for food. 
 
Spaces of intimate daily encounter that might unsettle knowledge of edible and 
non-edible animals do not need to be experienced first-hand. Rather unexpectedly, 
for some of my participants, imagining the intimate encounters of local, small-scale 
farmers with their ‘happy’ animals can be enough to construe the subsequent use of 
these animals for food as inappropriate—a betrayal of trust. Heather (C) once 
participated in the skinning and butchering of recently slaughtered possums on a 
friend’s farm and reflects, “if the farmer had, while I was staying there, slaughtered 
one of their lambs and I was involved in butchering that, I think I would feel a lot 
less comfortable”. She refers to the “duty of care” the farmer had for the lamb as 
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opposed to the possum— “the relationship is just so much more complex, whereas 
if you go out hunting…there’s not that connection and so it’s easier for me to 
proceed with using it as food”. As well as casting wild ‘meat’ in a more favourable 
light, this idea of trust can similarly frame factory-farmed meat as the ‘better’ choice 
in this context. As Maria (C) puts it, “it feels like a betrayal of trust and so in some 
ways the industrial system, because there’s no relationship, there isn’t that betrayal 
of trust”. 
 
This betrayal continues to bother Maria (C), who constantly weighs up the 
“ethics”, or perhaps more so the emotions associated with these ethics: “there’s the 
life and then there’s the death, there’s those two things in the ethics”. However, as 
these participants illustrate, the emotional discomfort associated with certain 
subjectified animals does not render all animals inedible. Practices involving their 
consumption persist and merely shift slightly to focus on alternate objects, 
knowledges and ‘’truths’. Discomfort is thus subdued within the broader scope of 
emotional associations considered more appropriate (and sometimes distinctive) 
with regard to the ethical use of ‘food’ animals and consumption of their flesh. For 
as Simon (P) emphasises, “at the end of the day they’re meat”, demonstrating how 
order shapes emotions, whereas emotions are more likely to merely unsettle order, 
and then usually only temporarily— “cultural categories are public matters. They 
cannot so easily be subject to revision” (Douglas 2002: 40). This pull of order and 
‘knowledge’, which shapes negotiations between appropriate vs inappropriate 
emotions, is clearly illustrated by examining how particularly memorable 
transgressions, as recounted by my participants, were corrected and/or policed.  
 
Correcting and policing transgressions 
Often during the course of my interviews, participants would recall past events and 
experiences that had made a particularly strong impression on them and were 
associated with intense emotions—intense enough to change their practices around 
food, even if only temporarily. Their memories of these events were typically very 
vivid and visceral, highlighting the dynamic, rhizomatic interplay between the 
emotions, senses, knowledge and the imagination (with the additional emotional 
and perceptual mimesis this introduces) as discussed in the previous chapter. What 
I want to focus on in these accounts are the intensities of the emotional associations, 
how they shaped participants’ practices, and how they were corrected or policed in 
line with how ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals are understood to make sense. Ultimately, 
  172 
they demonstrate the dominance of a normalised nexus of 
knowledges/senses/emotions associated with meat and its role, along with 
associated mechanisms of power, in maintaining the edibility of these animals. 
 
Maria (C) recounts a particularly graphic experience on a farm, which involved the 
inept shooting of a kangaroo:  
 
The kangaroo got shot from a distance and we kind of thought it was dead 
but it turns out that it had only been shot in the leg…so my friend had a 
knife and he cut the throat and the animal was first of all angry, or scared, 
and lashing out and scratching, and then it didn’t die. Cutting through the 
throat was quite a process and…death didn’t come instantaneously…I was 
thinking, ‘shit, this animal didn’t die as quickly as I expected it to, this was 
not a good death’. …so then my friend broke it down and I stripped off the 
skin and that was the first time I’d touched meat or flesh that was still blood 
warm, which is a very confronting thing.  
 
Maria (C) remembers, “I felt terrible about that…very complicit”. Although she 
and her friends “ate it later and it was delicious”, she goes on to say, “I was much 
more uncomfortable with eating meat for a period of time”. Quite spontaneously 
during her interview, Gillian (C) remembered that she worked in a chicken 
plucking farm when she was young, “that’s why I became a vegetarian, oh my god, 
of course…I’d totally forgotten that”. This experience created lasting and intensely 
discomforting emotional associations with animals and meat for Gillian (C) who 
says, “I don’t think I ate chicken for 20 years and I went off all food”. Alison (P) 
grew up on a farm and remembers that “as a child, [on-farm slaughter] was really 
hard. I actually found that quite traumatising”. She vividly recalls that she would 
take the chosen animals away, “go and hide” when the slaughterman arrived at the 
farm:  
 
I’d be like, ‘no, no, don’t kill them’, and then…that feeling of betrayal, when 
they talked me into handing [the animals] over. I remember going into my 
bedroom and just bawling my eyes out. 
 
Alison (P) was vegetarian for six years as a teenager, which, she says, was a direct 
result of this sense of ‘betrayal’.  
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The altered emotional associations with meat and animals that these participants’ 
experiences engendered were intense enough to disrupt, to varying degrees, what 
had until then been reportedly ‘normal’ associations. Nevertheless, these ‘ab-
normal’ associations only lasted a certain period of time (from months to years)—
they were not persistent and each returned to normalised practices involving meat, 
and more appropriate emotional associations with ‘food’ animals. Similarly, a family 
holiday to a deer farm led to Finn (P) refusing to eat meat for a year during his 
teens. Despite liking meat “a whole lot”, Lisa (C) became so “grossed out by 
chicken” as a result of a graphic PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals) campaign that she stopped eating all meat for six months. For Heather 
(C), news reports of strike action across Victorian abattoirs when she was young 
revealed a side of meat that she had not previously seen— “big images of carcasses 
hanging from hooks in the abattoirs…I just couldn’t face those images”. She 
stopped eating meat for four years as a result.  
 
The rhizomatic pathways by which practice-appropriate emotions are constituted 
in relation to meat and ‘food’ animals are both product and productive of the 
historically and systemically legitimised use of animals for food. These pathways 
are deeply inscribed on human and nonhuman bodies. As well as being self-
reinforcing, they are also magnetised, capable of drawing ‘errant’, outlying 
emotions back into line. This process is assisted by the plethora of normalised social 
practices that continually offer alternative ways to channel and thereby mollify 
discomforting or inappropriate emotional associations with animals and meat. 
These ‘socializing’ practices that shape human relations with all nonhuman animals, 
which include familiar representations of animals, are the focus of Cole and 
Stewart’s volume on the cultural construction of human-animal relations in 
childhood (Cole and Stewart 2014: 211). Therefore, building on their theory 
regarding socialising practices, I also identify the socialisation of emotions as a 
significant part of this process.  
 
In addition to the corrective socialization of discomforting associations with the 
consumption of ‘betrayed’ animals, and with particularly graphic experiences (e.g. 
of killing), my data also reveal instances where inappropriate emotional 
associations are actively policed, that is, ameliorated, subdued and properly 
socialised in favour of the ‘appropriate’ emotion before any transgression can occur. 
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Although children were not included among my research participants, my data 
nevertheless indicate the kind of childhood socialisation process that Cole and 
Stewart (2014) have examined. Henry (C) speaks of taking his young children with 
him to trap rabbits, which they will eat, but thinks, “it might be a bit confronting 
for them still”, with the implication that this will eventually abate. Illustrating this is 
likely to be the case, Brigid (P) recalls that her father would name the animals on 
their family farm “Mince, Roast, Chops, Stew, Casserole” and says, “good on him, 
it’s good, it’s in your face all the time and you do become desensitised”.  
 
Honed via this socialisation process, knowledge and awareness of the appropriate 
emotional associations within practices that depend on killing animals for meat is 
learned. This awareness regulates the presence of, or potential for, inappropriate 
discomfort and ensures the dominant “affective rut” (Wetherell 2012: 14) remains 
in place. Policing this affective ‘rut’ or norm involves, simply, not thinking about it 
too much. As Grace (C) very plainly attests, “I try not to think about the animals 
too much”. Even Geoffrey (C), a committed and enthusiastic meat eater, finds offal, 
and especially tongue, occasionally confronting: “It’s a bit disgusting when you’re 
peeling it”. However, as he says, “you just try not to think about it”. What is 
perhaps at stake in this instance is the potential for what Deller refers to in relation 
to bio-artworks as “ontological blurring” (2016: 75). This ontological blurring 
ensues when the “mutability” (ibid) of animals and humans, their proximity at the 
level of body parts, textures, sinews, blood and flesh, are foregrounded, or rather in 
this case, fore-knowledged, fore-sensed and fore-felt.  
 
Even without this ontological blurring, a strategy is required to mask certain 
discomforting knowledges, because, as Douglas comments: 
 
The search for purity is…an attempt to force experience into logical 
categories of non-contradiction. But experience is not amenable and those 
who make the attempt find themselves led into contradiction (2002: 163). 
 
For example, considering kangaroo a more ethical meat because “it’s better for the 
environment” and “it’s lived out in the wild”, Dan’s (C) comfortable associations 
with it were contradicted when a professional culler, visiting from interstate, started 
to regale him with stories of his culling experiences. Dan (C) explains, “I ended up 
having to tell him to shut up because I was like, I don’t want to know how it’s done, 
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because it’s not quite sounding like the idyllic situation that I wanted it to be”. 
Similarly, Heather (C) remains “really uncomfortable” and “anxious” about how 
animals are slaughtered— “I haven’t gotten my head around it”. Unable to reach a 
resolution, she says “I kind of avoid thinking about that…I remain in denial about 
it”. There is an implied emotional risk in thinking about ‘it’, whatever the ‘it’ might 
be (possibly the animal as an individual, sentient being, or their feelings, or how 
they are killed)—a sense of resistance to pulling back the veil, or letting the mask 
slip, on something potentially harmful. It is harmful because the associated 
emotions would be inappropriate and therefore transgress the affective norms of 
meaty practices. As Grace (C) continues, “If I actually think about the animal then 
I feel bad”, while Brigid (P) reveals, “sometimes I’ll let myself think about it too 
much and I freak out and I’m like fuck, what gives me the right to take another life 
in order to satisfy my cravings”.  
 
Emphasising the interdependent and co-constitutive nexus of 
knowledge/senses/emotions operating within meaty practices, emotional 
associations that are inappropriate to this nexus can bring about a questioning of 
the supporting knowledge and sensorial perceptions—or how these perceptions are 
made sense of. However, short-circuiting and denying potentially problematic 
emotional associations, for example by ‘not thinking about it’, more often than not 
successfully corrals the associated emotions and prevents inappropriate 
transgressions. This is because of the persistent and ongoing normalisation of the 
vast, interconnected web of meaty practices, and the associated relegation of 
counter-practices to heterotopia defined largely by exclusion.  
 
Keeping to the (normalised) emotional path  
Practices involving meat and ’food’ animals that have been deeply normalised over 
time also carry certain expectations regarding the experience of performing them 
(shaped by emotional and perceptual mimesis)—specifically, that the emotional and 
sensory associations experienced will be within a range that has over time become 
‘normal’. Before driving or cycling, for instance, a person has an expectation of 
what that experience will be like, what the car or bike will feel like physically, how 
they will interact with other cars and bikes, and how they will feel emotionally 
about the experience. Castelfranchi and Miceli (2011: 494) call these ‘expected 
emotions’ and suggest they “may play a remarkable role in the decision-making 
process”. Indeed, an empirical study of urban cycling by Passafaro et al. found that 
  176 
“positive anticipated emotions and past behaviour are…the most direct predictors 
of desire” (2014: 81).53 As well as shaping ‘decision-making’ and ‘desire’, as these 
authors conceive it, these practice-constituted expectations exert a kind of self-
fulfilling regulation on how each repeat performance unfolds. However, if one of 
these, or another, aspect of the actual experience falls outside the expected range, 
the practitioner experiences a rupture in the ‘normal’ performance that has to be 
negotiated. The elements, and their usual relation to each other, have become 
unsettled.  
 
For example, consider the differing perspectives on ‘normal’ noted by Evans and 
Miele between meat eaters, for whom “the act of eating an animal is an 
astonishingly smooth and unremarkable practice”, and vegetarians and vegans, for 
whom “this situation is simply intolerable” (2012: 312). They add that work needs 
to be done to maintain this smoothness—to maintain order, keep animals in their 
proper place and avoid ambiguity creeping in; the possibility of thinking ‘that’. In 
her analysis of relations between human and animal bodies used in psychological 
experiments, Vinciane Despret (2004) shows how expectation works to create the 
animal subject, and the experiment, in ways that produce the expected outcome. 
She describes expectations as “availability to an ‘affecting’ that both creates events 
and is created by them” (125). Seeing attempts to theorise dividing lines between 
what belongs to the inner and outer body as misguided and missing the point, she 
instead draws on William James’ account of emotion as belonging to a “more 
ambiguous sphere of being” (125):  
 
Ambiguous experiences, ambiguous bodies, experiences making bodies and 
bodies making experiences; signs that wander, hesitate to fix themselves: we 
produce emotion, and it produces us (Despret 2004: 127). 
 
An availability to ambiguity seems to describe what happens when my participants’ 
‘normal’ practices involving meat are ruptured in some way—when a different way 
of relating, one that runs contrary to expectations, somehow gains traction. 
                                                
53 While these theorisations reflect an individualised and behavioural approach to emotions, 
they do not negate my conception of the emotions they refer to as being associations that 
are socially, and culturally, constituted. Furthermore, they highlight the emotional 
dimension of what Reckwitz terms “motivational knowledge” (2002: 249)—a notion that 
aligns with Foucault’s pairing of knowledge and pleasure (1978). 
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Echoing the notion of heterotopia as where order, logic and language are detonated 
(Dehaene 2008), according to Wetherell (2012: 9), Despret is describing: 
 
Moment[s] of hesitation in emotion when it is possible to launch body and 
mind on new alternative trajectories and choose other forms of becoming. In 
this moment, body/mind is unlabelled potential - unscripted and 
undifferentiated. The old scripts, figurations, positions and narratives are 
always available waiting in the wings. 
 
For Douglas, these moments are “thresholds” that promise the “beginnings of new 
statuses” (2002: 115). They could thus be read as glimpses of, and potential 
pathways to, spaces of heterotopic abnormality. In terms of the persistence of meat, 
it would seem from my participants’ accounts that there are many potential 
‘moments of hesitation in emotion’ that carry the possibility of a rupture in these 
practices. However, the emotions associated with these moments are rarely intense 
enough, distinctive enough, or aligned with the ‘right’ kind of knowledge, to 
compete with those associated with normalised knowledges of meat and ‘food’ 
animals. The ‘moment’ or ‘ambiguity’ never takes off on a new trajectory but 
remains grounded, stepping back from the threshold. Even when the emotions are 
sufficiently intense and the practice as a whole is ruptured, allowing new emotional 
associations to endure for a few months or even years, the magnetising effect of 
normalised knowledge/senses/emotions eventually reasserts, and emphasises, their 
overarching persistence. As Wetherell explains, some “affective practices” are “very 
densely knotted in with connected social practices where the degree of knitting 
reinforces the affect and can make it resistant and durable, sometimes unbearably 
so” (2012: 14). 
 
Normalised emotional associations with meat and ‘food’ animals would appear to 
represent just such a densely knotted set of affective practices that are constituted 
by, and constitutive of, the wider complex of social practices of which they are part. 
The constitution of these ‘appropriate’ emotional associations simultaneously 
constitutes those deemed inappropriate. A tacit knowledge thus emerges regarding 
what is considered an inappropriate emotion and also of how to negotiate, or police, 
such associations to maintain the integrity of what is considered ’normal’. Hence, 
both the self-imposed injunction to ‘not think about it’, and the distinction that 
comes from requisite bravery, in combination with the validating discourses, serve a 
regulatory function that helps to contain emotional associations within the realm of 
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what is expected with regard to meat and ‘food’ animals. Alison (P) and Brigid (P) 
further illustrate this regulatory effect. 
 
Every week, Alison (P) selects the animals that are to be sent to the abattoir. 
However, she says, “I’m struggling with it a lot more now, I don’t know why, I’m 
just really not feeling good about it”. Reflecting for a moment, she continues, “I’m 
probably becoming a bit more aware of their feelings, and thinking, Oh goodness, 
we’re really taking their lives”. Given that Alison (P) later reckons that a scenario 
where “you can just have animals for pets, you wouldn’t have to eat them” would be 
her preference, and based on my participants’ allusions to the inherent risk of 
thinking too much, I suggest that Alison (P) is in fact now thinking too much, or 
more than she was previously. She is becoming available to Despret’s (2004) 
ambiguities in bodies and their ‘signs’, to different possibilities and knowledges of 
human/animal relations, and to alternate emotional trajectories that circulate within 
the same complex of practices that involve meat. As suggested, unless more positive 
associations can outweigh these newly discomforting emotional associations, the 
legitimacy of Alison’s meat eating as a whole may be ruptured (as it was 
previously).  
 
From admonitions to not ‘overthink’ or ‘think too much’ and the concomitant 
danger of doing so, there is a sense of emotional associations being actively policed, 
to keep them within the bounds of what is ‘appropriate’. For when Brigid (P) 
‘freaked out’ after ‘letting herself’ think about it too much—thereby engaging with 
an emotional association that is constituted (socially and culturally) as 
inappropriate to meaty practices—she quickly went on to explain, “I’ll rectify that”. 
Other, more appropriate, associations that she has with practices involving ‘food’ 
animals, such as “I believe we’re meant to eat meat”, enable her to correct her flight 
path and re-associate her emotions according to validating discourses. As she 
affirms, “this is what you’re doing, this is why you’re doing it, and then just enjoy 
it”. Similarly, Julie (C) is aware she “can’t” allow her uncomfortable feelings 
associated with the unknown-ness of any meat she might be offered, to “overwhelm 
everything”. Allowing feelings free rein, so they become ‘overwhelming’ is broadly 
constituted as an inappropriate emotional trajectory in relation to practices 
involving ‘food’ animals and meat, which instead reward fortitude and bravery. As 
she says, “just suck it up princess”.  
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There is an implicit understanding being delineated here that untoward emotional 
associations with animals and their flesh need to be brought back into line and 
should continue to toe that line. This line is shaped by the emotional community as 
part, and product, of meaty practices (and other social practices) and represents a 
practice-constituted and practice-regulating pressure to rein in and “rectify” 
inappropriate and potentially unruly or ‘overwhelming’ emotional associations. 
Anything else becomes problematic and poses a challenge to the tacit conventions 
of associated practices, even though these conventions may allow for a quite a 
broad range of acceptable and appropriate emotions. Aware of this order, which 
Douglas describes as delineating greater and lesser degrees of inclusiveness, my 
participants’ “sense of form makes demands on their behaviour, governs their 
assessment of their desires, permits some and over-rides others” (2002: 101).  
 
In Zembylas’ (2005) exploration of the emotional rules and labour of teaching, he 
draws on Foucault’s (1982; 1984; 1977) conceptions of orders of conduct, 
governmentality, discipline, and power, to depict the regulation of emotions in a 
similar way to Douglas. After Foucault, Zembylas conceives emotions not as fixed 
states located in individuals but as an effect of the organization and operation of 
social and institutional activities (2005: 55) – in other words social practices. 
Through these activities, emotional rules are shaped and exercised. Like power, the 
effects of these rules, Zembylas argues, are domination, conformity and resistance, 
represented by the expression of more or less appropriate or inappropriate 
emotions (2005: 56). With respect to Foucault’s discussions of docile bodies, 
conduct and especially the order of conduct, practices could thus be said to exert a 
“hold on conduct” (Foucault 1977: 172) through the ‘sense of form’ (as per 
Douglas) they engender in their participants. Effects of power therefore permeate 
the whole nexus of power/knowledge/pleasure, reflecting and reproducing unequal 
relations between humans and animals not only in the associated systems of 
knowledge, but also the emotional rules that surround(s) practices involving ‘food’ 
animals and meat.  
 
However, my attention is persistently drawn to those inappropriate, excluded or 
‘over-rided’ emotions—the ones that, according to Hochschild’s ‘feeling rules’, are 
“misfits between feelings and situations” (1979: 566). While he acknowledges that 
the ‘fit’ (appropriateness) or ‘misfit’ (inappropriateness) of emotions is socialised, 
Hochschild, in my opinion, does not give adequate consideration to the role of 
‘misfits’ in shaping the ‘fits’ for two reasons. First, inappropriate or misfit emotions 
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are constituted through normative social practices, but the process of their 
stigmatization, or exclusion, contributes in turn to the ongoing re-constitution and 
reinforcement of the dominant emotional rules. As with comfort/discomfort, 
fear/bravery, they are co-constitutive and mutually dependent. Second, the 
stigmatization of these inappropriate, excluded (and typically feminised) emotions 
extends to and encompasses all the knowledges, emotions, objects and practices 
that they are in any way associated with. These elements are not just floating 
around in space, but tend to become aggregated in various collectively imagined 
practices and the constructed abstract ‘figures’ that participate in them (e.g. ‘the 
vegan’).  
 
For example, Natalie (C) explains that her “soft spot for ducks” means that she has 
what she considers “too much of an emotional objection to duck hunting”—why too 
much, too much for whom or what, and according to what criteria/rules, is not 
clear. Also, where is ‘too much emotion’ located? What sort of meanings, practices 
and abstract figures are too much emotion associated with? These opposing 
counter emotions, practices, locations and figures are just as constitutive of her 
‘emotional objection’ as more direct associations with meaty practices. There is not 
the space here to explore these co-constitutive ‘mis-fits’ of the normalised social 
order. However, my participants collectively delineate certain ‘alien’ constructs that 
exhibit alignment with Sara Ahmed’s (2010a; 2010b) notions of affect aliens and 
feminist killjoys, and also Richard Twine’s (2014) conception of the vegan killjoy, 
and therefore warrant further analysis. 
 
Putting these misfit aliens aside, in the next section, I turn to the reverse 
transgression, when what is ethically inedible, or at least ambiguous, becomes 
productively edible. 
 
ii. ‘Bad’ schmad: disturbing practices and the maintenance of edibility 
Despite the lengths that my participants go to in order to ensure that their 
particular construction of ethical meat is being associated with the ‘right’ farm, 
producer, practices, animal and even parts of the animal, in certain situations, all of 
this order and knowledge is disturbed, and more or less dispensed with, when other 
practice ‘knowledges’ (including sensory and cultural dimensions) take precedence. 
Meat that in one context is understood as ‘bad’ suddenly becomes acceptable, and 
even ‘good’ because another knowledge is now being associated with it. I observe 
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this especially when my participants discuss their practices in relation to eating out, 
seeking novelty, travelling overseas, and being polite.  
 
These are, of course, not discrete bundles of practices with their own associated 
systems of knowledge and emotional rules. That is not how social practices operate 
(Shove et al. 2012) and so there are inevitable overlaps and synergies in what 
follows. However, I focus on what appear to be the overriding emotional 
associations within these practices that create transience in participants’ previous, 
‘normal’ distinctions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’. What I aim to demonstrate is how quickly 
even firmly expressed proscriptions and rules around ethical meat can be disturbed 
and fall away, revealing, on the one hand, the arbitrary and unstable basis that an 
‘ethical’ framework provides for the idea of incremental improvement and taking ‘a 
step in the right direction’, and on the other, the knowledge and ‘truth’ underlying 
this ethical framework, which is that eating meat—that is any meat from any 
animals, is still prioritised over not eating it at all. In addition to validating 
discourses and emotions of distinction, this is due, I argue, to the persistence of two 
fundamental ethico-aesthetic mechanisms of power, this first of which is moral 
approval. 
 
Eating out 
Eating out, as described by my participants, is one of the main practices involving 
food where they prioritise different knowledges such that their usual configurations 
of knowledge/senses/emotions in relation to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ meat no longer apply. 
Instead, such concerns are outweighed by the comforts and pleasures associated 
with ‘going out’, such as relaxing, ‘letting go’, eating things you do not have at 
home, and being with friends, which are now accorded priority. This creates a 
sense of all bets being off. As Anne (C) says, “when I eat out, I don’t worry about 
it…we tend to just give ourselves a bit of a break”. This suggests that in the 
different spatial context of ‘eating out’, sensory and emotional associations with 
particular foods change because the ‘event’ prioritises a different knowledge of 
what is appropriate. As Zembylas (2005: 56) similarly observes, emotional rules are 
shaped through a “detailed structuring of space, time, and relations among 
individuals”. What may, in another context, be of concern therefore becomes less 
appropriate, and perhaps even associated with discomfort. As Maria (C) says, 
when she is eating out, “I’m eating out for more hedonistic reasons and so 
sometimes will order pork without knowing where it’s come from”. Hedonism and 
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the opportunity to “indulge” (Dan C) are constituted as part of the alternate ‘space, 
time and relation’ of eating out, and are depicted as taking precedence over 
participants’ formerly stringent distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ meat. Anne 
(C) explains: 
 
When we go to Melbourne it is just an eating fest and we’d eat the things 
that we can’t get here, So we go to yum cha,54 we go to Malaysian, we go to 
Indian and that is purely a you know, a hedonistic experience. 
 
Practices of eating out suspend participants’ everyday food rules introducing an 
alternate ‘sense of form’ where ‘indulging’, ‘taking a break’ and being ‘hedonistic’ 
are constituted as more appropriate. If the meat involved in these practices is not 
‘ethical’ according to participants’ normal criteria, then eating ‘non-ethical’ or 
unknown meat is more appropriate to the sense of form of these practices than 
purposefully rejecting it. Eating meat is therefore the normalised benchmark, 
associated with certain comforts of eating out that are not surrendered even if the 
meat is not ‘ethical’. Vegetables and plant-based foods are not being associated with 
hedonism and comfort, only meat. In this way, normalised 
knowledge/senses/emotions associated with eating out can be seen as contributing 
to the persistence of meat. 
 
Sensory pleasure when eating out, or the perceptual and emotional mimesis 
involved in the anticipation of it (Illouz 2009), can even outweigh associations with 
what is known to be factory farmed meat, typically regarded as the worst of the 
‘bad’. Despite it being “pink pig”, Sally (C) cannot resist the pork crackling at one 
of her favourite restaurants, “it was amazing…It was soooo good”, and Maria (C) 
acknowledges that a particular meat that she buys is “still an industrial product so I 
feel a little bit uncomfortable about [it]”; however, “it does taste pretty good”. The 
corollary of these accounts is that to not engage with these otherwise ‘bad’ meats, 
which are now associated with positive knowledge/senses/emotions, would be to 
deny access to the rewards they implicitly promise when part of these other 
practices. Such denial, set against the comforting associations of eating out, 
becomes constructed as missing out on a ‘good’ experience, or as Damien (C) 
                                                
54 Yum cha is known in Australia as a traditional Chinese brunch involving varied dishes of 
small steamed or fried savoury dumplings. In Europe and North America, people more 
commonly speak of going for ‘dim sum’ which refers to the range of small dishes served at a 
yum cha. 
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describes it, “living in a vacuum”. Anne (C) similarly maintains that she “can’t cut 
[her kids] out of that experience”, because you have to “let them have a good time”. 
Referencing proscriptions around ‘thinking too much’, which might dampen or 
erase the pleasures that eating out promises, Anthony (C) says he tries not to 
“overthink the meat too much when I'm out”. 
 
When eating out, sensory and emotional associations with certain ‘meats’ can also 
constitute them as sitting outside the normal ‘rules’ of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, governed by 
a different set of standards, or knowledge, altogether. So, like Sally’s (C) crackling 
and Maria’s (C) industrial meat, Michael (C) makes his exception for steak and 
kidney pie: “I do have a strong desire for steak and kidney pies; wherever I go it’s 
kind of my measure of a pie shop”, and for Anthony (C) it is “crappy chicken 
Parma at the pub”. However, these associations are not necessarily enduring 
because knowledge/senses/emotions, and related practices, are rhizomatic, co-
evolving and in constant flux. For example, though not related to eating out, a 
particular dish that Maria (C) likes to make involved her buying a certain meat that 
she knew was not what she understood to be ethical but “it was so delicious that it 
kind of overrode my ethical impetus”. However, this only lasted “for a little while, 
and then I kind of stopped”. Presumably, the more uncomfortable knowledge and 
emotions that Maria (C) associated with the ‘unethical meat’ intensified and 
eventually outweighed the expectation and also the actual experience of its 
deliciousness. While notable, this reassertion of ethical determinations is atypical.  
  
Knowledge surrounding certain styles of food can similarly render meat edible 
where it might normally be regarded as ‘bad’, as Lisa (C) illustrates, “I’m getting 
fast food anyway, so I’ll just eat whatever it is”. Oliver (P) says that he is “guilty at 
once in a while grabbing fast food…we’re not purists”, while Bella (P) explains:  
 
When it comes to buying pizza I probably didn’t give a rat’s arse, I was 
tired, I made a takeaway decision because of other reasons, and the same 
probably goes for Asian.  
 
‘Asian’-style food offers a popular sanctuary from normal distinctions. Damien (C) 
and his partner “eat a lot of Asian food”; however, he says they lack the right 
tools— “the big woks that they have”, and skills—“I don’t have the ability”, which 
is why they eat out, even though “I know they wouldn’t have ethically sourced 
meat”. Sally (C) maintains, “it’s no good going into a Japanese restaurant and 
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trying to find out where the meat comes from”. Similarly, for Maria (C), whose 
local Vietnamese restaurant “does these amazing little rice paper rolls with this kind 
of beef jerky”, she says she has “no idea where that beef comes from and I’m not 
even going to bother asking because I know that it’s not…”.  
 
Putting aside the racist tone of these comments (another topic worthy of further 
research), ‘fast’ and ‘cheap’ food or take-out tends to exist in a slightly separate 
category of eating out where knowledge/senses/emotions associated with 
convenience, comfort, tastiness and also of cooking skills are prioritised over those 
associated with what is ethical or ‘good’. As with ‘indulging’ and hedonism, these 
associations, especially with comfort and tastiness, are persistently constituted by 
my participants in association with meat, not vegetables. In contrast, eating out in 
moderate and higher end restaurants is less about convenience and comfort, and 
more about experiencing the ‘hedonistic’, sensory, and also the commensal 
pleasures associated with the ‘occasion’ of eating out— “you go to socialise…so the 
food is not the actual priority” (Oliver P). In sum, when eating out, meat is 
synonymous with indulging, ‘taking a break’, enjoying hedonistic pleasure, 
commensality, comfort, and tastiness.  
 
Two dimensions to the persistence of meat and the use of animals for food can be 
identified here: one being the reflection and reinforcement of meat as normal and 
pleasurable, and the second being that the same associations are not being made 
with vegetables and plant-based foods. Effectively, the domination of animals is 
inscribed in the knowledge/senses/emotions associated with practices of eating out. 
However, as my participants illustrated, sometimes eating out is also as much about 
the food itself as the experience, especially when it is something not generally 
prepared and eaten at home, which brings me to my second emotion of distinction. 
 
Seeking novelty: Cultural omnivorousness as an emotion of distinction 
The pursuit of sensory experiences regarded as novel and exciting, and indeed the 
constitution of novelty and excitement as things worth pursuing, is another way in 
which the usual knowledge/senses/emotions associated with ‘ethical’, ‘bad’ or at 
least doubtful meat are pushed aside. The more stable and persistent ‘truths’ 
relating to how meat and ‘food’ animals make overall sense are then foregrounded, 
for once again, novelty and excitement is not being associated with vegetables and 
plant-based foods. The high regard afforded to novelty for its own sake constructs 
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the edibility of some foods (usually from animals) as a challenge of the unknown, or 
more accurately, a challenge of the never or not usually eaten, which is to be 
surmounted. As Maria (C) recalls, “I ate testicles. That challenged me because I 
don’t like the look of balls and the idea of eating them is just challenging”. Geoffrey 
(C) similarly, “saw it on the menu” and thought “that’s different, I’ve never had 
bull’s testicles before…I’m going to try it”. If Damien (C) and his partner go to an 
Asian restaurant, even though he would not cook tripe himself, he “would definitely 
give it a shot”.  
 
This sort of emotional association with novelty and excitement is typically theorised 
from a psychological perspective where it is framed as a genetically based 
behaviour (Hirschman and Stern 2001), a ‘motivational value’ (Pepper et al 2009: 
127), and an outcome of body-mind mechanics that produces a transient 
psychobiological condition or a more stable behavioural trait (Gallagher 2011). 
‘Neophilia’, as it is called, being “a love or enthusiasm for what is new or novel” 
(Merriam-Webster.com 2018), is therefore conceived as a personality trait that 
‘belongs’ to individuals (Mitchell and Hall 2003). Nowhere in the emerging 
literature on food neophilia (e.g. Capiola and Raudenbuch 2012; Ji et al 2016) are 
novelty and excitement conceived as being socially constituted, this constitution 
dependent on the collective interplay of knowledge/senses/emotions by which 
different objects and practices are variously designated novel and exciting. Mitchell 
and Hall do allude to the “new significance and meaning” that food can take on 
when it is part of ‘travel experiences’ (2003: 60). However, this is the only occasion 
they suggest that the social world may play a role in understandings of novelty.  
 
In contrast, Shatzki refers to novelty as something external to the individual—a 
known quantity, like innovation, that can “burst forth” (2016: 17), while Shove 
observes novel technologies as ‘created’ or arising in social practices (Shove 2003: 
203). In their review of sociological accounts of the drive for novel products and 
technologies, Ingram et al. (2007) identify a “desire for the new” that is fueled by 
industry and market economics, and increased specialisation, i.e. social processes. 
However, these less individualised conceptions do not adequately account for the 
discourse around novelty that I observe in my data. This is because they do not 
problematise the construction of novelty, and so ‘novelty’ is depicted as a reified, 
identifiable and fixed entity that just appears or motivates. Instead, like the variable 
assignations surrounding ‘ethical’ meat (as discussed thus far), I see the knowledge 
and emotional value associated with novelty as being constituted primarily (if not 
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entirely) in social practices. Novelty becomes variously associated with certain 
objects and practices, which thereby become exciting and ‘good’. What 
individualistic or market-driven accounts of novelty have missed seems therefore to 
be better encapsulated by the idea of cultural ‘omnivorousness’, a term coined by 
sociologist Richard Peterson to signify an “openness to experiencing everything” 
that is “antithetical to snobbishness” (Peterson and Kern 1996: 904).  
 
In their analysis of inconspicuous consumption, Shove and Warde remark on the 
social elevation of cultural omnivorousness, acknowledging it as a trend whereby 
being ‘truly’ cultural means: 
 
To have been everywhere, eaten everything, and heard as many types of 
music as possible in order to obtain the veneer of knowledge (and 
preferably hands-on experience) of all potentially discussable cultural items 
(2002: 234, emphasis added).  
 
This omnivorousness can therefore reasonably be associated with my participants’ 
notions of being adventurous and seeking novelty through eating foods that lie 
outside normalised categories of what is considered socially and culturally edible. 
Similar to psychological accounts of novelty, Warde et al. note “conventional” 
definitions of omnivorousness maintain, “that some people, an identifiable sector of 
the population, do and like more activities and things than others” (2007: 145). 
Referring to this as the ‘volume’ definition, like me, the authors find this insufficient 
to explain “some distinctive status orientation” that cultural omnivorousness seems 
to entail (ibid).  
 
What I understand from these authors accounts is that engaging with objects and 
practices understood in some way to embody omnivorousness enhances one’s 
stockpile of ‘discussable cultural items’ and thereby imparts social distinction. 
Linking this to the idea of affective practices that “confer ‘distinction’” (Wetherell 
2012: 16), I argue that there is also an emotional distinction that accompanies such 
practices, and attaches to certain objects, so that omnivorous cultural practices are 
as much constituted, and marked, by a particular orientation of 
knowledge/senses/emotions as by social status. The palpable sense of excitement, 
anticipation and pleasure that my participants exhibit in relation to what are 
perceived as novel ‘meats’ intensifies the positive orientation of 
knowledge/senses/emotions associated with these edible objects, and thereby my 
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participants’ attraction to them and their associated practices. The senses (real or 
mimetic), add a vividness that further enlivens these associations. They therefore 
become viscerally, emotionally and intellectually significant.  
 
For example, Oliver (P), for whom English is a second language, eloquently 
describes how he and his partner “sometimes intrigue ourself and indulge ourself 
with some like alternative meat”. Anthony (C) and Ellis (C) similarly allude to a 
sense of risk and pioneer-like exploration in their approach to eating meat. As 
Anthony says, “if I’m going to eat meat I might as well eat something weird, ‘weird-
wonderful’, make something strange out of it”, while Ellis describes her and her 
partner as “pretty adventurous eaters…certainly wouldn’t be afraid to try 
things…we certainly wouldn’t turn our nose up at things without trying them”. 
Eating something constituted as uncertain, intriguing and weird attaches an 
additional frisson to consuming animal flesh, on top of existing sensory and 
emotional associations that may already be present. As James (P) has also 
observed, “a huge part of the attractiveness of [our] meat is the fact that it’s come 
from animals that people think they haven’t eaten before”. This attraction is 
accompanied by a certain underlying tacit knowledge (like that related to 
witnessing or participating in animals being killed) that to be ‘adventurous’ is a 
commendable quality that one ought to have.  
 
Illustrating how emotional associations, both comforting and discomforting, can 
support and enhance each other, these associations with novelty also engage the 
distinction associated with requisite bravery, which is made accessible through the 
discomfort or fear that novel foods can engender. As Michael (C) explains, “when I 
go out to a restaurant, I like to eat things that I haven’t, because it’s new and I 
should be trying those things”. If there is something different on a restaurant menu, 
Dan (C) similarly says he is “always keen to give them a go, just for the novelty of 
trying it”. However, as indicated in Part II with respect to ‘freaky’ and typically 
inedible animals (such as dogs), there are understood to be limits to this 
adventurousness, and the perceived rewards of bravery, as James (P) explains 
(with a touch of perceptual and emotional mimesis): 
 
I’d look at the menu and see what’s unusual, but having said that if it was 
unusual and it was something like, you know, endangered, I wouldn’t eat it. 
I always look at the menu, that’s probably why I like eating offal when I go 
out. It depends on your mood but generally that’s what I do, scan the menu 
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and go, ‘that’s different, sounds nice, I know what part it is’, let’s see how 
they’ve cooked it. 
 
Accompanying this attraction and pressure towards ‘adventure’, novelty and 
omnivorousness, which earn social and emotional status across many practices 
involving, for example, food, music, art, travel, and sports, is a simultaneous push 
away from the emotional stigmatisation associated with not being these things. To 
not ‘give things a go’ is constituted respectively as ‘being strict’, in other words, not 
‘taking a break’, not being adventurous, not being indulgent and hedonistic, and 
instead being regimented and potentially offensive, as Anthony (C) suggests, “I’m 
not too militant about anything in life”. 
 
This is where I perceive the consumption of food to be slightly different from the 
consumption of other cultural items in the cultural omnivore’s palette such as places 
and music. Earlier, I described how an animal’s flesh can become materially 
inscribed with either violence or happiness, which affects how the nexus of 
knowledge/senses/emotions become orientated towards the idea of its literal 
embodiment and therefore its edibility. In the same way, I argue that certain 
practices involving food, with their associated knowledges and emotions, can 
inscribe ‘food’ animals or meat with ‘novelty’ so that they represent something 
‘good’, exciting, maybe a little scary and thereby also potentially life-affirming. To 
then incorporate them into your own body is “in both real and imaginary terms, to 
incorporate all or some of its properties: we become what we eat” (Fischler 1988: 
278). Hence, like the intrepid traveller, the eater is embodying novelty, risk and 
excitement along with the meat, and affirming their own aliveness in the process. In 
being constructed as a novelty, animals or meat that might normally be considered 
‘bad’, or associated with discomfort, thereby become edible because of the 
possibilities of accessing the emotional (and social) distinction associated with them 
and their consumption, and of absorbing their life-affirming qualities. However, as 
bell hooks said, and emphasising Foucault’s nexus of power/knowledge/pleasure 
that underpins this thesis, it is also “by eating the Other…that one asserts power 
and privilege” (1998: 197). 
 
In this section, I have discussed emotions associated with just two kinds of 
‘disturbing’ practices—eating out and seeking novelty—that my participants 
frequently describe as occasions when normal ‘ethical’ distinctions are suspended. 
However, they also describe other, interrelated practices, and particularly aspects 
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of their location (in time and space) that introduce additionally disturbing 
emotional associations. Notable among these are practices relating to travelling 
overseas, naturalised ‘cravings’ and ‘urges’, and occasions when the emotional rules 
surrounding the performance of a practice in a certain time and place prescribe 
‘being polite’. It is not possible to explore these more fully here. I highlight them 
only to emphasise that every practice and every performance of a practice brings 
together many different emotional associations, including those associated with 
overlapping practices, that variously mingle, merge, enhance, conflict, dominate, 
shrink, shift or change entirely.  
 
Thus, emerging as more important than whether meat is ethical or not, or even 
obviously ‘bad’ (according to their ‘normal’ distinctions), its associations with 
occasions of release from ‘normal’ everyday constraints (e.g. eating out, travelling 
overseas, and/or cravings), and with novelty, excitement, and polite commensality 
can take priority in certain practices and certain performances of practices. The 
prioritization of these ‘other’ emotional associations over those directly associated 
with the ‘food’ animals or meat in question highlights a fundamental adherence to 
the normalised nexus of power/knowledge/pleasure that supports meat 
consumption and the use of animals for food, regardless of how ‘ethically’ they are 
done. For, as discussed in Part II, eating meat is also conceived as basically natural 
and benevolent. It is this fundamental aspect of adherences to meaty practices that 
I address in the next and final section, having identified in my data emotional 
associations with eating meat and using ‘food’ animals that do not appear to be 
attached to particular practices (though they are constituted by them). Rather, they 
appear attached solely to a constituted anthroparchal ideology surrounding meat 
and ‘food’ animals, and what they have come to mean, at least in Westernised 
cultural contexts. In this way, they are more accurately conceived as ethico-
aesthetic mechanisms of power. 
 
iii. Moral approval – an ethico-aesthetic mechanism of power 
An invocation to do what is ‘appropriate’, ‘right’ and ‘good’ permeates the practices 
described in the previous sections, and also shapes their emotional associations. I 
propose that emotions associated particularly with “doing the right thing” 
(Geoffrey C) engender a particular ‘ethico-aesthetic’ of knowledge/senses/emotions 
that constitutes eating meat, in and of itself, as not just universally natural, right 
and good, but morally superior. Chloe Taylor traces the concept of ethico-aesthetics 
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through Foucault’s writings on diet, sexuality and ‘care for the self’, where, she 
explains: 
 
Foucault describes ‘techniques of the self’ both as an ethical relation to the 
self and as an aesthetics of one’s own life… To approach one’s own life 
ethically through such techniques of the self is, for Foucault, to see one’s 
existence as an aesthetic project or a work of art (2010: 72-73).  
 
In this reading, and in common with a non-dualistic, rhizomatic view of mind/body, 
an ethico-aesthetic is an embodied ethics that is less about meanings, causes and 
effects and more about bodily connections, affects and social formations (Malins 
2004: 95). Ethico-aesthetics as a specific concept was formulated by Guattari in his 
1995 volume Chaosmosis, an Ethico-aesthetic Paradigm. Subsequent scholars of the 
arts, humanities and social sciences, have drawn from and expanded on his thesis in 
different ways (Malins 2004, 2011; Alliez et al. 2014; Hynes 2013). In her work on 
assemblages of bodies and urban space, Peta Malins draws on Guattari (also with 
Deleuze 1987) to describe ethico-aesthetics as a project that aims: 
 
To increase ethical, life-enhancing assemblages…that increase a body’s 
power to form creative, productive relations and which increase its capacity 
for life (2004: 98).  
 
While post-Foucauldian accounts of ethico-aesthetics can appear anthropocentric, 
focused on increasing the human capacity for pleasure and life, both Taylor (2010) 
and Springgay (2011) recognise the potential for an ethico-aesthetic to foster a care 
for the life and pleasure of the ‘other’, something Foucault was also attentive to: 
 
Are we able to have an ethics of acts and their pleasures which would be 
able to take into account the pleasure of the other? Is the pleasure of the 
other something which can be integrated in[to] our pleasure (Foucault 
1983: 346). 
 
There is, therefore, the more radical potential for an ethico-aesthetic to “unsettle 
dominant features of reason and standardization” (Springgay 2011: 78), so that 
‘things’ might become something else. Using eating as an example, Stephanie 
Springgay, quoting O’Sullivan (2007) explains: 
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The ethical dimensions of eating would mean that the body no longer 
passively accepts what goes into it; rather the body opens itself up to 
deterritorializations, a multitude of surfaces, “a call to creativity, a call to 
become actively involved in various strategies and practices that will allow 
us to produce/transform, and perhaps even go beyond, our habitual selves” 
(2011: 78). 
 
However, while a certain ethico-aesthetic of sensations, affects, emotions and bodily 
pleasures is certainly operating in relation to ethical and sustainable meat, it is one 
that necessarily only pays instrumental attention to the pleasure of animal others. 
Former vegan Gillian (C) describes ethical meat as mind-expanding: “ethical eating 
has broadened my brain…and made me look at grain production and…water use 
and biodynamics and so much more than just animal production”. For Dan (C), it 
is indicative of a higher consciousness: “anything that expands our empathy and 
understanding is going to benefit humanity long term”. He continues, drawing in 
additional ‘good’ things (diversity) to emphasise the ‘goodness’ of ethical meat, “I 
think having a consciousness that respects the diversity on the planet and respects 
the other animals we share the planet with is a good thing”. Finn (C) describes it as 
“being in tune with your body or your conscience”. Alison (P) leverages on the idea 
of family to further reinforce the goodness of the association: “When you become 
socially conscious, you want to actually feed really good quality food to families”. 
For Gillian (C), as well having broadened her brain, she asserts “as humans who 
eat ethical and sustainable meat, I think we’re healthier in mind and body and 
spirit”. “It’s good for the soul”, says Andrew (P). Brigid (P), who would like to be 
considered “as some kind of pioneer”, similarly affirms that her work with animals 
“get[s] some actual soul into you”, which she feels she has “in buckets”.  
 
In his analysis of the ‘happy meat’ discourse, Matthew Cole notes: “Consumers of 
‘happy meat’…receive a gustatory reward for their vicarious pastorship, as well as 
moral approbation for fulfilling their responsibility towards animals” (2011: 94, 
emphasis in original). Contrary to Charlotte’s (C) view that “you can't buy ethics 
and you can't buy morality”, I argue that is exactly what my participants are doing. 
As both producers and consumers, they are shaping a market for ethics and 
morality as edible components of animal flesh, thereby maintaining an overall 
ethico-aesthetic of animal edibility as care for self and others. 
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Of course, everybody would like to think, sense and feel emotionally that they are 
doing the right thing to some extent—that they are engaging in practices that 
correspond more or less with their knowledge of cultural codes of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’. However, the fact that my participants seek ‘better’ emotions 
through increasingly refined and often variable definitions of ‘good’ meat (rather 
than no meat) suggests two things: first, that comforting emotional associations 
with objects and practices involving ‘better’ meat, and meat generally, are 
sufficiently normalised, and prioritised, to outweigh any discomforting associations; 
and second, that the threat posed by discomforting associations with practices of 
not eating meat (and their associated heterotopic spaces) far outweigh any 
discomforting feelings that may linger around objects and practices associated with 
eating animals. As Joyce (C) succinctly explains, “people feel bad about eating 
meat, and they want to feel better”—about eating it. In other words, they do not 
want to not eat meat.  
 
The inherent moral approval associated with the entire ideology pertaining to 
eating meat and using ‘food’ animals, and not just certain related practices, 
constitutes a significant limitation to generalising an acceptance that there are other 
ways of relating to ‘food’ animals beyond the grid that reflects their existing 
cartographies. In whatever way associated practices are challenged—
environmentally, health-wise, or in relation to animal ethics—the resilience of the 
ethico-aesthetic mechanism ensures the primary focus remains on improving how 
these practices are undertaken while leaving their ontological basis intact. For this 
reason, I identify it as a fundamental mechanism of power that maintains the 
edibility of ‘food’ animals and therefore their state of domination. 
 
Conclusion 
With this chapter, I have illustrated the ways in which ‘appropriate’ emotional 
routines can become disrupted, allowing edible animals to transgress their 
boundaries and break with the traditional meatified order. Crossing over normal 
category thresholds, these animals become something other than food and therefore 
emotionally inedible. However, these emotional blips are transient and largely non-
radical in their consequences—they do not constitute the ‘beyond’ of Foucault’s 
grid (1989). I discussed why this is the case and identified that ‘not thinking about 
it too much’ is one of the main ‘policing’ strategies for pulling errant emotions back 
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into line, and for keeping Foucault’s mask in place that hides the mechanisms of 
power at work.  
 
I have also demonstrated that when weighed in balance with the tacit knowledge 
and ‘appropriate’ emotions associated with certain practices involving food, such as 
eating out or travelling, discomforting emotions that might normally be associated 
with ‘bad’ or unethical animals or meat are mitigated, thereby maintaining and 
foregrounding the general edibility of ‘meat’. My participants’ accounts of 
transgressions therefore demonstrate that discomforting emotional associations, 
even those that variably disrupt or temporarily arrest their meaty practices, are 
always realigned in ways that emphasise the edibility of all meat, whether ‘good’ or 
‘bad’. Under the normalised nexus of power/knowledge/pleasure, which includes 
validating discourses and emotions of distinction among its mechanisms of power, 
meats’ edibility is (almost) always, maintained over any potential for its rejection. 
The potential for inappropriate, discomforting emotional associations (for example 
with graphic images and/or experiences of killing) to disrupt meat consumption and 
the use of animals for food as a whole is therefore found to be very limited.  
 
Proposing a possible reason for this apparently fundamental limitation, I identified 
moral approval as an emotional discourse that ideologically and emotionally 
supports the edibility of ‘food’ animals. Unassociated with specific practices, but 
rather delineating the limits of a grid that ontologically defines and orders all 
animals, I argued that this moral approbation constitutes an ethico-aesthetic 
mechanism of power that reflects and reinforces the domination of ‘food’ animals. 
From Part III, it becomes clear how, as Probyn observed, “food and eating is as 
much marked by pleasure as it is by power” (2000: 18). 
 
Based on the three validating discourses, two emotions of distinction, and one 
ethico-aesthetic I have thus far identified as mechanisms of power, I suggest that a 
universal knowledge or ‘truth’ underpins all the determinations, distinctions and 
associations relating to ‘food’ animals and meat. That universal knowledge quite 
simply asserts humans’ entitlement to use animals as if they were a natural 
resource. I argue that this entitlement is the most persistent, and naturalised, 
construct within human/animal relations, and that it provides a fundamental and 
universalised justification for the domination of animals while at the same time 
concealing the mechanisms of this domination behind a mask of legitimation. 
Nowhere is the exercise and power of this entitlement more apparent than in the 
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way in which increased visibility of meat production processes has been easily 
incorporated into this legitimising construct.  
 
Focusing on this ‘new’ ethical aesthetic of visibility in meat production and 
consumption, Part IV further demonstrates how “deployments of power are 
directly connected to the body” (Foucault 1978: 151), extending Foucault’s nexus 
of power/knowledge/pleasure to include his, and others, notions of the ‘arrogance’, 
‘ownership’, privilege and also pleasure that infuses ‘the gaze’. Hence, with 
reference to my data, I show how notions of transparency, and also the material 
visibility of ‘food’ animals and associated practices, are incorporated into 
participants’ understandings of their edibility. In short, I demonstrate how these 
animals are not only thought of, and sensed, but also seen as edible. This lends further 
support to Probyn’s (2000), and Hayes-Conroy and Hayes-Conroy’s (2008) 
articulations of the visceral politics of food by adding sight to Probyn’s textures, 
flavours and taste of power (2000: 7) and illustrating how “the power of taste” 
(Hayes-Conroy and Hayes-Conroy 2008: 463) is also accompanied by the power of 
the gaze. This final empirical section of my thesis draws on the broader literature 
on privilege, oppression and intersectionality and incorporates the notions of 
entitlement and respect, which are recurrent themes both in my data and in the 
wider discourse surrounding ethical meat. Respect thus becomes the second ethico-
aesthetic mechanism of power, while entitlement is transmuted into my account of 
the ‘entitled gaze’. Part IV brings my journey through Foucault’s nexus of 
power/knowledge/pleasure full circle by exploring what is ‘rendered visible’ 
through the grid, or map, of our current knowledge (Foucault 1989: 175).  
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  PART IV 
The Power of Transparency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…to a gaze forearmed by linguistics, things attain to existence only in so far as 
they are able to form the elements of a signifying system.  
 
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (1989: 416) 
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Introduction to Part IV 
Part IV constitutes the final leg of my trek through the terrain of cartographied 
meat, in which I gather together the preceding themes and arguments to 
demonstrate how power, knowledge and pleasure are brought to bear on the 
subject of the gaze. My contention is that in order to see through and beyond, to 
“the far side of this grid” (Foucault 1989: 175), where there is the possibility of 
thinking differently about animals, it is not more visibility that is required, but a 
radically alternate regime of power/knowledge/pleasure, and 
knowledge/senses/emotions. This is the only way to ‘un-encode’ the human-centric, 
or anthroparchal, eye and alter the gaze from one of entitlement to one that is open 
to the fully independent being-ness of ‘others’. Over two chapters, Part IV 
therefore addresses my fifth objective by examining what effect increased 
visibility of ‘food’ animals and increased transparency of meat production 
processes have on the edibility of animals, and what this says about how 
animals are ‘made sense’ of. 
 
Foucault’s thesis on the power of transparency, conceived as part of the regime of 
power/knowledge/pleasure relating to ‘food’ animals and meat, provides the 
analytical framework for this third dimension of my investigation into the 
persistence of meat consumption and the use of ‘food’ animals. With reference to 
Bentham’s prison Panopticon, a “technology of power” which achieves “subjection 
by illumination” (Foucault 1980: 148; 154), the visibility of practices relating to the 
use and edibility of ‘food’ animals similarly becomes a means of achieving absolute 
access and control over “their bodies, their gestures, and all their daily actions” 
(1980: 151-152). Under the systemically normalised regime of 
power/knowledge/pleasure, ‘food’ animals are seen, just as much as they are ‘made 
sense of’, as objects of consumption—mapped bodies of meat. Therefore, visibility 
cannot avoid functioning first and foremost under an expansion of this logic of 
power (Pachirat 2011: 289). Only when the logic is subverted, when the “already 
encoded eye” (Foucault 1989: xxii) is un-encoded, can they become visible as 
something else.  
 
Of course, it could be argued that the discomfort of visibility could itself generate a 
subversion of this logic, which is a theory on which many animal advocacy 
organizations base their campaigns. However, as I have demonstrated in the 
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previous sections, and will further illustrate in this final part of my thesis, there are 
many ways that discomfort associated with visibility can be re-interpreted and/or 
ameliorated to reinforce the normalised regime of power/knowledge/pleasure. For 
mechanisms of power, as Foucault explains, are “caught up in the very pleasure of 
their exercise” (1980: 186), and sight is one of the pleasures of the senses (Foucault 
1985). Elsewhere, Foucault further observes: 
 
There is something in surveillance, or more accurately in the gaze of those 
involved in the act of surveillance, which is no stranger to the pleasure of 
surveillance, the pleasure of the surveillance of pleasure, and so on. 
  (Foucault 1980: 186). 
 
Weaving together the power of knowledge, the pleasure of knowing, and the 
knowing of pleasure, with Foucault’s further theorisations on the gaze, the power 
of transparency and the pleasure of surveillance, the full extent of the regime of 
power/knowledge/pleasure that bears upon animals becomes clear. This culminates 
in a “gaze of power” (1979: 81). Drawing on complimentary theorisations of the 
gaze and the pleasures of looking as articulated by Mulvey (1999), Berger (1992), 
Pick (2015b) and other scholars of visual media, I argue that the gaze of power is 
one that is infused, through social practices and the regime of 
power/knowledge/pleasure that permeates them, with entitlement.  
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Chapter 8. Entitlement 
Thus far in this thesis, I have demonstrated that what Probyn describes as “a 
politics of feeding” (2000: 18) is a decidedly speciesist politics where a fundamental 
entitlement to animals’ bodies and lives is always unquestioningly assumed and 
reproduced at every turn. Drawing on Acampora (2016: 18), I argue that this 
entitlement, or ‘ideology of human privilege’, underpins the persistence of meat 
consumption and the use of animals for food, and the moral approval that 
associated practices attract. For not only does it “short-circuit” (ibid) attempts for 
animals to be known in any other way, it also prevents them being seen as anything 
but edible. Acampora insists these “…ideologies of human privilege must be 
exposed and analyzed for progress to be made in overcoming animal oppression.” 
(2016: 1).  
 
Therefore, noting that discursive and material transparency/visibility is a strategy 
employed by both animal advocates and the meat industry, particularly over the 
past decade, I argue that a Foucauldian ‘power of transparency’ is in operation 
whereby this visibility is always parsed under an ideology of human privilege or 
entitlement, i.e. the conviction that humans are entitled to use the bodies of animals 
for their own purposes. I conceive entitlement as an effect of power – a productive 
way of legitimating and interpreting relations of oppression. Like fear/bravery, and 
comfort/discomfort, entitlement and oppression are mutually constitutive and 
dependent. The production and exercise of entitlement through social practices 
shape systems of oppression, which in turn reinforce conditions of entitlement. 
Both are required to create a state of domination. Entitlement to animals’ lives and 
bodies, as an effect of the systemic power relation, permeates all its mechanisms—
the validating discourses, emotions of distinction, and ethico-aesthetics. However, it 
is the increased visibility of ‘food’ animals and meat, as it is constituted by my 
participants and in the broader literature on ethical meat, that especially 
foregrounds this entitlement and how it works to maintain the persistent edibility of 
‘food’ animals.   
 
I begin Chapter 8 with an outline of my approach to entitlement, drawing on 
theorisations of intersectionality to link privilege (conceived as entitlement) with 
the domination of animals. I then focus on how human entitlement manifests in my 
data, highlighting how a popularised notion of ‘respect’ functions, especially within 
the ethical meat discourse, to cloak this entitlement, and presumed ownership of 
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animals, in a benign sense of mutuality and the ‘giving’ up/over of life (as opposed 
to taking). Following this, I illustrate how this idea of ‘food’ animals ‘giving’ their 
life is woven through my participants’ accounts of various phases of the meat 
production process. While echoing my discussion of the ‘natural contract’ in Part 
II, here I foreground the entitlement that suffuses my participants’ reflections. 
Animals are attributed with thoughts and emotions, sometimes also a voice through 
which these are expressed, and the capacity to voluntarily enter into contracts, all 
of which attest to the benefits to animals of an ethical approach to eating their flesh. 
In this way, ‘food’ animals are cast as willing, or at least preordained, participants 
in a natural process.  
 
i. Entitlement, privilege and oppression 
In his imagining of the postcolonial animal, Armstrong (2002: 413) observes: 
 
In identifying the costs borne by non-European ‘others’ in the pursuit of 
Western culture’s privileged entitlement, post-colonialists have concentrated 
upon ‘other’ humans, cultures and territories but seldom upon animals. 
 
Entitlement can thus be thought of in terms of privilege as both terms connote a 
special right that is granted or enjoyed by some person, group or entity with more 
advantage. Black and Stone (2005: 244) identify the following five components of 
privilege: 
 
1. Privilege is a special advantage; it is neither common nor universal; 
2. It is granted, not earned or brought into being by one's individual effort 
or talent [i.e. a birthright]; 
3. Privilege is a right or entitlement that is related to a preferred status or 
rank; 
4. Privilege is exercised for the benefit of the recipient and to the exclusion 
or detriment of others; 
5. A privileged status is often outside of the awareness of the person 
possessing it. 
 
According to this conception, privilege, or entitlement, is not a commodity that is 
located in any person or entity but is, like Foucault’s power, understood as a 
dispersed phenomenon of social practices. I have chosen the word entitlement over 
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privilege because it offers a more active way of conceiving privilege. Entitlement 
immediately conjures the preposition ‘to’ while privilege does not. It therefore 
inherently implies an act to which the entitlement relates (to use, to kill, to eat), and 
a material object (human or nonhuman) the act is applied to. 
 
While Black and Stone acknowledge that ‘race’/ethnicity and gender have 
traditionally been the primary focus of literature dealing with privilege, they seek to 
expand this ambit to include “the five socially constructed categories of sexual 
orientation, SES [socio-economic status], age, differing degrees of ableness and 
religious affiliation” (2005: 244). Privilege, hereafter referred to as entitlement, is 
embedded in social practices via these (and many other) distinctions that set apart 
those who, knowingly or unknowingly, are on the ‘right’ side, and therefore enjoy 
its benefits, from those who are not. The latter ‘others’ may as a result experience 
different and limited access to practices, and be regarded differently within those 
practices compared with those who are entitled. Those regarded as ‘other’ can do 
little to access the ‘special advantage’, the innate birthright, and the ’preferred 
status’ that Black and Stone’s schema suggests would alter their position as the 
‘excluded’. They are therefore being oppressed by systemic mechanisms of power 
that are suffused with entitlement and reflected in social practices—oppression and 
entitlement go hand in hand. 
 
Emphasising this point, Iris Young’s (1990) account of oppression correlates closely 
with Black and Stone’s account of privilege. Young draws on differences in gender, 
age, socio-economic status, sexual identity, ‘racial’, ethnic and religious group to 
illustrate how oppression operates, and also prefigures the theory of 
intersectionality by highlighting that there are “similarities and overlaps in the 
oppressions of different groups” (64). Young also highlights the systemic nature of 
oppression, and underscores the fact that entitlement and oppression are not 
attributes possessed or experienced by individuals, but the product of everyday 
practices (39). While acknowledging that within a system of oppression, individuals 
may certainly cause intentional harm to those who are oppressed, and that entitled 
individuals and groups may benefit from the continuation of this system, it is, like 
power, ultimately the result of structural phenomena. The causes of oppression, 
Young explains, are “embedded in unquestioned norms, habits and symbols, in the 
assumptions underlying institutional rules” (1990: 39). They are exercised in 
“ordinary interactions, media and cultural stereotypes…bureaucratic hierarchies 
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and market mechanisms…systematically reproduced in major economic, political, 
and cultural institutions” (ibid).  
 
There are therefore multiple and distinct expressions of entitlement and 
oppression—based on gender, ‘race’, age etc., and more than one form can be 
associated with one body so that people are “shaped by the interaction of different 
social locations (e.g. ‘race’/ethnicity, indigeneity, gender, class, sexuality, geography, 
age, disability/ability, migration status, religion” (Hankivsky 2014: 2). 
Intersectionality is a term originally coined by critical race scholar Kimberle 
Crenshaw in 1989, but it designates a strand of critical thought that has a much 
longer history. In her account of intersectionality, Hankivsky explains that it is the 
interaction between these ‘social locations’ in “connected systems and structures of 
power (e.g., laws, policies, state governments and other political and economic 
unions, religious institutions, media)” that gives rise to “interdependent forms of 
privilege and oppression shaped by colonialism, imperialism, racism, homophobia, 
ableism and patriarchy” (ibid). This mirrors Young’s (1990) depiction of 
overlapping oppressions and, in a nod to Armstrong’s (2002) search for the 
postcolonial animal, I would add speciesism to these conceptualisations of systemic, 
structural and intersectional entitlements and oppressions. 
 
While being well established in the fields of feminist theory, social theory, and 
critical race studies, the extension of intersectionality to include animals through 
the operation of speciesism (prejudice or discrimination based on species) or more 
broadly anthroparchy (the social system of human domination) is for many scholars 
a logical and essential move due to similarities and overlaps with other forms of 
oppression.  
 
A recognition of how species difference and our treatment of animals are entangled 
in and shape discourses and ‘knowledge’ of ‘race’, ethnicity, gender, sexuality etc. 
acknowledges that these discourses are co-constitutive (Cudworth 2011: 174). The 
mechanisms of power through which all forms of oppression, domination, 
inequality and social difference gain expression are relational and “continue to 
fundamentally shape questions of in/justice across human and nonhuman cultural 
terrains” (Deckha 2008: 267).  
 
Taking this argument further, Sorenson suggests animal oppression is even more 
central and that speciesism “constitutes a basic form of oppression that provides a 
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structure for the oppression of other humans” (Sorenson 2014: xv). Wolfe (2003: 8) 
is more explicit and underlines the importance of recognising the intersectional 
dimensions of our use of animals: 
 
[…] as long as this humanist and speciesist structure of subjectivization 
remains intact, and as long as it is institutionally taken for granted that it is 
all right to systematically exploit and kill nonhuman animals simply because 
of their species, then the humanist discourse of species will always be 
available for use by some humans against other humans as well, to 
countenance violence against the social other of whatever species or gender, 
or race, or class, or sexual difference. 
 
Offering empirical evidence of these connections, Caviola et al. (2018) found 
speciesism to be positively associated with other prejudicial attitudes such as 
racism, sexism and homophobia. Furthermore, compared to these human-human 
prejudices, speciesism is the “dominant and explicitly accepted social norm and 
ideology in current Western societies” (16). I propose that the speciesism to which 
Sorensen and Wolfe refer manifests in my data as an entitlement to animals’ lives 
and bodies. From this perspective, it is the ideology by which humans ‘receive’ an 
entitlement to objectify and de-individualise animals while using them as a natural 
resource, which permeates and is normalised through social practices, that provides 
the enduring baseline model for a similarly entitled approach to the objectification 
and oppression of human ‘others’. These ‘others’ being those who are also 
objectified and used as part of social practices organised according to an entitled 
group, whether male, white, heterosexual, cis-gendered, able-bodied, affluent or 
otherwise socially advantaged. Cole similarly identifies privilege as symptomatic of 
fundamental relations of power between humans and animals, filtered through the 
benign “architecture” of pastoral care (2011: 97). As Gillian (C) says, “you can love 
animals and eat them, you know it is possible”.  
 
I consider entitlement part of power’s productive network, while oppression is its 
negative counterpart. According to Foucault, as discussed in the introduction and 
Part II of this thesis, it is the productive network of power that “induces pleasure, 
forms knowledge, produces discourse” and, in so doing, more than negative 
instances of power (e.g. oppression), “makes power hold good…makes it accepted” 
(1980: 119). Consequently, while the nature and operation of oppression are 
commonly the focus of intersectional studies, I focus instead on its counterpart—
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the nature and operation of the entitlement that facilitates oppression and greases 
its wheels. With reference to my empirical data, I show how entitlement manifests 
in producers’ and consumers’ accounts of their practices involving ethical and 
sustainable meat and how it describes a particular, apparently justified, regard for 
the ‘other’ who is oppressed.  
 
Entitlement: it’s your right. 
One of the basic cornerstones of the use of animals for food is breeding, which 
Weisberg (2009: 30) describes as: 
 
A practice built directly out of humans’ entitlement to the bodies and lives of 
other animals and to the latter’s reduction to the mere stuff of control.  
 
Weisberg suggests two related aspects of entitlement here—an entitlement to 
animals’ bodies and lives, and an entitlement to reduce them to ‘mere stuff’ besides 
meat (i.e. money) as part of broader (human) systems of value exchange. Both 
aspects are especially evident in how producers of ethical and sustainable meat 
refer to ‘food’ animals as a means to deliver their lifestyle goals. Many highlight that 
it is the ‘country lifestyle’ that they were primarily seeking, and one of the most 
obvious ways to make this economically viable is to raise animals and sell their 
flesh. Oliver (P) relates how he and his partner “fell in love with the 
environment…wanted to become part of it…wanted to call it home”. Will (P) was 
“always very interested in moving to the country”, and Jennifer (P) says, “I just 
like and enjoy farming”. “It’s a lifestyle choice” as James (P) describes it, but one 
that provides limited options for making money. Bella (P) and her partner were 
trying to move to the country but were unsure how they would make a living. Joel 
Salatin became an inspiration, as he is for many of my participants, and showed 
them “how you can make a living growing meat as a small farm” (Bella P). The 
stuff of meat, an outcome of the naturalised and normalised edibility of ‘food’ 
animals, therefore provides a means for these producers to define and control their 
lives. However, economically speaking, not every animal is ‘created’ equal. As Bella 
(P) explains, “you get very little meat off a sheep, so you have to have lots more of 
them”. Agreeing with this assessment, Melanie (P) says, “you can survive on pigs, 
you can’t survive on beef”, because, as Simon continues, pigs “create cash flow”. 
However, Andrew (P) has found that for him, ‘doing beef’ has meant that he is able 
to create an income and stay on the farm.  
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The two aspects of entitlement foregrounded here—the entitlement to use animals 
as food, and the right to financially leverage this entitlement to deliver a desired 
lifestyle—neatly illustrate what happens “when anthropocentrism sh[akes] hands 
with capitalism” (Wadiwel 2017: Keynote). The assumption that raising animals to 
sell their flesh is the only way to make an income in the country also emphasises the 
extent to which entitlement defines the colonization of animals as well as land in 
what Kanji calls “a matrix of Eurocentric-anthropocentric-androcentric power” 
(2017: 65; see also Armstrong 2002; Nibert 2013). Both land and animals are 
subject to the same “civilizing mission” (Armstrong 2002: 414), conceived 
respectively as terra or res nullius55 until mapped by anthroparchal cartographies of 
use. The understandings and practices that support the colonization of the ‘other’ 
(human and nonhuman) as part of a civilizing and beneficial project mean the 
authority of the implicit entitlement is not questioned. Indeed, it is rarely 
recognised or acknowledged that a fundamental, a priori entitlement is even being 
exercised. For example, Julie (C) considers herself “privileged to the able to eat 
ethical meat, it’s a privilege”, but the origin or foundation of that privilege is not 
questioned; it is taken for granted that eating animals is an advantage, benefit or 
birthright (Merriam-Webster.com 2018). The power of knowledge in the 
constitution of entitlement, and the social order, is evident, as Palmer explains: 
 
Power, truth, and right are intricately related because power produces truth; 
it produces knowledge; it constructs particular kinds of people; and it 
creates particular kinds of societies (Palmer 2001: 344, emphasis added). 
 
Colonialism objectifies as it also commodifies—seeing value in, and, more 
fundamentally, enacting an implicitly understood entitlement to ‘blank slates’ that 
can be “mastered and exploited” (Kanji 2017: 51). This is the ‘mission’ that 
underpins practices of breeding, genetically altering, raising, and killing ‘food’ 
animals in order to consume their flesh, however benign these practices are 
constituted as being.  
 
                                                
55 Res nullius is “a thing owned by no person” which can “be reduced to private ownership 
by capture” (Epstein 2002: 3) 
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Every producer describes having some level of emotional attachment to their 
animals, because, as Graham (P) says, “that’s why you do it, because you like to be 
around these animals, you’ve just got to love animals”. But the bottom line is always 
commodification, as Florence (P) illustrates, “we love our sheep, they’re grass 
eaters, aside from one a year [for eating]”. Betraying the same underlying 
instrumentalism, one of Blake’s (P) newly acquired pigs turned out to be barren “so 
I got rid of [her]”; Andrew (P) “kill[s] and butcher[s] the old layers [hens]”; and 
when Alison’s (P) cows reach a certain age, “we dry them off, let them fatten 
up…and turn them into sausages and mince”. James (P) explained to me how one 
of his cows simply has the “wrong attitude” and so “unfortunately she’s going to 
god”. Clearly, she is not conforming to the proper order wherein “‘docility’ is…an 
explicitly sought after and marketed characteristic of ‘farmed’, especially female, 
animals, in the discourses of breeders, especially as it implies ease of handling (i.e., 
control)” (Cole 2011: 86, referencing Cudworth 2008). A docile body is the desired 
effect of Foucault’s disciplinary power. This is one of the more visible mechanisms 
of power exerted over animals that maintains the lie of there being the possibility of 
resistance, for as James’ cow discovered, resistance is a mere trick that can only 
end one way for her as she inevitably falls off the spectrum of power.  
 
This casts Alison’s (P) benign conception of multiple enterprises where “the 
animals [are] doing what’s natural to them and have a quality of life” in a different 
light. For ‘loving animals’ while also deciding the terms and duration of that life 
suggests that they are being loved only as far as they adhere to their function, 
which is to provide a cash crop of meat. Farmer and author Catherine Friend 
makes this ‘loving’ instrumentalism explicit in her account of her quest to become 
The Compassionate Carnivore. She explains: 
 
I continue to farm because I love animals…It’s why we do what we do. But 
unless a landowner can afford to keep animals around just to look at, the 
rest of us animal lovers must find a way for the animals to earn their keep 
and contribute to the economic health of the farm”. (2009: 34) 
 
In most westernised countries, ‘food’ animals, or ‘livestock’, are legally accorded 
certain minimum rights under welfare standards and guidelines56 because, as 
                                                
56 For examples, see www.animalwelfarestandards.net.au/ , www.gov.uk/guidance/animal-
welfare , and www.nal.usda.gov/awic/standards-and-guidelines. Emphasizing how 
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Melanie explains, “all animals deserve to have shelter, shade, water and the right 
food and be able to move around freely”. However, as Blake clarifies: 
 
As ruthless as it is, it’s a business you’re running. Ultimately if you kept it as 
a pet, sheep get overweight and kind of sit, and at seven years old they die 
anyway you know as an old, unproductive ewe, cos you’re not breeding it. 
So, it’s just better just to have it go when it’s in its prime.57 
 
Finn (P) says “I just love animals”, as do most of my participants, but also, “they’re 
given one and a half to two years before they’re killed, which is a good amount of 
time” (emphasis added). The way my non-producer participants describe the 
relationship between a producer and their animals is perhaps more accurate. For 
Julie (C), an ethical producer is “somebody who is giving their animals” a ‘good’ life 
(emphasis added). Maria (C) similarly describes “the life that you give the animal” 
(emphasis added), while for Ellis (C), an ethical producer “allows them to have a 
good life” (emphasis added). After all, “we’ve domesticated these animals”, as Ellis 
(C) explains—implying a sense of human ownership over the lives that are ‘given’ 
to animals and are not theirs to live. These accounts complement the validating 
discourse relating to the value of contingent life, reinforcing the narrative whereby 
these animals literally owe their lives to humans, and that life is, in and of itself, 
good. The implicit appropriation of animal’s lives and bodies manifests discursively, 
though subtly in my discussions with participants.  
 
Consumers of ethical and sustainable meat repeatedly refer to their meat, and their 
animals. I am excluding producers here to avoid conflating their knowledge of legal 
ownership with consumers’ ‘knowledge’ of their entitlement. All emphases are 
added. Gillian (C) refers to “my lamb farmers”; Sally (C) describes visiting a local 
producer where she can “give my bacon a scratch behind the ear” (note also the 
rendering of the living animals as already meat)58; David (C) has been 
                                                                                                                                       
systemically normalised orders of animals have become, the standards and guidelines are 
different (and much less protective) for livestock compared with cats and dogs, aquatic 
animals, animals used in research and teaching, and exhibited animals (e.g. zoos). There 
are also different standards and guidelines for pigs, cattle, and sheep, and then depending 
whether they are at saleyards, “processing establishments” (i.e. slaughterhouses), or in 
transit. 
57 As indicated in the story of Baa in Chapter 4, a pet sheep may in fact live to 17 years. 
58 This, and the reverse, where meat is referred to as a living animal, are common features 
in my data. 
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“slaughtering my own chickens” for a number of years; Anne (C) knows the 
producers of “my pork and my beef”; while Geoffrey (C) investigates “how a lot of 
my cows are slaughtered”, and purchases “my pork products” from “my other 
butcher”.  
 
This possessive language may seem innocuous; however, Adams (2010 [1990]), 
Dunayer (1995), Stibbe (2001) and others have demonstrated the contribution of 
everyday, normalised language to the reproduction of speciesism; language being 
just one of the ways that Butler’s “Imperializing gestures of dialectical 
appropriation” gain their foothold (2000: 310). Furthermore, I construe this 
‘dialectical appropriation’ differently to the use of similar possessive terms in the 
context of more mutual and loving forms of relationality. The instrumentality that 
overshadows relations between humans and ‘food’ animals, and the constant 
presence of the power spectrum that they will all inevitably ‘fall off’ at some point, 
cast the use of these terms in a less genuinely, or necessarily differently-loving light. 
Instead, I suggest they are indicative of an enhanced sense of entitlement associated 
with meat and ‘food’ animals that are local, ‘known’ and therefore better. The fact 
that what these participants are commonly referring to is the ‘meat’, i.e. bacon, pork 
or beef, rather than the animals, lends support to this view. 
 
These animals, and their flesh, are therefore wholly constructed as the property of 
humans, much like natural resources are described as ‘ours’ when they are in fact 
appropriated. However, Armstrong explains that unlike ‘natural’ resources, animals 
somewhat resist representations of nature “as a passive object or blank slate ready 
for mapping” (2002: 415). This is because their sentient alive-ness creates an 
additional requirement for their use as a resource and that is death. While this 
aspect of eating meat remains problematic to some degree for most of my 
participants, as I have shown, it is mostly assuaged by the dominant regimes of 
power/knowledge/pleasure and knowledge/senses/emotions that constitute these 
animals as ‘food’, and also the entitlement therein that sanctions their use. In this 
sense, an awareness of entitlement sits comfortably alongside a knowledge of the 
‘proper’ order. As Bella (P) illustrates, “even though I think of them very much as a 
living creature that deserves its own decent life, I know that they’re for meat”. Dan 
(C) similarly comments, “I always try to consciously see it as still as an animal…a 
sentient being. It had interests, it had needs and now it’s becoming part of me”.  
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In the context of this deeply felt entitlement, the ‘realities’ of eating animals, 
however confronting in their content and delivery, can at best be discomforting for 
a period, but often merely thought-provoking and ‘interesting’, as Diane (C) 
illustrates: 
 
[…] but pork is still a pig, poultry is really still a chicken. So, you’re eating 
their dead bodies and putting it in your body, which is why that vegan 
meme is kind of cool. So I was like ‘Ooooh, yeah, they die, and their grave is 
my body’, it’s kind of dark right? 
 
Sentience, aliveness, being-ness, and even relatedness can seamlessly and 
unproblematically segue into edibility, or even be perceived simultaneously in a 
strange kind of co-existence. Jennifer (C) intriguingly comments, “if you’ve got a 
relationship with something, you’re less likely to just to be frivolous with it and 
leave it half uneaten in the fridge”. Relate-ability and edibility are more easy 
bedfellows than perhaps many animal advocacy organisations are aware. For those 
participants more indifferent about, and/or reducing, their meat consumption, and 
even the two consumers (one vegetarian and one pescetarian) who only buy and 
cook meat for their family or partner, there remains an acceptance of the basic 
human entitlement to meat—if that is what ‘they’ want. Julie (C) believes, “we 
need to accept that people enjoy meat and use and eat and want to eat meat”. 
 
However, the increasingly difficult-to-ignore exercise of lethal power over animal 
‘resources’, coupled with the social imperative to move away from the principles 
and conditions of factory farming, can trouble the knowledge, and practices, of 
innate entitlement, as the preceding accounts of discomfort illustrated. This 
introduces the need for an additional narrative and modified regimes that cast 
humans in a different role than that of animals’ oppressor and maintain the mask 
that denies this state of domination. A similarly productive mechanism is required 
to reinterpret colonialism, where what Bentley terms “self-validating narratives” 
rearticulate the aim of colonialism from one of resource appropriation to “a selfless 
project bestowing European gifts of progress” (2015: 65). The validating 
discourses, distinctive emotions, and ethico-aesthetic I have identified in this thesis 
are all constitutive of self (and practice)-validating narratives that rearticulate 
meaty practices in a more pleasant light. But there is one further ethico-aesthetic 
mechanism that features strongly in my data, and across broader discourses of 
ethical and sustainable meat. 
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To use these animals that humans are ‘unalterably and unquestionably’ entitled to 
use (ideologically as well as legally) and whose lives are therefore in every sense 
owned, but use them in a ‘better’ way, requires that, 1) the manner (rather than the 
fact) of their death is given consideration (as discussed in Parts II and III), and, 2) 
their former life is somehow acknowledged in the subsequent use of their flesh. The 
latter consideration often translates to not wasting meat, “so it doesn’t die in vain” 
(Lisa C), meaning to no purpose—that is, human purpose. Because, as David (C) 
emphasises, even though “you exploit an animal for a particular human need…you 
should get the best [human] use out of it”. However, more commonly, the 
‘unavoidable’ killing of animals is incorporated into an ethical aesthetic of meat 
eating through the notion of respect for life, as Diane (C) explains, “the key point, 
and the first point, should be about the quality of life of those that we eat, those 
sentient beings that we eat”. This is a discourse of respect that is predicated on the 
knowledge of entitlement and ownership and which therefore generates a 
necessarily human-centric consideration for the life and pleasure of the other, as I 
will demonstrate.  
 
ii. Respect: an ethico-aesthetic mechanism of power 
Respect is a fairly ambiguous term and can convey subtly different meanings. In 
the Oxford and Miriam Webster dictionaries, respect includes the notions of 
having ‘due regard’; treating someone in an ‘appropriate way’; admiring what is 
‘valuable’ or ‘a sense of the worth’ of a person; and deference to ‘certain rights’. 
However, when used in reference to a desire or ‘need’ for a non-renewable ‘natural 
resource’, such as a mineral, a plant, or a life, respect is highly problematic and 
even disingenuous. 
 
The word ‘respect’ carries different connotations depending how, and towards 
whom, it is directed. It is this ambiguity that I suggest is exploited in relation to 
animals, because the word can in one sense sound benevolent and caring, and yet, 
as I will show, animals are being ‘respected’ only to the extent that they are due, 
worth, or valued (i.e. as ‘food’ animals), and given ‘certain rights’ that are 
‘appropriate’ based on how they are thought about or looked at (i.e. as ‘food’ 
animals). It is therefore a respect already infused with entitlement and violation. A 
recent documentary series by food writer turned gourmet farmer Matthew Evans, 
which aired on Australia’s public television network SBS in 2016, exemplifies this 
perspective. As a reviewer from one of Australia’s leading national newspapers 
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commented, Matthew urges people to become “more knowledgeable, thoughtful 
and respectful about the meat we consume”, and have “a sense of respect for the life 
that has been taken for our enjoyment” (Quinn 2016).  
 
This is a call that has certainly been taken up so that respect has become part of a 
common discourse, one with a particular ethico-aesthetic of 
knowledge/senses/emotions surrounding ethical meat. However, as with the ethico-
aesthetic of moral approval, the regard being accorded to the life or ‘value’ of 
animal others is purely, or ‘appropriately’, instrumental. The discourse relating to 
respect is therefore, as yet, uncritical of the fact that normalised and systemic 
relations of power, oppression and domination permeate the ethico-aesthetics 
surrounding a body that is shaped by a predominantly white, male and, ultimately, 
human sensibility. This observation draws me back to my focus on entitlement and 
what it indicates about the apparent intransigence of the ‘natural’ order that 
decrees animals as edible resources for human use. For as long as this order 
remains in place, along with the entitlement it engenders, sensations, emotions, and 
pleasures become similarly ordered so that a prevailing ethico-aesthetic is incapable 
of moving ‘beyond’ to allow the decolonization of ‘food’ animals. I suggest that the 
ethico-aesthetic constitution of ‘respect’ for meat and ‘food’ animals plays a 
significant role in reinforcing this order. 
 
Helen (C) asserts animals should be “treated with respect the whole way 
through…with respect when they’re alive, when they’re killed, and how the meat is 
then cut up and put together and distributed…because it was a living creature”. 
The two meanings of respect (as in admiration or esteem, and also ‘due’ or 
‘appropriate’ regard) are more clearly conflated by Ellis (C) who explains 
“respecting another life is sort of that respect for mother nature…you’re treating 
things with respect…reflects how I feel about nature…respecting nature”. Nature 
can at once be admired for its qualities but also its value (i.e. an ‘other’s’ flesh), 
which is where an understanding of entitlement shifts the nature of that respect (for 
life) towards an appreciation of use. Gillian (C) demonstrates this shift when she 
says, “I think the main thing is [their use is] respectful, it’s respectful to what they 
are, and to their lives” (emphasis added). Similarly, Helen (C) re-emphasises the 
respect due all animals, “even if they are brought up to be killed”. Respect is 
allocated only according to what is appropriate to a ‘food’ animal, as Damien (C) 
clarifies, “animals need to be respected…they’re put on this earth for us, so we need 
to respect them…respect for the product”. As Damien’s comment indicates, respect 
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is directed at the ‘meat’ that an animal ‘provides’, alluding to the ‘knowledge’ of this 
as a ‘natural’ process where it is the provision of this ‘natural’ gift (of meat) as an 
outcome of a natural contract that is being respected, rather than the animal’s life.  
 
My participants cast themselves as humble and passive receivers of nature’s 
unsolicited rewards. For example, it is important to Grace (C) to “recognise that 
you’re eating an animal, and be, you know, aware of it, and appreciative”. For Julie 
(C), it’s more about “respecting the animals and knowing you’ve given them the best 
life that you can before slaughtering them for human consumption, and using as 
many parts of the animal as possible” (emphasis added). The knowledge that they 
are being respectful adds an important dimension to my participants’ use of animals 
for food. It allows this use to be construed benignly and even reverently, where 
animals are “treated with respect rather than like a piece of meat which they are” 
(Helen C, emphasis added).  
 
Drawing on the three validating discourses discussed in Part II, and especially the 
benevolent ‘natural contract’, the ethico-aesthetic of respect for ‘food’ animals and 
their flesh interprets their death as a naturalised gift that they offer up in return for 
the opportunity firstly to live, and secondly to live a ‘good’ life. This is an 
opportunity that humans are understood to have provided and have a responsibility 
to keep providing to contingent lives. Much like benevolent discourses of 
colonialism, the benefits to animals are emphasised such that the inherent 
entitlement and oppression are productively erased. The harsh, individual realities 
of civilizing missions against humans and animals are effectively transmuted and 
absorbed into a larger story of universal ‘good’, characterised by a reciprocal and 
respectful, balance between giving and taking life—as if life were a renewable 
resource. 
 
The apparently simple notion of ‘respect’ is thus supportive of a multi-storeyed, 
interwoven narrative that constructs a benevolent, mutually beneficial relationship 
between humans and ‘food’ animals. This narrative also pervades popular 
discourses on ethical and sustainable meat. In Animal, Vegetable, Miracle, Barbara 
Kingsolver’s part-memoir, part investigation of her journey to rural self-sufficiency, 
she emphasises, “It’s not without thought and gratitude that I slaughter my animals” 
(2008: 224).  
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The contractual discourse reinforces the ethico-aesthetic of ‘respect’ and legitimises 
it as being ‘appropriate’ to the ‘worth’ of these renewable ‘food’ animals. But, 
perhaps more than the terms ‘ethical’ or ‘natural’, respect is a demonstrably 
ambiguous term. There is no measure of respect and participants largely hope and 
assume that animals are ‘being respected’. This seems primarily to equate to the way 
they are killed, or even less significantly for animals, simply the attitude of the 
person carrying out the killing. Tracey (C) reasons that ethical producers who care 
for their animals “are not going to kill them in a way that is disrespectful”, and Finn 
(P) relies on abattoir employees “having some level of respect for the animals”.  
 
Much like the ritual surrounding Douglas’ sacrificial tribe member, respect does 
little to alter the circumstances or fate of ‘food’ animals’ lives, but it does make the 
consumer feel better about it, allowing them to modify their knowledge and 
mediate their experience of it. For Helen (C), the ritual of breaking fast at Easter 
allows her to view the consumption of offal as unproblematic, and “part of that 
respecting the animal”, and David (C) describes the positive affects he and others 
derive from his ‘ethical’ connection with his chickens before he kills them: 
 
Being with them…their entire lives and bringing about the end of their 
lives. And particularly…sharing it with others…that was very much 
something [that] I guess helped to really solidify the point of trying to eat, 
particularly meat, in an ethical way. 
 
As with ‘ethical’ killing, which I discussed in Part II, ‘respect’ is essentially pursued 
for the benefits it accrues to humans—how it makes them feel differently and 
‘better’ about eating animals, how it nourishes their experience of community and 
their knowledge of themselves as ‘good’ and ‘moral’ humans. This is a clearly 
anthropocentric rendering of ethico-aesthetics that does not take into account the 
‘pleasure of the other’, except via another veiled mechanism of power known as 
animal welfare. As long as the terminal or non-renewable use of some body, human 
or nonhuman, is being uncritically construed as respectful and in accordance with 
their ‘social location’, then under the normalised and systemic order of entitlement, 
it is difficult for this use to be regarded as problematic.  
 
Consequently, under the ethico-aesthetic of respect for these naturalised 
contractual gifts, it can be seen how the increased transparency of meaty practices 
and increased visibility (and subjectification) of ‘food’ animals do not pose a 
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significant challenge to the mask that keeps their state of domination substantially 
hidden. For this subjectification is capable of being narrativised with human voices 
(like the voice of the colonialist speaking for the colonised), which normalise the 
secular ritual surrounding eating animals. Any other kind of ‘true’ subjectification, 
in which the subaltern animal might speak and be heard (Spivak 1988), still 
‘glimmers’ beyond the grid. Hence, as Armstrong emphasises: 
 
Encountering the postcolonial animal means learning to listen to the voices 
of all kinds of “other” without either ventriloquizing them or assigning to 
them accents so foreign that they never can be understood (2002: 417, 
emphasis added). 
 
Conclusion 
So far in Part IV, I have shown that the ordering grid by which ‘food’ animals are 
‘known’ and made visible, along with the regimes of power/knowledge/pleasure and 
knowledge/senses/emotions that keep it in place, breeds an enduring sense, and 
reality, of entitlement to these animals’ bodies and lives. This entitlement permeates 
all social practices that in any way involve food, and sanctions the use of ‘food’ 
animals for any human, and therefore naturally justifiable, purpose, whether 
lifestyle, income, food, sensory or emotional pleasures. Entitlement seamlessly 
translates ‘want’ to ‘should/can have’, removing any question of ‘not having’ from 
the table (or preventing it from even arising). The ethical turn in meat consumption 
has simply added a concern for the conditions of provision surrounding this 
entitlement. The entire discourse of animal welfare, being focused on these 
conditions of provision, is therefore underpinned by entitlement, which is why, 
unless entitlement is part of the critique, welfare measures will never contribute to 
ending the use of animals as food.  
 
Entitlement permeates all the mechanisms of power discussed thus far that 
contribute to maintaining the persistent edibility of animals. These include three 
validating discourses (the value of contingent life, invoking nature, and the 
benevolent natural contract), two distinctive emotions (requisite bravery and 
cultural omnivorousness) and two ethico-aesthetics (moral approval and respect). 
Through the normalised and rhizomatic nexus of power/knowledge/pleasure, 
entitlement encodes everything that is known, felt and sensed, emotionally and 
viscerally, about meat and ‘food’ animals. It characterises the gaze of power and 
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infuses practices relating to the visibility of ‘food’ animals. It is also, I argue, why 
support for increasing the material visibility of ‘food’ animals, as a means to 
challenge not only their use as food but also their treatment, is misguided and even 
counter-productive to any radical change in the status quo.  
 
I take up this argument in the next chapter, Chapter 10, with reference to the 
heightened visibility of ‘meat’, ‘food’ animals, and practices of meat production that 
shapes my participants’ accounts of their meaty practices. I describe the forms this 
‘new’ visibility takes in the ethical foodsphere and identify two ‘types’ of visibility in 
effect. Drawing on Foucault’s accounts of the look or ‘gaze’ and panoptic 
surveillance, and also perspectives from visual culture and cinema studies, 
particularly Mulvey’s (1999) apt perspective on the ‘pleasure of looking’, I 
articulate how I arrive at, and what I mean by, my notion of the entitled gaze.  
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Chapter 9. Visibility: Inviting an untroubled gaze 
This is the second chapter on the power of transparency, and the final empirical 
chapter of this thesis. Here, I attend to my argument that, regardless of attempts by 
animal advocates to make visible the (mis)treatment and abuse of ‘food’ animals, of 
how transparent producers are about production practices, and how familiar 
consumers are willing to become with all these practices, a fundamental sense of 
entitlement, as described in Chapter 8, prevents ‘food’ animals from being seen any 
differently.  
 
Whether in life or in death, the visibility of ‘food’ animals is saturated with 
entitlement, with the knowledge and ‘truth’ of the purpose they were born to, and 
with the entwined sensory and emotional associations that contribute to masking 
their state of domination. With the understanding of how entitlement works 
through the mechanisms of power, sight only adds to an entirely normalised ethico-
aesthetic, or embodied ethics, of eating animals to constitute a more substantial 
mask. From Foucault’s conceptions of the nexus of power/knowledge/pleasure—via 
power/knowledge and the (dis)pleasure of knowing—to Probyn’s (2000) and 
Hayes-Conroy and Hayes-Conroy’s (2008; 2010) insights regarding the power of 
taste, I now arrive at film theorist Laura Mulvey’s seminal ideas on the pleasure of 
looking. This brings my tour of Foucault full circle by highlighting the “power 
through transparency” or “subjection by illumination” that is exercised by the gaze 
of power in the market for ethical meat (Foucault 1980: 154).  
 
i. Perfect vision? 
In 1975, Peter Singer said those who “require” animals to be killed for food “do not 
deserve to be shielded from this or any other aspect of the production of the meat 
they buy”, and a few years later Linda McCartney’s made her now famous 
assertion that “if slaughterhouses had glass walls the whole world would be 
vegetarian”.59 Over 40 years later, consumers are increasingly ‘choosing’60 not to be 
                                                
59 Although commonly attributed to Sir Paul McCartney, it was Linda McCartney who 
first said this. As far as I can tell, it first appears in her 1995 cookbook, Linda’s Kitchen: 
Simple and Inspiring Recipes for Meals without Meat. 
60 It is recognised that consumer ‘choice’ is not an accurate representation of the many 
factors that contribute to this shift in social practices involving meat. However, it depicts 
the nature of my participants’ engagement with a more transparent model of meat 
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shielded, as my data have indicated, while per capita meat consumption continues 
to outpace population growth. It would seem, therefore, that visibility does not 
have the anticipated transformational effect on social practices, and yet, visibility 
and ‘exposure’ is still one of the primary methods by which campaigners for dietary 
change and/or animal rights seek to jolt consumers out of their habitual routines. 
For example, The Animal Activists’ Handbook claims: 
 
[…] if the realities of factory farms and slaughterhouses were as visible as 
the meat they produce, all thoughtful compassionate individuals would be 
vegetarian advocates (Ball and Friedrich 2009:17). 
 
During those 40 years since Singer’s book, issues associated with the intensive, 
industrial-scale production of food in general have attracted increasing public and 
media attention and this has translated to the market place with more specialised 
product labelling (e.g. organic, fair trade, sustainable) and big retail partnerships 
with conservation groups, animal welfare organisations and leading animal 
advocates, including Singer (Lewis and Huber 2015; Satya 2006). In addition, 
there are frequent boycott campaigns designed to draw attention to, and 
commercially penalise, companies for a range of (alleged) nefarious practices. 
Reflecting the colonization of the foodsphere with multiple agendas around 
corporate dominance, social justice, health, environmental sustainability and animal 
rights, this gradual politicization of food has been well-documented (for example 
Cook and Crang 1996; Goodman et al. 2010, 2012; Goodman 2004; Micheletti and 
Stolle 2010; Clarke et al. 2008; Barnett et al. 2005b, among others).  
 
Common to the politics of food across all these agendas is the goal of “making 
transparent” (Goodman 2004: 902) according to a broader thesis of commodity de-
fetishization (Gunderson 2013). Under this thesis, previously hidden conditions of 
production and provision are exposed for public scrutiny and assessment, and in 
turn become part of the constitution of new orders of distinction—distinctions that 
determine not only whether a product is organic, environmentally friendly, socially 
just, or ethical, but whether one is more/differently organic or ethical than the next. 
What has been de-fetishised thus becomes re-fetishised as consumers become 
reconnected, and immersed, in the practices of production (Pottinger 2013). 
                                                                                                                                       
production, which they characterise as voluntary and even sought after, rather than 
imposed and unwelcome.  
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However, this immersion is often so highly mediated and managed that many 
authors refer to it rather as a double fetishism whereby a “diverse range of 
commodity signs” contribute to their continuing aestheticization (Cook and Crang 
1996: 136; also Goodman 2004: 902). 
 
Transparency is therefore a key feature of what are understood as alternate, and 
‘better’ practices involving food, and most especially meaty practices. However, it 
manifests in many forms, through different media and spaces, in ways that reflect 
different kinds and different degrees of mediation.61 For example, improved 
surveillance techniques have opened up the largely invisible world of industrial 
meat production to the public gaze. Depending on how this transparency is 
organised and mediated, and by whom, it can be used to create distance from 
popularised accounts of conditions in factory farms and other industrial spaces of 
animal production, thereby providing comforting reassurance of more benign 
treatment of ‘food’ animals. The trend in ‘chicken cams’, ‘cow cams’ and ‘pig cams’ 
showing real time footage of these ‘food’ animals going about their daily routines 
are illustrative of this benign visibility. Alternatively, it can be used to expose poor 
conditions and mistreatment of ‘food’ animals, commonly through the use of ‘raw 
footage’, with the aim of inciting discomfort in viewers and contributing to changes 
in how these animals are used. Examples of the latter include the Australian ABC’s 
Four Corners report on the live export trade titled A Bloody Business, Animals 
Australia’s Make it Possible campaign, and People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA)’s various campaigns targeting the use of animals for food. This 
capacity of visibility to be variously benign or raw is explored further in the next 
section. 
 
First, however, I need to address the obvious relevance here of the large body of 
literature drawing on Foucault’s theorisations of biopower and biopolitics (for 
example Rabinow and Rose 2006; Esposito 2008). This includes the application of 
these theories to the lives of, and human relations with animals (for example Wolfe 
2012, Wadiwel 2008; Chrulew 2012), and also how these intersect with Foucault’s 
technologies of the self (Agamben 1998; Mayes 2015; Genel 2006).  
 
                                                
61 Acknowledging that sight, like the other senses of perception, is always mediated and 
never independent of its co-constitutive environment of social practices which shape how 
what is sensed is made sense of. 
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In Foucault’s biopower, the subject or ‘biosubject’ (Wolfe 2012: 22)—here the 
‘food’ animal—is conceived as the object of a power to “make live and let die” in 
contrast to the sovereign power to “let live and make die” (Foucault 1997: 239). 
However, the foregrounding in theorisations of biopower of “primary material” 
(Esposito 2008: 29), “the molecularization of vitality” (Rose 2009: 13) or 
“individual bodies” Foucault 1997: 242) places the focus on how this kind of power 
acts on and shapes bodies, where what I am primarily interested in is how power 
(in relation to ‘food’ animals) is constituted in the first place. In this sense, my 
concern is with what Genel (2006: 48) describes as “technologies of power which 
are no longer presented exclusively internal to a code of legality or sovereignty, 
codes which in fact mask the new modes of the exercise of power”. Or as Wadiwel 
observes, in contrast to Agamben’s (1998) understanding of human/animal relations 
as defining of biopolitics, biopower is rather, “before anything else, a question of 
determining the distinction between human and animal” (Wadiwel 2008: 18).  
 
It is with the aim of understanding how this distinction between human and animal 
is constituted, how it is maintained and why it remains so persistent, that I reserve 
my focus for now on Foucault’s theorisations on power/knowledge/pleasure and 
also transparency. Such an understanding will provide added insight into how all 
forms of power in relation to animals are constituted, whether conceived as 
sovereign, pastoral, disciplinary or bio-. I would like to direct future analysis to the 
question of bio- versus sovereign power in relation to ‘food’ animals, observing that 
they represent the power of humans to both make live and make die.   
 
ii. Two views of visibility 
The majority of transparency currently circulating in relation to ‘food’ animals and 
meat lies somewhere between a purely benign, anodyne portrayal of animal 
farming, and the rawness of activist footage. Again, where on that scale usually 
depends on the intention of the visibility and how it is being mediated. To illustrate 
this point, there are slaughterhouses in Denmark and the USA that have opened 
their doors to the public so that, through glass walls, they can see “100% of what 
happens here, not 99%” (Wiper 2014, online). However, this access to the rawness 
of slaughter is done with the aim of normalizing slaughter, making it seem benign 
and even honourable, as the Vermont Packinghouse in the USA indicates: “What if 
you could see and know just how each animal was slaughtered, and know that it 
was done with respect and dignity” (Company website). Similarly, the American 
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Meat Institute produced video tours, narrated by Temple Grandin, of 
slaughterhouses for lambs, turkeys, pigs and cows, in the “meat industry’s sincere 
hope that these videos will give consumers who want to know more about meat 
processing the information they seek” (Animal Handling Website).62 Then there are 
the animal advocacy/welfare organisations, such as the RSPCA and Compassion in 
World Farming whose campaigns are oriented towards improving conditions for 
‘food’ animals, for example by abolishing factory farming, farrowing crates for pigs 
or promoting cage-free eggs. The practice being targeted will be presented in a raw 
manner intended to elicit discomfort, while animal farming in general is presented 
more benignly. 
 
Transparency also manifests discursively and the swathe of books published over 
the past ten to 20 years attests to the growth in appetite for behind the scenes 
accounts of practices of meat production (Table 1). Again, these accounts range 
from the benign—e.g. Simon Fairlie’s (2010) Meat: A Benign Extravagance, to the 
raw—e.g. Jonathan Safran-Foer’s (2009) Eating Animals. However, it is in the more 
popular media sphere, such as film and TV, that transparency as actual visibility, in 
association with ‘food’ animals and meat production, has really hit its stride in the 
past decade, challenging the emancipatory thesis of McCartney’s glass walls. In 
Table 1, I list at least eleven documentary films and three TV shows that include 
scenes of ‘food’ animals being managed, confined, and killed, and variably graphic 
images of associated mis-treatment and abuse. In her exploration of the depiction of 
‘food’ animals in documentaries, Smaill (2014: 34) identifies a further 14 that 
highlight problems with agricultural practices and ‘agribusiness’. New forms of 
digital media that have simultaneously sprung up over this time enable the 
dissemination and sharing of this and other kinds of visibility more rapidly and to a 
wider audience than ever before. As a result, increasing numbers of consumers are 
becoming aware of ethical (and not just environmental and health) issues 
associated with meat consumption, even if not the principle of using animals as 
food. Depending on the how the visibility of these issues is framed, the intent is to 
encourage a shift to more benign practices of meat production and consumption, or 
encourage an outright rejection of any use of ‘food’ animals. 
 
                                                
62 An organization sponsored by the American Meat Institute (AMI) and used to promote 
the project and the accompanying videos 
(http://animalhandling.org/ht/d/sp/i/80622/pid/80622) 
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This is, however, a mere speck on the tip of the visibility iceberg. Digital media 
such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, are not only outlets for the 
secondary promotion of the kinds of material described above, but have also 
become platforms for original material, often linked to personal blogs or other 
websites. A few minutes spent online will unleash a deluge of visual material 
relating to meat production, including practices of breeding and raising ‘food’ 
animals, and especially slaughter and butchery, much of it produced by meat 
companies.63 Indeed, the killing of ‘food’ animals, as the most widely discomforting 
and concerning aspect of meaty practices, features prominently in such material. 
This is especially so in light of the increasing popularity of keeping backyard 
chickens and even hobby farms as sources of more ethical, DIY meat, provided you 
have the ‘bravery’ and skills to carry out the killing and butchery.  
 
However, not all of this material aims to be instructional. Reflecting prescriptions 
around being able to witness slaughter, as discussed in Part III, detailed accounts of 
killing ‘food’ animals appeal to broader understandings of ethical meat and the 
practices associated with it. Newspaper and magazine articles, opinion pieces and 
blogs illustrate a discursive side of this second-hand transparency whereby the 
reader sees through the author’s eyes as they recount their experience of watching 
animals being slaughtered. Despite including fairly raw accounts, such stories are 
typically cast in overall benign and life-affirming terms, urging their readers to 
access the same experience.64 While the volume of this online material relating to 
slaughter and butchery is quite staggering, televised depictions also capture wide 
audiences and garner the kind of media attention that suggests a certain 
                                                
63 For example:  
- Chico Locker and Sausage Co. Inc. “A look inside the glass walls of a slaughterhouse.” 
27 August 2012. Web. 20 October 2015.  
- Smith Meadows. “Behind the scenes at a local butcher shop.” 15 April 2013. Web. 20 
October 2015.  
64 Just a fraction of such accounts include: 
- Eisendrath, Ben. “Loving a good slaughterhouse.” The Atlantic 30 March 2012. Web. 21 
October 2015. 
- Forbes, Paula. “Oprah tours a Colorado Slaughterhouse.”Eater. 3 Feb 2011. Web. 20 
October 2015. 
- Grover, Sami Grover. “A look inside a humane slaughterhouse.” Treehugger. 2 May 
2011. Web. 20 October 2015. 
- McEvedy, Allegra. “My visit to the slaughterhouse: crossing the line between life and 
meat.” The Guardian 29 August 2014. Web. 23 October 2015.  
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mainstreaming of associated practices (Mesirow 2011; Fearnley-Whittingstall 2008; 
Blundell 2016).  
 
TV celebrities imbue the visibility trend with added social status, and lend an air of 
authority and expertise to the increasingly ‘known’ social prescription to be more 
aware of, and embrace the ‘realities’ of meat consumption. In 2011, Oprah aired a 
tour of a Cargill ‘beef processing plant’ (i.e. slaughterhouse). Cargill agreed 
because “[consumers] want to know and we want to show them”. A steady stream 
of celebrities have likewise been keen to educate consumers about the harsher, raw 
realities of slaughter. In addition to performing a routine cull of underweight or 
injured chickens in his 2008 series Hugh’s Chicken Run, Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall 
had earlier (in 1995) filmed the shooting, stringing up, and butchery of Genghis the 
pig as part of the BBC series Food File. In 2005, Jamie Oliver and Gordon Ramsay 
both slaughtered lambs as part of their respective TV shows, Jamie’s Great Escape 
and The F Word. Ramsay’s footage was later endorsed by PETA who said it “will 
turn many compassionate people into vegetarians” (Adams 2006). More recently 
(2016), Matthew Evans, the ‘Gourmet Farmer’, co-wrote and narrated For the Love 
of Meat where he follows three ‘food’ animals—chicken, pig and cow, from the 
farms where they are raised, to the slaughterhouses where they are killed and 
processed, and finally their consumption. Matthew proclaims, “Consumers deserve 
more transparency from the meat industry so we can see how our animals are 
farmed in our name” (Broadcast November 3, 2016).  
 
While there is generally some degree of public outcry over these public displays of 
killing, they are predominantly considered to have been beneficial to the extent that 
they disclose exactly what is required to produce meat. As Julie (C) comments: 
 
If we’re going to eat it we need to understand and know it. I reckon even 
ridiculous stunts like that Jamie Oliver one where he slaughtered an animal 
on television, was a bit of a catalyst towards some of this kind of thing, and I 
think that’s where those, you know, those hipster things where you go and 
do a day of nose to tail eating with celebrity chefs, is kind of starting to help 
that. 
 
They therefore illustrate the resolution of raw visibility with benign visibility—how 
they can work together so that “sight and sequestration exist symbiotically” 
(Pachirat 2011: 252). For under the normalised regime of 
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power/knowledge/pleasure relating to ‘food’ animals and meat, visibility tends to be 
commodified by “engendering commerce for witnessing or participating in killing” 
(Acampora 2016: 10) more often than it elicits any fundamental shift in how ‘food’ 
animals are seen and made sense of. 
 
Again, the different forms and spaces of visibility I have described in this short 
space represent just a fraction of the ways in which people can gain visual access to 
the lives and deaths of ‘food’ animals. Besides these, first hand experiences can be 
purchased from farmers and permaculture hubs offering ‘artisanal’ workshops 
where attendees learn how to kill and ‘dress’ chickens, humanely slaughter lambs, 
and butcher cows. Local events may offer the novelty of meeting your meat before 
dining on it nose to tail (Figure 3), a foodie predilection that received satirical 
treatment in an Australian stage play by Eddie Perfect simply titled Beast (2013).  
 
Less confronting, though still a major part of an industry-mediated visibility 
strategy, many local farms now invite the public to tour their operations, meet the 
animals, and of course usually purchase some ‘product’ before they leave. This is a 
purposefully benign use of visibility as part of an embodied ethics of eating animals, 
as compared with the more raw approach to slaughter. However, both strategies 
are emblematic of the New Carnivore movement as theorised by Parry (2010) and 
the “celebrated carnivorism” noted by Cudworth whereby “killing ‘food’ is 
naturalised” at the same time as compassion for animals is resisted (2011: 94). As 
Parry also explains, the New Carnivore movement “strive[s] to present animals’ 
becoming meat as a humane, benevolent, and wholly ‘natural’ process” (2010: 4). 
Hence, not only is killing and eating animals naturalised and commodified, but, as 
discussed in previous sections, it has become part of a new ethical configuration of 
knowledge/senses/emotions to at least bear witness to their lives and preferably 
their deaths too. Actually participating in their death gains even greater moral 
benefits, as previously discussed. This ethical reconfiguration of humans’ inherent 
entitlement to kill animals lends it additional legitimation, and through these rose-
tinted lenses, visibility poses little threat to the mask that keeps the domination of 
animals hidden from view.  
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Figure 3. Advertisement for a local nose-to-tail dinner featuring Kaiser the pig 
(Author’s own image). 
In the following sections, I draw on my data to show how both benign and raw 
visibility operate in my participants’ accounts of their ethical meaty practices. In so 
doing, I further demonstrate how visibility simply reflects, and in turn reinforces, 
the entitlement born of the normalised regime of power/knowledge/pleasure. The 
result is a persistently mediated visibility whose horizons are still constrained by 
the proper order of things. 
 
Benign visibility   
It is primarily the lives of ‘food’ animals that are visually constituted in a benign 
way. On the websites of the producers that participated in my study, images are 
widely used, and in them, cows, pigs, chickens and sheep/lambs are made to appear 
relaxed, amiable, and content with their lives; their relationships with humans 
appear affectionate, warm and gentle; and their environments evoke the bucolic 
idyll and romantic ‘folksy charm’ as discussed in Part II. 
 
Portraying a sense of trust between the farmer and ‘their’ animals seems to be a key 
ingredient in emphasising their pastoral role in caring for the wellbeing of ‘food’ 
animals, rather than their ultimate role as ‘growers’ of meat, via the slaughterhouse, 
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for money. Of the 15 producer websites, three include images of people and animals 
in close proximity, the animals appearing interested or following closely behind in 
open fields or along tracks. A further seven show more intimate scenes of 
companionship: two piglets snuggling on the farmer’s lap; a lamb being gently 
cradled and caressed by the farmer in an open field; a fluffy, yellow chick being 
carefully held and kissed on the head by a small child; pigs being gently petted by 
the farmer as they feed; the farmer lying splayed in an open field in the centre of a 
large group of cows, all gathered around him peering curiously, just a few inches 
away; the farmer reclining in a field against the body of resting pig, gazing out over 
the countryside; and a large cow lying peacefully in a straw-laden area with a 
person resting prone along its back. The assurance that farmers not only love their 
animals, but that the animals in turn love and trust the farmer is the implicit 
message here. Family scenes are also common, further conflating this open and 
transparent model of farming with all the moral ‘goods’ associated with family, as 
well as with nature and the Australian rural tradition.  
 
These promotional images, along with the textual components of these websites, 
which, as demonstrated in Part II (Table 3), tap into the discursive field of 
authentic, natural and sustainable idylls, are speaking to a viewer concerned to 
‘know’ that the meat they eat is ethical, but also to substantiate that knowing with 
seeing. Producers are very aware of the power of the visual medium in this era of 
transparency and politicised food practices, as Andrew (P) illustrates: 
 
Words are just words, the more powerful thing is actually the media, like 
visual things, photos, videos. Those are the kinds of things that I try to do 
because they really, they’re powerful in what they can convey to people, 
much more than a word. 
 
Phillipov and Goodman (2017) describe this as “affective capitalism” (347), noting 
that farmers are increasingly selling themselves using presentational forms of media 
more typically associated with celebrity culture, such as family life stories, photos 
etc. In this way, they invite “affective investments” (347), and based on my 
consumer participants, these promotional images are receiving just the affective 
investments these farmers desire—but that are also demanded and shaped by the 
new embodied ethics of meat (which the farmers in turn are responding to). Julie 
(C) is assured that these ethical ‘food’ animals “have a better life, they’re more 
comfortable, they’re happier, they can socialise”. Based on her ‘knowledge’ of an 
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ethical farm, Heather (C) describes it as “where they pretty much go all out in 
responding to the needs of the animal during its lifetime…to make it natural, 
healthy, happy for the animal”.  
 
Similarly, Julie describes a farmer that she follows on Facebook: 
 
He’s very transparent, he does tours at least once a month kind of thing. 
Hopefully he’s opening a shop because…I’d be able to take the kids out 
there to get his meat. The reason why people follow him and support that 
farming practice is because he’s transparent about it. 
 
Images are also used at farmers markets where meat producers often display 
photographs of their farm and their animals. These are ‘addressed’ and ‘received’ 
(Sturken and Cartwright 2009) in a similar way, as Natalie (C) indicates, “often 
they’ll bring photographs kind of as proof, which is very sweet”. Validating 
producer Andrew’s assertion that images are more powerful than words, Natalie 
says, “I don’t need that certifying body to tell me that their animals are well treated 
because they bring photos”.  
 
Producers’ use of benign visibility is reflective of the broader project, in spaces of 
consumption, aimed at de-fetishizing relations of consumption and production. 
However, it also illustrates the problematic positions of ‘transparency’ in terms of 
whether it contributes to a simple re-fetishisation of these new arrangements or a 
double fetishisation whereby processes of production are further obscured 
(Goodman 2004; Lewis 2011). Whether used on websites or at farmers markets, 
these photographic images reflect a very familiar but highly ordered and 
constructed understanding of a ‘food’ animal, one that is built on the knowledge 
and exercise of entitlement, thus illustrating Sturken and Cartwright’s point that 
“the photographic gaze …helps to establish relationships of power” (2009: 100). 
This benign visibility of animals who are unerringly ‘food’ focuses on promoting the 
happiness of the lives they live, in which they are loved and cared for in natural 
surroundings, and avoids polluting this scene with images of their death.  
 
Scenes of death and slaughter may pollute a visibility constructed to be 
purposefully benign, where knowledge/senses/emotions associated with eating 
animals remain positive and unchallenged/ing. However, as discussed previously, 
the heightened visibility of industrialised and intensive meat production practices, 
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especially slaughter, has challenged the stability of these associations for many 
consumers, as mechanisms of domination have become more difficult to deny—the 
slipping of the mask. For them, part of the construction of a more stable mask 
requires a new configuration of knowledge/senses/emotions that incorporates the 
more raw aspects of visibility. Under this new configuration, it becomes a mark of 
social distinction to face the reality of slaughter, leveraging as it does both respect 
and requisite bravery. Raw visibility therefore becomes a route by which to attain 
this distinction. 
 
Raw visibility 
Words, together with the normalised systems of knowledge (and power and 
pleasure) they become associated with, can produce visibility through the 
imagination—another kind of perceptual mimesis and something that fiction 
writers especially rely on. This of course works also in reverse—using the 
imagination, mediated by these systems, to write stories. Similarly, actual visibility 
(or its interpretation) is shaped by, and can in turn reinforce, particular systems of 
knowledge (and power and pleasure), as with the ordering of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ meat 
by fat colour. 65 In The Order of Things, Foucault refers to this as the “already 
encoded eye” (1989: xxii). Normalised systems of knowledge need to be unsettled 
in some way before this eye can be de- (or re-)coded. There are many ways this can 
happen in relation to meat and ‘food’ animals, but the most likely way, based on my 
data, is in relation to visible practices of killing and their potential association with 
alternate, contrary systems of knowledge.  
 
As I have shown, many of my participants, consumers and producers alike, exhibit 
very detailed knowledge of the various practices by which ‘food’ animals are killed 
to produce meat. In negotiation with other aspects of meaty practices, they are then 
able to associate different practices of killing with understandings of more and less 
ethical meat. More often than not, this is accompanied by some kind of first-hand 
experience, whether watching, participating in, or conducting the killing 
themselves, which is described in terms that reference this knowledge (i.e. what 
about it was ‘good’ or ‘bad’). This is perhaps the most unmediated experience of 
raw visibility that is available to everyday consumers. First-hand experiences of 
                                                
65 In the same way that knowledge contributes to how other-sensory (taste, smell, touch, 
sound) experiences, real or mimetic, are interpreted, as Korzybski’s experiment 
demonstrated (see Part III). 
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animal death, being not just more visually but multi-sensorially embodied, might be 
expected to present more of a challenge to normalised systems of knowledge 
compared with second hand media representations. However, in every case the 
animals being killed are known definitively as ‘food’ animals, thereby appearing as 
already ‘encoded’ at a fundamental level. It appears the dominant regime of 
power/knowledge/pleasure in relation to meaty practices asserts itself through the 
encoded eye even when the potential for instability seems greatest. 
 
Episode two of Matthew Evans’ documentary series For the Love of Meat tackles the 
use of pigs for food. Visiting an intensive pig farmer who uses farrowing crates for 
her 650 breeding sows, Matthew says, “Sue [the farmer] understands how it might 
look to the untrained eye” (emphasis added). Under the normative regime by which 
pigs are edible, the implication is that some ‘corrective’ training may be all that is 
required for the eye that is discomforted by the sight of these conditions. As Berger 
says, “you are looking at something that has been rendered absolutely marginal; 
and all the concentration you can muster will never be enough to centralise it” 
(1992: 25). It is therefore practically impossible to ‘see’ the individual pig as 
anything other than a ‘food’ animal. This normalised, and normalising, nexus, and 
the entitlement it supports, is sufficient (in the case of my participants) to allay all 
types of discomfort that may be associated with raw visibility, even though this ‘re-
training’ may, in several cases, have taken a few years. 
 
In keeping with the proper order, confronting the ‘realities’ of killing animals is 
associated with bravery, which in turn is associated with a more moral, “clear-eyed” 
(Joyce C) and therefore ethical approach to eating meat. As Finn (P) says, “I feel 
like [going to an abattoir] educated me”. However, the value constituted around 
raw visibility not only includes the social distinction and the comforting sensory 
and emotional associations that this distinction then inscribes on meat, the practices 
that it is part of, and the individuals who eat it. It also includes its function as a 
regulatory measure to ensure that ‘food’ animals are always being treated in the 
‘appropriate’ and ‘proper’ way—i.e. in ways that belie any notions of domination. 
From this perspective, consumers seek more and not less visibility. For example, 
Grace (C) raises the issue of the proposed Ag-Gag laws66 in Australia, “to stop 
                                                
66 Based on US-style legislation, these laws are designed to criminalise the (unmanaged and 
unmediated) monitoring and investigative activities undertaken by various animal advocacy 
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Animals Australia”. She continues, “Why go to that trouble when you can just show 
that you’re doing the right thing?”  
  
Supposedly reliable distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ slaughter practices could 
therefore be largely based simply on how visible they are. As Anne (C) remarks, 
“there are abattoirs closer than Kyneton here but they’re not transparent, and so 
the people who care don’t use them”. The implication is that mechanisms of 
transparency in themselves generate the ‘right’ sort of practices, acting as a form of 
visive discipline—not of the animal ‘inmates’ of the system, like Foucault’s 
prisoners under the surveillance of the panopticon (1980: 146-165), but of the 
‘prison guards’—i.e. the slaughterhouse owners and workers. This reversal of the 
panoptic mechanism to become the surveillance of the few by the many is more 
accurately termed synoptic by Lyon (2006). Synoptic forms of surveillance are a 
characteristic feature of the kind of visibility that modern communication and 
information technologies have enabled, and which Lyon notes Foucault largely 
neglected. As Joyce (C) illustrates: 
 
If there is a legislative requirement for more humane practices, if there was 
a legislative requirement that all slaughterhouses be scrutinised with CCTV 
that would automatically change practices. 
 
However, this transparency is being applied to practices that are already 
‘unalterably and unquestionably’ (and legally) justified. Attention is therefore 
directed at the monitoring and control of the techniques of those practices, passing 
over any question of the actual work of killing. This is the same process by which 
Pachirat notes that a focus on food safety within industrial slaughterhouses deflects 
attention away from the routinised killing of animals and onto elaborate 
performances of hygiene (2011: 206). Additionally, regulation inherently carries an 
a priori and authoritative approval of what is being regulated, which once again 
bypasses any critical questions regarding the actual practice being regulated. 
Knowing that a certain practice is being regulated and monitored, especially 
visually, becomes sufficient in itself to instil a sense of comfort in the knowledge 
that it is a ‘normal’ practice being carried out in the ‘right’ way. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
groups and organizations in relation to any industry that uses animals for profit, but 
particularly those that raise ‘food’ animals and produce meat. 
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This principle extends also to local farmers as alternate ‘prison guards’, whose 
practices are similarly regulated, although the mechanisms of transparency here, in 
addition to online promotional images and photographs at farmers markets, include 
the farm tour. Of the 15 producers who participated in my research, six have an 
open farm-gate policy, meaning the public is welcome to visit anytime or on 
specially arranged tour days. A further seven are happy to accommodate visitors by 
arrangement. Indeed, these seven were all interviewed on-farm and were happy to 
show me around their everyday operations. Of the remaining two, one has since 
gone out of business, and one is a retail operator. It is again the possibility of this 
raw visibility, as much as its actual experience, that exerts a normalising and 
legitimising effect whereby all is perceived to be operating as it ‘should’. As 
Anthony (C) explains:  
 
There needs to be access, so if you claim to be something people should be 
able to come and check it out if they want to… I think that would go a big 
way in changing my perception of a producer if I could go there…even if I 
didn't go there myself, I trust that if they were doing something terrible then 
people would be speaking out about it. 
 
These practices of visibility also connect to a branding of practices of collaborative 
or ‘connected’ consumption and a growing emphasis on experiential consumption. 
The former is characterised by the reallocation of wealth “away from middlemen 
and towards small producers and consumers” (Schor and Fitzmaurice 2015: 410), 
and the latter by an orientation towards consumers as “hedonic feelings-centered 
fun-oriented flesh-and-blood living creature[s]” (Holbrook and Hirschman 2015: 2; 
also 1982). It is according to these more connected and experiential 
understandings, or constitutions, of consumption that raw visibility exercises and 
extends a power that is already systemic. As Pachirat notes, “The politics of sight 
feeds off the very mechanisms of distance and concealment it seeks to overcome”, 
they are, “modes of power capable of acting in concert to reinforce relations of 
domination” (2011: 252). The power of this politics of sight lies not only in the 
‘already encoded eye’ it directs at ‘food’ animals through a focus on ensuring 
‘appropriate’ methods of ‘meat’ production, but also in the fact that it is discreet, 
functioning “permanently and largely in silence” (Foucault 1977: 177). Foucault 
highlights that the principle of power, according to Bentham, is that it should be 
visible and unverifiable: 
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Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the 
central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must 
never know whether he is being looked at at any one moment; but he must 
be sure that he may always be so (1977: 201). 
 
Hence, the glass walls, cameras, farm-visits, websites, and photographs become 
synoptic ‘technologies of power’ that increase the efficiency of the entire ‘‘food’ 
animal to meat’ system by “increasing its own points of contact” (Foucault 1977: 
206, emphasis added). For these technologies are essentially productive rather than 
repressive—they are “an internal part of the production machinery” whereby the 
goal is “to strengthen the social forces – to increase production, to develop the 
economy…to increase and multiply” (Foucault 1977: 175; 208). And the consumer 
is very much part of this optic machinery, being: 
 
[…] neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic 
[synoptic] machine, invested by its effect of power, which we bring to 
ourselves since we are part of its mechanisms (Foucault 1977: 217). 
 
The commodification of visibility, as part of the capitalist project, becomes the 
ultimate testament of the rhizomatic co-production of power, knowledge and 
pleasure and the success of this normalised regime as it relates to ‘food’ animals. 
The increase in public access to local farm operations and the emergence of glass-
walled slaughterhouses charging people admission to witness or participate in 
killing ‘food’ animals – a consequence of the original ‘glass walls’ theory that 
Pachirat anticipated (2011: 253), are exemplars of this commodification. 
Furthermore, as with other sensory and emotional associations (like violence and 
happiness), visibility becomes inscribed and thereby secondarily commodified on 
the meat itself through labelling and promotion. In this way, knowledge and 
signification of ‘transparent’ production practices carry sufficient authority alone to 
increase the ethical, and also monetary value or ethical meat. Continuing this logic, 
the more visibility the better for my participants, as Gillian (C) illustrates: 
 
I would like to see it lead towards transparent labelling and transparent 
practices. So that a label on the piece of meat would have say, a photo of the 
way that animal was raised, the kind of life it led, verified, and the kind of 
death it had. 
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Producers are also keen to further increase opportunities for visual contact. In 
addition to his current farm tours, Andrew would also like to include, “a photo of 
the cow in the box the people were getting…just so they understand it was a living 
animal, and now it’s meat [that is] going to nourish them”. Just as Pachirat says, 
“the act of making the hidden visible may be equally likely to generate other, more 
effective ways of confining it” (2011: 253). But, as indicated, visibility would not be 
such an effective economic technique if it were not also productive of a certain 
amount of pleasure, as Laura Mulvey (1999) observes in her account of the 
pleasure of looking. It is this pleasure associated with visibility—an essential part of 
the power of transparency—that I will now explore in more detail. 
 
iii. The pleasure of looking 
How can the role of emotions and pleasure in relation to visuality be understood? 
Here I draw on Mulvey’s (1999) seminal account of the male gaze and Columpar’s 
(2002) extension of her politicised rendering of visuality to encompass also the 
ethnographic and colonial gazes. All three gazes, Columpar argues, “project their 
own fantasies” onto an objectified other as a “site/sight of difference” (2002: 34, 40). 
The bearer of the gaze is thus situated in a position of mastery from which they 
derive pleasure, but which may also be associated with other emotions, including 
anxiety and fear (Columpar 2002). 
 
While Mulvey’s theory concerns the pleasure derived by the specifically male gaze 
in narrative cinema, her construction of the relationship between the spectator and 
the (female) object of the gaze is in many ways analogous to that between humans 
and the visible ‘food’ animal. Mulvey draws on Freud’s (1955) notion of 
scopophilia, broadly defined as the pleasure derived from looking. Though more 
often applied in reference to sexual pleasure, Mulvey highlights that Freud 
associated it “with taking other people as objects, subjecting them to a controlling 
and curious gaze” (1999: 835). She describes the woman in popular narrative 
cinema as “(passive) raw material for the (active) gaze of man…[as] demanded by 
the ideology of the patriarchal order” (843). Paraphrasing Sturken and Cartwright 
on Mulvey, one could therefore propose that ‘conventions of ‘food animal visibility’ 
are structured by a normative speciesism, positioning animals represented in film, 
photographs, slaughterhouse tours, farm-tours, etc. as objects of an ‘entitled’ 
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human gaze...Images are geared towards human viewing pleasure’.67 Further 
demonstrating the parallels, Mulvey explains how: 
 
The power to subject another person to the will sadistically or to the gaze 
voyeuristically is turned on to the woman as the object of both. Power is 
backed by a certainty of legal right… (1999: 841). 
 
Voyeurism is routinely associated with pleasure in media and cultural studies (van 
Zoonen 1994; Padva and Buchweitz 2014; Rodosthenous 2015). It is also 
implicated in a long history of using animals as objects of visual pleasure in 
circuses, zoos and other forms of visual entertainment. Royal menageries were the 
precursors of the modern zoo and were essentially monuments to the power and 
vanity of the ruling classes, for their viewing pleasure only. It was only later that 
they were opened to a paying public, reducing animals even more explicitly to the 
status of objects to be visually consumed for amusement and entertainment. 
 
According to Acampora, this voyeurism is indicative of a “structure of possessive 
consciousness” (2005: 76), or what I would call normalised entitlement, that is 
backed, as with Mulvey’s female object, by legal rights. Emphasising the similarities 
with Mulvey’s theory of looking, Acampora even goes so far as to describe zoos as 
“a form of pornography defined as visive violence”, in the sense that they “engage a 
destructive desire in relation to the object of inspection” (2005: 71). The wildness of 
these ‘wild’ animals is cauterised in the service of a look that demands a docile 
body. In this sense, “the zoo to which people go to meet animals, to observe them, 
to see them, is, in fact, a monument to the impossibility of such encounters” (Berger 
1977, in Acampora 2005: 71)—the impossibility of seeing them as anything but 
objects to which humans are entitled, mere “biotic entertainment” (Acampora 2005: 
74). Taking this idea of animals as ‘biotic entertainment’ further, I combine it with 
the demonstrated trend in Dark Tourism as touched on in Part III, and the 
elevation of requisite bravery and also cultural omnivorousness as associated 
emotions of distinction, to explain why the visibility of ‘food’ animals is similarly 
productive of pleasure.   
                                                
67 Sturken and Cartwright’s original phrase: “…the conventions of popular narrative 
cinema are structured by a patriarchal unconscious, positioning women represented in 
films as objects of a "male gaze." In other words, Mulvey argued that Hollywood cinema 
offered images geared toward male viewing pleasure.” (Sturken and Cartwright 2009: 76). 
 
  233 
 
In her work on tourism and voyeurism, Debbie Lisle (2004) demonstrates how the 
pleasure derived from looking may also incorporate confronting and difficult 
subject matter as part of the viewer’s quest for “authenticity and reality” (17). 
Indeed, Lisle uses the example of the Ground Zero memorial in New York to 
illustrate how viewers adopt a “mediated reverence” whereby they become “both 
voyeur and consumer—acquiring goods, lifestyles, aesthetics, and political stances 
from a global marketplace” (2004: 15). Drawing on Bauman’s idea of the world as a 
giant theme park “commodified and packaged for the enjoyment of tourists” (ibid), 
Lisle refers to the combination of “titillation and shame” (19), “terror and beauty” 
(17), desire and repulsion that has characterised “the consumption of catastrophe” 
(14) since the time of the Gladiators in the Roman Colosseum, to public executions 
and now the trend in visiting sites of tragedy. She even notes how Ground Zero has 
slotted into “a normalized circuit of tourist consumption”, being just one of many 
‘attractions’ on a list to be ticked off in a “[b]een there done that” manner (9).  
 
I argue that this same ‘theme-park’ sensibility is at work with regard to animals, 
most obviously in the numerous spectacles that take place around the world today 
designed specifically to amuse and excite, including rodeos, bullfighting, the 
running of the bulls, and many others. In the same way, these have become 
experiences to be ‘ticked off’ the adventure list of many cultural omnivores. Less 
obviously, I include here the renewed interest in not just knowing, but seeing how 
meat is produced and exactly how ‘food’ animals are killed. Indeed Andrew (P) 
explicitly references the notion of tourism: 
 
People also want an experience, like there’s a lot more agro-tourism68 
happening because people really want an experience, there is a calling to 
actually kind of be more in touch. 
 
As my participants indicate, this has become a ‘must see’ spectacle for the ethical 
consumer, one that they “should” tick off at some point, essentially because it 
                                                
68 Agritourism has been a popular topic in the tourism and agricultural literature for more 
than a decade, where it is examined from the perspective of economic development and 
sustainability—i.e. its respective benefits and impacts (for example, McGehee and Kim 
2004; Carpio et al. 2008; Phillip et al. 2010). As far as I know, there has as yet been no 
sociological or more critical exploration of its constitution as a social practice as there has 
been for other forms of tourism – notably dark or thanatourism. 
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increases the pleasure associated with eating meat, or ensures that the association 
with pleasure remains in the face of increased knowledge and raw visibility of 
production practices. The pleasure derives from the social distinction of being 
brave enough to face such ‘reality’, demonstrate an ‘authentic’ and ‘respectful’ 
approach to meat, and, more simply, being able to say “I’ve done that” (i.e. visited a 
farm, witnessed a slaughter, or killed an animal) and gaining the associated social 
and moral approval. In this way, the emotional and sensory pleasures of eating 
‘food’ animals are heightened. 
 
Interestingly, Lisle remarks that it is the public nature of the consumption of 
catastrophe that legitimises these experiences by moving them from the private to 
the public sphere (2004: 17), a view that Lyon agrees with (2006). When filtered 
through appropriate, codified and almost ritualised kinds of public practices—
visiting memorials, attending scenes of death (human or nonhuman), or visiting 
zoos, any problematic and discomforting feelings are more easily socialised and, I 
would argue, somewhat sanitised. What essentially emerges, usually by design, is a 
collectively authorised, socially approved narrative by which these ‘spectacles’ are 
made sense of. For instance, unlike the heroes and experts of spectacles involving 
animals (e.g. the cowboy, matador or slaughterman), the perceived ‘aggressors’ or 
objects of ‘biotic entertainment’ are typically aggregated and depersonalised to 
become simply ‘fighting’ bulls, or ‘food’ animals. Within the narrative and order of 
the spectacle, these roles are reinforced rather than challenged, the associated 
forms of persecution are thereby justified, and emotions are also mediated 
accordingly. Hence, just as it is impossible to see the wild animal behind the zoo 
animal, as Berger remarked, it becomes impossible within these ‘spectacles’ to see 
the passive, docile animal behind the ‘fighting’ bull, or to see the pig, cow, sheep or 
chicken behind the ‘food’ animal. These animals are unable to be anything else, the 
highly constructed nature of their visibility (whether raw or benign) effectively 
“disempowering those before its gaze” (Sturken and Cartwright 2009: 76). 
 
Transparency is, then, not only productive of power, as Foucault articulates, but 
also of pleasure. Transparency is equated with knowledge, knowledge with 
pleasure and looking with pleasure to weave a rhizomatic nexus of 
power/knowledge/pleasure that translates visually to affirm and assert an 
entitlement that is normalised, unquestioned and whose associated mechanisms of 
power are substantially hidden. As Foucault says, it is its capacity to induce 
pleasure and forms of knowledge, and to also “hide its own mechanisms”, that 
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“makes power hold good” (1978: 86; 1980: 119). Thus, to repeat Pachirat, “sight 
and sequestration exist symbiotically” (2011: 252) and it is for this reason that he 
questions the transformational potential of making the hidden visible (248): “This 
politics of sight…must acknowledge the possibility that sequestration will continue 
even under conditions of total visibility” (255). 
 
In sum, while Foucault describes the panopticon as a “technology of power 
designed to solve the problems of surveillance” (1980: 148), I suggest that in the 
case of ‘food’ animals, the various synoptic technologies I have described are being 
used by producers and consumers of meat to manage and mediate a slightly 
different perceived problem of surveillance. This being one where these same 
technologies, in the hand of animal advocates, promote an un- or differently 
encoded eye that identifies mechanisms of domination where the “arrogant” (Frye 
1983: 66) or entitled eye69 sees only pastoral care and humanely killed meat. Under 
the entitled eye, these differently encoded views gain little traction, but they do 
resist and challenge the normalised arrangement of power/knowledge/pleasure and 
are therefore countered by a meat-friendly ethico-aesthetic of visibility to ensure 
animals’ state of domination continues to remain hidden. However, I say perceived 
problem because further challenging the common assumption, and expectation, that 
visibility can achieve the work of uncoding is the fact that what is often referred to 
as a ‘new visibility’ in meat production and consumption (Parry 2010; Linne 2014) 
is more accurately a repackaged return to visibility. From this perspective, the 
period of ‘sequestration’ of production processes at the onset of industrialization 
could be regarded as a circumstantial departure from visibility that is in the process 
of being reversed and repackaged.  
   
iv. Old as New: Visibility re-packaged with an ethical twist 
The ethically charged ‘new’ visibility of ‘food’ animals and meat production 
practices stands in contrast to previous arrangements of, and encounters with, the 
visibility of animal slaughter and death (Arcari 2017b). Although largely a 
consequence of the organization of community living and food provisioning, the 
visibility that characterised earlier periods of history was not only in connection to 
                                                
69 In her volume The Politics of Reality, Marilyn Frye describes the arrogant eye as one that 
organises everything seen with reference to itself and its own interests: “Everything is 
either “for me” or “against me”” (1983: 67). Also: “The arrogant perceiver…coerces the 
objects of his perception into satisfying the conditions his perception imposes” (ibid).
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routine practices of meat production. It was also turned into a spectacle of more 
acceptable public entertainment and became, for many, an experience that was 
highly sought after—another form of manufactured visibility but with a different 
association with pleasure. Although this association is still in evidence today – for 
example in rodeos, and bullfighting arenas, and practices of animal baiting and 
fighting – these practices are regarded more problematically under the revised 
terms of today’s repackaged visibility.  
 
The primary function of the ‘dark’ experience, whether involving humans or 
animals, is thought to be the opportunity to confront the reality of one’s own 
mortality within an everyday context where this is more routinely denied (Stone 
2009: 24). This recalls the discussion in Part III in relation to requisite bravery 
where I noted how experiences that incite heightened emotions are sought after, 
especially those that confront death and dying (Stone and Sharpley 2008: 576). 
Drawing on Berger, Stone explains that death is associated with “those ‘fateful 
moments’ and ‘marginal situations’ whereby individuals have to confront problems 
which society has attempted to conceal from public consciousness” (28). He 
continues: 
 
Hence, if death and mortality are not dealt with by adequate confrontation 
mechanisms, not only will the individual have to face up to challenges of 
personal meaninglessness and a significant loss of ontological security, but 
the social framework as a whole becomes vulnerable to collapse into chaos 
(2009: 29). 
 
Again, concealment is being linked to potential chaos, while confrontation is linked 
to stability and order – recalling Foucault’s “subjection by illumination”. The power 
of transparency thus lies in its capacity to contain death and dying within a 
normalised, and normalising, system of knowledge. This system keeps the power 
grid (and a sense of ontological security) in place and prevents any glimpse of a 
beyond. Within the narrative of this knowledge system, death is “abstracted, 
intellectualized and depersonalized”—“socially neutralized” (Stone 2009: 31-32). It 
has also become increasingly commonplace. In her doctoral thesis on cinematic 
representations of animal slaughter, Sarah Jane O’Brien remarks that the public 
spectacle of violent and accidental death is increasingly familiar and hence 
unproblematic (2012: 35). Since its sequestration during industrialisation, the re-
packaged return to the visibility of animal death has been normalised as well as 
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neutralised. Conceived as a response to a demand for visual knowledge of death, 
the re-visibility of practices of meat production and especially animal slaughter can 
be seen as a continuation of the largely humanist project which seeks to reassure, 
enrich, and nourish a sense of the human at the centre, and in control, of 
everything. What has changed, however, is the added ethical twist in constitutions 
of animal visibility, shaped by shifts in understandings of consumption in response 
to the defetishisation of relations of production and provision, the foregrounding of 
animal rights, and the broader politicisation of food.  
 
In Why Look at Animals, Berger (1992) describes animals as “raw materials” to be 
visually consumed in zoos or literally consumed as food. The burgeoning of new 
ways and opportunities to look at animals ethically—whether at zoo animals with a 
conservation eye, or ‘food’ animals with a welfare eye—using a range of synoptic 
technologies, emphasises how persistently unproblematic visibility really is. What 
this then foregrounds is the ultimate synergy of power, knowledge and pleasure in 
relation to ‘food’ animals, whereby they can be looked at ethically before being 
eaten.  
 
Integrating the preceding discussions of entitlement, respect, ethical visibility—
both benign and raw, and the pleasure of looking, I now arrive at my notion of the 
entitled gaze. This clearly references Marilyn Frye’s account of the Arrogant Eye 
and broader theorisations of the gaze, but it is an effort to more fully articulate the 
enduring essence, or persistent core at the heart of meat consumption and the use 
of animals as food that makes the perception of any other “that” beyond Foucault’s 
grid of naturalised domination so seemingly impossible. In using the word 
‘entitlement’, I am purposefully drawing on its positive connotations with privilege, 
right, proper due, and being deserving, in contrast with arrogance, which carries 
more clearly negative connotations. For the gaze that is most evident in my data is 
one that is constituted in decidedly positive, and importantly for Foucault’s account 
of power, productive terms. My contention is that throughout evolutions in meat 
production practices, techniques, sensibilities (as both sense and emotion), ethics 
and levels of visibility over the centuries and decades, what has remained constant 
is this entitled gaze directed at ‘food’ animals.  
 
I acknowledge that critiques of human-centrism shaped by the impacts of climate 
change and theorisations of the Anthropocene are certainly offering alternate 
systems of knowledge on the production of meat compared to pre-industrialisation. 
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However, ‘food’ animals remain at the centre of what are widely understood to be 
sustainable, equitable, nutritious, and efficient food systems, now and for the future 
(Arcari 2017a). The ethics being incorporated into each of these agendas are 
therefore persistently anthropocentric and they play a key role in shaping the re-
packaged constitutions of visibility that surround ethical meat. In other words, the 
visibility of ‘food’ animals has been repackaged, but the entitlement of the gaze 
remains the same. 
 
v. The Entitled Gaze  
My definition of the entitled gaze is one that is suffused with a fundamental 
knowledge and sense of entitlement to use ‘food’ animals. This systemic entitlement, 
as explained previously, is constituted through social practices permeated with the 
normalised regime of power/knowledge/pleasure in relation to animals and meat. 
The validating discourses, emotions of distinction, and ethico-aesthetics identified 
thus far are mechanisms of power that contribute to the maintenance and 
persistence of this regime. The gaze directed at ‘food’ animals made ethically visible 
(in ways both benign and raw) therefore incorporates all the power, knowledge and 
pleasure associated with looking at an objectified ‘other’ whose body and life one is 
ideologically and legally entitled to control. In this section, I explore this gaze in 
more detail. In particular, I show how it interacts with ethically re-packaged 
constitutions of animal visibility and transparency in ways that are mutually 
reinforcing and also reinforcing of the associated meaty practices.   
 
The gaze translates to le regard in French, and the English definition of the verb 
regard includes: to look at; observe; consider; think of with a particular feeling or in 
a specified way; relate to; evaluate; show concern for; judge; gaze steadily at in a 
particular way (Merriam-Webster; Oxford Dictionary; Dictionary.com). This is 
somewhat different to the definition of ‘to gaze’, which is simply: to look steadily 
and intently, especially in admiration; or with great curiosity, interest, pleasure or 
wonder; to fix the eyes in a steady intent look (ibid). However, as Victor Burgin 
says, “There can never be any question of ‘just looking’” (2009: 118-119).  
 
Although the exact definition of the gaze has not been problematised (to my 
knowledge), its usage especially in feminist and colonial literature (Columpar 2002; 
Yancy 2008; Sturken and Cartwright 2009), suggests the assumed and intended 
meaning is closer to that associated with ‘regard’ than the more passive ‘gaze’. 
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Beyond simply looking, the regard embodies and enacts certain implications for 
what or who is gazed at because of how they are considered, evaluated, judged, felt 
about, related to etc. It is this element of ‘in a particular way’ that the common 
definition of the gaze does not account for. The gaze, as it is used in theory, 
therefore denotes a broader, more suggestive and portentous ‘sensing’ than simply 
sight. Foucault’s 1963 work The Birth of the Clinic is widely held to have introduced 
the theoretical concept of the gaze, which Lacan also took up in his 1973 volume 
The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Given that the translator of both of 
these works notes in a 1973 translation of Birth of the Clinic, “I have used the 
unusual ‘gaze’ for the common ‘regard’” (1973: vii), I suggest that it is the more 
nuanced meaning and intention of the regard that ought to be brought to an 
understanding of the gaze.  
 
As well as describing the liminal point where a living being is sensed/known as 
belonging to a particular classification and not another, the gaze, as I conceive it, 
simultaneously draws from and re-enacts historical relations—it “always-already 
includes a history of the subject” (Burgin 2009: 119). These historical relations 
prescribe, and proscribe, the sort of life that is considered normal and acceptable 
for that being to have. Essentially then, the gaze attaches a particular ontological 
pathway to the human or animal in question, which they then experience as a set of 
more or less direct limitations in what they are and are not allowed to do while they 
are alive. It is in this ontological sense that “…animals only exist in the ways 
humans imagine them” (Cudworth, commenting on Tester, 2003: 163), but with 
very real-life, tangible implications, because as Foucault says, “the gaze that sees is 
a gaze that dominates” (1973: 39). Non-living objects are also of course looked at 
and sensed, but the primary significance of the gaze lies in its capacity to objectify 
what is living and construe it/them as a commodity with a use and exchange value - 
whether people, animals or the living environment (Urry 2005). Going one step 
further, the most imposing sense of the gaze, and indeed the sense in which it is 
used most often in theory, is as a look that can be returned. It is this capacity of the 
gaze, “armed…with its privileges and qualifications” (Foucault 1973: 51) that 
introduces the potential for some lives to be valued more than others, feel entitled 
where others are not, and to unproblematically assume the power of life or death 
over some lives but not others. 
 
The gaze is therefore never neutral or, as Burgin said, “indifferent” (2009: 118). 
There is a sense in which the look or gaze is a further appropriation or devouring of 
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a body over which the subject already claims ownership—an ownership defined by 
“the eye that knows and decides, the eye that governs” (Foucault 1973: 89). As 
Pick says, looking is “an act of mastery over the other” (2015a, Keynote) and in the 
case of ‘food’ animals, the mastery demonstrated by the devouring gaze 
foreshadows the literal devouring of the animal’s body. What Pick describes as 
“vibrant assemblages”70 of animal, human, technology, bodily fluids, breath, and 
nature that occur during a slaughter, and which are increasingly being experienced 
first-hand, captured visually or described in graphic prose by those witnessing or 
doing it themselves, convert the animal’s death into a kind of “hypnotic aesthetic” 
(2015: Keynote). The act of killing, poetically recast or re-fetishised by this 
aesthetic, “presupposes unlimited access to animals” and highlights the “similarity 
between violence and looking that simply takes for granted the fact that animals are 
there for the taking” (2015a: Keynote). 
 
Looking at the violence of animal death, in all its raw vibrancy, and finding it fits 
comfortably with an accepted knowledge and sense of entitlement, is, I suggest, the 
ultimate expression of the systematised regime of power/knowledge/pleasure 
surrounding animal edibility. Practices involving ethical meat where visibility is 
understood as a further mark of distinction that can be bestowed on the farmer, the 
animal, the meat or the consumer, are therefore where this entitlement can manifest 
most clearly.  
 
Both Maria (C) and Michael (C) spoke of becoming more intimately connected 
with ‘food’ animals through participating in their death (see Part II). This intimacy 
is not achieved by reading about a farm, how they raise their animals, or how the 
animals are killed to produce meat. It is achieved through practices that involve 
sharing the animal’s physical space—hearing them, smelling them, seeing them, and 
even touching them. Participating in such raw visibility is pivotal to Maria’s and 
Michael’s understanding of a ‘good’ killing. As Pick observes, the intimacy of 
looking while killing “redeems instrumental relations between humans and animals” 
(Pick 2015a: keynote). Yet these intimate encounters, or vibrant assemblages, are 
always pursued to nourish and fortify the human observer, to confirm his or her 
own identity (Pick 2015a). Thus, the realities of human entitlement, unlimited 
                                                
70 Elsewhere (Pick 2012), Pick takes issue with certain strands of posthumanist theory, 
specifically the work of Jane Bennett and more especially Donna Haraway. For this 
reason, I suspect her use of the term ‘vibrant assemblages’ is intended to be slightly 
disparaging. 
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access, and unquestioned control that are presupposed in the killing of animals for 
food are concealed behind an appealing ethical narrative where humans participate 
in the normalised act of killing, just as other animals do, in acknowledgement of 
their natural role in the food chain and with respect for those animals whose lives 
‘must’ be taken, after already being ‘given’. 
 
Naturally, not everyone can raise and kill their own animals for food, or has the 
capacity to be as engaged in the process as they might like.71 The bucolic narrative 
of the ‘natural’ is therefore not accessible to the majority of consumers who are 
reliant on the large-scale, mostly invisible, intensive meat industry. However, the 
synoptic technologies of websites, social media, film, labels, and CCTV, and, as I 
have demonstrated, merely the knowledge of such technologies, allow all 
consumers to participate (whether mimetically or actually) in the increased 
visibility of production processes in whatever way they can. Through this visibility, 
whether benign or raw, consumers may thereby appropriate a part of the ethical 
narrative and contribute to its re-fetishisation. Visibility of, and participation in, the 
production, slaughter and butchery of ‘food’ animals merely expands the scope of a 
commodification where one no longer simply buys the meat, but may also own 
some part of the life, and his/her story, that provided it. Through this entitled gaze, 
“the pleasures of mastery” (Pick 2015b: 8) already encoded in the 
power/knowledge/pleasure that normalises the edibility of animals is not challenged 
but only enhanced. Rather than turning everyone vegetarian, visibility is being 
used to expand and refine the ethical remit of meat consumption in a direct and 
‘productive’ response to the issues being associated with ‘sequestered’, 
industrialised production processes. 
 
Throughout his work, Foucault variously articulates the medical or clinical gaze, 
the disciplinary gaze, the institutional gaze, the sovereign gaze, and the normalizing 
gaze, describing the latter as one “that makes it possible to qualify, to classify, and 
to punish” (1977: 184; also 1973, 1978). It is this already and always ordered aspect 
of the gaze, inflected (or infected) by “a permanent corpus of knowledge” 
(Foucault 1977: 190), that makes the quest for ‘truth’ via visibility doomed to fail. 
                                                
71 I acknowledge that practices of ethical consumption, including those involving meat, 
have become reflective, and therefore reproductive, of systematised relations of class, 
gender and ‘race’. However, as noted in the Exclusions and Limitations section of Chapter 
3, the parameters of the research process and the priorities of my research precluded me 
from including aspects of social location in my data collection activities.  
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For visibility is already enrolled in technologies of ‘truth’. It already plays an 
integral role in shaping, affirming and maintaining understandings of what is real, 
normal, proper and right. In her analysis of the gaze, Corinne Columpar notes the 
capacity for ethnographic cinema to close a geographical gap while at the same time  
 
[…] manufactur[ing] the theoretical gap on which the power of the gaze 
rests and by which people from other cultures were rendered reassuringly 
distant, yet utterly knowable (2002: 37). 
 
Through such films, she says, viewers are taught “how to ‘read bodies’” (ibid). I 
argue that the visibility of animals used as food works in a similar manner by 
bridging a spatial gap—the much maligned disconnect between consumers and the 
origin of their food—while leaving the theoretical/ontological gap between humans 
and ‘their’ ‘food’ animals firmly in place.  
 
It is for this reason that I suggest Freeman and Tulloch’s (2013) (and many others’) 
faith in the power of animal liberation documentaries to deconstruct “barriers to 
seeing” (3) is overstated. These authors’ focus on “a violent human/animal 
hierarchy” that is “covered in dark recesses” (4) and the “violent practices” of 
“industrial animal suffering” (5) neglects to consider that, using Foucault’s terms, 
this form of resistance to normalised power relations can serve to productively 
redefine the terms by which ‘food’ animals are dominated. Consequently, a ‘violent 
human/animal hierarchy covered in dark recesses’ can become a benign 
human/animal relation that is transparent and perpetually visible, and similarly 
‘violent practices of industrial animal suffering’, can become humane practices of 
animal care in a pastoral context. The manner in which these animals are used may 
become knowable, and they may become physically proximate and visible, but they 
are still, as ‘food’ animals, a (cognitively) distant ‘other’. As Pick (2012: 73) astutely 
observes: 
 
[…] violence does not solely depend on mechanisms that distance and 
estrange, that frame lives in such a way as to render them ungrievable, but 
also and simultaneously on mechanisms that presuppose kinship and 
precariousness: violence is always also domestic violence. 
 
While accepting that these documentaries have not necessarily brought about any 
radical change in the situation of animals, the authors maintain that undercover 
  243 
footage is a powerful means to establish the preconditions for such change. I 
remain skeptical, especially given that many of my participants are familiar with 
such footage, and also with certain documentaries, and yet their so-called ‘barriers’ 
remain in place. Recent research supports this point, finding that meat consumers 
generally ignore online animal activist material, questioning its credibility and 
association with a vegan agenda that is “ignorant about ‘real’ farming conditions” 
(Buddle et al. 2018: 8). To constitute a more radical challenge to the use of animals 
as food, it is my contention that it is precisely the transparent, visible, supposedly 
benign, humane and ethical models of this use that need to be more squarely 
critiqued. For it is here that entitlement reveals its staunchest resistance. 
 
Through a regime of power/knowledge/pleasure, the bodies of ‘food’ animals are 
‘read’ in a particular way that has been socially, culturally and economically 
normalised over centuries. Given this ‘unalterable’, ‘unquestionable’, and unlimited 
power over animals’ lives and deaths, which is contained in, and exercised through, 
the entitled gaze, being able to observe what was previously invisible only 
emphasises their absolute accessibility, confirms their status as usable, and 
highlights the systemic relations of privilege that entitle us to that use. Repackaged 
ethical visibility is therefore highly problematic and not some more evolved, “clear-
eyed” (Joyce C) way of seeing our world.  To insist that visibility and transparency 
is the route to revealing the domination of animals is to fail to appreciate the full 
meaning and implication of ‘the regard’, and the extent to which: 
 
Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted 
distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose 
internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught 
up. (Foucault 1977: 202) 
 
Visibility, as Foucault implies, is just one part of a rhizomatic nexus of entitlement.  
 
Conclusion 
In Part IV, I have critiqued the trend towards increasing visibility of ‘food’ animals 
and transparency in practices of meat production and consumption, suggesting that 
this visibility, both raw and benign, is not entirely ‘new’. Rather, it is an ethical 
repackaging of what were once more mundane, routine practices of raw visibility, 
shaped by the mainstreaming of formerly marginal agendas around animal rights, 
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environmental sustainability, health, corporate dominance and social justice, and an 
accompanying de- and re-fetishisation of relations of production and consumption. 
In a response to the politicization of food, and especially meat, according to these 
and other agendas, visibility has become a highly mediated and commodified 
component of practices involving ethical meat. By foregrounding the entitled gaze 
that is brought to bear on ‘food’ animals—even, and more especially, when their 
visibility is at its rawest (i.e. during death)—ethical re-visibility becomes a marker 
of the extent to which associated practices are normalised. It also illustrates the 
persistence of the regime of power/knowledge/pleasure relating to ‘food’ animals 
and meat, having the capacity to evolve and incorporate new knowledge and 
understandings on the use of ‘food’ animals while retaining the fundamental 
entitlement of this use.  
 
I have also countered claims that visibility is capable of revealing mechanisms of 
domination and thereby dismantling the mask that normalises and naturalises the 
edibility of animals. Instead, I argue that concern about the industrial treatment of 
animals has translated into a carefully constructed kind of transparency, or 
“graspable materiality” (Pottinger 2013: 662), that neatly “inoculates” against these 
concerns (Pachirat 2015: Keynote). The reason for this, I have argued, is the 
entitled gaze, which, through its repeated performance as part of meaty practices, is 
always encoded with, and in turn reinforces, the ‘proper’ order of things. Under the 
conditions of this gaze—which align with the normalised regime of 
power/knowledge/pleasure, increasing the visibility of ‘food’ animals merely 
emphasises and extends the unlimited access humans assume, as their natural right, 
over their lives and death. Moreover, perceived in ethico-aesthetic terms, visibility 
contributes to the constitution of a more substantial mask with which to hide 
‘ethical’ mechanisms of power at the same time as the industrial mechanisms, which 
have become difficult to deny, are illuminated. When concealment rather than the 
domination of animals is identified as the problem, whether by animal advocates or 
the meat industry, the use of visibility can work perversely to quell discomfort 
and/or resettle consumers in new and ‘improved’ practices of meat consumption. 
This emphasises the power that can be exercised through transparency, or how 
illumination can work as a mechanism of power that keeps animals subjected to a 
persistent state of domination (Foucault 1980). 
 
In his analysis of human privilege in relation to animals, Acampora posits: “…the 
oppressive society is that of human privilege and the dominant view of its injustice 
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is anthropocentrism” (2016: 3). On this basis, I speculate whether it might be more 
accurate to refer to what I have dubbed the entitled gaze as simply ‘the human 
gaze’, pulling back and extending theorisations of the specifically male, colonial and 
ethnographic gazes. This avoids what I suspect is the dubious question of whether 
a human gaze can ever be unentitled. It is from this view point that I approach my 
conclusion. Drawing together the evidence, arguments and discussions I have 
presented over these three main parts, I clarify what constitutes the grid that, “by a 
glance, an examination, a language” (Foucault 1989: xxi) keeps animals persistently 
edible. After Foucault, I then ask what sort of animals might exist beyond this grid 
and how we might see them. Can we exit the panoptic/synoptic machine? Is there a 
territory where there are no cartographies of meat? Is “the purity of the 
unprejudiced gaze” (Foucault 1973: 195), and all that this would imply in terms of 
power/knowledge/pleasure, even possible?  
  
  246 
 
 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These orders are perhaps not the only possible ones or the best ones. 
 
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (1989: xxii) 
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Chapter 10 
This chapter, which wraps up my expedition across the territory of edible orders 
currently inhabited by animals, is divided into two parts. In the first, I provide a 
summary of my main arguments and findings. Beginning with a brief outline of my 
Foucauldian approach, I reiterate the rationale for my research and its focus on the 
practices of self-described producers and consumers of ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ 
meat. This is followed by an overview of the key findings and contributions of my 
analysis relating to how meat, animals and associated practices are constituted, or 
‘made sense of’, by my participants to generate what are revealed to be unstable, 
shifting and slippery orders of overall edibility. From here, and based on these 
variable constitutions of edibility, I summarise the mechanisms of power I have 
identified that, I argue, contribute to the persistence of meat consumption and the 
use of animals as ‘food’, and thus to maintaining these animals in a state of 
domination. To conclude this précis of my analysis, I suggest how these 
mechanisms might be destabilised to instigate a more radical challenge to the 
edibility of animals, and more fundamentally, to the anthropocentric orders that 
constitute them as such. 
 
My broader conclusions, occupying the second part of this chapter, launch from the 
implications of this challenge, and of Foucault’s opening quote. With reference to 
my openly emancipatory agenda, I consider what a critically posthuman approach 
might mean for how ‘food’ animals are then ‘made sense of’. I orient this discussion 
around my notion of the entitled or anthropocentric gaze, arguing less for an 
expansion of this gaze in a sort of benevolent ‘becoming with’ animals, and rather 
for its retraction. This respects the possibility that, from a genuinely nonhuman-
centric posthuman perspective, animals might rather make no human sense at all. 
Drawing on Braidotti, I suggest an alternative way of framing posthuman 
intentions that foregrounds life instead of the unrelentingly insistent human. 
 
i. Cartographies of meat – A précis 
‘Food’ animals did not choose their form, and yet they have no meaning in the 
human world that is independent of it. They are afflicted with a space and time 
prescribed for them by the anthroparchic maps of their bodies that delineate a 
topography of edibility, usefulness, texture and taste. It can be argued that the 
consumption of meat exemplifies Foucault’s regime of power/knowledge/pleasure 
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even more than human sexuality, around which he constructed his idea of “a system 
of legitimate knowledge and of an economy of manifold pleasures” (Foucault 1978: 
72). For, as Palmer (2001: 351) observed, there can be no more extreme expression 
of power than when it “drops off” the spectrum into violence and death. To then go 
even further and consume the body of the ‘other’ is the ultimate literal and symbolic 
assertion of that power and privilege (hooks 1998). In Jamieson and Nadzam’s 
(2015) anthroparchic playground of nature, ‘food’ animals represent the pinnacle of 
our narcissistic capacity to extend ourselves and our desires. 
 
In this thesis, I have applied a Foucauldian regime of power/knowledge/pleasure to 
the consumption of meat and the use of animals as food with the aim of gaining 
insight into the question of how ‘food’ animals remain persistently edible 
specifically when the environmental and ethical legitimacy of their 
consumption is challenged. Pursuing Foucault’s assertion that the success of 
power depends on its ability to “mask a substantial part of itself…to hide its own 
mechanisms” (1978: 86), I have been particularly concerned with how this 
concealment is achieved in relation to the persistence of mechanisms by which 
growing numbers of ‘food’ animals are being dominated. More especially, as the 
increasing problematisation of meat production and consumption has foregrounded 
(via various technologies of transparency) what were previously hidden 
mechanisms of power, I have been concerned with how the domination of animals 
continues to be concealed even under conditions of absolute visibility. With this in 
mind, my objectives were designed to identify the fundamental and enduring 
mechanisms by which a ‘substantial’ component of this domination is successfully 
hidden so that it continues as a persistent and seemingly intractable component of 
everyday practices. 
 
For this task, I focused on everyday social practices involving ‘better’ meat and 
more specifically meat labelled as ‘ethical’ and/or ‘sustainable’. Social practices are 
understood as incorporating material objects and infrastructures (living and non-
living), common understandings and meanings (including discursive practices), 
competencies and skills, rules (tacit and explicit), emotions, and sensory 
experiences. My participants were self-identified producers and consumers of this 
meat located in the greater Melbourne region. During semi-structured interviews 
of between one and three hours, 15 producers and 26 consumers were asked about 
their everyday practices involving ethical and sustainable meat to explore how meat 
and ‘food’ animals were (re)constituted as part of these practices.  
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The emergence of ethical and sustainable meat, and various analogues of ‘better’ 
meat such as organic, free-range, hormone-free, grass-fed, humane, 
environmentally friendly and others, can be seen as an almost direct response to 
efforts to highlight the unethical, unsustainable, environmentally harmful, and 
unhealthy aspects of meaty practices. Consequently, as well as providing a tangible 
illustration that these latter efforts missed the point—if that point was to 
fundamentally challenge meat consumption and/or the use of animals it involves, 
so-called ethical and sustainable meat provides an opportunity to identify what it 
would take to make that point more clearly. For in these re-articulations of ‘better’ 
meat production and consumption, associated practices are understood to be more 
ethical and sustainable not only in comparison with factory-farming, but with not 
eating meat at all. There are clearly associations with meat and/or ‘food’ animals 
that are able to transcend ethical, environmental and health-related concerns—
including those based on the most incontrovertible evidence. In undertaking this 
research, it was my contention that identifying and exploring these associations 
would reveal those mechanisms of power that are able to keep the substantial part 
of animals’ domination consistently hidden even when almost everything about 
associated practices seems increasingly laid bare, both discursively and visually. 
 
The particular expression of meat and ‘food’ animal persistence that is 
foregrounded in practices involving ethical and sustainable meat, is one that is, 
necessarily, especially positive. My participants’ engagement with this ‘better’ meat 
emerges from their acknowledgment and confrontation of the many challenges 
being directed at meaty practices. They have, in every instance, accumulated 
substantial knowledge, often matched with experience, relating to the worst 
representatives of these challenges—both environmentally and ethically. This 
knowledge and experience has shaped their understandings of what is ‘better’ and 
reconfigured their practices such that problematic and discomforting associations 
with meat and ‘food’ animals are, on balance, left behind (as they continued to eat 
meat), while distinctively positive associations are enhanced. Hence, across 
practices involving meat and ‘food’ animals, a range of distinctions are enacted to 
help achieve (and maintain) this balance.  
 
These distinctions form a complex, dynamic, and slippery series of nets that overlap 
in more and less compatible ways. Just from this research, those that shape the 
ethical edibility of meat and ‘food’ animals fall into three loose categories. First 
  250 
there are those relating to the animals and their bodies: wild vs domesticated 
animals (generally, though not always, the former is considered more ethical), cows 
and sheep vs chickens and pigs (the former are generally considered more ‘free-
ranging’ and therefore ethical), breed (preferably heritage), age (not ‘too’ young), 
colour (of the flesh), and cuts (nose-to-tail and no waste philosophies constitute 
certain parts as more ethical and sustainable to eat). Second are those relating to 
where and how they are raised: local (can variously mean neighbourhood, 
community, region, state, or nation), size of farm (preferably small and family-run), 
type of operation (organic vs non-organic; free-range, grass-fed, outdoor bred), and 
visibility (preferably the consumer has visited the farm and met the animals, seen 
pictures of them, or at least met the farmer). And finally, there are those relating to 
how they are killed: wild shot vs bow and arrow (preferably the latter, but 
professionally), backyard vs industrial slaughter (preferably the former, but again, 
professionally), and killing first hand vs watching/participating (ideally the 
former).  
 
This demonstrates not only the amount of ‘work’ my participants put into 
reconfiguring their meaty practices, but also how nebulous and unstable 
conceptions of ethical and sustainable meat can be. It can mean very different 
things to different people. However, the aim of my research was not to identify 
what ethical and sustainable meat actually is, but to understand all the ways in 
which meat and ‘food’ animals are ethically and sustainably constituted or made 
sense of—effectively, how these constitutions are constituted, and re-constituted, as 
this is considered key to the persistence of associated practices. In relation to ‘meat’ 
and ‘food’ animals, the cognitive, emotional and sensorial dynamics of this 
(re)constituting process were found to be especially foregrounded when normalised 
orders were disturbed or challenged in ways that threatened or actually broke 
categorical boundaries. 
 
Boundaries were troubled or challenged when, for example, a ‘food’ animal was 
somehow “humanised” and thereby came to be regarded more as a pet, or if 
knowledge of an animal’s intelligence contested its constitution as food. In Mary 
Douglas’ terminology, what was clean becomes dirty. However, such transgressions 
troubled my participants normalised constitutions of animals’ edibility only for 
limited periods of time (a few months to several years), and/or were isolated to one 
individual animal or one species of ‘food’ animal. In fact, such transgressions 
become regular, almost ritualistic, focal points for discomfort across broader 
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cartographies of meat— “flashpoints” or “abominations” (Douglas 2002: 166) that 
do not threaten, but are actually essential to, the stability of this normalised order. 
Most significantly for understanding the persistence of ‘meat’s edibility, 
transgressions also worked the other way, i.e. from dirty to clean. Hence, in certain 
circumstances, for example as part of practices of eating out or travelling overseas, 
animals and parts thereof typically regarded as (culturally) inedible became edible. 
In other words, unethical meat is still largely and fundamentally edible. This 
further emphasises my previous contribution that there are associations with meat 
and ‘food’ animals that transcend ethical concerns, thus making efforts to expose 
‘unethical’ practices ultimately ineffective. Producer Finn echoes this view when he 
comments, early in our discussion, “I suspect that there is no such thing as ethical 
meat”. 
 
Thus, and as Foucault asserted, my analysis indicates that productive and positive 
mechanisms, being the ones that “produce knowledge, multiply discourse, induce 
pleasure, and generate power” (1978: 73), routinely, and persistently, take 
precedence over the negative. It is through these productive mechanisms that 
animals’ bodies are invested with “what is most material and vital” (Foucault 1978: 
152) – at least to humans. And it is because of these investments that critiques of 
meat production and consumption, even the most confronting and graphic, 
intended to shock, disgust and shame meat eaters into turning vegetarian, have 
instead generated a significant shift to methods of meat production and 
consumption that are humane, ethical and environmentally friendly, more ethical 
and environmentally friendly even than plant-based diets. 
 
The circulation and reinforcement of productive mechanisms ensure that the mask 
hiding the substantial part of animals’ domination remains in place even when the 
mechanisms of this domination are visible. Indeed, my research shows that, under 
the normalised and anthropocentric regime of power/knowledge/pleasure, 
transparency and visibility are equally constituted by these productive mechanisms. 
Hence, visibility works, through the “encoded eye” (Foucault 1989: xxii) to 
reinforce animals’ ontological invisibility at the same time as it enhances the 
visibility of their already, and persistently, meatified bodies. It is therefore the 
enduring and persistently productive mechanisms of meat production and 
consumption that need to be identified and challenged for there to be any radical 
and lasting change in how meat and ‘food’ animals are constituted. These 
mechanisms of power reflect and reinforce the normalised, anthropocentric regime 
  252 
of power/knowledge/pleasure that suffuses meaty practices and maintains the 
edibility of animals.  
 
Among the productive mechanisms of power I have observed in my data, I have 
identified validating discourses, which tend towards the more discursive aspects of 
Foucault’s regime. Then there are emotions of distinction, which are more reflective 
of its emotional and also sensory dimensions. Finally, there are ethico-aesthetic 
mechanisms, which constitute a kind of “aesthetics of existence” that take into 
account “the pleasure of the other” as well as the self (Foucault 1984: 343-346). In 
comparison to the validating discourses and distinctive emotions, which also have 
ethico-aesthetic aspects, the ethico-aesthetic mechanisms I identify constitute parts 
of a more all-encompassing, life-enhancing existential framework that guides and 
legitimates my participants’ relationships to self and ‘others’ on a more notably 
visceral level—those ‘others’ being ‘food’ animals. These mechanisms, summarised 
below, constitute the major contribution of this thesis to understanding, challenging 
and ideally unsettling practices relating to the persistent edibility of ‘meat’ and 
‘food’ animals. 
 
Validating discourses 
Validating discourses re-inscribe the edibility of animals at the same time as they 
negate or ‘disprove’ any counter-practices or discourses associated with their non-
edibility. There are three validating discourses I have identified in the course of my 
analysis, which constitute the first of this thesis’ three-part contribution to an 
understanding of how ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals are persistently (re)constituted as 
normalised objects of practices. These are, 1. The value of contingent life, 2. 
Invoking ‘Nature’, and 3. The benevolent ‘natural contract’. 
 
These validating discourses are prominent features of my participants’ accounts of 
their meaty practices, functioning as discursive ‘go-to’s’ especially when explaining 
the edibility of meat that would, as part of their ‘normal’ practices, be constituted as 
‘bad’. Hence ‘meat’ that is variously factory-farmed, from a supermarket, not local, 
the wrong breed, too young, too old, too intelligent, or not ‘properly’ killed, can still 
maintain its edibility when it is understood that meat is, above all, a ‘natural’ 
resource ‘provided’ by animals who would otherwise not exist. As long as the 
power and prevalence of these discourses remain unrecognised, I contend there is 
unlikely to be any radical, or even moderate, change in the edibility of animals, 
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however environmentally damaging, ethically questionable or socially problematic 
it is demonstrated to be. Their edibility might be forcibly removed due to external 
conditions, but ontologically, it remains inscribed on their bodies via these 
discursive mechanisms of power. 
 
Emotions of distinction 
My reference to emotions of distinction is drawn from Wetherell’s observations of 
emotional practices that “confer distinction” so that some emotions are seen as 
“exemplifying moral virtue” while others are stigmatised as “disgusting” (2012: 16).  
Emotions of distinction are a doubly productive mechanism of power. First, they 
accrue an elevated social standing to the participant of the meaty practices of which 
they are part, and second, they reinforce the fundamental ‘goodness’ and edibility 
of meat, even if that meat would not normally be understood as ‘ethical’. The two 
emotions of distinction that I have identified from my participants’ accounts are, 1. 
Requisite bravery, and 2. Cultural omnivorousness. Exerting a significant 
regulatory influence, in certain practices, on the ways in which animals and meat 
are made sense of, emotions of distinction comprise the second part of this thesis’ 
contribution to elucidating how constitutions of ‘meat’ and ‘food’ animals are 
themselves constituted so that they remain persistently normalised elements of 
meaty practices.   
 
Ethico-aesthetics 
The understanding of ethico-aesthetics I draw on in this thesis constitutes a more 
radical extension of Foucault’s consideration for the life and pleasure of the 
‘other’—one that is open to the deterritorialization of bodies, including those that 
are ingested (Taylor 2010; Springgay 2010). While this is the theoretical promise of 
a life-enhancing ethico-aesthetic of existence, it is not the one I observe in my 
participants’ accounts of their meaty practices. The intent to care for the life and 
pleasure of the ‘other’ is ostensibly there; however, it is directed at animals already 
constituted as food. Hence, this care, otherwise understood as animal welfare, is 
already limited to what is appropriate to, and does not detract from, the animal’s 
primary allocated function. It is therefore inherently and persistently 
anthropocentric.  
 
The ways in which producers and consumers describe their interactions with meat, 
‘food’ animals, and indeed all ‘nature’ of which they are part, is nevertheless in the 
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broader life-enhancing terms of an embodied ethico-aesthetic. Exemplified here by 
the notions of 1. Moral approval, and 2. Respect that my participants draw on, 
and (re)constitute, as part of their ethically meaty practices, this overall ethico-
aesthetic, construes all life, not just human life, as benefiting physically and 
spiritually from the ‘natural’ relationship between humans and edible animals. Meat 
is thereby constituted and understood as a vital substance, in all senses of that 
word—an understanding that my participants experience not only cognitively, but 
emotionally, sensorially and viscerally. These ethico-aesthetics complete my three-
part contribution to a better understanding of how ‘food’ animals remain 
persistently and ethically edible. 
 
These three productive mechanisms—validating discourses, emotions of distinction, 
and ethico-aesthetics—successfully conceal the substantial part of ‘food’ animals’ 
domination. It is through these (and likely other) mechanisms of power that these 
animals are made sense of and thereby remain persistently edible despite significant 
challenges to their environmental and ethical legitimacy – and no doubt in the face 
of other challenges yet to come. In arriving at these mechanisms of power, I have 
addressed my first four objectives by providing insight into, and developing a better 
understanding of: 
 
1. How ‘knowledge’ of animals contributes to their edibility and non-edibility. 
2. How sensory and emotional associations with animals and meat shape their 
edibility or non-edibility. 
3. Where and how this embodied knowledge of ‘food’ animals is challenged 
and how their edibility is maintained. 
4. The mechanisms of power that can be discerned in relation to the 
persistence of meat consumption and the use of animals as food. 
 
I have also shown how these mechanisms, exercised through a universally 
normalised regime of power/knowledge/pleasure in relation to meat and ‘food’ 
animals, are mutually constitutive, rhizomatic, and emotionally and sensorially 
embodied. However, it is the entitlement I discuss as part of the ethico-aesthetic of 
respect that I found to be especially, and most viscerally, embodied. Entitlement 
permeates and underscores every validating discourse, emotion of distinction and 
ethico-aesthetic that has been (and I suggest could be) identified in relation to the 
edibility of ‘food’ animals. It even permeates those practices in which the graphic 
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visibility of these animals’ treatment and death is specifically intended to challenge 
associated relations and/or practices of use.  
 
Entitlement thus speaks to my fifth objective by accounting for how the increased 
visibility of ‘food’ animals and meat production practices have shaped my 
participants’ understandings of the edibility of animals. For pleasure is derived 
from looking, and looking at an objectified ‘other’ engages with historically 
normalised and systemic relations of power along lines of class, ‘race’, ‘gender’ and 
also species. These relations are characterised by power, privilege, and oppression. 
The visibility of ‘food’ animals is therefore embroiled in a spiral of pleasure and 
power, part of the regime of power/knowledge/pleasure in which these animals are 
entangled. Under this regime, visibility becomes a synoptic technology of power 
that emphasises, rather than challenges, humans’ entitlement to animals’ bodies and 
lives—further evidence that, as Pachirat (2011: 252) observed, sight and 
sequestration exist symbiotically.  
 
From this, it follows that meat and animals that are part of visible practices are 
being made sense of by my participants through an “already encoded eye” 
(Foucault 1989: xxii) or what I have identified as the entitled gaze, referencing 
existing theorisations of the male, ethnographic and colonial gazes. The entitled 
gaze maps human orders of value on to everything it sees. It is through the 
rhizomatic embodiment of these resolutely dualistic and anthroparchic orders, via 
all the aforementioned mechanisms of power, that ‘food’ animals and meat are made 
sense of, not just cognitively, emotionally, sensorially, viscerally, and visually, but 
also philosophically, existentially and cosmologically—as persistently edible. 
 
These are not easy constructs to overturn. As my research demonstrates, they get to 
the heart of animals’ persistent meatification and meat’s persistent edibility. 
However, my identification of mechanisms of power in practices involving ‘ethical’ 
and ‘sustainable’ meat at least provides a more potentially destabilizing starting 
point. With my participants, I have bored down through their ethical, 
environmental, social, and health-related concerns associated with the production 
and consumption of meat, to uncover those rhizomatic, embodied mechanisms that 
insist on the fundamental ‘rightness’ and ‘goodness’ of meat. It is therefore not that 
these producers and consumers are not informed, do not believe the evidence, or do 
not care about animals—assumptions that continue to fuel the efforts of animal 
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advocacy organisation. There are bigger nuts to crack relating to cartographies of 
meat that are profoundly systemic and mostly invisible.  
 
ii. Beyond the grid 
What tools, then, might be directed at this nut-cracking, and to what end? These 
are the questions I address with my seventh and final objective where I consider 
whether ‘food’ animals could be made sense of in other ways, or permitted to make 
no (human) sense, and ask what sort of dis-ordering of Foucault’s nexus of 
power/knowledge/pleasure this would require. I tackle these questions in reverse, 
starting with how to destabilise cartographies of meat. 
 
Destabilising cartographies of meat 
From the vantage point of a vegan heterotopia, I have traversed cartographies of 
meat using a purposively deterritorializing and critically posthuman Foucauldian 
lens. My aim has been to challenge the existing and persistent ‘order of [animal] 
things’ designated as ‘food’ by drawing on key literature and the sense-making 
accounts of my participants to trouble habitual ways of thinking and feeling about 
them. This approach has allowed me to identify some of the key mechanisms of 
power, which serve as vital landmarks in the meatified territory, anchoring ‘food’ 
animals to their orders of edibility. Destabilizing these mechanisms is therefore 
essential for the production and consumption of meat, and the use of ‘food’ animals, 
to be challenged in any radical and lasting way. The first step is to generate 
awareness of these mechanisms by highlighting when, where and how they are 
being exercised. The second is to have rigorous, comprehensive strategies ready to 
challenge and refute them, not simply piecemeal responses as part of an apparently 
balanced discussion or debate. Such strategies might involve: 
 
1. Asserting the value of existing lives above contingent lives and roundly 
critiquing the philosophical basis of that argument, drawing on the work of 
Visak (2013), Visak and Garner (2015), Salt (1914) and others. 
2. Breaking associations of meat, ‘food’ animals, and associated practices with 
conceptions of nature and ‘naturalness’. 
3. Demystifying and discrediting the notions of a benevolent, respectful 
natural contract and benign, mutually beneficial human/animal relations. 
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4. Problematizing the social distinction of masculinised bravery and its 
association with practices involving ‘food’ animals, especially killing.   
5. Unpacking and challenging the social constitution of practices involving 
meat and ‘food’ animals such that ‘appropriate’ emotional associations 
become those that prioritise the life that is taken above the life at risk of 
being offensive, offended or excluded. 
 
These strategies also highlight potential areas for further research, such as the role 
of socialised emotions in the constitution and reproduction of practices, and how 
these emotions are themselves constituted more broadly. This could include 
building on Wright’s (2015) articulation of the ‘threatening’ vegan body, along with 
Ahmed’s ‘affect aliens’ and Twine’s ‘vegan killjoys’, to explore the abstract figures in 
which a bundle of (negative) emotions seem to become invested and almost 
solidified. Common conceptions and understandings of such ‘inappropriate’ figures 
were very evident across my participants’ accounts, which suggests these, and 
other, shadowy spectres exert some agency in the constitution of practices that is 
yet to be fully recognised. In addition, the enduring association of certain 
masculinised emotions with ‘meat’ and other forms of mastery over nature, and how 
that intersects with feminist priorities needs to be examined more closely. Indeed, in 
light of Parry’s (2010) analysis of the New Carnivore movement, and particularly 
the feminisation of killing and butchery that he documents, the specific role that 
gender plays in the (re)constitution of meat and animals as universally persistent 
elements of everyday practices involving food is a significant topic for further 
empirical investigation. Stepping back further, and as noted in the introduction, 
interrogating the way social locations besides gender, such as socio-economic 
status, religion and ‘race’, intersect with practices involving ‘better’ meat—similarly 
conceived through the regime of power/knowledge/pleasure—would also offer 
valuable and much-needed critical insight into the ethical foodsphere in all its 
varied expressions and permutations.  
 
In the case of the ethico-aesthetic mechanisms, it is admittedly much harder to 
devise a strategy that could disentangle constitutions of moral approval and respect. 
As I have illustrated, they are tied to something much deeper, more dispersed and 
yet pivotal to all mechanisms of power by which animals continue to be dominated. 
I therefore propose, as the final strategy, first highlighting (because it is largely 
invisible) and then problematizing the anthropocentric entitlement that permeates 
and shapes the ordering, territorialization, meatification, mapping, control, 
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modification, killing, knowing, feeling, sensing and eating of animals’ bodies. That 
this entitlement is socially constituted needs to be somehow foregrounded and then 
extracted from naturalised philosophies and cosmologies of existence that are 
inherently anthroparchal. Only then will there be the possibility of thinking what is 
currently unthinkable (Sorenson 2014), and seeing what remains persistently 
sequestered from the entitled gaze. 
 
Until such time, and under the existing terms of an enduringly entitled, 
anthroparchic, or simply human gaze, it is still considered wholly natural, 
appropriate and ethical to eat animals. It is also considered variously natural, 
appropriate and/or ethical to kill, hunt, watch, race, wear, breed, trap, track, cage, 
ride, touch, cull, poison, exterminate, train, break, punish and abuse them, as well 
as use them for human health, ‘education’, experiment on them, and profit from 
them. It is not, however, considered natural, appropriate or ethical to do these 
things to humans72 and that is the definition of speciesism. This illustrates the 
fundamental, systemic dualism that a posthumanism that is true to its aspirations 
needs to recognise and address by being critical of just how ‘post’ it is claiming to 
be – what the critique of humanism extends to and includes, and what it excludes. 
In other words, referencing Cudworth (2011: 13), how wide is the circle of the 
social in social science?  
 
Launching from this question, the rest of my conclusion takes its lead from Pick, 
who invites: 
 
[…] the possibility that animals may not want to be looked at, or that in 
turn we may not have the right to look at them, or we may wish to look 
differently at them (2015a: Keynote). 
 
This orients my attention to the first part of my final objective, which is to consider 
if/how ‘food’ animals might be ‘made sense’ of in other ways, or be permitted to 
make no (human) sense?  
 
                                                
72 Although most of these things have been or are still done to human ‘others’ they are 
mostly, except for the last three, considered illegal. 
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Stop making sense 
Is it possible to dis-order the existing order, un-map animals’ bodies, and allow 
them to occupy a broader territory of meaning? The imaginings that these sorts of 
questions lead to are not entirely alien even to some of my participants. In Part II, I 
showed how Michael (C) imagines a future where ‘food’ animals are not seen as 
something to kill and eat, and not even as pets, but “something that should be 
viewed, in nature…or something to paint, maybe to pat, maybe to ride on”. 
Similarly, in Part III, Alison (P) demonstrates her preference for a future where 
“you can just have animals for pets, you wouldn’t have to eat them”. Comparing the 
gaze of a meat consumer with her own vegetarian gaze, Florence (P) describes the 
difference as follows, asking of a hypothetical meat-eater: 
 
[…] what are you thinking about that animal, ‘oh, you’re looking good for 
the dinner plate’, versus you know, like I think about our cattle, how 
gorgeous are you and you might outlive me, whatever, that’s great. You just 
enjoy being in each other’s company with no guilt or anything, or anything 
using or abusing of the relationship. 
 
However, even here, the anthroparchic gaze is alive and well in ascribing an albeit 
non-edible role to these animals that is still predicated on some pleasure-based 
reward for humans—via looking, painting, patting, riding, or otherwise relating in 
some way. Though Florence (C) does come closest to not exercising that gaze, even 
if not removing it altogether. As Pick’s comment above indicates, the need for their 
existence to be humanly justified demonstrates just how deeply rooted the 
anthroparchic sense of entitlement really is. Would these animals be permitted such 
a non-edible existence if they were neither watchable, paintable, pat-able, ridable 
nor relatable? Based on the following comment from (pescetarian) Sophie (C), I 
suspect not: 
 
I like cows, I don’t want to eat them, yeah, I think it ended up being, if I 
could have a relationship with that animal potentially, I don’t really want to 
eat it, so I guess that’s why I’m comfortable eating seafood, cos yeah, you’re 
not going to have any relations with a fish or prawn, but a cow or a roo, you 
know, you can get quite friendly with a cow or a roo. 
 
For Sophie (C), the difference is clear. A ‘food’ animal is either relatable or edible. 
Either way, it is making a sense that is decidedly human-centric. 
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It starts to become apparent just how welded the human gaze is to rhizomatically 
embodied orders of animal use, whereby different understandings of animals—as 
food, pet, entertainment, research, fashion—are associated with very different but 
interconnected regimes of power/knowledge/pleasure. In response, I want to 
explore the possibility of decoupling the gaze and breaking up these orders. Playing 
with Carol Adams’ (2010 [1990]) notion of the absent referent, which describes the 
erasure of living animals in everyday discourses and practices involving ‘meat’, 
‘livestock’, ‘protein’ etc., I propose a sort of counter-mechanism in the form of a 
‘present deferral’—a caesura in the normalization of ‘food’ animals that, rather than 
absenting them, brings them into sharp focus, stripped of their existing orders and 
maps.  
 
Such caesuras could be regarded as mechanisms of emancipation. Baa the sheep, 
from Chapter 4, is one example of a present deferral where the normalised edibility 
of the collectively understood ‘sheep’ was suspended as Baa, the individual subject 
of his owner’s love, became more than her word and therefore a ‘thing’ quite out of 
order whose body had been divested of its traditional map. Baa and her owner 
created a little heterotopic counter-site that subverted the normal order. Because of 
this relinquishing of the worst expressions of power, for me, Baa represents a 
Foucauldian “glimmer” of the territory beyond the anthroparchic “grid of 
denominations” (1989: 175), much more so than, for example, Dolly the cloned 
sheep who sits squarely within this power grid. For Braidotti, Dolly “embodies 
complexity, this entity which is no longer an animal but yet not yet fully machine”, 
and therefore is, for her, “the icon of the posthuman condition” (2013: 74). 
However, a posthumanism that celebrates and seeks greater incursions into 
animals’ space and bodies, supposedly making us more than human at the same 
time as we make animals less than themselves, is not one that I think should be 
encouraged given the ideologies and practices that have led to the Anthropocene. 
This constitutes a continuation of the normalised order, not its subversion. 
 
I acknowledge here (again) the connections that could be made in my thesis with 
Foucault’s concept of biopower and also Agamben’s notions of ‘bare life’ and the 
anthropological machine. However, I restate, and support, my focus on how meat 
and ‘food’ animals are made sense of emotionally, sensorially, and viscerally as a 
way to better understand the persistence of these constitutions and their associated 
practices, with reference to the following observation by Wadiwel (2002: Online): 
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[…] whilst Agamben’s analysis of bare life, and Foucault’s theory of bio-
power, provide a means by which to assess the condition of non-human life 
with respect to sovereign power, the political project must reach beyond 
these terms, and embrace an intertwining of the human and the non-human: 
an intersection which may be found in the animal life shared by both 
entities.  
 
As discussed, caesuras are breaks, interludes, pauses, or ruptures where something 
is experienced or seen in a novel rather than a normal way—a suspension of 
regularity. Baker notes that it is in pursuit of such breaks in normality that artists 
often focus on the ‘abject’, for its capacity to disturb “orderings of subject and 
society alike” (2000: 89). Drawing on philosopher Julia Kristeva, he describes the 
abject “as ‘neither subject nor object’, and as that which ‘draws me toward the place 
where meaning collapses’” (Baker, citing Kristeva. 2000:89). ‘Food’ animals can be 
seen to occupy just such an ambiguous and liminal space between subject and 
object, where their ordered meanings can often collapse. Particularly in Part III, I 
discussed how animals are sometimes rendered emotionally inedible on account of 
their becoming relatable individuals. However, the rent caused by these ruptures 
rarely extends species-wide, and even more rarely to all ‘food’ animals. If it does, it 
is eventually repaired and ‘normality’ returns after a few months or years. In fact, 
the repair often reinforces normality and decreases the likelihood and impact of 
further ruptures.  
 
Escaped and individualised ‘food’ animals become momentary transgressions 
subsumed within the dominant order. An obvious question is, then, how to extend 
the effect/affect and the duration of these caesuras? However, given that this 
question has occupied political and social scholars for decades, attentive to 
questions and ‘places of otherness’ (Foucault 1984) especially in relation to ‘race’, 
‘gender’, gender identification, and sexuality, and given further that progress 
towards emancipation in these areas is still uneven and unpredictable, perhaps I 
need to set a more realistic goal for non-human animals.   
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Therefore, acknowledging the value of these “paradoxical spaces” (Hayes-Conroy 
and Hayes Conroy 2008), or ‘heterotopia’ 73 (Foucault 1984) where “an alternative 
social ordering is performed” (Hetherington 1997: 40), I aim simply to embed an 
attentiveness to them, and their significance, in a critically posthuman approach to 
social studies of the Anthropocene and more especially the anthroparchy that 
supports it. In this way, and to paraphrase Douglas, it might be possible to force 
thinking into less habitual tracks (2002: 38), 
 
My ultimate, unapologetic but admittedly unrealistic, agenda is to see the 
expansion of heterotopic sites of veganism to the point of a vegan pantopia. To this 
very hopeful/less end, and based on my research and findings regarding 
mechanisms of power, I propose not only an attentiveness to caesuras, ruptures, 
paradoxical spaces, and heterotopia, but more especially to the entitlement of the 
more dominant, normalised gaze that they foreground. This is the critical aspect 
that is missing from most current conceptions of posthumanism. 
 
The entitled, anthroparchic gaze, like a laser beam of normalised 
power/knowledge/pleasure, needs to be powered down before any ‘beyond’ can be 
glimpsed through its glare; a beyond in which the ‘thing’ can be more than its word 
and more than its map. Pick (2015a: Keynote) provides the most eloquent, almost 
zen,74 account of how to achieve this, which had a quite profound impact on my 
own outlook. It involves simply switching off this gaze entirely. As she explains, the 
possibility of “letting be” then arises—of purposefully foregoing “the automation 
and acceleration of the gaze” that denotes animals’ unconditional availability. 
Recognising the structural ties that exist between acts of violence and acts of 
looking (Pick 2015a: Keynote), this perspective is what allows for “the possibility 
that animals may not want to be looked at, or that in turn we may not have the 
right to look at them, or we may wish to look differently at them” (ibid). In this 
respect, veganism is rather a rejection of the dominant, anthroparchic orders that 
                                                
73 To restate, Foucault’s heterotopia set up “unsettling juxtapositions of incommensurate 
‘objects’ which challenge the way we think, especially the way our thinking is ordered” 
(Hetherington 1997: 42). Heterotopia are thus “sites of all things displaced, marginal, novel 
or rejected, or ambivalent”, and where “meaning is dislocated through a series of deferrals 
that are established between a signifier and a signified…” (ibid: 46; 43, emphasis added). 
74 In Zen Buddhism, instant enlightenment can be achieved via satori. Suzuki describes 
satori as “the sudden flashing into consciousness of a new truth hitherto undreamed of. 
[…] intellectually, it is the acquiring of a new viewpoint. The world now appears as if 
dressed in a new garment, which seems to cover up all the unsightliness of dualism…” 
(1964: 65) 
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decree that these animals’ lives have no intrinsic value, that we are entitled to them 
and their bodies from the moment of their birth (and also before), and that their 
only purpose in existing it to provide ‘food’.  
 
Retracting the entitled gaze altogether is thus the more radical response to issues of 
meat production and consumption than efforts to produce ‘better’ meat. It 
renounces the reliance on, and faith in, market solutions, and asks that humans 
forego the economic opportunities that seeing animals as a resource have thus far 
provided. By rejecting the anthroparchic construction of unlimited access to 
animals, ‘doing nothing’ refutes the impulse to own, expose, control and master, and 
respects the lives of ‘food’ animals not through ‘good killing’ but by considering 
their lives as their own—a “notion of animal privacy that denies human eyes and 
their technological proxies unlimited access” (Pick 2015b: 2). This is the opposite of 
Jamieson and Nadzam’s (2015) narcissist’s playground. 
  
However, entitlement could be the battlecry of the Anthropocene and I do not hold 
much hope that the state of domination in which animals exist will change any time 
soon. As Wadiwel remarks, “…when we consider our relationship to animals, 
sovereignty appears to precede ethics.” (2015: 22, emphasis in original). 
Nevertheless, attention to the entitlement of the anthroparchic gaze will have 
broader benefits for scholarship, especially in those fields attempting to address 
dualisms or to move beyond them and advance anti-dualistic and posthuman 
approaches. Firstly, it highlights the fundamental shift in orientation that is 
required to truly de-centre the human and adopt an alternate stance that 
acknowledges the orders of value—the grids—that construct our world and our 
actions, and the worlds and actions of ‘others’, and succeeds in seeing beyond them. 
Secondly, awareness of this gaze leads to a recognition of the depth and scale of 
human entitlement, and this is a crucial element that needs to be factored into any 
attempt to understand or generate social change.  
 
Anthroparchy holds human entitlement as sovereign—the right to take what is 
‘yours’ as decreed by religious, natural, secular, and also juridical law. Nature, we 
have been socialised to believe, belongs to humans, to do with as we please. From 
food to chimeric organ donors, and from zoos to animal selfies,75 the situation of 
                                                
75 This trend, which Bridgeman (2016) refers to as “cultural narcissism”, has seen the death 
of dolphins, sharks, peacocks, snakes, and probably many other animals, and fuels a 
 
  264 
animals is the ultimate affirmation of the totalizing power of our boundless 
entitlement to consume both physically and visually. As Kingsolver demonstrates 
plainly and conclusively in her self-sufficiency memoir, “The farm-liberation fantasy 
simply reflects a modern cultural confusion about farm animals. They’re human 
property, not just legally but biologically.” (Kingsolver: 223). Consequently, simply 
asking from whose perspective a certain approach or action construed as ‘co-
shaping’ or ‘becoming-with’ could be said to be beneficial, respectful, nourishing, 
life-affirming and ethical, might furnish the corrective necessary to avoid the 
pitfalls of an uncritical posthumanism that is, as Cudworth says, politically weak, 
and serves to reinforce systemic systems of oppression and domination. In this 
regard, meat consumption, which Vint identifies as the “material basis of our 
culture”, is “among the most problematic sites that must be addressed in any 
transformed vision of posthuman companion species”76(2010: 44). 
 
Describing Braidotti’s 2013 volume ‘The Posthuman’ as a ‘tour-de-force’, 
Herbrechter goes on to define her posthuman figure as “embrac[ing] the risks that 
becoming-other-than-human brings” (2013b: 2). Where, once again, it is a human 
project of becoming that is centred, I am contending that a necessarily critical 
posthumanism for the Anthropocene should actually be about pulling back, 
treading more lightly and considerately, instead of continuing full bore on a path of 
our own discovery, justified as some kind of enlightened post-dual aspiration. 
Unless we have been invited into other lives and worlds, a multi-species non-
dualism is still a decisively human-directed and human-centred endeavour. Indeed, 
Braidotti refers to her ‘cartography’ of vital materialism as “a nomadic zoe-centred 
approach [that] connects human to non-human life so as to develop a 
comprehensive eco-philosophy of becoming” (2013: 104). Instead of being attentive 
to and addressing existing maps, Braidotti is intent on creating another, even 
though, as Korzybski indicated, they are what obscure the territory and hide the 
‘thing’. Perhaps, then, just as there are whiteness studies within critical ‘race’ 
studies and masculinity studies within feminist and ‘gender’ studies, there is a need 
                                                                                                                                       
profitable tourist trade in exotic animals, notably lions and tigers, who are taken from the 
wild and later killed when they grow too big or aggressive to be used as photo props for 
tourists (Holloway 2016; Dearden 2014). Christina Best (2015) describes the selfie as a 
purposeful and, importantly, witnessed, extension of the self into the world, invited or 
not—one that provides the ‘self’ new ways “to explore and define his or her own self 
identify” (61). 
76 Vint is referring specifically to what she perceives as a miss-fire in the posthumanism of 
Braidotti, Haraway and some others. 
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for further human studies before a posthuman and postspecies world can be 
properly conceived and approached. Nevertheless, despite being littered with 
traces of the anthroparchic gaze, Braidotti’s work offers much of value in my 
attempt to articulate how to ‘stop making sense’ of ‘food animals. 
 
iii. (Rhizomatic) Non-conclusion 
To be posthuman is to be… 
How to curb the kleptocratic human impulse to identify and extract every bit of 
perceived value from the natural world, which we consider has been provided 
solely for our benefit, is the most salient but also the most intractable question for 
the Anthropocentric age. Finding ways to draw attention to, undermine, and 
dismantle the entitlement that supports the anthroparchic gaze in all its systemic 
and rhizomatic forms, as it is expressed and reproduced through social practices, 
may provide a new way of approaching it. In the previous section, I suggested how 
this might be achieved in relation to the mechanisms of power that support meaty 
practices. But what exactly should we focus on when this entitled gaze is switched 
off? If the human is de-centred, what is centred?  
 
The posthuman still contains ‘the human’, and while it provides a useful way to 
introduce, and acclimatise to, the notion of de-centering the human, I suggest that it 
is time for a more radical and positive articulation of what it is, instead of what it is 
not. It is here that Braidotti’s suggestion of a ‘zoe-centred approach’ resonates. Zoe 
means life, as in the fullness of all life, both biological and spiritual, or what I would 
regard as the immaterial. It is therefore inherently rhizomatic, alluding to what can 
only be a non-essentialist account of everything that life on earth involves. 
 
I find it interesting in itself that I have struggled to find a way to represent this 
stance I am reaching to define—the opposite of narcissism, without falling prey to 
mawkish sentimentality or vague calls for more compassion, empathy or an ethics 
of care. Words do not seem to exist for the territory I am trying to describe, like a 
room that does not yet have the language to furnish it, and so I risk using the 
wrong linguistic map and confusing the matter even further. Braidotti (2013) comes 
close in her discussions of a “zoe-centred egalitarianism” (71), and the process of 
“becoming-earth” (81), although lingering traces of the exercise, rather than 
removal, of the anthroparchic gaze in her work slightly mar the intent of these 
terms. However, a ‘zoe-centred’ approach, or ‘zoe-ism’, seems well suited to my 
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aspiration for a critically posthuman research approach that regards all life, and all 
that contributes to the fullness of that life, as interconnected and co-constituted 
constituents of zoe.  
 
Whether it is defined as ‘zoe-ology’, ‘zoe-graphy’ or zoe-ism’, it is not sufficient to 
think through a zoe-centred approach; it must also be sensed—felt emotionally and 
sensorially. In removing all mention of the insistent human, ‘zoe-ism’ performs a 
subtle energetic shift by not foregrounding thinking about how to be posthuman, 
but rather placing that thought within a frame that has already removed the human 
and put zoe at the centre. Perhaps in this way, orders can start to be dis-ordered, 
broken down rhizomatically the same way the body breaks down enzymes. For my 
research has demonstrated that power does not just work affectively, as Anderson 
(2014: 27) suggests, but in ways that are more, less, and not only. Breaking down 
the embodied enzymes of anthroparchic orders of entitlement might be the catalyst 
that finally removes the mask, reveals animals’ state of domination, and eventually 
permits ‘food’ animals to make no human sense. To this end, I propose 
consolidating and expanding studies directed at better understanding what it means 
to be human—critical human studies—so that posthuman thinking, and social 
practices, can together proceed on an altogether more emancipatory trajectory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Image accompanying the online publication of Foucault’s ‘Of Other 
Spaces and Heterotopias’ (1984) by https://foucault.info/, described as a 
“repository of texts by Michel Foucault” (no copyright information).  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Methodology 
Phase 1 - Literature review 
This phase comprised a comprehensive review and analysis of relevant literature 
encompassing consumption, meat, animals, food, sustainability and ethics from 
different disciplinary perspectives including cultural and social theory, ethics, 
sustainability, health sciences, law and others. Literature was collated from mostly 
primary sources but also drew on secondary literature as relevant. This literature 
served two functions: 1) to contextualise and anchor my analysis of power, 
knowledge, discourse, emotions and the senses, as they relate to meat and animals, 
in the wider literature, and 2) to identify the broader historical, economic, social 
and cultural practices that are particularly implicated in normative constructions of 
meat and ‘food’ animals. This constant contextualisation of my thinking, 
throughout the entire research process, also assisted me in the application of a 
multi-faceted and iterative approach to my research, or rather, it prescribed such an 
approach. 
 
Phase 2 - Content and discourse analysis 
On the back of the recruitment process for my empirical data collection, I 
conducted a content analysis of promotional material from 15 producers and 
retailers. The recruitment process for these producers/retailers is described here. 
 
Producers and retailers were located by searching online, and visiting retail outlets 
and farmers markets to identify businesses in the greater Melbourne region of 
Victoria, Australia, who described themselves as purveyors of ethical and/or 
sustainable meat. Suitable candidates were approached for recruitment directly by 
myself either via email, phone (using telephone numbers and email addresses that 
are publicly available on their websites), or in person (at their retail site or farmers 
markets). They were provided with information about the project, including a 
project flyer and the Participant Information Statement (Appendices 3 and 4 
respectively). Introductory emails and in-person first meetings at farmers markets 
were followed up by a phone conversation during which participants were given 
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the opportunity to ask further questions about my study, indicate if they were 
interested in participating, and arrange a suitable time and place for the interview.  
 
My analysis of producers’ and retailers’ promotional content encompassed both 
textual and visual elements that make up their on-line presence—whether on a 
website or Facebook page, plus any materials that contribute to their retail 
presence, including photos, leaflets and branded signage. With this analysis, I 
aligned myself with the intentions of a social semiotic approach, which van 
Leeuwen describes as an analysis of how meaning is made using a range of semiotic 
‘resources’, including “speech and writing and picture making” as well as types of 
physical activity and material artefact (2005: 4). Noting the potential for text and 
image to ‘rhyme’ (12), van Leeuwen highlights the intrinsically embodied and 
rhizomatic effect/affect that a visually augmented discourse can both generate and 
leverage in the process of meaning (or sense) making. However, as Machin and 
Mayr emphasise, “choices of visual elements and features do not just represent the 
world, but constitute it” (1012: 19). Therefore, to paraphrase these authors (2012: 
19): 
 
As in language, where we must look at the terms used to describe animals, 
such as cows being described as ‘livestock’ and ‘meat’, or the processes they 
carry out, so we need to look at the visual representation of animals as 
‘food’, ‘livestock’, or ‘ethical meat’.  
 
The ‘talk, text and images’ that are the focus of Machin and Mayr’s semiotic 
approach convey certain identities, values and activities. Hence, the important 
questions to ask, according to these authors, concern the power relations that 
semiotic choices reflect and thereby reinforce (2012: 29): 
 
What are the consequences of these choices?...How do the choices we find 
serve the interests of authorities, ruling groups, institutions or even 
individuals in face-to-face situations?” 
 
Admittedly, the practical limitations of my research did not allowed me to conduct a 
detailed analysis of producers’ use of visual imagery. Such an analysis would 
include a comprehensive account of what each image connotes or denotes, its 
‘attributes’ (what discourses it communicates), settings, and salience (use of 
symbols, size, colour, tone, focus, and elements of framing such as rhyme and 
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contrast) (van Leeuwen 2005; Machin and Mayr 2012). Therefore, I narrowed my 
analysis to focus only on the meanings of ‘food’ animals and meat that are 
foregrounded, and those that are, correspondingly, backgrounded or excluded 
(Machin and Mayr 2012: 31). In this way, my visual analysis more closely qualifies 
as an analysis of the kind of gaze that the image invites upon the ‘food’ animal, as 
per Sturken and Cartwright’s (2009) approach to visual culture and practices of 
looking. 
 
Phase 3 – Interview research 
The empirical phase of my research focused on producers, retailers and consumers 
of ethical and sustainable meat in the greater Melbourne region of Victoria, 
Australia, to explore how they ‘made sense of’ meat and ‘food’ animals. In my 
original research design, I aimed to gather data via semi-structured interviews from 
five to ten producers and retailers, and 20 to 30 consumers of ethical and 
sustainable meat, with the understanding that producers and retailers are also likely 
to be consumers. These figures represented an estimation only of the numbers of 
participants of each group that might allow me to reach data saturation (Given 
2008; Morse and Richards 2002), assuming that there would be less variation in 
producers’ practices. Data collection was undertaken gradually and reflexively 
until I detected that I was not gathering any significantly new data. I determined 
that this point had been reached when I had interviewed 15 producers and 26 
consumers. 
 
Recruitment 
The recruitment process for producers and retailers has been described in the 
previous section. Consumers in the greater Melbourne region were approached 
indirectly via project flyers located at several retail sites. I visited each of these sites 
in person and spoke with a manager or owner who then agreed to display my 
flyers. Sites included a butcher store located in a suburb of Melbourne, Victoria 
(the only butcher I found that specifically promoted their meat as being ethical and 
sustainable), The Market Shop at the Centre for Education and Research in 
Environmental Strategies (CERES) Community Environment Park, Brunswick 
East, Organic Wholefoods ‘ethical retailing’ on Smith Street, Collingwood, and 
finally the stalls of several producers at farmers markets who were kind enough to 
provide space to display them, often over several weeks. Farmers markets in the 
greater Melbourne region take place on different weekends for each suburb or 
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town (for those that have a market)—generally the first and third, or the second 
and fourth weekends. I visited a total of ten markets over five weekends at 
Fairfield, CERES Environment Park, Newport, Coburg, Abbotsford Slow Food 
Market, Flemington, Boroondara, Veg Out at St Kilda, Eltham, and Castlemaine. 
These trips also provided the opportunity to introduce myself to producers, 
exchange business cards and gain their approval to be contacted at a later date for 
potential participation.  
 
Finally, I contacted several key organisations in Melbourne associated with the 
promotion and/or distribution of local, ethical and/or sustainable food, and 
requested that they post a notice regarding my research on their Facebook page or 
website. These organisations included CERES, Animals Australia, Sustainable 
Table, Victorian Farmers Market Association, Melbourne Farmer’s Markets, and 
Slow Food Melbourne. Independent of my own efforts, there was also Twitter 
activity around these links as people shared news of my research among their 
networks. Interested participants could either contact me directly via email or 
phone, or follow a link to a webpage that I had set up for recruitment: 
https://ethicalmeat.wordpress.com/. This webpage provided an overview of the 
project, a link to a participation form which they could then fill out and submit to 
me electronically, and my contact details. 
 
Sampling 
My sampling approach was purposive or purposeful (Creswell 2002) in order to 
achieve representativeness or typicality of the selected activity (Maxwell 2012). 
The one criterion I set for recruitment of retailers, producers and consumers was 
around the words ethical and sustainable.  
 
Retailers and producers had to promote their meat specifically as being ethical 
and/or sustainable. Organic, biodynamic or free range was not sufficient. Meat that 
is organic, biodynamic and/or free range is not necessarily also aiming or claiming 
to be ethical and sustainable. As is becoming more widely recognised, there are 
industrial scale organic and free range producers. Perceptions of sustainability and 
ethics are often generated through strategic advertising—including assurances of 
chemical free produce, ‘natural’ farming practices, and images of animals roaming 
free in pleasant environments—and then consumers conflating ethics and 
sustainability with these largely constructed attributes of organic and free range. As 
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Phillips (2008) says, “there is no universal truism that intensive systems are 
associated with low welfare and extensive systems with high…” (150). As actual 
practices and conditions at some free-range egg farms in Australia have been found 
to contravene or be inconsistent with free range standards (Fyfe and Millar 2013; 
Homer 2013; Parker et al. 2013), and could be viewed as anything but sustainable 
and ethical, a certain distrust has emerged among discerning consumers around 
free range, and confusion around organic, free range, biodynamic and other 
labelling (Gardiner 2011). For this reason, I am interested in the more overt and 
specific claims of meat that is ethical and/or sustainable, which purports to offer an 
alternative to factory farmed meat that is even better than organic and free range, 
with a greater and more explicit focus on delivering benefits for animals and the 
environment.    
 
Accordingly, my recruitment flyer and webpage for consumers began with the 
question, ‘Do you buy meat that is promoted and/or labelled as being: Ethical, 
Humane, or Sustainable?’77 A total of 65 people responded to my recruitment drive 
and I called and spoke with nearly every one of these bar five who were not 
contactable by either phone or email after several attempts. During these calls, I 
provided further information about the project and what to expect, and most 
importantly, asked if they bought meat that was labelled as organic, free-range, 
ethical or sustainable - did they make any distinctions? This allowed me to 
determine whether and to what extent they differentiated between these terms. If 
they made no distinction at all, I did not consider them for my study. Many 
described a hierarchy of decision-making, such as ethical first then organic if 
unavailable, while grass-fed and local were important additional criteria for others. 
Due to the high level of interest in my study, generating more than double the 
number of potential participants than I was aiming for, I was able to make an even 
more purposive selection of participants from this larger group, targeting only those 
who made a clear distinction between these terms. This gave me 37 potential 
participants, each of whom I called for a second time to inform them of their 
selection. When it came to setting and the date and time for an interview, 26 of 
these 37 were available to commit and a copy of the Participant Information Sheet 
and Consent Form (Appendix 3) was emailed to each participant at this time.  
 
                                                
77 See Appendix 4 for a copy of the recruitment flyer. The recruitment webpage can be 
viewed here: https://ethicalmeat.wordpress.com 
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Regarding the project sampling, a traditional approach in quantitative and much 
qualitative social research is to seek representativeness of the general population by 
including participants across a range of ages, socio-economic status, cultural 
backgrounds, genders and other variables, the logic being that this will generate a 
more accurate and generalizable understanding about the topic or issue in question. 
However, when the topic or issue is being investigated at the level of practices, 
pursuing this kind of representativeness may not be representative of the practice. 
Practices can be gendered and distinctively profiled socially, economically, 
culturally, ethnically and many other ways that can vary temporally and 
geographically. Hence, while people of all ages, genders and from different cultural 
and socio-economic backgrounds might consume ethical and sustainable meat, it is 
not the diversity in how associated practices might be practiced that I am 
concerned with. Rather, I am concerned with how these practices within the 
broader Melbourne region, in their ‘mainstream’, most widespread, most publicised 
and promoted aspect, are constituted. The participants I have recruited are thus 
considered representative of practices associated with ethical and sustainable meat 
in the greater Melbourne region. Though parallels may be able to be drawn with 
how the practice is constituted in other regions, generalizability or ‘scaling up’ of 
my findings is not an aim of this research.  
 
Questions and data collection 
Semi-structured interview schedules were designed to initiate broad and then more 
detailed discussions regarding participants’ ‘knowledge’ and practices in relation to 
food, meat, animals, health, ethics, sustainability and other topics as they arose. The 
schedule for producer/consumers was slightly different and included questions 
about their business. Both schedules may be viewed in Appendices 5 and 6. 
Preliminary background questions for both consumers and producer/consumers 
created an opportunity for participants to tell me something about their life and 
how meat eating had featured in it so far. These were followed by more open-ended 
questions that explored participants’ practices associated with sourcing, buying, 
preparing and eating ethical and sustainable meat, and for producer/consumers also 
producing, marketing and selling it, and in particular their ‘knowledge’ of meat, 
ethical and sustainable meat, and ‘food’ animals. With these questions, I intended to 
not only encounter this ‘knowledge’, but also explore how it is constituted, how it 
aligns or perhaps conflicts with any of their practices that involve food or meat, and 
how any conflict is resolved. 
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Questions specifically about meat explored what ethical and sustainable meat 
means to the participant (as compared with factory-farmed, organic, or free range); 
where they get their meat from; what they like about it; what they do in 
circumstances where they cannot get ethical and sustainable meat; and for 
producers, how/why they started producing ethical and sustainable meat and what 
is involved in marketing and selling it. Questions about animals explored how 
participants feel about eating animals; in what ways they think ethical and 
sustainable meat is better for animals; and what they think is an ethical and 
sustainable way for an animal to die. Participants were also asked about their 
experiences surrounding ‘food’ animals, meat, and its embodiment in order to elicit 
sensory and emotional associations and explore their role in the ‘making sense’ of 
meat and animals. Questions addressed aspects of taste, touch, sight, smell and 
even sound, with the intention of investigating how the senses and emotions shape 
and even challenge knowledge of food, meat, animals, sustainability, ethics and 
associated practices, and how in turn they might be shaped by knowledge and 
practices.  
 
A set of closing questions was designed to broaden the discussion and explore 
participants’ knowledge of meat, ethical and sustainable meat, and ‘food’ animals 
further—capturing additional nuances and how these are articulated in relation to, 
and shape orientations towards, alternative and prospective practices. Finally, if the 
topic had not arisen during the course of the interview, I also asked participants for 
their views on in vitro meat, which is meat grown in a laboratory from a cell culture. 
As the closest analogue to the flesh of an animal without requiring the breeding, 
raising, and killing of an actual animal, I was interested in what about this meat—
structurally and nutritionally still meat in biological terms—participants might still 
find problematic, or not. In other words, would meat from living animals still be 
preferable, even allowing for potential and probable improvements in the texture, 
taste, look and usability of in vitro meat to the point that it was indistinguishable 
from that from a once living animal? If so, why? I anticipated that this question 
might lead me to more obstinate meanings of meat and ‘food’ animals that 
contribute to the persistence of meat consumption even when presented with a 
viable alternative. I sidelined questions and concerns related to the production 
process and cost of this meat. Unscheduled prompts and probes were used 
throughout the interviews to elicit more in-depth and detailed responses (Qu and 
Dumay 2011).  
  274 
 
Interviews lasted on average between one and a half to two hours for consumers 
and two to three hours for producer/consumers, although some interviews with 
producers went for over three hours as I accompanied them on their work routines 
across various locations. Consumer interviews were conducted in a local café, at the 
participant’s home, or in a private office at RMIT University’s city campus, 
depending what was convenient and preferable to the participant. All but two of 
the producer/consumer interviews were conducted on-farm. Of the two that were 
not, one was conducted at one of their primary retail sites, and the other was 
conducted in a vehicle during transit to and from business appointments. In a 
couple of cases, the interview shifted locations according to the activities of the 
producer, moving from the farmhouse to a butcher shop, a ‘deboning’ room, a 
tannery, out to farmland to check fencing, and back to the farmhouse. In most 
cases, I was invited to view their operations first-hand and witness animals in the 
different types of environments provided for them. I kept the audio recorder on at 
these times (with the participant’s knowledge) as they often chatted further about 
their animals and the processes involved in the business of turning them into 
profitable meat. The data collection phase of my research was completed between 
April and November 2014. 
 
When conducting these semi-structured interviews, I wanted to “respond quickly 
to the unexpected and spot interesting and unusual avenues for further questions” 
(Slim et al. 1993: 76). Slim and Thompson emphasise the importance of ‘lateral 
listening’ and ‘listening between the lines’—“to identify what is being left unsaid 
and to assess the significance of pauses and silences. Keeping an ear open for these 
areas of experience at which the narrator may hint, but not bring into the 
interview” (76). Being interested in aspects of emotion that might inflect my 
participants’ responses, this commitment to patient and concentrated listening was 
considered essential. This type of semi-structured but also ‘improvisational’ 
interview often took longer than anticipated, with interviews averaging two to three 
hours; however, the material I acquired was the richer for this approach and 
delivered some unexpected outcomes. 
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The participants 
A brief overview of my 41 participants, including a summary table of basic 
demographic and dietary information for each producer and consumer, is included 
in Chapter 3 (Table 3).  
 
Emphasising the iterative nature of qualitative research, my final selection of 
participants made it necessary to revisit and revise my data collection methods. 
Towards the end of the interviews, my first cohort of five consumers were shown a 
series of six images depicting chickens, pigs and cows in various situations of 
confinement—indoor sheds, outdoor paddocks, and feedlots, and with different 
environmental features—straw, concrete, metal shelters, grass, and mud. The aim 
of this element was to explore whether visual stimuli generated new insights or 
discussions about meat, animals as food, sustainability, ethics, or any other subject. 
Rather than rely on verbal communication alone, I wanted to allow for the 
possibility that visual cues might for some participants encourage greater 
engagement and perhaps different thoughts around the topics being discussed. 
However, after these five interviews I elected to drop the images from my interview 
schedule as my participants were already engaged in the topic and associated issues 
at such a high level that they did not add significantly to the foregoing discussions.  
 
All 41 participants provided their written consent to all intended data collection 
activities under the conditions of the project’s ethics approval. Names have been 
changed to protect the identity of participants, and data pertaining to consumer 
participants are distinguished from those of producer participants by the suffixes 
(C) and (P) respectively. For the sake of conciseness, I refer to all my participants 
as consumers and producers, although it is acknowledged that producers are also 
consumers, or producer/consumers. The ‘consumer’ component is therefore implied 
throughout my thesis. 
 
Phase 4 - Analysis 
All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim by myself. The 
completed transcripts were exported to the NVivo qualitative software program, 
along with relevant observational notes and outcomes from the previous content 
and discourse analyses. These data were interrogated and, informed by my research 
aim and objectives, topics and themes were explored, coded and modified as 
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required using an iterative process of coding and (re)analysis (Bazeley and 
Richards 2000). The next section describes this process in more detail. 
 
Preliminary readings of the data took me on a predictably crude coding journey 
based partly on the themes I had intended to focus on, plus those that were less 
expected but that I found particularly interesting. As a result, this first level coding 
was rather broad-brushed, unstructured and random. Data were collated under 
such themes as ‘better’ meat (with sub-themes relating to cost, convenience, and 
transparency), animals as food, aspects of commensality, DIY politics, factory 
farming, killing, emotion and affect, and plant-based diets. As my analysis 
progressed, and I continued to reflect on the data in light of a constantly evolving 
review of literature, I arrived at a second iteration of coding in which I focused 
more directly on the constitution of things and their meanings. Hence, I identified 
themes that explored ‘being ethical’ or unethical, boundaries between humans and 
animals (and their transgression), emotions (such as discomfort, excitement, guilt, 
pleasure, sadness and others), meanings of meat (relating to health, ethics, good vs 
bad, natural, necessary and normal), visibility (as it manifested as both practice and 
commodity), and references to ownership and entitlement. These latter themes, 
concerning visibility and ownership, contributed to a more abstract theme relating 
to ‘the gaze’. 
 
It was this second level of coding that provided the basis of my final analyses. It 
allowed me to recognise multiple affinities with the work of Foucault (1977; 1978; 
1980; 1982; 1989; 2002) and, from there, conceive of a framework which both drew 
from, and drew together, his perspectives on power, knowledge, pleasure, 
transparency and the gaze. Essentially, and primarily inspired by The Order of Things 
(Foucault 1989), this framework seeks to shed light on how ‘food’ animals, the 
‘things’ of my concern, come to be understood as they are, how they stay that way, 
and how they might become something else. 
 
A key focus of my analysis was, therefore, the language and discourse that is 
associated with meat and animals, how this discourse is constituted and maintained, 
what knowledge it is associated with, how this knowledge interacts with sensory 
and emotional associations, and ultimately how consumers and producer/consumers 
‘make sense’ of meat and ‘food’ animals. The aim of this analysis was to identify 
dominant discourses and a normalised ‘knowledge’ of meat and ‘food’ animals, gain 
insight into the rhizomatic interaction between power/knowledge/pleasure as part 
  277 
of the ‘making sense of’ animals and meat, and acquire an understanding of the 
mechanisms of power by which ‘food’ animals are kept in a state of domination and 
thereby remain persistently edible.  
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Appendix 2: PIS and Consent Form, Version 1 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION 
Project Title: The role of ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ meat in Australia 
Investigators: 
• Paula Arcari, MA(Geog), MA(EnvSci), BA Hons Ph: 03 9925 9062 
email: Paula.Arcari@rmit.edu.au  
• A/Prof Tania Lewis, PhD, MA, BA Hons, MBBS Ph: 03 9925 2406 
• Email: Tania.Lewis@rmit.edu.au  
• Dr Cecily Maller, PhD, BSc Hons Ph: 03 9925 9091  
email: Cecily.maller@rmit.edu.au  
• Dr Yolande Strengers, Ph.D, BArts Ph: 03 9925 1916 
email: Yolande.Strengers@rmit.edu.au  
 
Dear Participant,  
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by a PhD candidate at RMIT University. 
Please read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding whether to 
participate. If you have any questions about the project, please ask one of the investigators.  
 
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted?  
My name is Paula Arcari and I am a PhD candidate and lead researcher of this project. The other members of 
the research team are my co-supervisors A/Prof Tania Lewis (Vice Chancellor’s Senior Research Fellow, RMIT 
University), Dr Cecily Maller (Senior Research Fellow, RMIT University) and Dr Yolande Strengers (Vice 
Chancellor’s Research Fellow, RMIT University). The project is approved by the RMIT Human Research Ethics 
Committee and is funded under the Federal Government’s Australian Postgraduate Award scheme. 
 
I am undertaking this research to develop a more detailed understanding of meanings and practices associated 
with ethical and sustainable meat in Australia.  
 
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed?  
The purpose of the project is to identify and explore in detail meanings and practices associated with ethical 
and sustainable meat in Australia. The main question for the research is: What is the role of ethical and 
sustainable meat in Australia and how does this inform its status as a more ethical and sustainable option? 
Questions will be asked of producers, retailers and consumers regarding the meanings they associate with 
ethical and sustainable meat and their related practices. Example questions for producers and retailers include: 
• When did you start producing/selling ethical and sustainable meat?  
• What contributed to your decision to produce/sell 'ethical' and 'sustainable' meat? 
• What do you think are the benefits of 'ethical' and 'sustainable' meat? 
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The research will be carried out between November 2013 and March 2015 and will involve interviewing 5-10 
producers and retailers, and 20-30 consumers of ethical and sustainable meat in Australia.  Interviews may 
also involve site visits (e.g. farm, shop, home) with ‘walk-around’ interviewing. 
 
Why have you been approached?  
You have been approached as you have been identified by the researchers as a producer, retailer or consumer 
of ethical and sustainable meat. Participation is voluntary, and if you decline to participate you will not be 
disadvantaged in any way. 
 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do?  
Involvement in this part of the project involves agreeing to participate in a face-to-face, audio recorded interview 
about your understandings of, and practices related to ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ meat. The interview will take 
place at the ‘site’ of production or retail (e.g. farm, shop, market), at your home or an alternate venue if you 
prefer. The interview will last from 1 to 2 hours and you can request a copy of the questions beforehand if you 
wish. The interview will be transcribed and you may request a copy of this transcription to check for accuracy.   
 
You may also be requested to allow myself, and potentially one of my supervisors, to follow you about your 
work at one of these ‘sites’. Notes and, with your permission, digital photographs may also be taken at this time 
to document key images and elements of your practices associated with ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ meat.   
 
The topic of this PhD research relates to a separate, Australian Government funded RMIT project titled ‘Ethical 
Consumption’ led by Associate Professors Tania Lewis and Kim Humphery. This three-year project aims to 
explore the role of ethical consumption in Australia and specifically how and why ethical preferences are 
increasingly shaping mainstream consumer culture.  With your permission, outcomes from my research 
activities may be shared and used by the investigators for this project.  Only the investigators associated with 
this project will have access to your data and the same ethics and terms of confidentiality will apply.  If you 
consent, you will be provided with an equivalent Participant Information Sheet and consent form for this 
separate project, and your details will be passed on to the lead researchers who may contact you at a 
subsequent date.  You may also be invited to participate in an additional interview for the Ethical Consumption 
project.  You are free to decline this invitation but still allow your existing data to be shared between the two 
projects.  
 
What are the possible risks or disadvantages?  
The possible risks to you are small. There are no perceived risks outside of your normal daily activities. 
However, if you are concerned about your responses to any of the interview questions or if you find participation 
in the project distressing, you should contact your local doctor as soon as convenient. They will discuss your 
concerns with you confidentially and suggest appropriate follow-up, if necessary.  
 
What are the benefits associated with participation?  
The benefits of participating in this research are that it provides you with an opportunity to reflect on your 
understandings of, and practices related to ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ meat. The (anonymous) findings of the 
research may contribute to broader understanding of the role of ethical and sustainable meat in Australia and 
implications for the current and potentially mainstreamed market.  
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What will happen to the information I provide?  
Your confidentiality and anonymity will be protected. All written documentation and recordings, and any 
photographs will be treated confidentially and not used for any purpose outside of the research. Any data that 
identifies you will only be seen by members of the research team.  
 
Outcomes of the research will contribute to my final doctorate thesis and may also be presented at conferences 
and published in academic journals. No information will be included which could identify any person or family. 
This will be achieved by using non-identifying codes or pseudonyms for all information collected and any results 
published will contain group data only. You can request access to this information at any time. A summary of the 
research outcomes can be provided to all participants if they wish to receive it.  
 
If you agree to participate in the parallel project on Ethical Consumption, your data may also be used as part of 
that project.  You will be provided with an equivalent Participant Information Statement detailing how your data 
may be used for this project.  The same terms of confidentiality will be applied. 
 
All information will be kept for a maximum of 5 years and stored securely on RMIT University premises before 
being destroyed. No-one other than the research team will have access to the raw or coded information. You 
can request access to the information collected about you at any time. Any information that you provide can be 
disclosed only if (1) it is to protect you or others from harm, (2) a court order is produced, or (3) you provide the 
researchers with written permission.  
 
What are my rights as a participant?  
• The right to withdraw from participation at any time.  
• The right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be reliably 
identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk for you.  
• The right to have any questions answered at any time.   
 
In addition to reading this document (the Participant Information Statement), you will be asked to sign a 
consent form stating that you understand and agree with the terms of this research project and are happy to be 
involved. 
 
Please feel free to call me at any time if you have any questions or concerns, or if you would like to discuss any 
aspects of this research. Thank you very much for your time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paula Arcari, MA(Geog), MA(EnvSci), BA(Hons)  A/Prof Tania Lewis,  
PhD Candidate and Research Officer   School of Media and Communication 
Centre for Urban Research    GPO Box 2476  
GPO Box 2476      Melbourne VIC 3001    
Melbourne VIC 3001     Ph 03 9925 2406    
Ph 03 9925 9062     Email Tania.Lewis@rmit.edu.au   
Email Paula.Arcari@rmit.edu.au     
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Dr Yolande Strengers, Ph.D, BArts     Dr. Cecily Maller, BSc (Hons), PhD 
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Urban Research Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Urban Research 
GPO Box 2476      GPO Box 2476 
Melbourne VIC 3001     Melbourne VIC 3001 
Ph 03 9925 1916     Ph 03 9925 9091 
Email Yolande.Strengers@rmit.edu.au    Email Cecily.Maller@rmit.edu.au  
  
Any complaints about your participation in this project may be directed to the Executive Officer, RMIT 
Human Research Ethics Committee, Research & Innovation, RMIT, GPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, 3001.  
Details of the complaints procedure are available at: http://www.rmit.edu.au/rd/hrec_complaints 
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Appendix 3: PIS and Consent Form, Version 2 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION 
Project Title: The role of ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ meat in Australia 
Investigators: 
• Paula Arcari, MA(Geog), MA(EnvSci), BA Hons Ph: 03 9925 9062 
email: Paula.Arcari@rmit.edu.au  
• A/Prof Tania Lewis, PhD, MA, BA Hons, MBBS Ph: 03 9925 2406 
• Email: Tania.Lewis@rmit.edu.au  
• Dr Cecily Maller, PhD, BSc Hons Ph: 03 9925 9091  
email: Cecily.maller@rmit.edu.au  
• Dr Yolande Strengers, Ph.D, BArts Ph: 03 9925 1916 
email: Yolande.Strengers@rmit.edu.au  
 
Dear Participant,  
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by a PhD candidate at RMIT University. 
Please read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding whether to 
participate. If you have any questions about the project, please ask one of the investigators.  
 
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted?  
My name is Paula Arcari and I am a PhD candidate and lead researcher of this project. The other members of 
the research team are my co-supervisors A/Prof Tania Lewis (Vice Chancellor’s Senior Research Fellow, RMIT 
University), Dr Cecily Maller (Senior Research Fellow, RMIT University) and Dr Yolande Strengers (Vice 
Chancellor’s Research Fellow, RMIT University). The project is approved by the RMIT Human Research Ethics 
Committee and is funded under the Federal Government’s Australian Postgraduate Award scheme. 
 
I am undertaking this research to develop a more detailed understanding of meanings and practices associated 
with ethical and sustainable meat in Australia, and explore what its broader uptake might mean for meat 
consumption and the treatment of animals.  
 
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed?  
The purpose of the project is to identify and explore in detail meanings and practices associated with ethical 
and sustainable meat in Australia. This is a critical study looking at the potential impacts and benefits of this 
meat, as well as implications of its broader uptake. The main question for the research is: What is the role of 
ethical and sustainable meat in Australia and how does this inform its status as a more ethical and sustainable 
option? Questions will be asked of producers, retailers and consumers regarding the meanings they associate 
with ethical and sustainable meat and their related practices. Example questions for those who are both 
consumers and producers/retailers include: 
• How often do you and/or your household purchase/consume ethical and sustainable meat?  
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• When did you start producing/selling ethical and sustainable meat?  
• What contributed to your decision to purchase/produce/sell 'ethical' and 'sustainable' meat? 
• What do you think are the benefits of 'ethical' and 'sustainable' meat? 
 
The research will be carried out between November 2013 and March 2015 and will involve interviewing 5-10 
producers and retailers, and 20-30 consumers of ethical and sustainable meat in Australia.  Interviews may 
also involve site visits (e.g. farm, shop, home) with ‘walk-around’ interviewing. 
 
Why have you been approached?  
You have been approached as you have been identified by the researchers as a producer, retailer or consumer 
of ethical and sustainable meat. Participation is voluntary, and if you decline to participate you will not be 
disadvantaged in any way. 
 
 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do?  
Involvement in this part of the project involves agreeing to participate in a face-to-face, audio recorded interview 
about your understandings of, and practices related to ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ meat. The interview will take 
place at the ‘site’ of production or retail (e.g. farm, shop, market), at your home or an alternate venue if you 
prefer. The interview will last from 1 to 2 hours and you can request a copy of the questions beforehand if you 
wish. The interview will be transcribed and you may request a copy of this transcription to check for accuracy.   
 
You may also be requested to allow myself, and potentially one of my supervisors, to follow you about your 
work at one of these ‘sites’. Notes and, with your permission, digital photographs may also be taken at this time 
to document key images and elements of your practices associated with ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ meat.   
 
The topic of this PhD research relates to a separate, Australian Government funded RMIT project titled ‘Ethical 
Consumption’ led by Associate Professors Tania Lewis and Kim Humphery. This three-year project aims to 
explore the role of ethical consumption in Australia and specifically how and why ethical preferences are 
increasingly shaping mainstream consumer culture.  With your permission, outcomes from my research 
activities may be shared and used by the investigators for this project.  Only the investigators associated with 
this project will have access to your data and the same ethics and terms of confidentiality will apply.  If you 
consent, you will be provided with an equivalent Participant Information Sheet and consent form for this 
separate project, and your details will be passed on to the lead researchers who may contact you at a 
subsequent date.  You may also be invited to participate in an additional interview for the Ethical Consumption 
project.  You are free to decline this invitation but still allow your existing data to be shared between the two 
projects.  
 
What are the possible risks or disadvantages?  
The possible risks to you are small. There are no perceived risks outside of your normal daily activities. 
However, if you are concerned about your responses to any of the interview questions or if you find participation 
in the project distressing, you should contact your local doctor as soon as convenient. They will discuss your 
concerns with you confidentially and suggest appropriate follow-up, if necessary.  
 
What are the benefits associated with participation?  
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The benefits of participating in this research are that it provides you with an opportunity to reflect on your 
understandings of, and practices related to ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ meat. The (anonymous) findings of the 
research may contribute to broader understanding of the role of ethical and sustainable meat in Australia and 
implications for the current and potentially mainstreamed market.  
 
What will happen to the information I provide?  
Your confidentiality and anonymity will be protected. All written documentation and recordings, and any 
photographs will be treated confidentially and not used for any purpose outside of the research. Any data that 
identifies you will only be seen by members of the research team.  
 
Outcomes of the research will contribute to my final doctorate thesis and may also be presented at conferences 
and published in academic journals. No information will be included which could identify any person or family. 
This will be achieved by using non-identifying codes or pseudonyms for all information collected and any results 
published will contain group data only. You can request access to this information at any time. A summary of the 
research outcomes can be provided to all participants if they wish to receive it.  
 
If you agree to participate in the parallel project on Ethical Consumption, your data may also be used as part of 
that project.  You will be provided with an equivalent Participant Information Statement detailing how your data 
may be used for this project.  The same terms of confidentiality will be applied. 
 
All information will be kept for a maximum of 5 years and stored securely on RMIT University premises before 
being destroyed. No-one other than the research team will have access to the raw or coded information. You 
can request access to the information collected about you at any time. Any information that you provide can be 
disclosed only if (1) it is to protect you or others from harm, (2) a court order is produced, or (3) you provide the 
researchers with written permission.  
 
What are my rights as a participant?  
• The right to withdraw from participation at any time.  
• The right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be reliably 
identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk for you.  
• The right to have any questions answered at any time.   
 
In addition to reading this document (the Participant Information Statement), you will be asked to sign a 
consent form stating that you understand and agree with the terms of this research project and are happy to be 
involved. 
 
Please feel free to call me at any time if you have any questions or concerns, or if you would like to discuss any 
aspects of this research. Thank you very much for your time. 
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Paula Arcari, MA(Geog), MA(EnvSci), BA(Hons)  A/Prof Tania Lewis,  
PhD Candidate and Research Officer   School of Media and Communication  
Centre for Urban Research    GPO Box 2476   
GPO Box 2476      Melbourne VIC 3001   
Melbourne VIC 3001     Ph 03 9925 2406 
Ph 03 9925 9062     Email Tania.Lewis@rmit.edu.au 
Email Paula.Arcari@rmit.edu.au      
 
 
        
Dr Yolande Strengers, Ph.D, BArts     Dr. Cecily Maller, BSc (Hons), PhD 
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Urban Research Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Urban Research 
GPO Box 2476      GPO Box 2476 
Melbourne VIC 3001     Melbourne VIC 3001 
Ph 03 9925 1916     Ph 03 9925 9091 
Email Yolande.Strengers@rmit.edu.au    Email Cecily.Maller@rmit.edu.au  
 
  
Any complaints about your participation in this project may be directed to the Executive Officer, RMIT 
Human Research Ethics Committee, Research & Innovation, RMIT, GPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, 3001.  
Details of the complaints procedure are available at: http://www.rmit.edu.au/rd/hrec_complaints 
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Appendix 4: Project Flyer 
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Appendix 5: Consumer Interview Schedule 
Thanks for agreeing to be part of this project.  I’ll just go through the main points of the Participant 
Information Sheet to make sure you understand what is involved before we complete the consent 
form. Your participation is voluntary so you can withdraw at any time. All information you provide 
is confidential and will not be disclosed to anyone else without your prior consent.  Your name and 
those of any people you refer to will not be used in any reports or publications. A summary of 
project outcomes will be made available to all participants.  So today, most of the questions I’ll be 
asking are about ethical and sustainable meat but I also have some more general questions about 
your food activities.  I also have a few images I’ll be showing you a bit later which I’d like to get 
your thoughts on. I’ll be audio recording our discussion and may also take some photos depending 
what we talk about.  I won’t be taking any pictures of you or family members.  Do you have any 
questions? If that all sounds ok, if you could just sign here…. 
Intro  
- Can you tell me a bit about your household? Who else lives here? How long have you lived 
here? 
- Have you always eaten meat? 
- Have you ever not eaten meat?  - when and why? 
- What sort of meat do you usually eat? 
- How many times a day would you eat meat? – Breakfast? Lunch? Dinner? Certain occasions? 
Others time? 
- What sort of meals do you cook with it? 
- What did you cook for dinner last night? 
- How have your eating activities changed since you…(e.g. moved here, got married, became a 
parents etc.)?  
- How did you learn about food and cooking? (Where does your knowledge mainly come from?) 
- Do you read about and/or watch TV shows on food and cooking? Which ones? How often? 
Ethical and sustainable meat 
- What does ethical and sustainable meat mean to you? (as compared with factory-farmed, 
organic, free-range) 
- What do you like about it? 
- How did you first learn about it? 
- How often do you buy ethical and sustainable meat?  
- Why do you buy it? 
- Where do you get it from? – type of meat? 
- What’s involved in getting it? (prompts: ordering, travel distance) 
- What sort of meals or occasions do you buy it for? What do you cook with it? 
- In what ways is it different from factory farmed meat? – does it look/feel/smell different?  
- How does it taste compared to other meat? 
- When else do you eat ethical and sustainable meat? (e.g. restaurants, events etc.) 
- What do you do if you can’t get ethical and sustainable meat (either for home or dining out)?   
- What do you think is the difference, if any, between meat that is sustainable and meat that is 
ethical? Is one more important that the other? 
Animals 
- How do you feel about eating animals? 
- How do you describe that process when an animal is transformed into meat? Do you think 
about that at all? What sort of words do you use? 
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- What do you think about the lives of the animals that you eat? 
- In what ways do you think ethical and sustainable meat is better for animals?  
- What’s an ethical and sustainable way for an animal to die? 
Images 
- How does this image match/or not with your idea of ethical and sustainable meat? 
- What do you think about the image? 
General 
- What do you think are the benefits of ethical and sustainable meat? 
- If there were a vision or broader goal for ethical and sustainable meat, what would you say it is, 
or should be? 
- What problems or risks do you think could be associated with it? (prompt: economic, health, 
sustainability, welfare) 
- What do you think of big business like McDonalds, Coles and Woolworths starting to sell 
ethical and sustainable meat? Can you see any risks and opportunities associated with this? 
- What do you think of the argument that it is more ethical and sustainable to eat less meat, or not 
eat it at all? 
- Finally, what sort of food systems and diets do you think we will or should have in the future 
 
Thoughts on In-vitro and fake meats?? 
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Appendix 6: Producer/Retailer Interview Schedule 
Thanks for agreeing to be part of this project.  I’ll just go through the main points of the Participant 
Information Sheet to make sure you understand what is involved before we complete the consent 
form. Your participation is voluntary so you can withdraw at any time. All information you provide 
is confidential and will not be disclosed to anyone else without your prior consent.  Your name and 
those of any people you refer to will not be used in any reports or publications. A summary of 
project outcomes will be made available to all participants.  So today, most of the questions I’ll be 
asking are about ethical and sustainable meat but I also have some more general questions about 
your own food activities.  I’ll be audio recording our discussion and may also take some photos 
depending what we talk about.  I won’t be taking any pictures of you or family members.  Do you 
have any questions? If that all sounds ok, if you could just sign here…. 
Intro  
- Can you tell me a bit about your farm/shop? Is it a family business? How long have you been 
operating? 
- What got you interested in producing your own meat? 
- Have you always eaten meat? 
- Have you ever not eaten meat?  - when and why? 
- What sort of meat do you usually eat? 
- How often do you eat meat? (Breakfast? Lunch? Dinner? Others?) 
- How important do you think meat is in Australian culture and diets? 
- How have your eating activities changed since you…(e.g. moved, married, had kids, started 
business etc.)?  
- How did you learn about food and cooking?  (Where does your knowledge mainly come from?) 
- Do you read about and/or watch TV shows on food and cooking? Which ones? How often? 
Ethical and sustainable meat  
- What does ethical and sustainable meat mean to you? (as compared with factory-farmed, 
organic, free-range) 
- What do you like about it? 
- How did you first learn about it? What did you used to buy? Where did you get it? 
- When did you first get involved in producing/selling ethical and sustainable meat? 
- Why did you start producing/selling ethical and sustainable meat? 
- What was involved in setting up or switching your business? – Or (for shop) sourcing this 
meat? 
- How does producing/selling ethical and sustainable meat differ from ordinary meat? 
- What’s involved in marketing it – how do you go about it? 
- How have your own eating activities changed since you started selling/producing this meat?   
- Where do you get it from? -  always your own supplies? 
- What sort of meals or occasions do you cook it for? What do you cook with it? 
- What did you cook for dinner last night? 
- How does it taste compared to other meat? 
- Does it look, feel or smell different from factory farmed meat? 
- When else do you eat ethical and sustainable meat? (e.g. restaurants, events etc.) 
- What do you do if you can’t get ethical and sustainable meat (either for home or dining out)?   
Animals 
- How do you feel about eating animals? 
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- How would you describe that process when an animal is transformed into meat? Do you think 
about that at all? 
- What do you think about the lives of the animals that you eat? 
- In what ways do you think ethical and sustainable meat is better for animals?  
- What’s an ethical and sustainable way for an animal to die? 
General 
- What do you think are the benefits of ethical and sustainable meat? 
- If there were a vision or broader goal for ethical and sustainable meat, what would you say it is, 
or should be? 
- What problems or risks do you think could be associated with it? (economic, health, 
sustainability, welfare) 
- How can current ethical and sustainable meats be improved? 
- What do you think is the future of ethical and sustainable meat? 
- What do you think of big business like McDonalds, Coles and Woolworths starting to sell 
ethical and sustainable meat, and the potential regulations and standards?  Can you see any 
risks and opportunities associated with this? 
- What do you think of the argument that it is more ethical and sustainable to eat less meat, or not 
eat it at all?  
- Finally, what sort of food systems and diets do you think we will or should have in the future?  
 
Thoughts on In-vitro and fake meats?? 
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